BurmaNet News: February 26 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

February 26 2003 Issue #2184

INSIDE BURMA

Irrawaddy: No dialogue without real pressure
Narinjara: Rice Bags from UN World food Programme arrives at Western Burma

MONEY

Irrawaddy: Bank crisis reeks of a Ponzi scheme
Guardian Unlimited: City Diary (excerpt)

DRUGS

AFP: Myanmar halves opium production but still world’s second largest
producer
AFP: Illicit production of methamphetamines rising sharply in SE Asia: UN
report
Bangkok Post: War on drugs is not all about killing

REGIONAL

AFP: Sacked Phnom Penh governor will not serve as envoy to Myanmar
Narinjara: Bangladesh returns a Burmese Military Intelligence-owned
Smuggling vessel at a Flag Meeting

STATEMENTS

Myanmar Information Committee: Myanmar rejects charges that Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi’s verdict was ‘politically motivated’
Reuters: War vet elephant bows out
Burma Centrum Nederland: Dutch banks agree not to finance IHC’s Burma
projects

INSIDE BURMA

Irrawaddy February 26 2003

No Dialogue Without Real Pressure
By Aung Naing Oo

The Burmese military junta appears to have turned its back on political
dialogue. If it was not clear in the beginning, it is abundantly clear
now. Early on, the Burmese generals seemed to have bowed to international
and domestic pressure by demonstrating some degree of seriousness towards
negotiations with Burma's main opposition group, the National League for
Democracy (NLD). Recent political developments, however, have indicated
otherwise.
Ten months after the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the
Burmese junta is up to its old tricks again. Aung San Suu Kyi appears to
have enjoyed some level of freedom, but it has not come without the
detention and harassment of her supporters. The regime has detained nearly
60 political activists, including Sai Nyunt Lwin, a well-known Shan leader
since her release. Many have been given hefty prison sentences.
Reports of human rights abuses, especially in the border areas where
Burmese troops operate, continue to surface. One irksome reminder of the
regime's intransigence is the halting of political prisoner releases,
despite promises to the contrary. According to the Assistance Association
for Political Prisoners (Burma), the regime has not released a political
detainee since November 2002, while an estimated 1,400 remain
incarcerated. Worse yet, the regime has recommenced a shelved propaganda
campaign against the NLD. And is again attacking them in the state-run
press, while also distributing slanderous pamphlets, indicative of the
regime's unwillingness to negotiate.
Part of the regime's change of face may be attributed to its winning over
of its neighbors. Whether this was the immediate aim of the regime is hard
to say, but the success of it has obviously emboldened them, and given an
enormous boost to the junta's morale and confidence.
In January, the Burmese junta secured a US $200 million loan from China,
its closest ally. This was a crucial bail out as the regime’s deep
financial troubles continue. Trade with Bangladesh, which the regime was
at odds with a decade ago over the exodus of Arakanese Muslims, is again
doing well. Sr-Gen Than Shwe's visit to Dhaka last December and the
proposed return visit by the Bangladeshi prime minister in March,
indicates that Bangladesh is no longer a hostile neighbor. Needless to
say, trade and cooperation in security issues between Burma and India, a
former ally of Burma’s pro-democracy movement, have increased
tremendously.
Looking eastward, a recent visit to Rangoon by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra is likely to improve ties between the two countries after a
series of border problems last year soured relations. Undoubtedly, the
regime feels extremely secure in knowing that for the first time since it
seized power in 1988, friends, not foes, surround Burma. This may cause
the regime, and especially the regime’s leader, Sr-Gen Than Shwe, to feel
political negotiations with the opposition can be bypassed, as the regime
continues to wield tremendous power.
Adding to the regime’s recent successes is the looming war in Iraq. With
the US and the UK—the regime's harshest critics—busy preparing for war,
Burma may have dropped off their to do list. The regime’s confidence is
running so high that it has even extended its diplomatic offensive to
include both Europe and North America. The junta’s recent invitation to
Washington to hold talks regarding "economic and political development" in
Burma as well as to make suggestions on "making the transition to a stable
democracy" may prove to be the first step in that direction.
So where does all this lead? It is too early to predict, but what has
occurred is the return of Burma’s reconciliation process to square one.
The regime's intransigence has provoked mistrust, anger and particularly
necessary reactions by the opposition. Obviously frustrated over the lack
of progress, the opposition has begun to speak out. The regime, however,
has responded to the criticisms in a manner that exposes their true
authoritarian colors. Any desire by the regime to push towards democratic
reform, since agreeing to negotiations with the opposition in October
2000, has now dissipated.
Thanks to the opposition's commitment to a peaceful resolution, the verbal
confrontations have yet to reach the boiling point. Crunch time for the
opposition, however, will come if the stalemate continues. If and when the
opposition believes nothing is accomplished by speaking out, it may have
to chart a new political course. This may widen an already existing gap
between the two camps, thus further polarizing the political divide.
There must be a balance of power between the government and the
opposition, so that negotiations are the only way out of the deadlock. In
the Burma context, the regime continues to maintain an incredible edge,
nor is the stalemate having any affect on its rule. As far as the NLD
goes, they will need to add another card to their hand, beyond simple
political legitimacy, if they want to successfully neutralize the regime’s
current domination of the dialogue.
The regime has shown its recalcitrance in not heeding any advice the
international community has offered towards the future implementation of
reform. And internal pressure alone is not strong enough to force the
regime to the negotiating table. There may be only one way to increase the
tempo, which is to call for more comprehensive sanctions from the
international community. This is likely to be the only way to both create
a balance of power between the junta and the opposition, and to avoid the
further deterioration of an already fragile relationship between the two
sides.
South Africa under apartheid offers the best example of how sanctions can
be effective. International sanctions inflicted a wound so deep that
negotiations became the only choice for the South African government.
Burma cannot hope for military intervention, as in the case of Iraq or
Serbia, for various geopolitical reasons, and the international strategy
as to how to deal with the Burmese regime remains divided. But the
sanctions, in their various forms, have proven to be fairly effective,
especially from countries like the US. Washington has the power and
political will to recognize real reform in Burma when it happens and could
repeal existing sanctions. But if Rangoon continues its non-compliance
concerning international calls for change, Washington could also punish
the regime by stepping up sanctions on a variety of fronts, including
further economic sanctions.
The international community has given the regime over two years now to
solve their political impasse by entering into dialogue with the
opposition, just as it had promised. As the release of political prisoners
has halted, while the arrests of democracy activist has been on the rise,
it is now time for real action. No further proof is needed to show that
the regime has not changed its ways.
____________

Narinjara News February 26 2003

Rice Bags from UN World food Programme arrives at Western Burma

On February 6th rice bags from the UN World Food Programme arrived at
Maungdaw, the border town of Rakhine State in the western part of Burma,
our correspondent said.

Twelve hundred bags of rice was transported on the Zaw Min Htay II motor
vessel to Ngakhura Village on the Naaf River that serves as the common
border between Burma and Bangladesh under Maungdaw Township.  The bags of
rice will be distributed among the poor people and the refugees
repatriated from Bangladesh in the area.

At present the UNHCR, BAJ (a Japanese NGO) and MSF are engaged in
distributing the rice jointly with the State Peace and Development Council
junta officials for developmental activities and repatriation of the
Burmese Muslim refugees from Bangladesh.

Recently the prices of essentials have recorded a sharp increase so that
the people are facing an almost-famine like situation, our correspondent
said.  In the rural areas the scarcity is more conspicuous since the
transport of rice is forbidden in the village tracts, our correspondent
quoted a villager elder.

MONEY

Irrawaddy February 26 2003

Bank Crisis Reeks of a Ponzi Scheme
By Kyi May Kaung

Burma's banks are more like a dubious "Ponzi" or pyramid scheme than
well-run commercial banks. Between 1962 and 1988, the banks in Burma were
all state-owned, and lent primarily to state owned enterprises. After
1988, the declaration of a so-called open market economy made way for
private commercial banks, but they were never built on strong capital.
These private commercial banks lent money to the newly enlarged private
sector and managed to attract some private deposits too. But the
performance of Burma's commercial banks has proved something of a mixed
bag. It has been alleged that banks in Burma are money laundering
facilities and not real banks. The ruling junta has never revealed the
cash reserve ratio that banks legally need to operate, as inflation has
continued to soar at around 20 to 25 percent each year.
It is obvious that the junta, in charge of the Central Bank authority, has
not been doing a good job. In fact it has been doing a lousy job of
controlling the money supply. In the 1990s, loans were given to developers
who invested in office buildings and apartment complexes; cottage
industries in retail and wholesale trade; and ambitious investments in
tourism.
Hotel construction in Burma went quickly from boom to bust as the Asian
Tigers spiraled into financial crisis in 1998 and an international boycott
on tourism in Burma took effect. Since then, there have been recurrent
runs on several commercial banks where the banks have been unable to
refund money to depositors.
Even at the best of times, the cash reserve ratio is likely to be between
10 to 30 percent, which means that if everyone was to come to the bank at
once to demand their money, the bank could not return all their savings.
Banks make money by offering loans and taking interest, and survive
knowing that not everyone will come to withdraw their savings
simultaneously. When people do, there is a classic run on the bank.
Without enough capital as foundation and security, so-called banks are
just pyramid schemes, where there is no real economic enterprise and the
whole thing is a scam with depositors being offered high rates of returns.
The rates seem impossibly high because they are, in fact, impossible.
Eventually of course, there is no real economic activity and the rates are
unsustainable. The scheme collapses like a towered stack of cards.
History's most famous pyramid scheme was the brainchild of Charles Ponzi,
an Italian migrant who promised US investors on the east coast he could
double their money in just 90 days. He attracted 40,000 investors and a
great deal of excitement, but in the end it was nothing but a farce and
his investors were swindled for millions.
The current bank crisis in Burma reeks of a Ponzi scheme. Burma's Central
Bank has already lent to the commercial banks. It has already started
printing money to finance its deficits. How long can a government
struggling economically keep helping its commercial banks?
Is the International Monetary Fund going to help Burma? Not likely. It
bailed out Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia after the economic
crisis because of their high population and integration in the wider
global economy. Because Burma is so isolated, and has only a few important
trade ties with other countries, the situation will only implode inwards.
The effect on neighboring countries and trading partners will be minimal.
Now, democracy activists abroad should try to persuade humanitarian aid
advocates to hold off on lending assistance to Burma. It is likely that by
delaying aid and prolonging economic instability, this crisis may be the
"straw" that finally breaks the camel's back.
It all rests on an issue of trust. How are the people of Burma to trust
the military government which has already demonetized the currency at
least three times? They are right to trust only dollars.
In the US, savings placed in major banks are assured by the government's
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).
According to official data at the end of the last financial year, the BIF
had a $31.2 billion safety net for American investors.
Burma's "insurance fund", if one even exists, would no doubt be
considerably smaller.
____________

The Guardian Unlimited February 26 2003

City diary  (excerpt)
By Richard Adams

· Speaking of corporate responsibility, British American Tobacco has
its own corporate social responsibility team. Anyone writing to complain
that BAT is one of the few companies prepared to do business with Burma's
brutal regime receives a very pleasant response, thanking them for their
letter and assuring them that BAT expects all its companies "to operate to
high standards of business integrity". The letter doesn't mention that
BAT's factory there is a joint venture with Burma's military dictators.

DRUGS

Agence France Presse February 26 2003

Myanmar halves opium production but still world's second largest producer

Production of opium has halved in Myanmar since 1996, although the country
is the second largest producer of the drug after Afghanistan, the UN
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) said Wednesday.

"Because opium poppy cultivation has resumed at a relatively high level in
Afghanistan, Myanmar has again become the second largest producer of
illicit opium in the world, its opium production levels having decreased
by some 50 percent since 1996," the INCB said in its annual report.

"In Myanmar, it was reported that in 2002, eradication efforts alone
reduced by about seven percent the total area under illicit poppy
cultivation, thus contributing significantly to the general decline in
such cultivation in that country," said the report, made available to the
press here. A UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) survey found that
Myanmar last year produced 820 tonnes of opium -- the raw material for
heroin and morphine, UNODC representative Jean-Luc Lemanhieu told
reporters.

"We know that the government had indicated they want to reduce opium
production based on the figures of our last survey by another 50 percent,"
he said.

However, he warned that good rainfall this year would likely lead to a
high crop yield of the poppies from which opium is made.

"It's too early to say (what the yield will be)... but definitely the
rainfall has not helped because we will have high yields," he said.

The results of the UNODC's opium-yield survey for this year were expected
to be released by September.

Lemanhieu said government efforts at crop eradication by preventing the
cultivation of illicit poppies with the help of Myanmar's local ethnic
leadership had resulted in surface areas under production going down
"dramatically".

He cautioned though: "Decline can be very fast in a very short time but it
is not sustainable in the long run."

A UN survey in 2001 found that opium brings Myanmar some 150 to 160
million dollars a year, making up around 10 percent of the country's
economy.

The country has come under harsh international criticism for its alleged
involvement in the drugs trade -- which some critics say bankrolls the
junta -- and for its failure to clamp down on illegal drug producers. The
regime however denies the charges.

More than 90 percent of Myanmar's opium poppy cultivation is confined to
the eastern Shan state, which has borders with Thailand, Laos and China
and is part of the opium-rich region known as the "Golden Triangle".
________________

Agence France Presse February 26 2003

Illicit production of methamphetamines rising sharply in SE Asia: UN report

Illicit manufacture of methamphetamines has risen significantly in
Southeast Asia, the International Narcotics Control Board warned Wednesday
in its annual report.

"There continue to be indications that manufacturers of heroin are
increasingly shifting their attention to methamphetamine, particularly in
Myanmar," the United Nations organ said.

The psychotropic substance is "clandestinely manufactured on a large scale
along Myanmar's border with Thailand and in China and the Philippines,"
the Vienna-based board said. Methamphetamine remains "the main drug of
concern in Japan, the Philippines and Thailand," it said, noting the Thai
health ministry has estimated that three million people, or five percent
of the country's population, regularly abuse the substance.

That would make Thailand the world's largest consumer of methamphetamines.

In Japan, authorities have reported a rise in the abuse of stimulants, the
board said.

A sharp rise in methamphetamine abuse has also been noted in Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam, while in China there has been a
rise in arrests related to the drug, the board's report noted.

In Cambodia, the abuse of amphetamines among children has risen sharply,
it said.

Law enforcement efforts had led to major busts of amphetamines in East
Asia, the UN organ said, noting that more than "70 percent of all the
seizures in amphetamines made in the world took place in East and
Southeast Asia, mainly China and Thailand.

"In recent years, most of the world manufacture of amphetamine-type
stimulants, with the exception of MDMA (ecstasy), has taken place in the
region."

The production of methamphetamine poses a growing threat to other regions,
the report said, noting that seizures of the drug have been increasing in
Europe and the United States.

Meanwhile, illicit opium poppy cultivation was falling in Laos and
Myanmar, the board said but cautioned that the region still witnesses
massive amounts of trafficking.

The region remains the second largest source of opium and heroin in the
world, behind Afghanistan, it noted.

Intravenous drug abuse has become one of the driving forces behind the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region, it warned.

Referring to an issue closely related to the illicit drugs trade, namely
money-laundering, the board urged Indonesia, Myanmar and the Philippines
to enforce without delay laws passed over the last couple of years in the
three countries, to combat the practice.

The board voiced concern that Cambodia and North Korea have yet to become
parties to any of the international drug control treaties.
_____________

Bangkok Post February 26 2003

WAR ON DRUGS IS NOT ALL ABOUT KILLING
By JAMES EMERY

We used to grow opium,'' said Asoupa, a Lisu farmer in northwest Thailand,
but now we only grow cabbages and corn and other crops. It's better. If we
grow opium, we get in trouble and lose everything.''

Asoupa represents the country's once-primary opium growers, the hilltribes
of northwest Thailand _ the Lisu, Lahu, Akha, Mein and Hmong. Living in
remote jungle villages, they practise slash-and-burn agriculture.

The Thai government, in cooperation with the United States' Drug
Enforcement Agency and the United Nations International Drug Control
Programme, combined aggressive eradication and interdiction with flexible,
alternative crop programmes to encourage poverty-ridden hilltribes to
abandon opium in favour of legal cash'' crops including cabbages, beans,
coffee and peaches. The current opium crop, harvested in December and
January, marks the fourth successive year opium cultivation in Thailand
was estimated to be less than 1,000 hectares. By comparison, opium
production in Burma has ranged from 80,000 to 170,000 hectares over the
last 10 years, an annual yield of up to 2,500 tonnes. Much of this opium
is refined into number four grade heroin, about 90% pure.

TASK FORCE 399

To stifle the flow of drugs out of Burma, the Thai government organised
Task Force 399. Made up of several hundred military personnel and border
guards, and supported by an extensive intelligence network, Task Force 399
snares drug smugglers as they enter Thailand. In an effort to circumvent
the task force, some smugglers are travelling from Burma to Laos before
attempting to enter Thailand.

Aggressive operations by the Border Patrol Police, the 3rd Army and Task
Force 399 finally caused many drug smugglers to avoid Thailand altogether
and seek alternative routes out of Burma.

A lot of heroin is being shipped through China,'' said William Snipes,
regional director with the Drug Enforcement Administration in Bangkok.
Part of it is feeding a growing addict population in China, but much of it
is shipped on to Western markets.''

The UN Drug Control Programme estimates that 60% of Burma's opiate
production is now shipped through China.

To monitor drug traffickers, the United States and Thai governments
established three separate intelligence gathering modules. Each collects
information on drug activity and trafficking for its geographic region.
Information is combined and analysed to respond to immediate
opportunities, feed on-going investigations and predict future activity.

While Thai authorities have been successful in eradicating the indigenous
opium crop and intercepting heroin shipments coming from Burma, they have
been plagued by a growing problem with amphetamine-type stimulants,
primarily methamphetamines.

Methamphetamine pills, called ya ba in Thailand, have been around for
decades. Approximately 800 million methamphetamine pills were smuggled
into Thailand during the last year. Virtually all of the production takes
place in Burma and is smuggled across the border into Thailand, with some
shipments being routed through Laos. The Wa and Shan tribes are the
primary players in the methamphetamine trade, just as they have been in
the opium and heroin trade.

TEN YEARS LATER

Initially used by truck drivers and workers to stay awake and increase
stamina, usage among young Thais began increasing around 1988 as they
copied the habits of dancers, a few locals and tourists in Patpong and
other entertainment areas. Ten years later, methamphetamine abuse was
rampant, driven by increased supplies and falling prices. Methamphetamine
indictments in Thailand increased from 1,025 in 1988 to a staggering
125,335 by 1998. There were 187,479 cases during 2001.

Eventually, methamphetamines made their way into schools, cutting across
social and economic boundaries, and the Thai government declared them the
number one security and social threat. The rise of methamphetamines also
caused a surge in the number of poly-drug users, individuals abusing more
than one drug.

A sign of the growing drug problem and expanded efforts by Thai
authorities is the number of Thais in jail. The prison population in
Thailand has doubled in the last five years,'' said Douglas Rasmussen of
the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement at the US
embassy in Bangkok. Over 60% are for drug issues.''

BROADENING THE SCOPE

To combat the growing use of methamphetamines, Thai authorities, assisted
by US government staff, significantly changed their approach to the drug
trade. The government broadened its scope from eradication and
interdiction to demand reduction through education, prevention and
rehabilitation programmes.

The Thais are using a multifaceted approach to combat the drug trade,'' Mr
Rasmussen said. They realise you can't just go after the supply side, you
have to go after the demand side too.''

A number of agencies have been established to provide training programmes
in drug counselling and drug prevention for school teachers and community
outreach workers throughout Thailand.

A joint effort by the DEA and Thai officials set up a successful DARE
(Drug Abuse Resistance Education) programme based on the US model.
Approximately 130 Thai police officers conduct drug awareness classes in
middle and high schools,'' said William Snipes, DEA regional director in
Bangkok. The Thais are very concerned about methamphetamines going down
into the younger ages.''

The government also has established community drug centres throughout the
country, including one in Klong Toey, the Bangkok slum.

The government objective this year is to have drug centres in at least 60%
of the communities in Thailand. We must educate the younger generation,''
a Thai police officer said. And this will carry on because they will
educate their children.'' Thai actors and musicians have become involved
in the campaign.

The Ministry of Public Health dramatically increased the number of drug
treatment centres, and today there are over 500, ranging from public and
private hospitals to drug rehabilitation clinics. Since methamphetamine
treatment is different from heroin, and requires more family support, drug
centres have modified and expanded their programmes to address specific
needs.

Since 1999, the majority of people seeking treatment in Thailand have been
addicted to methamphetamines. As recently as 1995, heroin (90%) and opium
(5%) addicts accounted for 95% of the treatment population.

STUDYING THE PROBLEM

To help fight drugs on a regional level, the International Law Enforcement
Academy of Bangkok opened in 1999 under the direction of the US State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs. The curriculum covers everything from narcotics trafficking and
money laundering to computer crime and illegal migration.

Courses are taught by the Royal Thai Police Office and the Office of the
Narcotics Control Board in conjunction with representatives of several
United States government agencies. Experts are brought in from around the
world including the Netherlands, Australia and Japan.

Police and government officials from Thailand, Cambodia, China, Laos,
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines attend
the academy. One of our objectives,'' said Luis Diaz-Rodriquez of the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, is to build
cooperation between branches of law enforcement, both within and between
these countries. We hope to have alumni that will assist each other in
investigations and exchange information between themselves and their US
counterparts.''

In addition to the International Law Enforcement Academy, the UN Drug
Control Programme in Bangkok has developed a regional cooperation
programme with Thailand, Cambodia, China, Laos, Burma and Vietnam. The
regional programme complements a number of different country level
projects,'' said Vincent McClean, formerly of the UN Drug Control
Programme's Bangkok office. It also encourages cooperation between members
by bringing them together for joint training and discussion.'' Mr McClean
is currently the director of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention in New York.

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

The proliferation of new drugs like methamphetamines and ecstasy, combined
with the devastating impact of heroin, cocaine and other substances, can
best be controlled through interagency cooperation at the regional and
global level.

At one time, many transit countries _ that is, countries through which
drugs were transported on their way to more lucrative markets _ did not
consider the drug trade to be a serious problem. That changed when the
bleed'' effect, drugs dealt along transit routes, caused them to have a
growing population of addicts, and the secondary problems of crime, HIV
and corruption among police officers and public officials.

Developing interagency operations like those run by the United Nations,
DEA, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
facilitates regional cooperation. These programmes provide education and
incentive to discourage people from using drugs, help for those already
addicted, and a flexible, cooperative web of law enforcement and
regulatory agencies that apprehend drug dealers and eliminate smuggling
operations.

REGIONAL

Agence France Presse February 26 2003

Sacked Phnom Penh governor will not serve as envoy to Myanmar

The popular former governor of Phnom Penh will not take up his assigned
post as envoy to Myanmar, instead staying in Cambodia as advisor to Prime
Minister Hun Sen, a senior official said Wednesday.

Chea Sophara was sacked by Hun Sen's administration in the wake of
anti-Thai riots here on January 29 that left the Thai embassy and several
Thai businesses torched and looted. The government quickly announced after
the sacking that Chea Sophara would be reassigned as ambassador in Yangon,
but soon afterwards said he would also assume the position of personal
advisor to Hun Sen, with the rank of minister.

"He (Chea Sophara) is an advisor to Hun Sen, so he cannot work as an
ambassador," government minister Sok An told reporters, declining to
elaborate.

Officials close to the ex-governor said the government offered the role of
advisor in an effort to assuage Chea Sophara and city residents who had in
large measure stood behind his tough policies, which made Phnom Penh a
safer and cleaner city.

On Wednesday Chea Sophara and Hun Sen returned to Cambodia from Kuala
Lumpur, where they had attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement.
____________

Narinjara News February 26 2003

Bangladesh returns a Burmese Military Intelligence-owned
Smuggling vessel at a Flag Meeting

 On February 15th, after a flag meeting held between the officials of the
Nasaka (Burmese Border Security Forces) and BDR (Bangladesh Rifles border
security forces) at a hotel in Teknaf, the border town opposite Maungdaw
Town on the Naaf River, the BDR handed over a smuggling vessel owned by
the Burmese Military Intelligence, our border correspondent at Maungdaw
quoted a source in the Burmese Army.

The flag meeting began at eleven in the morning and lasted for an hour. 
Captain Kyaw Zeya led the Burmese side composed of seven participants and
Subadar Abul Kalam Azad led seven-member Bangladesh side.

The two sides discussed bilateral issues on the recent developments on
both sides of the common Naaf River, where there are no delineation of the
international border. The Bangladesh side handed over the Saw Mratt Radana
motor vessel and its six-member crew to the Burmese counterparts.  The
Burmese side also handed over one Aman Ullah, son of Nur Muhammad, who was
captured and awarded a sentence of five years’ RI on February 12, on
charges of illegal entry, to the Bangladeshi border troops.

Though it is not usual for the Burmese junta officials to demand return of
the captured vessels from Burma, the prompt demand for the return of the
Saw Mratt Radana vessel was made because the vessel was owned by the
Burmese Intelligence battalion MI 18, our correspondent quoted sources in
the military.  The vessel was captured a few weeks ago on Bangladesh side
on charges of cross-border smuggling.  There are wide allegations that the
Western Commander Brigadier Maung Oo also had shares in the cross-border
smuggling done on the vessel.

Sources in the Bangladeshi town of Teknaf said that there have never been
any instances of demanding the captured vessels back from Bangladesh
before.  At present there are about seven hundred Burmese prisoners in the
prisons of Bangladesh most of whom have been jailed on charges of
cross-border smuggling and illegal entry, said a Burmese national who
recently was released from a Bangladeshi jail.  The Burmese junta have not
recognized these prisoners who have overstayed their prison terms by as
much as seven/eight years as their own citizens, complicating the
repatriation process, he concluded.

STATEMENTS

Myanmar Information Committee February 25 2003

Myanmar Rejects Charges That Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Verdict Was
"Politically Motivated"

The Government of Myanmar categorically rejects the charge by the National
League for Democracy that a recent court verdict against Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi was "politically motivated."
The verdict resulted from a complaint filed by Ko Soe Aung, Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi’s cousin, that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi refused to let him enter the
compound where they both lived. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi admitted in court
that she had done this, and the court subsequently found her guilty and
levied a small fine.
The verdict prompted a complaint from the NLD that, any court case
involving the NLD will be resolved according to the instructions of the
military authorities.
This charge is completely untrue. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s own use of the
Myanmar courts is proof of her faith in the judicial system.
It is important to remember that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself used the
court to bring an earlier complaint against Ko Soe Aung, accusing him of
assaulting her. Ko Soe Aung was found guilty in that case, and fined
accordingly. As the court found in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s favor, the NLD
made no complaint.
It was only in the second case, after the court found Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
guilty of charges she admitted were true, that the NLD complained that the
verdict was "politically motivated."
Under Myanmar law, all citizens are treated equally. It is obviously
hypocritical for an individual to accept the court’s rulings when they go
in one’s favor, but then reject them when the court finds one guilty.
Equality under the law is fundamental to a democratic system, and it is
unfortunate to see the NLD leadership "playing politics" with the judicial
system.
________________

Reuters February 26 2003

War vet elephant bows out

Lin Wang, an 86-year-old Asian elephant taken prisoner by Chinese troops
in World War Two, died of old age on Wednesday at Taipei Zoo.
In his youth the venerable beast, known to Taiwan children as Grandpa Lin,
dragged Japanese army cannon and supplies through the jungles of Burma,
now known as Myanmar, until his capture in 1943.
Then a sprightly 26, Lin continued his army service on the Chinese
mainland and later on Taiwan. In 1954, he was retired to the zoo in the
company of a female elephant, Ma Lan.
The island's children loved him, and the zoo threw birthday parties for
him each year. The people of Taiwan mourned his death by burning paper
money and lighting incense.
A zoo statement said Lin, in poor spirits since Ma Lan died last year,
fell sick a few days ago and stopped taking food.
It appealed for T$5 million (US$144,000) in contributions to preserve the
body of Lin, believed to have been the world's oldest Asian elephant.
__________________

Burma Centrum Nederland February 26 2003

Dutch banks agree not to finance IHC's Burma's projects

Amsterdam (ANP)- Banks have reached an agreement to no longer finance
projects of the offshore and sludging company, IHC Caland in Burma.
The banks have not gone so far as to boycott loans to this company.
The banks recently informed Friends of the Earth Netherlands of their
decision. A large coaltition of organisations had called on the banks
in particular ABN Amro, Fortis, Rabo, ING and NIB Capital to stop
financing IHC Caland. In past years the company received hundreds of
millions of Dutch guilders in loans. ABN-Amro says that it has set
the condition that no funds go to the ruthless military regime that
leads Myanmar, formerly known as Burma to its loans. According to the
bank this condition exists since 1998.

2)      Damage
IHC Caland does not want to withdraw from the country, but has said
it will not take on any new projects. The current project in
collaboration with the British oil company Premier Oil,  started in
1998 and will carry on for another ten years. IHC has said that it
will suffer financial damages if it withdraws from the contract on
its own. Premnier Oil recently withdrew from the project.

The banks have discussed their standpoints together. They are under
pressure from the organisations, but Dutch Parliament has also called
on the banks to cease their investments in this company.

ABN-Amro has said it does not want to end its releationship with IHC.
he bank says IHC is responsible for Burma, not the bank. The bank
also states that it understands IHC's decision to remain in Burma.
IHC has publicly expressed its concern about the human rights
situation in Burma and stated that withdrawing from the contract will
involve great financial damage.