BurmaNet News: April 1 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

April 1 2003 Issue #2206

INSIDE BURMA

Xinhua: Myanmar boosts screenings for deadly virus
Irrawaddy: Burmese workers face chemical danger

MONEY

AFX-GEM: Human rights group hails drop in US clothing imports from Myanmar
as victory
Xinhua: Myanmar’s industrial production totals 11 mln USD

DRUGS

UN Wire: Japan gives $1.2 Mln for opium eradication

REGIONAL

TV Myanmar: Burma, Australia sign agreement on agriculture
Times of India: Mellowed-down George is China-bound
AFP: US businessmen urge Washington to normalize trade ties with Laos

INTERNATIONAL

AFP: US showers praise on Myanmar democracy heroine Aung San Suu Kyi

STATEMENTS

Amnesty International: Myanmar: Limited human rights improvements—serious
concerns persist
Dictator Watch: War in Iraq, and child soldiers and a humanitarian mission
in Burma (excerpt)
CPJ: Attacks on the Press in 2002 (excerpt)
U.S. State Department: Country reports on Human Rights Practices-2002
(excerpt)

INSIDE BURMA

Xinhua News Agency April 1 2003

Myanmar boosts screenings for deadly virus

Myanmar's health ministry said Tuesday it was conducting increased
passenger screenings and other monitoring in efforts to combat the threat
of a mysterious atypical pneumonia circling the globe.

"We have been carefully monitoring passengers coming in at the airports
with medical teams headed by specialists of infectious diseases," a senior
health ministry official told AFP.

The teams have been deployed at Yangon's international airport as well as
at other airports, sea ports and checkpoints particularly along the
Chinese and Thai borders, the official said.

"We have taken all necessary measures to monitor the disease, and so far
we have not found any suspected cases" of the disease labelled as Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).

The deaths of at least 62 people have been attributed to the malady, which
has sown worldwide fear with more than 1,700 people diagnosed with SARS in
15 countries around the globe.

Myanmar has issued several public alerts about the respiratory illness
over the past few weeks in its tightly controlled media, and advised
anyone exhibiting symptoms such as fever, muscular aches, headache and a
sore throat to report to hospital immediately.

Tour companies have reported a decrease in business in the past month --
some saying it has dropped off by as much as 10 percent -- but have
attributed the decline to concerns over war in Iraq rather than SARS.

Air China officials in Yangon said the airline's two flights per week from
the Myanmar capital to Beijing via the southern China city of Kunming were
operating on schedule.

Myanmar Airways International said its three weekly flights to Singapore
were also unchanged.
____________

Irrawaddy April 1 2003

Burmese Workers Face Chemical Danger
By Aung Su Shin

The health of farmers is threatened by chemical sprays used on farms near
the Thai-Burma border at Phoppra District, Tak province, an inspection by
a Thai Senate committee found yesterday.
Dr Chamnan Hansuthiweichaing, a local health worker, advised workers to
wear the protective clothing and masks and avoid being downwind after the
chemicals have been sprayed. "But I’ve found that most workers don’t have
masks and no protective shirts," Chamnan said.
Farmers have also been told to wash their clothing thoroughly to get rid
of contaminated fibers.
Last year, health officials tested blood samples from 208 Burmese migrant
workers in the villages of Mae Ku and Mahawan, close to the border
checkpoint at Mae Sot, and discovered the workers had high chemical
contents in their blood. According to an official who asked not to be
named, 21 percent of those tested were in a state of "danger".
A Burmese woman said that her husband has been suffering for more than a
year after working in a vegetable farm at Phoppra District. The woman’s
husband has now returned to Burma and is living in Hlaing Bwe Township,
Karen State.
"He cannot work and has trouble breathing," she said.
According to official figures, more than 50,000 Burmese migrants are
working in the agricultural sector in the five districts of Tak province.
Fruit and vegetables are grown at Phoppra District, with most of the
produce being sold across the border in Burma or taken to markets in
Bangkok. Flowers grown in Tak province are sold in Rangoon and Mandalay.
Teangjai Dithep, of the Special Senate Committee for Dangerous Chemical
Control and Protection which conducted yesterday’s inspection, said
Thailand need to protect vital export and production industries by
carrying out higher food safety standards.
"After our study, we found chemicals and poisonous substances in
vegetables, fruit and flowers from Phoppra district being distributed in
Bangkok," she said. She warned that some of the chemicals found have been
linked to diseases like cancer.
"Thailand is worried about food safety because they don’t want it to
affect income from export and the health of Thai people, but Burmese
consumers and workers in the farms know nothing," a Burmese migrant on the
border said.
A produce trader who has been selling vegetables across the border for
five years said that no one has complained of any health problems.
"Vegetables from Mae Sot go to Myawaddy, Kawkareik and Pa-an [the capital
of Karen State] and Thaton [Mon State] because it is cheaper than growing
vegetables inside Burma," the trader said. He said Thai-grown potatoes,
which are often four times cheaper, are particularly popular in Burma.

MONEY

AFX-GEM March 25 2003

Human rights group hails drop in US clothing imports from Myanmar as victory

[Ed. Note: Since the publication of this article, May Department Stores
has announced that it will not to sell products made in Burma.]

A human rights group that has convinced 39 US retailers to stop selling
clothes made in Myanmar said Tuesday that recent government statistics
showing a 27 percent drop in US clothing imports from Myanmar last year
show their campaign is working.

Total clothing imports from Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, fell to 303
million dollars last year from 411 million dollars in 2001, the US
Department of Commerce reported last month.

The Free Burma Coalition has spearheaded a boycott of Myanmar clothes in
an effort to pressure the military regime to implement democratic reforms
and cease human rights violations.

The regime, which ignored the results of elections throwing it from power
in 1992, has been accused of widespread human rights violations, including
the use of child soldiers, rape and torture.

Wal-Mart, Kenneth Cole, Tommy Hilfiger, Jones New York, and Federated
Department Stores, owner of Macy's and Bloomingdale's have joined the ban,
along with most of the other major US apparel retailers.

"We believe that the decision by so many powerful companies to refuse to
import goods from a country based on human rights concerns is probably
unprecedented," says Aung Din, a former political prisoner who now serves
as Director of Policy at FBC.

Dan Beeton, a spokesman for the group, said he thought the boycott played
a large part of the drop in imports.

"We think this the start of a trend that is just going to increase,"
Beeton said.

FBC has called for a boycott of May Department Stores Co, whose chains
include Lord and Taylor, Hecht's, Foley's and Robinsons-May, in an effort
to pressure the retailer to heed the group's demand that it stop selling
clothes made in Myanmar.

The group said the company is the only major US clothing retailer that has
not agreed to the ban.

May said none of its own labels are manufactured in Myanmar, but it does
not have a policy banning other labels made there from its stores.

"There is no policy that addresses Burma specifically, but we do have a
strict vendor responsibility program that tells them they must comply with
applicable safety wage and labor laws in that location," said Sharon
Bateman, a May spokeswoman.
___________

Xinhua News Agency April 1 2003

Myanmar's industrial production totals 11 mln USD

Production of Myanmar's industrial sector reached over 10 billion kyats
(about 11 million US dollars) in fiscal 2002-03, which ended in March, 
according to the latest official figures.

The figures show that the industrial output value for the fiscal year
calculated in kyats equals to two and a half fold of that in fiscal
1988-89 which was over 4 billion Kyats (about 33.3 million dollars).

There are nearly 60,000 factories and mills across the country in the
just-ended fiscal year.

To promote its industrial development, Myanmar has established 18
industrial zones in nine state and divisions, regrouping nearly 40,000
private industries. Of them, over 5,600, or 14 percent, are reportedly
running successfully.

A total of 180 state-owned enterprises out of 600 ones have been
reportedly privatized since the country implemented a privatization plan
in 1995, aiming at systematically transferring them into effective
businesses.

DRUGS

UN Wire April 1 2003

Japan Gives $1.2 Million For Opium Eradication

Japan granted $1.2 million to support U.N. programs in Myanmar aimed at
eradicating opium cultivation, U.N. officials said yesterday, and
earmarked the money for a program that will help opium farmers shift to
alternative crops.
Such alternative development projects have reportedly been successful in
Myanmar, which, according to U.N. estimates, is the No. 2 opium producer
in the world behind Afghanistan.  In 2002, Myanmar generated an estimated
828 tons of opium -- a figure down 25 percent from 2001.
"The Myanmar experience offers the evidence that alternative development,
along with eradication and law enforcement efforts, represents a vital
part of the effective drug supply reduction strategy," said U.N. Office of
Drugs and Crime Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa.
Costa's agency oversees the Drug Control and Development Project in the Wa
region of Shan state in Myanmar, where the Japanese grant will help fund
farmer training in irrigation system construction, flat paddy field
development and double-cropping of rice, among other projects (U.N.
release, March 31).

REGIONAL

TV Myanmar March 31 2003

BURMA, AUSTRALIA SIGN AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE

Agriculture Minister Maj-Gen Nyunt Tin and the deputy agriculture
ministers attended a ceremony to sign an agreement on ecologically based
management of rodents in rainfed cropping system in regions of Burma
between the Union of Myanmar Burma and Australia, which took place in a
meeting hall of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation at Thiri
Mingalar Avenue on Kaba Aye Pagoda Road in Yangon Rangoon at 1030 today.

The agreement was signed and documents were exchanged by Mr Trevor David
Wilson, Australian ambassador to Myanmar, and U Tin Htut Oo, director
general of the Agriculture Planning Department, and U Tun Than, managing
director of the Myanmar Agriculture Service.
__________

Times of India April 1 2003

MELLOWED-DOWN GEORGE IS CHINA-BOUND
By Rajat Pandit

NEW DELHI: After repeatedly trying to slay the Chinese dragon over the
years, defence minister George Fernandes is now all set to shake hands
with it.

Fernandes will finally be embarking on a week-long visit to China towards
the end of April, say defence ministry sources.

Sources said the government was waiting for the new regime in China,
headed by President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, to take over
before finalising the visit. Fernandes will leave for Beijing after April
20...the exact dates will be decided in a day or two,'' said a source.
Incidentally, Prime Minister Vajpayee is also slated to visit China, the
first by an Indian PM in a decade, later in the year.

Fernandes himself has publicly toned down his hawkish stance against China
over the past few months. The 73-year-old minister, in fact, now hotly
disputes he described China as potential threat number one'' after the
1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests. And no, he strongly protests, he is
certainly not a China-baiter''.

Fernandes will, however, raise some of our concerns and misgivings''
during his visit. One concern is the continuing Chinese military help to
Pakistan, especially in its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

Another area of worry is the ever-increasing Chinese military presence in
the Bay of Bengal. This includes listening posts'' and electronic
surveillance installations in islands off the Myanmar coast to monitor
Indian naval and missile activities.

India is also keen on accelerating the delineation of the 4,057-km-long
Line of Actual Control (LAC) to settle the complicated border dispute with
China. The two sides have only managed to exchange sample maps of the
middle sector'' of the border area so far.

The far more contentious western and eastern sectors are yet to even reach
this preliminary stage. In the western sector, for instance, the major
dispute revolves around an area of 33,000 square km on the Aksai Chin
plateau in Ladakh, which has been complicated further by Pakistan ceding a
portion of it to China as far back as in 1963.

Be that as it may, Fernandes' visit will try to underline that the common
interests of the two countries far outweigh any differences. As Fernandes
recently remarked, India and China are the two oldest and largest
civilizational states in the world...we will not be a threat' to each
other and this has been reiterated at the highest political levels.''
_____________

Agence France Presse April 1 2003

US businessmen urge Washington to normalise trade ties with Laos

An American business group on Tuesday urged the US Congress to normalise
trade ties with Laos, stressing the importance of Southeast Asia to US
political, economic and security interests.

Establishment of normal trade relations (NTR) with Laos would be in the
United States' national interest as it could stem the illegal export of
narcotics, the US-ASEAN Business Council said.

It could also lead to lowering of tariffs by Laos, which has the highest
rates in the world averaging 45.3 percent, exceeding North Korea's 35
percent, and help the impoverished Southeast Asian nation gain entry into
the World Trade Organisation, the council said.

ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which groups Laos
along with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

The council represents 150 US firms doing business in ASEAN, a market of
500 million people.

Council president Ernest Bower has written to Philip M. Crane, chairman of
the subcommittee on trade, committee on ways and means at the US House of
Representatives to voice the group's support for the normalisation of
trade ties with Laos.

The subcommittee has been soliciting comments before Congress moves to
ratify a US-Laos bilateral trade agreement negotiated in 1997.

Bower said in his letter that "the importance of the ASEAN region to
American political, economic and security interests is increasing and
there is a lot that needs to be done to increase our engagement of ASEAN
and its member nations."

Normalising trade ties with Laos is achievable within this year, he said
in the letter, a copy of which was received by AFP here.

"Laos now exports garments, gems and jewelry, agricultural products,
hydro-electricity, timber, labor and narcotics (illegally)," Bower said.

"As a matter of US national interest, if we would like Laos to export less
in the last three categories, we have to help them export more in the
first four. NTR is key to that," he said.

Laos however must provide US firms and their own companies with the "legal
framework and operational authority" for successful trade and investments.

The Lao government must also continue efforts to stem the illegal flow of
narcotics and address issues related to prisoners of war and soldiers
missing in action during the Indochina war.

INTERNATIONAL

Agence France Presse April 1 2003

US showers praise on Myanmar democracy heroine Aung San Suu Kyi

The United States praised Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi on
Monday and castigated her bitter enemies in the country's junta, in a
withering analysis of the country's human rights situation.

"Even after years of on-and-off political arrest, harassment and constant
surveillance, Aung San Suu Kyi is still wholly committed to bringing
democracy and a humane rule of law to the Burmese people," the State
Department said in its annual human rights report.

"Her tremendous strength of character stands boldly in the face of the
military regime's disregard for human rights and democracy, a disregard
that extends to abuses such as extrajudicial killings, rapes,
disappearances, forced labor and forced relocations."

The United States engages in frequent rhetorical battles with the junta,
and is a strong supporter of Aung San Suu Kyi, maintaining an array of
investment strategies to protest her exclusion from politics.

It said that 1,300 political prisoners remained behind bars, in conditions
which were often harsh and life-threatening.

Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel peace laureate, was released from house arrest
in May 2002 and has been engaged in UN-brokered talks with the junta since
October 2000, but they are yet to progress beyond a confidence-building
stage.

US officials have made no secret at their disappointment that the
consultations have made little progress so far.

The report, part of the broader Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
covering 196 nations, slammed the ruling State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) for its "extremely poor" rights peformance in 2002.

"The regime's human rights record remained extremely poor, and it
continued to commit numerous serious abuses," the report said.

It resuscitated allegations that Myanmar troops had raped women from
ethnic minorities, especially in Shan, Karenni and Karen states, which
drew international condemnation and fierce denials from the junta last
year.

The ruling junta's security forces, it said, "continued to commit
extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly relocated persons, used forced
labor, and conscripted child soldiers."

"Disappearances continued, and members of the security forces tortured,
beat and otherwise abused prisoners and detainees."

It also said the SPDC continued to restrict freedom of speech, press,
assembly, association and religion, and that people suspected of
pro-democratic activity were subjected to surveillance and harassment.

It noted how Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy was allowed
to open 90 of some 300 offices nationwide last year, but said the SPDC did
not allow domestic human rights organizations to function independently
and remained hostile to outside scrutiny of its human rights record.

Myanmar, the former Burma, has been ruled by authoritarian military
regimes since 1962.

STATEMENTS

Amnesty International April 1 2003

Myanmar: Limited human rights improvements -- serious concerns persist

Almost two months after its first-ever visit to Myanmar,  Amnesty
International welcomed some limited improvements in the human rights
situation, but at the same time expressed disappointment that other urgent
steps have not yet been taken by the  State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC),  the military government. The SPDC has told the organization that
political prisoners now have access to reading  materials and social
contact, which are positive developments. However over 1200 political
prisoners are still held in prisons throughout the country, and the pace
of releases has decreased considerably in the last four months.

        "We welcome our ongoing dialogue with the SPDC and look forward to
future visits to Myanmar, when we will investigate the human
rights situation further.  However we are disappointed that the
SPDC has not released prisoners who are ill, elderly, or are
imprisoned with their young children," Amnesty International said
today.

        "During our visit, we submitted a number of lists of political
prisoners, whose releases should be a first priority for the SPDC.
 Yet to our knowledge none of these people have been released,"
the organization added.

        People on the lists include imprisoned members of
parliament-elect; people who should be released on humanitarian
grounds; and those held under the administrative detention
provisions of the 1975 State Protection Act.

        Among those whom Amnesty International asked to be released as a
matter of urgency is U Htwe Myint, a 73-year-old prisoner of
conscience with multiple health problems; and Ma San San Maw, a
prisoner of conscience held at Insein Prison with her 19 month old
child.

        At the time of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release in May 2002 the SPDC
publicly renewed its commitment to release political prisoners. 
They had begun to release political prisoners in January 2001, and
hundreds have subsequently been freed, including a group freed in
mid March 2003.

        However many of them were not released unconditionally, and since
July 2002 arrests of people for their peaceful political
activities have begun again.  Amnesty International has recently
submitted a  list of 27  such people to the SPDC, and is seeking
further information about them.

        At this time Amnesty International renews its call for the SPDC to
release all prisoners of conscience immediately and
unconditionally.

Background

Amnesty International's first ever visit to Myanmar took place from 30
January until 8 February 2003.  After the trip, the organization publicly
welcomed the SPDC's cooperation in facilitating the visit, and the open
and cordial discussions between government officials and AI.

        The SPDC has taken a number of positive steps in the last three
years.  These include permission for an International Labour
Organization (ILO) presence in Myanmar to work with the SPDC on
the elimination of forced labour of civilians by the military.
Amnesty International has also noted an improvement in prison
conditions during this period.

        The SPDC has permitted Professor Paulo Pinheiro, the UN Special
Rapporteur for Myanmar, to visit the country five times to
investigate the human rights situation. He has recently concluded
a mission there, and addressed the UN Human Rights Commission on
31 March. Ambassador Ismail Razali, the UN Secretary General's
Special Envoy to Myanmar, has also travelled to the country
several times a year, although he has not visited since November
2002. Amnesty International hopes to return to the country before
the end of 2003.
______________

DICTATOR WATCH

Contact: Roland Watson, roland at dictatorwatch.org. Please see
www.dictatorwatch.org/chrono for links to the reports and photography
described below.

WAR IN IRAQ, AND CHILD SOLDIERS AND A HUMANITARIAN MISSION IN BURMA (excerpt)

29 March 2003


Dictator Watch is not distracted. In particular we will endeavor to
maintain pressure on the Burmese dictators including to disseminate
information about their crimes against humanity.  To this end we have
added to the website the results of an interview, including a photo, of
two child soldiers who recently escaped from the Burmese army. We also
have a report from the Free Burma Rangers, with photography, of their
December 30 - January 20 humanitarian mission in-country. (This report
details dozens of crimes against humanity.) Lastly, the Thai National
Human Rights Commission is now investigating our report about fifty-five
Karen men who were detained by the Thai army in February 2000, and who
have not been seen or heard from since.
______________

Committee to Project Journalists March 31 2003

CPJ RELEASES ATTACKS ON THE PRESS IN 2002 (excerpt)

New York, March 31, 2003-The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) today
released its annual survey, Attacks on the Press in 2002
(<http://www.cpj.org/attacks02/attacks02index.html>), during a press
conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. Copies of the
book are available through The Brookings Institution Press.

BURMA

Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi's release from 19 months of house arrest
on May 6 did nothing to improve conditions for the media in one of the
world's most repressive countries. More than seven months after the Nobel
Peace Prize laureate was freed with the help of a U.N. special rapporteur,
the ruling State Peace and Development Council had not fulfilled its
promise to open a dialogue with Suu Kyi.

The generals who oversee all aspects of life in Burma, including the
press, barred local newspapers from printing stories about Suu Kyi's
release, despite the fact that it made headlines worldwide. "What has
changed since she was let out? Nothing," said Aung Zaw, editor of the
respected Thailand-based exile magazine The Irrawaddy.

Around the time of Suu Kyi's release, the government began allowing
foreign reporters relatively free access to the country, although limits
on the number of visas allowed for international correspondents were
reimposed later in the year. In October, the regime barred the press corps
traveling with Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer, the first
Australian foreign minister to visit the country in two decades, from the
capital, Rangoon.

Newspapers, magazines, and all other media in Burma (which the current
military government renamed Myanmar after crushing a pro-democracy revolt
in
1988) are either state-owned or subject to harsh censorship through the
official Press Scrutiny Board. Burmese rely on shortwave Burmese-language
broadcasts from the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, or the
Democratic Voice of Burma, based in Norway, for uncensored information.
However, those caught listening to such broadcasts can be arrested.

The only Internet access in the country is through a partially state-owned
company, Bagan Cybertech, which in the last year was allowed for the first
time to offer prohibitively expensive public access to a heavily
restricted Burmese "intranet." This service provides about 900 carefully
selected Web sites, none of them containing news or access to the rest of
the world, through Web-based e-mail. The government announced in September
that it would allow the company to open a handful of Internet-or, more
properly, "intranet"-cafés in Rangoon and Mandalay.

The litany of news topics that the Burmese people are not allowed access
to includes everything from social issues, like widespread poverty and a
burgeoning AIDS epidemic, to human rights developments, such as
allegations that Burmese army troops have been involved in the systematic
rape of ethnic minorities in northern areas of the country. News coverage
in the country is generally devoid of political developments, with the
exception of ribbon-cutting ceremonies and official government
announcements.

A border conflict with neighboring Thailand reportedly led the regime to
issue an order in May barring mention of Thailand or Thai products in the
Burmese press. The exile group Burma Media Association (BMA) reported that
the fashion magazine Beauty was banned in October for carrying
advertisements from a Thai company. BMA noted that the ban has damaged the
Burmese private media, which rely heavily on their prosperous neighbor for
advertising revenue. In July, the government forbade 15 Thai journalists
from visiting Burma, accusing them of "damaging bilateral relations,
causing disunity among ethnic minorities and belittling [government]
policies."

When the architect of Burma's retreat from the modern world, Gen. Ne Win,
died in December at the age of 91, the event was also absent from the
press. The former dictator held power for 26 years, starting with a coup
in 1962. Ne Win imposed a reclusive, authoritarian form of socialism that
impoverished what was once one of the richest countries in Asia. At the
time of his death, he was under house arrest. Ne Win's son-in-law and
three of his grandsons were arrested in March 2002 for allegedly plotting
to overthrow the current government. The stunning arrests, a subsequent
trial, convictions, and pending death sentences against the supposed
plotters all went unreported in Burma.

Although the government claims to have released more than 600 political
prisoners in the last two years, the regime still holds at least nine
journalists in jail. The best known of these is U Win Tin, 72, who has
been imprisoned since 1989 and is in poor health. Sources in Burma have
told CPJ that his long detention is due not only to his influence as one
of the country's leading journalists and intellectuals, but also to his
role as a close adviser to Suu Kyi.
____________

U.S. State Department March 31 2003

Burma: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices  - 2002

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
[Ed. Note: To access this report in its entirety, visit:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18237.htm]

Burma is ruled by a highly authoritarian military regime. In 1962 General
Ne Win overthrew the elected civilian government and replaced it with a
repressive military government dominated by the majority ethnic group. In
1988 the armed forces brutally suppressed prodemocracy demonstrations, and
a junta composed of military officers, called the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC), led by Senior General Than Shwe, took control.
Since then the SPDC has ruled by decree. The judiciary was not
independent, and there was no effective rule of law.
The regime reinforced its firm military rule with a pervasive security
apparatus, the Office of Chief Military Intelligence (OCMI). Control was
implemented through surveillance of government employees and private
citizens, harassment of political activists, intimidation, arrest,
detention, physical abuse, and restrictions on citizens' contacts with
foreigners. The SPDC justified its security measures as necessary to
maintain order and national unity. Members of the security forces
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The country had a population of approximately 50 million. The country was
extremely poor; the estimated annual per capita income was approximately
$300. Four decades of military rule and mismanagement resulted in
widespread poverty, poor health care, and declining educational levels.
Primarily an agricultural economy, the country also had substantial
mineral, fishing, and timber resources. Extensive state influence over the
economy, widespread corruption, and poor infrastructure has led to rapidly
deteriorating economic conditions.
The regime's human rights record remained extremely poor, and it continued
to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens did not have the right to
change their government. In ethnic minority areas, security forces
continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly relocated
persons, used forced labor, and conscripted child soldiers. Disappearances
continued, and members of the security forces tortured, beat, and
otherwise abused prisoners and detainees. Citizens were subjected to
arbitrary arrest without appeal. Arrests and detention for expression of
dissenting political views occurred on numerous occasions. The SPDC
arrested approximately 45 persons, including some NLD members, for
political activities during the year; most were released within days. The
Government also released approximately 550 political prisoners since talks
began with the NLD in 2000. By year's end, an estimated 1,300 political
prisoners (including members and supporters of ethnic armed groups)
remained in prison. Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening,
although conditions improved in some prisons since the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed access. The judiciary was
not independent.
The SPDC continued to restrict severely freedom of speech, press,
assembly, association, and travel. During the year, persons suspected of
or charged with prodemocratic political activity were subjected to regular
surveillance and occasional harassment. The junta restricted freedom of
religion, coercively promoted Buddhism over other religions, and imposed
restrictions on religious minorities. The regime's control over the
country's Muslim minority continued, although acts of violence against
Muslims decreased from last year. The regime regularly infringed on
citizens' privacy; security forces continued to monitor citizens'
movements and communications systematically, search homes without
warrants, and relocate persons forcibly without just compensation or legal
recourse. The SPDC also continued to forcibly relocate large ethnic
minority populations in order to deprive armed ethnic groups of civilian
bases of support. The regime continued to restrict freedom of movement
and, in particular, foreign travel by female citizens. On May 6, the
regime released opposition leader and National League for Democracy (NLD)
General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi from almost 20 months of house
detention and has allowed her to travel within the country since that
time. The regime also loosened restrictions on NLD activities and
generally allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to meet representatives of foreign
governments and international organizations. The regime closely monitored
NLD activities at NLD offices as well as the activities of other political
parties throughout the country. The junta recognized the NLD as a legal
entity; however, it restricted their activities severely through security
measures, harassment, and threats. The NLD was permitted to reopen
approximately 90 out of 300 offices countrywide. The SPDC did not allow
domestic human rights organizations to function independently and remained
generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its human rights record. However,
in 2001 and during the year, it allowed the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in Burma to conduct missions to the country. It also allowed
the International Labor Organization (ILO) to establish a liaison office
in Rangoon. Violence and societal discrimination against women remained
problems, as did discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities.
There were no policies that discriminated against persons with
disabilities. The regime continued to restrict worker rights, ban unions,
and used forced labor for public works and for the support of military
garrisons. Other forced labor, including forced child labor remained a
serious problem, despite recent ordinances outlawing the practice. The
forced use of citizens as porters by SPDC troops--with attendant
mistreatment, illness, and sometimes death--remained a common practice as
did recruitment of child soldiers by the SPDC. Trafficking in persons,
particularly in women and girls mostly for the purposes of prostitution,
remained widespread, despite increased regime efforts to publicize dangers
to potential victims.
Ethnic armed groups including the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP), and the Shan State Army-South (SSA)
reportedly also committed human rights abuses, although on a lesser scale;
abuses included killings, rapes, forced labor, and conscripted child
soldiers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life Amnesty International (AI), and
groups like the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and the Karen Human
Rights Group (KHRG), which have been associated with armed ethnic
resistance groups, reported numerous cases throughout the year of military
troops killing civilians in border areas and areas of ethnic resistance,
often after confiscating property or torturing the individuals (see
Sections 1.g. and 5). Interviews by foreign observers documented similar
abuses.
In a July report entitled "Myanmar: Lack of Security in Counter-Insurgency
Areas," AI cited a January 30 killing of six Shan State civilians near the
Thai border. The six villagers, who had been relocated forcibly from their
original homes by SPDC troops in 1996-97, were attempting to cross into
Thailand illegally when reportedly they were robbed and killed by SPDC
troops. According to the report, the killings did not appear to be related
to counter-insurgency activities. On April 28, the KHRG reported that
villagers who recently had been forced from their homes in Karen State
were attacked by SPDC troops while sleeping. Ten persons were shot and
killed, six of whom were children; and nine others were injured, including
a pregnant woman. On May 10, one of the injured died. The regime contended
that the casualties were caught in a crossfire during a fight with armed
ethnic groups. The SHRF reported that on September 21, a SPDC unit raided
a village in Kholam, Shan State, killing 10 villagers in retaliation for
an earlier attack by the Shan State Army (SSA) against SPDC troops, which
killed one soldier. These reports were not confirmed by independent
sources.
Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused deaths among those conscripted as
military porters and laborers. There were unconfirmed reports by various
groups indicating that porters and laborers who no longer physically were
able to work sometimes were abandoned without medical care or were killed
(see Section 6.c.).
In 2001 according to one report from the KNU, at least 200 prisoners from
the Tavoy prison in Tenasserim division were conscripted by SPDC troops as
laborers to construct a front line camp. The prisoners were tied together
in groups of 5 and were guarded by 40 soldiers. As prisoners weakened and
no longer could work, 11 of them were shot and killed. During the year,
there were similar credible reports of the military taking over 300
prisoners from jails in Shan State for use as porters. There were no
reports that soldiers involved in past killings or other abuses were
investigated or punished during the year.
Inmates died in prisons and labor camps, or shortly after being released
from them, due to harsh treatment and lack of adequate medical care (see
Section 1.c.). On July 31, Aik Paung, Secretary of the Palaung Liberation
Front, died in Moulmein prison. Although his stomach reportedly was
bloated and swollen for 3 days, he was not hospitalized or provided with
any type of medical attention. In September political prisoner Aung May
Thu died from a bleeding ulcer while in custody (see Section 1.c.). In
October an NLD Shan State Vice Chairman, U Sai Hpa, died in custody,
reportedly from cerebral malaria (see Section 1.d.).
Some armed ethnic groups also reportedly committed killings. On April 15,
according to the SPDC, the KNU blew up a trishaw in Myawady, Karen State,
killing 5 persons and injuring 31 persons. The KNU denied responsibility
for the killings.
b. Disappearance
Private citizens and political activists continued to "disappear" for
periods ranging from several hours to several weeks or more, and many
persons never reappeared. Such disappearances generally were attributed to
government authorities detaining individuals for questioning without the
knowledge of their family members, or the SPDC troops' practice of seizing
private citizens for porterage or related duties, often without the
knowledge of their family members (see Section 6.c.). In many cases, the
individuals who were detained for questioning were released soon afterward
and returned to their families. However, the whereabouts of persons seized
by SPDC units to serve as porters, as well as of prisoners transferred for
labor or porterage duties, often remained unknown. There also were reports
of private citizens who were killed while serving as porters (see Section
1.a.). Family members generally learned of their relatives' fates only if
fellow prisoners survived and later reported information to the families.
According to the SHRF, in August a villager returning from gathering wild
vegetables allegedly disappeared after being taken by three SPDC troops to
the military camp at Naa Kawng Mu village in Mung-Ton township.
During an interview with the Democractic Voice of Burma, Ko Tait Naing,
the Secretary of the Association for Assistance to Political Prisoners
(AAPP), alleged that several political prisoners were executed secretly by
the junta. Naing stated that in July 2001, seven prisoners were taken away
from the prison in Beik and that there were unconfirmed reports they were
executed. Naing also alleged that in April six prisoners who were taken
away from the prison in Kawthaung, were executed at Ngapyawjoaw village
tract to the east of Zatekyi naval base.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
There are laws that prohibit torture; however, members of the security
forces reportedly tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners,
detainees, and other citizens. They routinely subjected detainees to harsh
interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. There were
reports in past years that prisoners were forced to squat or assume
stressful, uncomfortable, or painful positions for lengthy periods. There
continued to be many credible reports that security forces subjected
citizens to harassment and physical abuse. The military forces routinely
confiscated property, cash, and food, and used coercive and abusive
recruitment methods to procure porters. Persons forced into porterage or
other labor faced extremely difficult conditions, beatings, and
mistreatment that at times resulted in death. From June 7 to June 20, SPDC
troops forced more than 130 civilians to serve as porters near Keng Tung,
Shan State. According to the SHRF at least seven persons died due to
mistreatment (see Section 6.c.). SPDC soldiers beat, raped, and killed
persons who resisted relocation or forced conscription and forced labor.
There were numerous reports that SPDC troops looted and confiscated
property and possessions from forcibly relocated persons, or persons who
were away from their homes; these materials often were used for military
construction. There were reports of SPDC troops who confiscated privately
owned vehicles for military transport without compensating the vehicle
owners.
During the year, there were complaints of government mistreatment and
exploitation of farmers. In the past, numerous farmers were held in
custody for failing to meet local production requirements, although there
were no such reports during the year.
In early March, in downtown Rangoon, residents of 25 homes in Weggi
quarter were ordered by the regional military commander to vacate their
houses by the end of the month. These persons, many of whom were long time
residents, appealed the order to senior SPDC officials to no avail. Under
military threats, many accepted relocation to apartments estimated to be
worth approximately 10 percent the value of their vacated homes. On April
5, armed military authorities forced remaining tenants to leave their
houses, arresting those who refused. The homes were destroyed, reportedly
to make way for construction of new residences for families or companies
connected to the regime.
In May according to the KHRG, SPDC troops attempted to extort money from
villagers in Karen State prior to a forced relocation. The troops
reportedly burned homes, tortured a village headman by shooting him in the
thighs and cutting tendons in his legs, and beat other villagers (see
Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
The KHRG reported that on July 11, soldiers opened fire on Saw Poe Tot, a
villager looking for his elephant, in Kameik village in Tenasserim
division. He was taken to a hospital by relatives and survived.
On August 17, Captain Zaw Min Oo reportedly entered Yusomoso, a mainly
Catholic village in Timoso township in Kaya State (east of Karen State)
where, according to a reliable source, the Captain raped a 4-year-old
child. Military authorities reportedly offered the villagers approximately
$20 (20,000 kyat) to drop the case. In October the SHRF reported that two
SPDC soldiers used their rifle butts to beat and rape a woman who was
doing her laundry by the river in Kaen-Tung township. They allegedly threw
her into the river while she was still unconscious. The woman survived and
she and her husband complained to their village headman and the community
leader. No action was taken due to fear of the police and SPDC township
authorities. Also in October, a group of six or seven SPDC troops
reportedly raped two women in Murng-Khark township.
SPDC troops raped women who were members of ethnic minorities, especially
in Shan, Karenni, and Karen States (see Section 1.g.).
Corruption among local government officials was widespread and included
complicity in the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.).
During the year, both men and women were conscripted to serve as forced
laborers and some of the women subsequently were raped at gunpoint by
military personnel (see Section 1.g.).
Prison and labor camp conditions generally remained harsh and life
threatening. The regime's Department of Prisons operated approximately 35
prisons and approximately 70 labor camps throughout the country (see
Section 6.c.). In the prisons, food, clothing, and medical supplies
reportedly were in very short supply. Bedding consisted of a single mat on
the floor. Prisoners were forced to rely on their families, who were
allowed to visit once every 2 weeks for 15 minutes per visit, for basic
necessities. HIV/AIDS infection rates in prison reportedly were high due
to communal use of single syringes for injections. During the year, the
health of several political prisoners deteriorated, and at least three
political prisoners died in custody (see Section 1.a.).
During the year, some prisoners were denied adequate medical care while in
prison. In one case, authorities did not provide a prisoner with proper
medical attention, and the prisoner subsequently died (see Section 1.a.).
There were reports during the year that the health of U Win Tin, a
72-year-old journalist who has been in prison since 1989 for his political
activities, continued to decline. Similarly, there were serious concerns
about the health of Min Ko Naing, a student leader also arrested in 1989
and subjected to years of isolation and torture. The AAPP reported that on
May 17 and 18, prison authorities severely beat two political prisoners in
Bassein prison because they submitted a complaint to the prison
superintendent. AAPP also reported that 22 political prisoners were moved
from Kalay prison to Kathar prison, because they smuggled out letters
documenting conditions in the prison.
According to the regime, political detainees were separated from common
criminals, juveniles from adults, and men from women. According to the
ICRC, the regime stated that political prisoners should not be subjected
to hard labor.
During the year, the ICRC conducted periodic visits to all prisons in the
country, attempting to visit each one a minimum of once a year. ICRC
visits to labor camps began in March 2000 and continued during the year.
There reportedly were approximately 70 of these camps, but many were
temporary, existing only long enough to complete a specific work project.
The regime allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional services, such as
providing medications, delivering letters to and from prisoners, and
providing support for family visits to prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is no provision in the law for judicial determination of the
legality of detention, and the SPDC routinely used arbitrary arrest and
incommunicado detention. The Penal Code allows authorities to extend
sentences arbitrarily after prisoners have completed their original
sentence.
From September 2000 until May, Aung San Suu Kyi was held under house
detention without charge. Although the regime allowed visitors to meet
with her, the visits were controlled.
The regime has released an estimated 550 political prisoners, as well as
another 380 political prisoners on humanitarian grounds, since talks began
with the NLD in October 2000. However, it also arrested some political
activists. In August approximately 20 activists were arrested for
distributing pamphlets. There were reports that at least some of the 20
students were beaten during interrogation before being released
approximately 10 days after their arrests. Two students arrested for a
protest at Rangoon's city hall were held incommunicado for several weeks
and then sentenced to 14 years in prison for subversive acts against the
state. Family members and the NLD continued to make inquiries to the SPDC
regarding their status but to no avail. On August 22, two NLD student
members were arrested in Rangoon for possessing an illegal publication.
They reportedly were not allowed adequate legal representation at their
trial and were sentenced to 3 years in prison. On September 13, two NLD
executive members, U Sai Hpa and U Saw Nan Ti, were arrested in Kengtung,
Shan State, apparently for discussing the regime's rice quota increase
with local citizens. On October 10, they were scheduled to stand trial but
one, Shan State NLD Vice Chairman U Sai Hpa, died in custody on October 9,
reportedly of cerebral malaria. Tu Saw Nan Ti was sentenced to 7 years in
prison. In September the regime arrested at least 30 political activists
in Rangoon. Among those arrested was, U Hla Tun, an NLD Member of
Parliament (M.P.) elect from the 1990 elections who had not been active in
the NLD since he was released from prison in 1999. As with other arrests,
there was incomplete information on these cases. There was no official
announcement of the arrests and information was only available from those
who witnessed the arrests or from family members who were notified by
authorities of relatives who were arrested.
Prior to being charged, detainees rarely had access to legal counsel or
their families. Even after being charged, detainees rarely had the benefit
of counsel. Political detainees were not released on bail. Some political
detainees were held incommunicado for long periods.
In September Aung May Thu died in custody while serving the sixth
consecutive extension of his sentence, as permitted under the Penal Code
(see Section 1.a.). At year's end, there were approximately 50 political
prisoners serving extended sentences, including Min Ko Naing, a former
political activist and student leader who reportedly was in deteriorating
health (see Section 1.e.). In Mandalay 11 prisoners sentenced for
political reasons, including Zaw Min, Ne Win, U Tin Aye Yu, U Tin Myint, U
Tin Aye, U Khin Maung Thant, U Zarni Aung, U Thein Than Oo, U Kyaw Sein
Maung, U Naing Myint, U Htay Nyunt, and Soe Myint completed their terms,
but were not released.
Since October 2000 when confidence-building talks between Aung San Suu Kyi
and the SPDC began, the SPDC has reduced its campaign of detention and
intimidation against the NLD. In June 2001, the regime began releasing NLD
political prisoners from "guest houses" and prisons. By year's end, the
releases totaled approximately 550, including most NLD detainees and all
members of the NLD's Central Executive Committee (CEC). However, at year's
end, according to ICRC, there were more than 1,300 "security detainees,"
including approximately 170 NLD members, still incarcerated, 17 of whom
were elected (NLD) M.P.s. Included among the 1,300 political prisoners
were ethnic leaders, supporters of ethnic opposition groups (some of which
were armed), non-NLD politicians, lawyers, journalists, and students (see
Section 1.e.).
Authorities continued to detain private citizens and political activists,
some of whom disappeared, at times temporarily, at the hands of security
forces (see Section 1.b.).
During the year, the authorities did not detain or deport any foreign
journalists.
The Constitution does not provide for forced exile, and the regime did not
use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent of the military junta. The junta appoints
justices to the Supreme Court who, in turn, appoints lower court judges
with the approval of the junta. These courts then adjudicate cases under
decrees promulgated by the junta that effectively have the force of law.
The court system includes courts at the township, district, state, and
national levels.
During the year, the regime continued to rule by decree and was not bound
by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials or any
other rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system formally
were in place, the court system and its operation remained seriously
flawed, particularly in regard to the handling of political cases. The
misuse of overly broad laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act, the
Unlawful Associations Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on
Safeguarding the State from the Danger of Destructionists--and the
manipulation of the courts for political ends continued to deprive
citizens of the right to a fair trial. Pervasive corruption further served
to undermine the impartiality of the justice system.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to be represented by a
defense attorney, generally were respected in criminal cases, but not in
political cases that the regime deemed especially sensitive. In criminal
cases, defense attorneys generally were permitted to call and
cross-examine witnesses; however, their primary purpose was to bargain
with the judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their clients.
Reliable reports indicated that senior military authorities dictated
verdicts, regardless of the evidence or the law. In addition, in political
cases, trials were not open to the public. However, during the year, two
high profile cases, one involving Ne Win's grandchildren and the other
involving Aung San Oo and Aung San Su Kyi, were opened to the public. The
press attended and reported on both trials.
In March Professor Salai Tun Than, a 74-year-old academic was sentenced to
7 years' imprisonment for staging a peaceful protest in November 2001; the
details of his trial, or if he even had a trial, were not public.
During 2000 the regime initiated an extensive campaign to remove
independent lawyers who were capable of providing advice and counsel to
the NLD. The regime arrested and sentenced under fabricated charges nearly
every lawyer with a perceived connection to the NLD. Cases included those
of U Soe Han, a 77-year-old highly respected and nonpolitical lawyer, who
was arrested with several others and sentenced to 21 years in prison for
sending a letter to Senior General Than Shwe and Secretary One Khin Nyunt,
urging the regime to release political prisoners and begin a dialog with
the NLD. In 2001 the regime discontinued its campaign against independent
lawyers. During the year, there were no new arrests of lawyers perceived
to have NLD connections, and NLD members appeared to be able to retain the
counsel of lawyers without fear of the lawyers being imprisoned. However,
approximately 20 of the more than 40 lawyers jailed in 2000 remained
imprisoned at year's end.
During the year, the regime slowly continued to release NLD members from
prison and also began releasing a small number of student activists, many
of whom had been in prison since 1989-90. The majority of the releases
were of prisoners who had completed or almost completed their sentences or
who were in poor health. Several political prisoners, who were convicted
of crimes against the regime, were required to sign an agreement accepting
to serve the remainder of their current sentences if they were rearrested
for any reason. Prisoners who were being held in detention, but who had
not been convicted of a crime, were not required to sign an agreement. In
addition, political prisoners who were released shortly after the October
2000 talks between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi began, were not
required to sign any pre-condition agreement.
The ICRC reported that as of October there were 1,300 "security detainees"
in the country. The AAPP estimated that there were approximately 1,400
political prisoners. It also found that some political prisoners remained
in custody despite having completed their sentences (see Section 1.d.). Of
the estimated 1,300 political prisoners, 17 were NLD M.P.s elect from the
1990 elections. Among prisoners released this year was U Aye Tha Aung, who
represented four large ethnic groups in the Committee Representing the
People's Parliament (CRPP). In August the regime released U Aye Tha Aung,
who was arrested in 2000 and whose health was deteriorating rapidly while
serving three 7-year sentences. He immediately underwent an operation for
a lung tumor. Another prominent political prisoner, U Win Tin, a noted
journalist and writer, arrested in 1989, still was in prison at year's
end. He was 72-years-old and also reportedly was in poor health. Another
high-profile political prisoner, Min Ko Naing, a student leader whose
sentence was extended under the Penal Code and whose health was
deteriorating, was released. Three political prisoners, Aung May Thu, U
Sai Hpa, and Mai Aik Pan, a leader of the Palaung ethnic group, died while
in prison during the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.).
Opposition political parties have attempted to use the courts to enforce
their political rights, thus far without success. In April 2000, the
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the NLD against the regime for
illegally detaining and libeling M.P.s elect. The Supreme Court ruled that
a case could not proceed against a government official--in this case the
head of military intelligence--if the Head of State did not grant
permission. In September 2000, lawyers for the NLD began a suit against
General Than Shwe and the Chairman of the Election Commission for failing
to fulfill commitments made in regard to the transition to democracy. In
2001 the suit was dismissed without a hearing.
In November 2000, the regime allowed Aung San Suu Kyi's brother, a foreign
citizen, to file a suit against her seeking half ownership of the family
compound in which she resided. The case widely was believed to be
motivated politically, because the regime generally did not allow
foreigners to file claims for property against citizens. In fact the
regime had to grant a special authority to the brother for the case to be
filed at all. The trial was public and lasted for several months. The case
eventually was dismissed for having been filed improperly, however, the
regime granted the brother authority to file a second suit, and in October
the judge presiding over the case ruled that Aung San Suu Kyi's brother
had the right to inheritance of the property under Buddhist customary law.
The case continued at year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution does not provide for these rights, and authorities
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The military regime interfered
extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of citizens. Through its
pervasive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the regime
systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and closely monitored
the activities of many citizens, particularly those known to be active
politically.
The law requires that any person who spends the night at a place other
than his registered domicile inform the police in advance, and that any
household that hosts a person not domiciled there to maintain and submit
to the police a guest list. There were reports that this restriction,
which appeared to be relaxed somewhat last year, was enforced strictly
this year. At least 30 arrests reportedly occurred following
house-to-house searches.
Telephone service also was controlled tightly. Security personnel
regularly screened private correspondence and telephone calls. The
authorities generally continued to discourage citizens from subscribing
directly to foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). However, in 2001 the
regime loosened controls over the use of satellite television that allowed
the general population to register satellite receivers for a small fee.
Previously only a few businesses and individuals with special connections
to the regime were allowed licenses for satellite receivers.
The regime continued to control closely the licensing and rationing of all
electronic communication devices, which were monitored closely. Possession
of an unregistered telephone, facsimile machine, or computer modem was
punishable by imprisonment (see Section 2.a.). In April 2000, an
Indonesian citizen, Irawan Sidaria, and two local technicians were
arrested under the statute for having installed an Inmarsat satellite
telephone unit at the Asia Plaza Hotel in Rangoon. In August 2000, Irawan
Sidaria was deported to Indonesia. In June 2000, according to the SHRF,
SPDC troops confiscated approximately 30 mobile phones in Murng-Ton.
Although no arrests were reported, troops threatened to punish citizens
severely if they refused to turn over their mobile phones. In June 2000,
Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications also announced that users of
nonregistered cordless telephones in the country would face up to 3 years'
imprisonment, and/or a fine of approximately $75 (30,000 kyat).
Weak private property rights and poor land ownership records facilitated
involuntary relocations of persons by the regime. The law does not permit
private ownership of land; it recognizes only different categories of
land-use rights, many of which are not freely transferable. Postcolonial
land laws also have revived the precolonial tradition that private rights
to land were contingent upon the land being put to productive use.
For decades successive military regimes have applied a strategy of forced
relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking autonomy in an effort to
deny support to the armed ethnic groups; such forced relocations continued
during the year, particularly along the Thai border. The forced
relocations often were accompanied by alleged rapes, executions, and
demands for forced labor to build infrastructure for villagers and SPDC
units. To make way for commercial or public construction and, in some
cases, for reasons of internal security and political control, the SPDC
forcibly relocated citizens to "new towns." This practice has become
somewhat less common in recent years. Persons relocated to new towns
generally suffered from greatly reduced infrastructure support. Residents
targeted for displacement generally were given no option but to move,
usually on short notice (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
A September report by a highly respected private citizen in Thailand
estimated more than 2,500 villages have been destroyed or forcibly
relocated by SPDC troops since 1996, displacing more than 600,000
citizens. The report estimated that more than 350,000 of these citizens
were moved to SPDC-controlled "relocation centers," while the remainder
lived in hiding. This practice was particularly widespread in the Shan,
Kayah, and Karen States and in areas of Mon State, and Pegu Division. In
these areas, thousands of civilian villagers were displaced from their
traditional villages, which often were burned to the ground and moved into
settlements tightly controlled by SPDC troops in strategic areas. In other
cases, villagers who fled or were driven from their homes, found shelter
in the forest, frequently in heavily mined areas without adequate food,
security, or basic medical care.
The forced relocations often generated large refugee flows to neighboring
countries or to parts of the country not controlled by the regime. In some
areas, the junta replaced the original ethnic settlements with settlements
of ethnic Burmans. In 2000 in Rakhine State, the regime forcibly relocated
several largely Muslim villages and resettled the area with Buddhist
Burmans, who were forced to move from Dagon township in Rangoon division.
In other areas, army units forced or attempted to force ethnic Karen to
relocate to areas controlled by the proregime Democratic Karen Buddhist
Army (DKBA).
Military units also routinely confiscated livestock, fuel, food supplies,
fishponds, alcoholic drinks, vehicles, or money. Such abuses have become
widespread since 1997, when the junta ordered its regional commanders to
meet their logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the central
authorities. As a result, regional commanders increased their use of
forced contributions of money, food, labor, and building materials
throughout the country (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.).
In violation of humanitarian law, both army and insurgent units used
forced conscription, including conscription of children (see Sections 1.g.
and 6.c.).
Government employees generally were prohibited from joining or supporting
political parties; however, this proscription was applied selectively. In
the case of the regime's mass mobilization organization, the Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), the regime used coercion
and intimidation to induce many persons, including nearly all public
sector employees, both to join the union and to attend meetings in support
of the regime (see Section 2.a.).
In the past, government officials, including senior officials, repeatedly
made statements warning parents that authorities could hold them
responsible for any political offenses committed by their children;
however, there were no reports of this practice during the year.
The regime's intelligence services also monitored the movements of
foreigners and questioned citizens about conversations with foreigners.
Government employees generally were required to obtain advance permission
before meeting with foreigners. During the year, international NGOs
officially were required to ensure that a representative from a government
ministry accompanied them on all field visits (at the NGOs' expense).
However, the requirement appeared impractical and was not enforced fully
(see Section 4).
Marriages between female citizens and foreigners officially were banned;
however, the ban was not enforced.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal
Conflicts
Since independence in 1948, SPDC troops have battled a variety of ethnic
insurgencies. Ethnic insurgent groups have sought to gain greater autonomy
or, in some cases, independence from the ethnic Burman-dominated State.
Since 1989, 17 groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the
regime. Under the agreements, the groups have retained their own armed
forces and performed some administrative functions within specified
territories inhabited chiefly by members of their ethnic groups. However,
a few groups remained in active revolt. The KNU continued to conduct
insurgent operations in areas with significant Karen populations in the
eastern and southern regions of the country. In Kayah State, the KNPP
resumed fighting against the regime since the breakdown of a cease-fire
negotiated in 1995.
In May the SHRF and Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) alleged the
military used rape as a systematic weapon of war against the ethnic
populations in Shan State. The report described 173 incidents of rape or
sexual violence against 625 women and girls committed by soldiers from 52
military battalions between 1992 and 2001. Given the brutality of the
rapes, (the report stated that 25 percent of the rapes resulted in death),
the incidence of rapes by officers (83 percent), and the impunity with
which they were carried out, the report concluded that the rapes were
condoned by the military regime in order to terrorize and subjugate the
Shan. There were corroborating reports on rapes and sexual violence, by
the military in Shan State and elsewhere, including first hand accounts
from rape victims documented by credible foreign observers. According to a
report by Refugees International, rape of ethnic women by the SPDC troops
similarly was prevalent in Karen, Mon, and Karenni regions.
The SPDC denied the report and ordered three internal reviews. In August
the junta claimed that no soldiers were involved in the rapes. In October
the regime stated it continued to investigate the allegations and had
found evidence of five cases of rape similar to those described in the
SHRF/SWAN report. The regime stated it provided copies of its report on
the investigations to the international community and to the U.N. Special
Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. However, according to Pinheiro, the
investigations were undertaken by military and other SPDC personnel with
no special skills or experience in investigating human rights allegations.
The investigations reportedly consisted of prearranged, large, collective,
and public meetings with local officials, organized by military personnel.
There has been continued international pressure on the regime to allow an
independent assessment of the allegations and to take appropriate actions
to prevent rape and sexual abuses by the military.
In central and southern Shan State, government forces continued to engage
the SSA. The military maintained a program of forced relocation of
villagers in that region to SPDC-controlled sites, that reportedly was
accompanied by killings, rapes, and other abuses of civilian villagers.
According to AI, 90 percent of the civilians from Shan State whom it
interviewed in Thailand in February said they had been subjected to unpaid
forced labor by the military within the last 18 months.
Border disputes with Thailand during the year exacerbated the plight of
civilian populations along the Thailand border (see Sections 2.d and
6.c.).
In January 2001, according to a credible but not independently confirmed
report, in Murng-Nai, military troops beat to death a Palaung villager,
raped his wife, and stole his property. In March 2001, according to the
SHRF, SPDC troops gang-raped a woman in Murng-Ton township after troops
had tortured and killed her uncle. Also according to the SHRF, in April
2001, SPDC soldiers encountered four villagers near Naa Ing, Shan State.
The soldiers found packets of rice, which they claimed the villagers were
going to give to the SSA. The soldiers tied up the men and took the woman
to a different location, where they reportedly raped her. They then
reportedly required the villagers in the area to pay a substantial fine
for the release of the four persons.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), SPDC troops conscripted children as
young as the age of 11, especially orphans and street children (see
Section 5).
Active insurgent groups included the Chin National Front, the Naga
National Council, the Arakan-Rohingya Solidarity Organization (ARNO), the
SSA-South, and the KNU (including its affiliate the Karen National
Liberation Army). Some members of the insurgent groups committed serious
abuses. For example, according to the regime, in December 2001, the KNPP
killed seven villagers who refused to join their ranks in Loikaw township.
The regime also accused the KNU and the SSA of killings and bombings
throughout Shan and Karen States and of recruiting and using child
soldiers. UNICEF, AI, and HRW reported that both SPDC troops and insurgent
groups recruited child soldiers (see Section 5).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The law allows the regime to restrict freedom of speech and freedom of the
press and, in practice the junta continued to restrict these freedoms
severely and systematically during the year. The regime continued to
arrest, detain, convict, and imprison citizens for expressing political
opinions critical of the junta, and for distributing or possessing
publications in which opposition opinions were expressed (see Sections
1.d. and 1.e.). Security services also monitored and harassed persons
believed to hold such political opinions.
Legal restrictions on freedom of speech have intensified since 1996, when
the junta issued a decree prohibiting speeches or statements that
"undermine national stability." In all regions of the country, the regime
continued to use force to prohibit virtually all public speech critical of
it by all persons, including persons elected to Parliament in 1990, and by
leaders of political parties. The regime has pursued this policy
consistently since 1990, with few exceptions.
There was an unconfirmed report from the Democratic Voice of Burma that in
August 2001, military security personnel arrested a monk for delivering a
sermon criticizing the economic and political conditions in the country
during a ceremony at the Mahamyatmunni Payagyi Pagoda in Mandalay. The
monk, Ashin Pandita, reportedly was derobed and detained at the police
station. No additional information was available at year's end.
The regime permitted the NLD to resume some public meetings during the
year. In keeping with the confidence-building that has surrounded the
talks between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD moderated its
criticism of the regime in these meetings. The NLD continued to press for
substantive dialog with the regime as quickly as possible, and has
refrained from any direct attacks on the policies or actions of the
regime.
Many prominent writers and journalists remained in prison for expressing
their political views. The Paris-based organization Reporters Sans
Frontieres reported that at least 18 journalists remained in prison at
year's end, including Ohn Kyaing, better known by his pen name Aung Wint,
who wrote articles in favor of democracy and also was a NLD M.P, elect
from Mandalay. He has been in prison since 1990. Government censorship
boards prohibited publication or distribution of works authored by those
in prison, although in 2000 the regime allowed former political prisoners
Ma Thida and U Sein Myint (also known as U Moe Thu), to write several
magazine articles following their release from prison. In 2001 at least
one well-known publisher, Tin Maung Than, departed the country for fear
that his activities would lead to imprisonment.
Between April and June 2000, the junta arrested 11 persons for
distributing antijunta leaflets and allegedly planning attacks on
government buildings. In September 2000, the junta sentenced Chein Poh, a
highly respected, 77-year-old lawyer in Rangoon, for allegedly
distributing foreign publications with antiregime annotations written on
the back. Although the regime presented no credible evidence to prove the
charge, Chein Poh was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Chein Poh was
released from prison early in the year and died approximately 6 months
later.
The regime owned and controlled all daily newspapers and domestic radio
and television broadcasting facilities. These official media remained
propaganda organs of the junta and normally did not report opposing views
except to criticize them. The only partial exception was the Myanmar
Times, an expensive English-language weekly newspaper, targeted at the
foreign community in Rangoon, which occasionally reported on criticisms of
regime policies by the U.N. and other organizations.
All privately owned publications, including the Myanmar Times, remained
subject to prepublication censorship by state censorship boards. Due in
part to the time required to obtain the approval of the censors, private
news periodicals generally were published monthly. However, since 1996 the
regime has given transferable waivers of prepublication censorship for
weekly periodicals. As a result, weekly tabloids proliferated. Regime
controls encouraged self-censorship, and publications generally did not
report domestic political news.
Imported publications remained subject in principle to predistribution
censorship by state censorship boards, and possession of publications not
approved by the state censorship boards remained a serious offense. Cases
involving prodemocracy literature, including two such cases during the
year, were punished by imprisonment. The regime also restricted the legal
importation of foreign news periodicals and discouraged subscriptions to
foreign periodicals. However, foreign newspapers may be purchased in
Rangoon. Prior to August 2000, such foreign newspapers and magazines were
censored regularly at the airport on arrival, but starting in 2001 they
were distributed uncensored.
Since 1997 the regime issued few visas to foreign journalists and has held
only a handful of press conferences on political subjects. Journalists
occasionally were blacklisted. In previous years, several journalists who
entered the country as tourists were detained and deported by the regime.
During the year, the regime began holding more frequent press conferences
and invited foreign journalists to the country, including some who
previously were blacklisted. Cable News Network, the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), and other foreign news organizations filed reports from
the country during the year. However, the regime refused visas to
Australian reporters seeking to cover Australian Foreign Minister Downer's
visit to the country in October.
Due to widespread poverty, limited literacy, and poor infrastructure,
radio remained the most important medium of mass communication. News
periodicals rarely circulated outside urban areas. The junta continued to
monopolize and control the content of the two domestic radio stations.
Foreign radio broadcasts, such as those of the BBC, Voice of America,
Radio Free Asia, and the Democratic Voice of Burma, remained the principal
sources of uncensored information.
The regime continued to monopolize and to control tightly all domestic
television broadcasting, offering only a government channel and an armed
forces channel. However, in 2001 the regime loosened restrictions on the
reception of foreign satellite television broadcasts by allowing new
licenses to be purchased. Previously, new licenses were not available and
the operation of an unlicensed satellite television receiver was a crime
punishable by up to 3 years in prison and or a fine. The Television and
Video Law makes it a criminal offense to publish, distribute, or possess a
videotape not approved by a state censorship board.
The junta systematically restricted access to electronic media. All
computers, software, and associated telecommunications devices were
subject to government registration, and possession of unregistered
equipment was punishable by imprisonment (see Section 1.f.).
The Ministry of Defense operated the country's only known Internet server
and offered expensive, limited Internet services to a small number of
customers. During the year, a café that was billed as a cybercafe opened,
but it did not have access to the Internet, only CD-ROM and other such
games.
The regime continued to restrict academic freedom severely. University
teachers and professors remained subject to the same restrictions on
freedom of speech, political activities, and publications as other
government employees. The Ministry of Higher Education routinely warned
teachers against criticizing the regime. It also instructed them not to
discuss politics while at work; prohibited them from joining or supporting
political parties or from engaging in political activity; and required
them to obtain advance ministerial approval for meetings with foreigners.
Like all government employees, professors and teachers have been coerced
into joining the USDA, the regime's mass mobilization organization.
Teachers at all levels also continued to be held responsible for the
political activities of their students.
In June and July 2000, the regime reopened the remainder of the
institutions of higher education that were closed in 1996 following
widespread student demonstrations. However, the regime took a number of
special measures to limit the possibility of student unrest. Campuses were
moved to relatively remote areas, teachers and students were warned that
disturbances would be dealt with severely, and on-campus dormitories were
closed, which disrupted university life. There was evidence that many
students chose to continue with self-study because the quality of
education deteriorated to such an extent that many students opted to stay
with self-study or tutoring. The regime tightly controlled the limited
number of private academic institutions in the country as well as what
they were allowed to teach.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The law limits the freedom of assembly, and the regime restricted it in
practice. An ordinance officially prohibits unauthorized outdoor
assemblies of more than five persons, although the ordinance was not
enforced consistently. The 10 existing political parties also are required
to request permission from the regime to hold meetings of their members;
nevertheless, meetings occurred without regime permission.
The military junta continued its decade-long policy of preventing the
Parliament elected in 1990 from convening. During the year, the regime
loosened its restrictions on the activities of the main opposition party,
the NLD, and allowed 90 of NLD's 300 offices to reopen (see Section 3).
In May and September 2001, the regime forced the closure of three Shan
National League for Democracy (SNLD) offices in townships near the capital
of Shan State. In September 2001, the regime reportedly told the SNLD
Chairman to disregard the regional authority's directive and to continue
with normal operations.
In previous years, authorities used force to prevent prodemocracy
demonstrations, punish participants and organizers in prodemocracy
demonstrations and meetings, and detained or imprisoned persons suspected
of planning and organizing such demonstrations. During the year, there
were no reports of such practices (see Section 1.c.). However, authorities
did attempt to prevent the public from coming out to see Aung San Suu Kyi
when she traveled to Rakhine State, ostensibly on the grounds that outdoor
political gatherings of any type were illegal. Organizations affiliated
with the SPDC handed out leaflets that questioned Aung San Suu Kyi's
patriotism and discouraged citizens from showing any support for her. The
authorities blocked off streets and told citizens to stay home. Her party
experienced similar, though less pronounced, harassment on visits to Mon
and Shan States during the year (see Section 2.d.).
The regime at times interfered with the assembly of religious group
members (see Section 2.c.).
The Government restricted freedom of association, particularly in regard
to members of the main opposition political party, the NLD. The law
prohibits more than 5 persons from meeting outdoors without prior
government approval. In the past, while the regime allowed the NLD to
celebrate certain key party events with public gatherings, it restricted
the size of the gatherings and the individuals who were allowed to attend.
For example, in September 2001, the NLD held a ceremony to commemorate the
third anniversary of the CRPP and the regime responded with Military
Intelligence (MI) personnel surrounding NLD headquarters. In 2000 the
regime prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from traveling to Rangoon to attend
party meetings. During the year, the regime lifted most of these
restrictions on NLD activities but, through mutual agreement, the NLD
attempted to avoid large gatherings in order not to alarm the regime.

Since the initiation of talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta in
October 2000, there have been no reports of coerced resignations or recall
motions. The regime-controlled media ceased its campaign against the NLD,
and the regime loosened some restrictions on NLD party activity.
In general the right of association existed only for government-approved
organizations, including trade associations and professional bodies, such
as the Forest Reserve Environment Development and Conservation
Association. Few secular, nonprofit organizations existed, and those that
did took special care to act in accordance with government policy. There
were 10 legal political parties but most were moribund.
c. Freedom of Religion
The 1974 Constitution permits restrictions on religious freedom, stating
that "the national races shall enjoy the freedom to profess their
religion... provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom does not
offend the laws or the public interest." Most religious adherents duly
registered with the authorities generally were free to worship as they
chose; however, the regime imposed restrictions on certain religious
activities. In practice the regime restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy
to promote human rights and political freedom, and coercively promoted
Buddhism over other religions in some ethnic minority areas.
The regime's pervasive internal security apparatus sought to infiltrate or
monitor meetings and activities of virtually all organizations, including
religious organizations. Religious activities and organizations also were
subject to restrictions on freedom of expression and association. In
addition, the regime controlled and censored all publications, including
religious publications (see Section 2.a.)
..
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International Religious
Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation
The regime restricted freedom of movement. Most citizens were able to
travel within the country, although their movements were monitored and
they were required to notify local officials of their whereabouts (see
Section 1.f.). Movement was limited in areas of armed conflict. Urban and
rural residents were subjected to relocation.
In past years, the freedom of movement of opposition political leaders
also was curtailed rigorously. Between 1995 and 2000, the junta allowed
NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi to travel outside the capital only
once, on a visit to a monastery, and until May 6, she remained under house
detention. While the Government has relaxed restrictions on Aung San Suu
Kyi, generally allowing her freedom of movement and association, some
restrictions remained. Since her release from house detention in May, Aung
San Suu Kyi has traveled to Mon, Shan, and Rakhine States, as well as to
Mandalay, Magwe, and Irrawaddy divisions. Although she generally was
allowed to meet with international visitors, including the foreign
ministers of Japan and Australia, the Government did not allow either
Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir or the Malaysian Foreign Minister to
call on her when they visited in August. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party
also were harassed by government-affiliated groups on some of her visits
to various regions of the country (see Section 2.b.). During the year, the
regime loosened travel restrictions on all NLD members including the most
senior members. NLD M.P.'s elect who were released from prison were able
to travel between their electoral districts and Rangoon to coordinate with
NLD leaders.
During the year, the regime reportedly implemented policies to consolidate
the border with Bangladesh and to further control the movement of Muslim
Rohingyas in Rakhine State (see Section 6.c).
The regime refused to accept Burmese deportees from other countries, but
accepted the return of approximately 4,000 illegal migrants from Thailand.
The regime allegedly refused to document Burmese seafarers who were
stranded abroad due to the sinking of their ship or bankruptcy of the ship
owners.
The regime also carefully scrutinized prospective travel abroad. Such
control facilitated rampant corruption, as many applicants were forced to
pay large bribes. Bribes for passports were sometimes as high as $3,000
(approximately 3.6 million kyat), the equivalent of more than 10 years'
salary for the average citizen. The official board that reviews passport
applications has denied passports on political grounds. All college
graduates who obtained a passport (except for certain government
employees) were required to pay a special fee to reimburse the regime for
the cost of their education. Citizens who emigrated legally generally were
allowed to return to visit relatives, and some who lived abroad illegally
and acquired foreign citizenship also were able to return.
Residents unable to meet the provisions of the citizenship law, such as
ethnic Chinese, Arakanese, Muslims, and others, must obtain prior
permission to travel internally. Since the mid-1990s, the Government also
has restricted the issuance of passports to female citizens (see Sections
5 and 6.f.).
The regime prohibited foreign diplomats and foreign employees of U.N.
agencies based in Rangoon from traveling outside the capital without
advance permission. All residents, foreign and local, were required to
apply for authorization to leave the country.
Restrictions on foreign travelers to the country were eased as part of an
effort to promote tourism. Burmese embassies now generally issue tourist
visas, valid for 1 month, within 24 hours of application. However, certain
categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates,
journalists, and political figures were denied entry visas regularly
unless traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the regime and
for purposes approved by the Government.
There was a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the
country. NGOs based in Thailand estimated that the regime moved forcibly
more than 250,000 citizens from their villages and districts to live near
or along the Thai border (see Section 5). These NGO estimated that more
than 350,000 IDPs resided in SPDC relocation sites.
During the year, the military continued to abuse thousands of villagers
and drove them from their homes, including during the course of military
campaigns in Karen, Kayah, and Shan States (see Section 1.f.). In January
AI reported that a 75-year-old Shan man said that he and his family fled
to Thailand after SPDC troops and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops
confiscated all their land, arrested villagers, looted homes, raped
numerous women, and drove them out of their village. He reported that
between 500 to 600 UWSA troops occupied the area, and that he received no
compensation for the loss of his woodlands, orchards, or fields.
Ethnic minority areas previously affected by conflict, such as the large
Karen areas of Irrawaddy division, experienced tighter controls on
personal movement, including more frequent military checkpoints, closer
monitoring by military intelligence, and larger military garrisons.
"Informal taxes", or bribes, were extracted from all nationalities at
checkpoints in border areas. In Rakhine State, many controls and
checkpoints applied only to the Muslim population (see Section 5).
Harassment, fear of repression, and deteriorating socio-economic
conditions continued to force many citizens into neighboring countries and
beyond. In the border regions populated by minority ethnic groups, the
regime continued its policies of forced labor, confiscation of lands,
compulsory contributions of food, and forced relocations. These policies
produced thousands of refugees in neighboring countries such as Thailand,
China, and India. One report from Kachin State alleged that in May 2001,
3,000 Naga villagers fled the country into northeastern India when SPDC
troops launched an offensive against Naga separatists. The security forces
reportedly burned villages and laid landmines to discourage villagers from
returning. Harsh conditions in Shan State compelled an exodus to Thailand,
with unconfirmed estimates that approximately 10,000 Shan citizens may
have relocated there during the year (see Section 1.f.). There were
approximately 150,000 persons in refugee camps on the country's borders.
Of these at least 135,000 Karen, Mon, and Karenni resided in refugee camps
in Thailand. In addition, there were tens of thousands of Shan refugees in
Thailand not living in camps. On the country's western border, 22,000
Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh (see Section 5).
More than 100,000 Rohingyas lived outside the refugee camps in Rakhine
State with no formal documentation as refugees. In addition, Rohingyas who
have returned to Rakhine State claimed that they faced government
restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in economic
activity.
The regime did not allow refugees or displaced persons from abroad to
resettle or seek safe haven in the country and has not formulated a policy
regarding refugees, asylum, or first asylum. There were no reports that
persons formally sought asylum in the country during the year. There were
no reports of forced repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
their Government
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The junta
continued to prevent the Parliament elected in 1990 from convening.
Since 1962 active duty military officers have occupied most important
positions in both the central Government and in local governments. Since
1988 a military junta has held all state power. All members of the regime
have been military officers on active duty, and the junta has placed
military or retired military officers in most key senior-level positions
in all ministries. At year's end, active duty or retired military officers
occupied 37 of the 39 ministerial-level positions.
Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the military junta
refused to implement the election results and disqualified, detained, or
imprisoned many successful candidates (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). Many
other M.P.s elect fled the country. Following an aborted effort from
1993-96 to draft a new constitution assigning the military the dominant
role in the country political structure, the military junta continued its
systematic use of coercion and intimidation to deny citizens the right to
change their government.
In September 1998, the NLD leadership organized a CRPP on the basis of
written delegations of authority from a majority of the surviving members
elect of the 1990 Parliament, in view of the junta's refusal to allow the
entire Parliament to convene. The committee was empowered to act on behalf
of the Parliament until the Parliament was convened. In retaliation the
junta launched a sustained and systematic campaign to destroy the NLD
without formally banning it; the authorities pressured many thousands of
NLD members and local officials to resign and closed party offices
throughout the country. Military intelligence officials also detained more
than 200 members elect of Parliament in 1998. At year's end, a total of 19
M.P.s elect remained in prison. According to AAPP, two of these M.P.s
elect have been in prison since 1990 (see Section 1.d.).
In October 1999, the Multiparty Democracy General Election Commission
announced, that of 392 NLD members elected to Parliament in 1990, only 92
remained both NLD members and M.P.s elect. It claimed that 105 had
resigned their parliamentary status, 139 had been disqualified by the
commission, 27 had resigned from the NLD, and 31 had died. In contrast, in
September 2000, the CRPP claimed to enjoy the support of 433 of the 485
members elect of Parliament.
Late in 2000, with encouragement from the U.N. Special Envoy Razali
Ismail, the regime initiated talks with Aung San Suu Kyi that produced
some relaxation in the restrictions on the NLD. In subsequent years, the
NLD was able to resume some normal party activities. Press attacks on the
NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi also ceased. However, since 2000, the regime has
not opened a substantive dialog with the NLD and still held more than a
1,000 political prisoners at year's end.
Women were excluded from military leadership. There were no female members
of the regime, ministers, or Supreme Court judges.
Members of certain minority groups also were denied full citizenship and a
role in government and politics (see Section 5).

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government did not allow domestic human rights organizations to
function independently, and it remained generally hostile to outside
scrutiny of its human rights record.
The regime's restriction on travel by foreign journalists, NGO staff, U.N.
agency staff, and diplomats; its monitoring of the movements of such
foreigners; its frequent interrogation of citizens concerning contacts
with foreigners; its restrictions on the freedom of expression and
association of citizens; and its practice of arresting citizens who passed
information about government human rights abuses to foreigners all impeded
efforts to collect or investigate information regarding human rights
abuses. Reports of abuses, especially those committed in prisons or ethnic
minority areas, often emerged months or years after the abuses allegedly
were committed and seldom could be verified with certainty.
There were approximately 25 nonpolitical, international humanitarian NGOs
working in the country. A few others have established a provisional
presence while undertaking the protracted negotiations necessary to
establish permanent operations in the country. Beginning in 2001,
international NGOs sometimes were required to have a government ministry
representative accompany them on all field visits, at the NGOs expense
(see Section 1.f.).
The regime permitted the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro,
to visit the country three times during the year. In his reports, Pinheiro
cited instances of positive change and pledged to work with the regime,
the opposition, members of civil society, and the international community
to promote human rights in the country. He also cited problems, including
the denial of fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, expression,
and movement, and encouraged the regime to correct these deficiencies. He
also called for the release of all political detainees. In addition, he
cited "the gross violations of human rights of civilians" living in areas
of conflict in eastern Karen and Kayah States, southern Shan State,
northern Sagaing division, Rakhine, and Chin States.
In 2001 the regime announced the creation of a Human Rights Committee,
chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs and including the Chief of Police
as one of the members. Several human rights workshops that targeted abuses
and were sponsored by the Australian Government were held in Rangoon.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The military junta continued to rule by decree and was not bound by any
constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
Women
Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse, appeared to be
relatively infrequent, although there was little data available. The
regime did not release statistics regarding spousal abuse or domestic
violence. Married couples often lived in households with extended
families, where social pressure tended to protect the wife from abuse.
Rape is illegal; however, spousal rape is not a crime unless the wife is
under 12 years of age. The regime stated that rape was not common in
populous urban areas but occurred more often in remote areas. The
Government did not release statistics regarding rape.
Prostitution is prohibited by law and punishable by 3 years in prison;
however, it was becoming an increasing problem, particularly in some of
Rangoon's "border towns" and "new towns," which were populated chiefly by
poor families that were relocated forcibly from older areas of the
capital. There were credible reports that a large number of female
prostitutes were imprisoned and often subjected to abuse while
incarcerated. One estimate put the number of women detained for
prostitution at 400 at any given time in Mandalay prison alone.
There were no laws against sexual harassment.
In general women traditionally enjoyed a high social and economic status
and exercised most of the same basic rights as men. Consistent with
traditional culture, women kept their names after marriage and often
controlled family finances. However, women remained underrepresented in
most traditional male occupations, and women continued to be barred
effectively from a few professions, including the military officer corps.
Poverty, which was widespread in rural areas, affected women
disproportionately. Women did not receive equal pay for equal work on a
consistent basis. Women legally were entitled to receive up to 26 weeks of
maternity benefits; however, in practice these benefits often were not
accorded them.
There were no independent women's rights organizations. The National
Committee for Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Social Welfare was
responsible for safeguarding women's interests. The Government and at
least one international NGO operated schools and other rehabilitation
programs for former prostitutes. The Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare
Association, a government-controlled agency, provided assistance to
mothers. A professional society for businesswomen, the Myanmar Women
Entrepreneurs' Association, provided loans to women starting new
businesses.
Children
The regime continued to allocate minimal resources to public education.
According to the latest available statistics, government expenditures for
all civilian education were equivalent to less than 1 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) during the year and have declined by more than 70
percent in real terms since 1990. According to government studies
conducted with U.N. assistance, only 37 percent of children finished
fourth grade in urban areas and only 22 percent did so in rural areas.
Rates of school attendance and educational attainment decreased during the
year, largely due to rising formal and informal school fees as the junta
diverted expenditures from health and education to the armed forces. On
average teacher's pay was equal only to approximately $7.00 (10,000 kyats)
a month, far below subsistence wages and has forced many teachers to quit
teaching out of economic necessity. Only relatively prosperous families
were able to afford to send their children to school, even at the primary
level. In ethnic minority areas, the regime often banned teaching in local
languages. In some areas where few families were able to afford unofficial
payments to teachers, teachers generally no longer came to work and
schools no longer functioned. In response to government neglect, private
institutions began to provide assistance in education, despite an official
monopoly on education.
Children also suffered greatly from the junta's severe and worsening
neglect of health care. The junta cut government expenditures on public
health care even more sharply than it cut spending for education.
Government expenditures for civilian health care in 1998-99 were
equivalent to only 0.3 percent of GDP. Government studies sponsored by
U.N. agencies in 1997 found that, on average, 131 of 1,000 children died
before reaching the age of 5 years, and that only 1 out of 20 births in
rural areas was attended by a doctor. Those same studies indicated that,
among children under 3 years of age, 37 percent were malnourished, and 13
percent were malnourished severely. The World Health Organization
considered the country's health care system to be extremely poor.
Child abuse is prohibited by law. The Government stated that child abuse
was not a significant problem; however, the regime did not release
supporting statistics.
Child prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose of
prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to
Thailand--continued to be a major problem (see Section 6.f.).
The official age of enlistment in the ostensibly all-volunteer army is 18
years. However, the authorities reportedly rounded up orphans and street
children in Rangoon and other cities and forced them into military
service. An October HRW report entitled My Gun Was As Tall As Me, alleged
widespread forced conscription of children into the SPDC army, and, to a
lesser extent, into armed groups fighting against the regime (see Section
6.c.).
Several international NGOs and agencies promoted the rights of children in
the country, including World Vision, Save the Children UK, CARE, UNICEF,
UNDP, and foreign governments
.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Wide-ranging governmental and societal discrimination against minorities
persisted. Animosities between the country's many ethnic minorities and
the Burman majority, which has dominated the Government and the armed
forces since independence, continued to fuel active conflict that resulted
in serious abuses during the year. These abuses included reported
killings, beatings, torture, forced labor, forced relocations, and rapes
of Chin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan by SPDC soldiers and the armed ethnic
groups (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.f., and 1.g.).
The Government continued to discriminate systematically against
non-Burmans. Because the regime reserved secondary state schools for
citizens, Rohingya Muslims did not have access to state run schools beyond
primary education and were ineligible for most civil service positions.
There were reports that forced labor of Muslims occurred in Rakhine State
(see Section 6.c.)
Since only persons who were able to prove long familial links to the
country were accorded full citizenship, nonindigenous ethnic populations
(such as Chinese, Indians, and Rohingya Muslims) were denied full
citizenship and were excluded from government positions. Members of the
Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, on the country's western coast,
continued to experience severe legal, economic, and social discrimination.
The Government denied citizenship status to most Rohingyas on the grounds
that their ancestors did not reside in the country at the start of British
colonial rule in 1824, as required by the country's highly restrictive
citizenship law. Persons without full citizenship faced restrictions in
domestic travel (see Section 2.d.). They also were barred from certain
advanced university programs in medicine and technological fields.
Ethnic minority groups generally used their own languages. However,
throughout all parts of the country controlled by the regime, including
ethnic minority areas, Burmese remained the language of instruction in
state schools. Even in ethnic minority areas, most primary and secondary
state schools did not offer instruction in the local ethnic minority
language. There were very few domestic publications in indigenous minority
languages.
There were reports that the junta resettled groups of Burmans in various
ethnic minority areas (see Section 1.f.). There were ethnic tensions
between Burmans and nonindigenous ethnic populations, including Indians,
many of whom were Muslims, and a rapidly growing population of Chinese,
most of whom immigrated from Yunnan Province and increasingly dominated
the economy of the northern part of the country. Both groups tended to be
more commercially oriented and hence more prosperous and economically
powerful than Burmans.

.

f. Trafficking in Persons
Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem during the year.
There reportedly was widespread complicity among local regime officials in
trafficking in persons.
The law does not prohibit trafficking in persons and there were reports
that persons were trafficked from and within the country. There are laws
which are used against traffickers such as the Penal Code which prohibits
kidnaping; the Suppression of Prostitution Act; and the Child Law, which
includes provisions against the sale, abuse, or exploitation of children.
According to the regime, traffickers have received sentences of between 3
and 14 years for trafficking in persons. According to the regime's
figures, investigations have resulted in jail sentences being handed out
in approximately 90 cases. Between 1999 and June, the Myanmar National
Committee on Women's Affairs and other NGOs held more than 10,000
village-level seminars to educate families regarding the dangers of
trafficking. In Mon State, eastern Shan State, and Kayin State, these
seminars were carried out in cooperation with the U.N. Inter-Agency
Project on Trafficking in Women and Children in the Mekong Sub-region
(UN-IAP). In two reports during the year, the regime highlighted the
prevention, repatriation, and prosecution actions taken under a newly
formed Working Committee for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons,
chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs. While there were still many
weaknesses in the program, the regime has made progress, particularly in
the area of prevention and prosecution, and to a lesser extent,
repatriation. Regime officials recognized the need for continuing
engagement on preventing trafficking and the prosecution of traffickers.
Although the regime was active on these fronts, its effectiveness still
was unclear by year's end. In addition, the regime reported that it was in
the process of gathering data on the incidence of trafficking and
expanding cooperation with international and local NGOs. However, during
the year, the regime did not cooperate with neighboring countries, most
significantly Thailand, on trafficking in persons.
Trafficking of women and girls to Thailand and other countries, including
China, India, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan,
and countries in the Middle East, for sexual exploitation, factory labor,
and as household servants was a problem. Shan women and girls were
trafficked across the border from the north; Karen and Mon women and girls
were trafficked from the south. There was evidence that internal
trafficking generally occurred from poor agricultural and urban groups to
areas where commercial sex work flourished (trucking routes, mining areas,
and military bases) as well as along the borders with Thailand, China, and
India. Men and boys also reportedly were trafficked to other countries for
sexual exploitation and labor, but this appeared to be a small percentage
of overall trafficking. While most observers believed that the number of
these victims was at least several thousand per year, there were no
reliable estimates of the total number.
While laws exist against child prostitution and child pornography, they
were not enforced well. Reports from Thailand indicated that the rising
incidence of HIV infection there increased the demand for supposedly
"safer," younger prostitutes, many of whom came from Burma. Trafficking in
persons within the country appeared to be a growing problem; however there
were no reliable statistics regarding its extent. The regime has begun to
help locate families of freed child trafficking victims and to assist in
their repatriation from Thailand.
In recent years, the regime has made it difficult for women to obtain
passports or marry foreigners in order to reduce the outflow of women both
as victims of trafficking (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). In addition, there
are regulations forbidding girls under the age of 25 from crossing the
border unless accompanied by a guardian. However, most citizens who were
forced or lured into prostitution crossed the border into Thailand without
passports.
Corruption among local government officials was widespread and included
complicity in the trafficking of persons. The regime's efforts to stop
international and internal sex and exploitative trafficking were limited
given the magnitude of the problem.
A number of NGOs offered poverty alleviation and education programs
designed to counter trafficking. Reportedly these programs have been
moderately successful.
While the Government has made limited progress on trafficking in persons
during the year, baseline information on the extent to which trafficking
occurs and the success of the government's activities is not available.
The government's pervasive security controls, restrictions on the free
flow of information, and lack of transparency prevent a meaningful
assessment of trafficking in persons activities in the country. For
example, while experts agree that human trafficking from the country was
substantial, no organization, including the Government, was able or
willing to estimate the number of trafficking victims.