BurmaNet News: October 16, 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

October 16, 2003 Issue #2348

INSIDE BURMA
Xinhua: Myanmar says it stands at historic crossroads
DVB: Clashes between KNU and SPDC troops

MONEY
Xinhua: Bangladesh, Myanmar to sign coastal shipping protocol

GUNS
DVB: Burmese army replaces Chinese weapons with Indian weapons

REGIONAL
AFP: Myanmar junta faces sharp criticism from Bush at APEC summit

OPINION / OTHER
USCB: As Bush Speaks in Asia, Students Lead Global Day of Action for
Imprisoned Burmese Student
Nation: Burma: Asean faces US wrath
Irrawaddy: The Need for Two-Way Traffic (Part One)  by Ashley South


----INSIDE BURMA----

Xinhua General News Service   October 16, 2003
Myanmar says it stands at historic crossroads

YANGON, Oct. 16 (Xinhua) --Myanmar said on Thursday that it is standing at
a historic crossroads, having embarked on a new road to democracy which
will lead 52 million's country people to a better future.

However, this road is not easy as it is a complex and difficult endeavor,
particularly in Myanmar which comprises more than 130 different ethnic
groups and suffered from more than four decades of ethnic strife, a
government statement said.

"Patience and wisdom will be required. Rushing to quick and simplistic
answers will mean failures, and history is full of democracy which has
failed," it said.

The statement warned that Myanmar's future is too important to be wasted
in rash and hasty acts and building strong long-lasting democracy is not a
race.

The statement expressed Myanmar's deep sharing of the spirit of
partnership and cooperation as demonstrated by members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the recent Bali Summit, saying that
with the support of them among the international community, the Myanmar
government will adopt policies toward building a democratic state as in
the "roadmap" outlined by Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt on Aug. 30.

The statement claimed that Myanmar is fortunate not to be alone on the
path with many other countries helping it to move out of isolation of the
past and into democracy of the future.

"The fewer problems a new democracy faces, the more chances it will have
of success," it said.

The statement denied an allegation which says isolating Myanmar will
promote change, citing the country's self isolation for decades which has
prevented any change at all.

Noting that by closing off from the outside world, Myanmar was unable to
move toward democracy and a market economy, the statement pointed out the
country has now opened its door and is entering a new era with new ideas.

The statement commented that it is not the time to criticize and point
fingers but to join hands to build a strong, peaceful and lasting
democracy in Myanmar.


Democratic Voice of Burma   October 16, 2003
Clashes between KNU and SPDC troops

While the SPDC is ‘offering’ the KNU to return to ‘legal fold’, its troops
are constantly attacking the rebels’ bases in massive number.

The SPDC troops and DKBA fighters are launching massive offensives on the
KNU bases at Maepalae region of Myawaddy Township, Karen State. Many
soldiers were killed during the clashes and these offensives are the
largest since the KNU lost its HQs at Manerplaw.

DVB’s Khaing Thazin reports:

Khaing Thazin : 11 SPDC battalions and DKBA troops are launching
offensives on the areas under the control of KNU’s Brigade 7. The
offensives started on the 5 August and there have been daily clashes, said
Phado Ah-Toe as follows:

Phado Ah-Toe : The clashes have been occurring everyday during the two
months of the offensives. The fighting is still raging on while I am
talking to you now. They are using all their ammunitions and we are still
resisting them with steely nerve.

The SPDC army is using villagers near Kawkareik, Myawaddy Township and
prisoners from police controlled prisons as military porters and landmine
sweepers ahead of the attacking troops. Those who were wounded were shot
or bayoneted to death on the spot, according to Phado Ah-Toe.

Some KNU fighters were wounded during the clashes and more than 160
soldiers have been killed. The SPDC soldiers are feeling dejected by the
losses and many have been trying to escape to the KNU bases.



----ON THE BORDER----




----DRUGS----




----MONEY----

Xinhua General News Service   October 16, 2003
Bangladesh, Myanmar to sign coastal shipping protocol

DHAKA, Oct. 16 (Xinhua) --Bangladesh will sign a coastal shipping protocol
with Myanmar later this year to cement growing trade ties with its eastern
neighbor.

The protocol would allow smaller oceangoing ships in private sector to
conduct cargo trade and two ports in Myanmar and four ports in Bangladesh
would be used for the purpose, The Financial Express reported Thursday.

The suggested ports include Chittagong, Mongla, Teknaf and Cox' s Bazar in
Bangladesh and Yangon and Akiab in Myanmar.

Bangladesh imports about 15 million US dollars of goods from Myanmar
annually in recent years. The volume would increase manifold after the
agreement, according to the newspaper.

Bangladesh imports fishes, timber, agricultural products, spices and some
mineral items under the existing border trade agreement with Myanmar. It
exports some pharmaceutical products to the latter.


----GUNS----

Democratic Voice of Burma   October 16, 2003
Burmese army replaces Chinese weapons with Indian weapons

The SPDC’s troops in Tenneserim Coastal Military Command are preparing to
replace China-made weapons with those from India. The Strategic HQs in
Rangoon has been sending Indian weapons to the region since July.

U Maung Maung Hein reports: The soldiers from Strategic HQs are collecting
existing Chinese weapons from 11 artillery bases in the sea, 11 artillery
bases on the Thai-Burma borders, frontline bases with rocket launchers,
No.3 base in Kawthaung with heavy anti aircraft guns. The weapons from
bases in the sea are being collected by warships such as MC and CRC2 which
could carry up to loads of 3000 tons. These Chinese weapons are to be
replaced by Indian weapons which had been already transported to the
Coastal Command by the Defence Ministry in Rangoon since July. The
commander of Coastal Command, Ohn Myint who has arrived at Kawthaung on
the 9th of October himself is supervising the procedures.


----REGIONAL----

Agence France-Presse   October 16, 2003
Myanmar junta faces sharp criticism from Bush at APEC summit

Myanmar's junta faces a roasting from US President George W. Bush over the
continued detention of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi when he attends
next week's meeting of Pacific Rim leaders here.

Bush is also expected to urge Southeast Asian leaders at next week's Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit to do more to push for
democratic reforms in Myanmar, which has been run by the military for four
deacdes.

Bush's national security adviser Condoleezza Rice has said the president
will make clear his concern for the welfare of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is
under house arrest in the Myanmar capital Yangon, during his six-nation
tour of Asia.

"We have been in constant contact with the UN representative about this
and asking that she be visited and that we know her state," Rice said this
week.

"You can believe the president will talk quite a lot about the need for
freedom in Burma," in talks with Thai leaders, among others, she added.
Myanmar is not a member of APEC.

However, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra suggested Thursday that the
United States did not understand the issue well and that he would resist
pressure from Bush to do more to intervene in the neighbouring nation's
internal affairs.

"I don't think that this issue, on which Thailand does not agree with the
United States, will put more pressure on Thailand," he told reporters.

"The US wanted us to put on more pressure which we can only do to a
certain extent that is not considered intervention," he said.

"Myanmar is just one small country which the United States wishes to see
democratised but has no time to study in detail."

The United States and the European Union tightened sanctions on Myanmar
after Aung San Suu Kyi was detained at an undisclosed location following a
bloody clash between her supporters and pro-junta demonstrators on May 30.

She was admitted to hospital last month for major gynaecological surgery
and afterwards taken to her home to begin her third stint under house
arrest since beginning her political career in 1988.

The Myanmar junta's refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi before the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Bali earlier this
month was expected to attract criticism at the meeting.

But instead, regional leaders hailed recent events in the military-run
state as "positive developments" and said international sanctions would
not help bring about democratic change.

The ASEAN resolution also lent its support to the regime's new "roadmap"
to democracy, which envisages "free and fair" elections and a new
constitution but does not mention Aung San Suu Kyi or any timeframe for
reform.

The United States gave a caustic response to the ASEAN declaration, saying
it had little confidence in the junta's talk of democratic reform while it
held the opposition leader and her deputies in custody.

With regards to the "positive developments" praised by ASEAN, State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher said: "We don't see those and we
don't see any need for a roadmap unless it has the full participation of
the opposition."

Thailand's Nation newspaper said in an editorial Thursday that Southeast
Asian leaders could expect a tongue-lashing from the United States over
its praise for Myanmar's "roadmap," which analysts view with scepticism.

"ASEAN will find that the soothing reassurances they gave Rangoon will be
quickly washed away by the wrath of the American leader. In the final
analysis, Rangoon will once again learn that whatever friends it made in
Bali will not be there in the coming winter of their discontent," it said.


----INTERNATIONAL----




----OPINION / OTHER----

US Campaign for Burma   October 16, 2003
As Bush Speaks in Asia, Students Lead Global Day of Action for Imprisoned
Burmese Student

(Washington, DC) On Saturday October 18th, students from approximately 50
colleges, universities, high schools, and middles schools around the world
will participate in a 24-hour fast to demand the release of Burmese
student leader Min Ko Naing, who has been imprisoned in the Southeast
Asian country for the past 14 years.  The action, organized by the U.S.
Campaign for Burma, takes place on the same day President Bush arrives in
Thailand for an official state visit, where he has pledged to press for
freedom in Burma, according to National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice.

"Min Ko Naing is a hero to many students around the world," said Kim
Jacobson, a student at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.  "As fellow
students, we demand his immediate release and hope President Bush demands
the release of all political prisoners in Burma."

For decades, Burma has been ruled by one of the world's most brutal
military dictatorships. The dictators' use of murder, torture, rape, and a
modern form of slave labor to maintain their brutal grip on power has been
well-documented by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, US State Department, and other organizations.

Min Ko Naing is one of the most unique and "inspiring" students in Asia,
says Cristina Moon, a USCB student at the University of Chicago.  While a
student at Rangoon University, he was imprisoned in 1989 after
spearheading nationwide demonstrations aimed an ending decades of
dictatorship.  He was severely tortured and has been held in solitary
confinement ever since. October 18th marks his 14th birthday behind bars.

In an attempt to break his spirit, the dictators have offered release and
deportation in exchange for giving up the democracy movement, yet he
refuses.  The military has now moved him to a prison far away from his
family, making it nearly impossible for family members to visit him. While
in prison, he has been awarded the John Humphrey Freedom Award by Canada’s
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development , the
Homini Prize  from the Czech Republic, and Norway's Student Peace Prize,
the student equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize. In 2002, 49 members of
the U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to Burma's military regime
demanding his release.  He and incarcerated 1991 Nobel Peace Prize
recipient Aung San Suu Kyi are Burma's most well known dissidents.

In Washington, DC, dozens of students are organizing a protest in front of
Burma's embassy.  Modeling their action on protests against apartheid in
South Africa during the 1980s, students from American, Georgetown, and
George Washington Universities plan to conduct civil disobedience
resulting in arrest.  Additionally, Aung Din, a personal friend of Min Ko
Naing and director of policy at U.S. Campaign for Burma, who was tortured
and spent four years in prison, plans to join the civil disobedience.  The
demonstration and arrests will take place at 10:00 am on October 17th at
2300 S St., NW which because of international time differences is the 18th
in Burma.

"Min Ko Naing is imprisoned for his belief in freedom.  Students of the
world stand with him and support him," said Dominic Nardi, a USCB student
at Georgetown University who plans to participate in the civil
disobedience.

For more biographical information, publishable photos, a complete list of
schools participating in the fast, and a new online slide show on Burma,
go to www.uscampaignforburma.org


The Nation (Thailand)   October 16, 2003
Burma: Asean faces US wrath

The incorrigible Burmese junta escaped relatively unscathed at the recent
meeting in Bali of the 10 Asean members and their three dialogue partners
- South Korea, China and Japan. But with US President George W Bush and
other vocal critics of Burma coming to town for the Apec summit, Asean
will find that the soothing reassurances they gave Rangoon will be quickly
washed away by the wrath of the American leader. In the final analysis,
Rangoon will once again learn that whatever friends it made in Bali will
not be there in the coming winter of their discontent.

Credit should also go to the Japanese, who remain committed to their
position on Burma despite the hypocritical attitude of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, which unabashedly portrayed the recent 'changes'
in Rangoon as a 'positive development' and said international sanctions
would not help bring about democratic change.

The so-called 'changes' was a reference to the announcement by Burmese
Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt that the constitutional drafting was
back on track and that the country has come up with a roadmap to national
democracy and reconciliation of its own.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra called the move 'concrete progress'. How
he can justify his statement is a mystery. Like the rest of Asean, Thaksin
conveniently overlooks the fact that the world has been down this road
before.

The committee overseeing the drafting of a new constitution was
established in 1993 but put on hold just two years later after the
opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) withdrew from the process.
The walkout did not come as a surprise because the junta was throwing
hundreds of NLD members into jail. Some have since died in captivity as
prisoners of conscience.

This new initiative envisions 'free and fair' elections and a new
constitution, but does not mention any role for opposition leader Aung San
Suu Kyi, ethnic nationalities or a timeframe for political reform.

From 1995 until the recent announcement by Khin Nyunt, Burma's
constitution drafting has virtually stood still. Between then and now,
Burma has shown little interest in changing track to include opposition
and ethnic minority voices in any form of dialogue or reconciliation.

A shred of hope came last July in Phnom Penh when Asean collectively
issued a statement urging Burma to immediately release Suu Kyi, who has
been under detention following the May 30 attacks against her supporters
by pro-Rangoon thugs.

But less then four months later, Asean switched course inexplicably and
praised the junta in spite of the fact there has been no substantial
headway made on democratisation - let alone releasing the Nobel Peace
Prize winner.

Instead of using the Bali summit to establish some sort of benchmark of
behaviour for the generals, Burma's nine fellow Asean members decided to
put all their eggs in one basket and praise Rangoon for merely promising
to put the process they earlier derailed back on track.

The issue is likely to be raised by Bush at next week's gathering of 21
world leaders at the Apec meeting. Washington says it has seen no
'positive developments' in Burma, especially as Suu Kyi was put under
house arrest last month after four months of detention at a secret
location. 'We don't see those [positive developments] and we don't see any
need for a roadmap unless it has the full participation of the
opposition,' said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher.</P>Asean may
feel obliged to lend its unpopular friends in Rangoon a lifeline from time
to time. But at the end of the day, the junta will learn that it's every
man for himself. The generals in Rangoon will realise that in this
globalised world where complex relations between nations are dictated by
national interest, nothing comes without a price. And the temporary relief
from their Asean partners will eventually run out.


The Irrawaddy   October 16, 2003
The Need for Two-Way Traffic (Part One)
By Ashley South

October 16, 2003—Transition in Burma may come abruptly—perhaps as a result
of a 1988-style peoples’ uprising—or more gradually and with less
bloodshed. The latter scenario may involve a power-sharing arrangement
between the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the
opposition, or a gradual process of "regime reform," with little direct
input from the wider society or opposition forces.
Although opposition tactics will vary according to the circumstances, a
number of strategic considerations remain the same. However and whenever
change occurs, members of Burma’s diverse social groups must be ready to
act.

 Efforts to build local democracy are already underway, in
government-controlled areas, in some ethnic nationality-populated
ceasefire and war zones, and in neighbouring countries. However, these
bottom-up initiatives will not bring about substantial change



In general, opposition strategies have focused on elite-level politics,
rather than grassroots democratization. However, both approaches are
necessary, while neither is sufficient in itself. Change at the national
level is urgently needed, but sustained democratic transition can only be
achieved if accompanied by local participation and development from below.

Among the three parties to any tripartite negotiations in Burma, the
ethnic nationalities in particular could benefit from a combination of
elite-level, blueprint-type solutions and a grassroots, participatory
approach, aimed at strengthening civil society. Although overseas-based
activists and Burma-watchers have sometimes assumed that there is no civil
society in the country, this far from true. The re-emergence of local
networks within and between ethnic nationality communities over the past
decade has been one of the most significant—but under-reported—aspects of
the social and political situation in Burma. Efforts to build local
democracy are already underway, in government-controlled areas, in some
ethnic nationality-populated ceasefire and war zones, and in neighbouring
countries. However, these bottom-up initiatives will not bring about
substantial change, without accompanying top-down, national-level reforms.

Competing Vehicles, and a Major Road Block

Since 1990, the military government has resisted all options but a managed
(by the military) transition to some type of disciplined or guided (by the
military) democracy. The recently appointed Prime Mnister, Gen Khin Nyunt,
announced in late August that the government will restart the National
Convention to draw up a new constitution. This will not convince the
opposition, or most Western nations, that the regime is committed to
political transition in Burma. Nevertheless, Khin Nyunt’s statement may be
an important move in a complex political game, perhaps indicating that the
military is positioning itself to participate in some kind of transitional
process, the success and legitimacy of which will depend on who
participates in constitution-drafting, and under what conditions.

If the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic nationality parties
are included in the process, this may yet prove to be a watershed in
Burmese history. The stakes are high, and some analysts suggest that Khin
Nyunt (the "good cop") is merely being set up to fail—while protecting
Sr-Gen Than Shwe (the "bad cop") from the need to reform.

While the NLD and most Burmese democracy groups have consistently demanded
recognition of the 1990 election results, they have come to accept the
necessity for compromise and dialogue with the SPDC. However, when
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s efforts to mobilize her supporters
came to a bloody end on May 30 this year, international efforts to foster
bipartite dialogue between the SPDC and NLD also came to an abrupt halt.

There is however a third set of political actors in Burma, which have been
largely sidelined within the UN-brokered peace process. The 1994 and all
subsequent UN General Assembly resolutions on Burma have called for a
tripartite solution to the country’s problems, involving the government,
the NLD (and other parties elected in 1990), and the ethnic nationalities.

Many ethnic nationality cadres are wary of the NLD leadership, which is
largely composed of ex-Tatmadaw (Burma’s armed forces) officers, who share
a common political culture and conceptions of state-society relations
based on a strong, centralized state. However, most ethnic nationality
leaders have trusted Suu Kyi to demand their inclusion in any negotiations
which may come out of talks in Rangoon.

This was a risky strategy. If an agreement had been reached between the
SPDC and NLD, the international community would have responded
enthusiastically, and the process gained considerable momentum, before any
ethnic nationality representatives were brought into the picture. In this
case, the ethnic nationalities risked further marginalization. Their
leaders were faced with two options: either be co-opted into endorsing an
agreement which they had little part in negotiating, or insist on a
nation-wide ceasefire, followed by a possibly lengthy intranationalities
consultation process, and then a pan-Burmese Panglong-type tripartite
constitutional convention. Such demands, in the context of pre-exiting
deals between the NLD and SPDC, might have exposed the ethnic
nationalities to accusations of obstructing national reconciliation.
Either scenario would suit the "divide and rule" strategy of elements in
Burman political society.

However, the brutal events of May 30 have provided an opportunity to
re-present the importance of the ethnic question, and the role that ethnic
nationality politicians might play in breaking the current political
deadlock. This historic opportunity is also fraught with danger.

The key challenge facing Burma’s ethnic nationality leaders is how to
coordinate their positions. In doing so they risk being exposed as divided
over key issues, and once again consigned to a marginal role as crucial
decisions over the future of the country are made by the urban political
elite.

The ethnic nationalist community is composed of three elements. Most of
the 65 ethnic candidates elected in 1990 are represented by the United
Nationalities Alliance (UNA, previously the United Nationalities League
for Democracy), which has always worked closely with the NLD. Then there
are the 14 armed ethnic groups which have agreed on ceasefires with
Rangoon since 1989 (plus 10-or-so other ex-insurgent groups with local
agreements with the Tatmadaw). The third sector of the ethnic community is
composed of those insurgent groups still at war with the military
government, which are members of, or allied with the National Democratic
Front (NDF).

There is a fairly high degree of cohesion between the positions of the
main UNA parties and the NDF. More problematic are the positions of
various ceasefire groups. The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the
New Mon State Party (NMSP) and other NDF allies have participated in the
Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Coordination Committee (ENSCC;
established in 2001), to agree common positions among the ethnic
nationality groups, in preparation for tripartite negotiations. The NMSP
in particular plays an important role here, with a foot in all three camps
of the ethnic nationality community. It is the closest of the ceasefire
groups to the rump NDF, and also enjoys good relations with the UNA
leadership. However, the positions of a number of ex-Communist Party of
Burma (CPB) and other ceasefire groups in northern Burma are far from
clear. The Wa, Kokang, Pa-O and others may feel that there is more to be
gained by following the SPDC line and staying clear of politics in order
to concentrate on local community and economic development programs,
including in some cases, the drugs trade.

Since 1989, the military government has repeatedly stated that it will
negotiate only with individual armed groups, refusing to recognize joint
fronts, such as the NDF. These divide and rule tactics have served
successive regimes in Rangoon well, and some observers expect the SPDC to
offer further concessions to some ceasefire groups, in exchange for their
continued support (or at least, quiescence) in efforts to complete the
National Convention. Alternatively, the military may attempt to divert
attention from the current political crisis, by turning against groups
involved in the drugs business, in order to mobilize domestic support and
perhaps gain some credit with the Thai and American governments.

Ethnic nationality parties must also assess the risk of alienating the
urban- and exile-based Burmese democracy movement. By launching an "ethnic
initiative" at a time when the NLD is weak, ethnic nationality politicians
may be accused of undermining Suu Kyi, and abandoning Burmese democracy
groups in exile.

A New Roadmap

In response to recent events, and especially Khin Nyunt’s revival of the
National Convention, the ENSCC announced its own "Roadmap for Rebuilding
the Union of Burma." The ENSCC first called for the immediate release of
Suu Kyi.

According to the ENSCC plan, a tripartite body, known as the Congress for
National Unity should be established, and charged within two years with
drafting a new constitution or a National Accord. The ENSCC plan requires
the Congress to ask the international community for humanitarian
assistance and, once the accord is finalized, for the formation of an
interim Government of National Unity.

In the second stage, the Government of National Unity would call for
sanctions to be lifted and for further international development
assistance. A referendum would then be held on the new constitution,
followed by general elections. This process would obviously need to be
preceded—or at least accompanied—by a relaxation of restrictions on civil
and political rights, and a probably nationwide ceasefire.

Could elements of this platform be incorporated into the regime’s National
Convention? Could the SPDC be persuaded to establish an interim
administration—or at least a Panglong-like Congress for National Unity, to
be tasked with drafting a new constitution? One obvious sticking point is
the representation of different parties in any such bodies. What
proportion should come from the military, the NLD and the parties who won
in 1990 parties, and the armed ethnic groups? Furthermore, could the
opposition accept the ENSCC’s proposal that the SPDC continues as the
government for the first two years of the road map—presumably with Khin
Nyunt as interim premier?

Another sticking point is the issue of federalism. Although the "f-word"
is anathema to the generals in Rangoon, most ethnic nationality parties in
Burma are committed in principle to a federal solution to Burma’s
protracted constitutional crisis. However, there are different
federalising and federating processes, various kinds of relations between
the states and the federal union, and different types of federal
structure. For example there is the symmetrical and asymmetrical, where
different states and sub-states enjoying different levels of autonomy or
divisions of power. Or corporate federalism, in which citizens enjoy
certain group rights, wherever they happen to live). In recent years,
ethnic nationality leaders and Burmese democracy groups in exile have
begun to discuss such arrangements in detail, paying special attention to
the situation of minorities within ethnically-defined states, such as the
Wa and others within Shan State.

Another key issue is who should represent which ethnic groups at what
stage in negotiations, and with what degree of legitimacy. Such
discussions need to move beyond the sometimes simplistic statements of
principle, to grapple with concrete issues. Other important questions
include how to address Burma’s complex social, economic and humanitarian
problems, and what to do about past human rights abuses, particularly
those committed by the military. What about amnesty, or a truth and
reconciliation commission?

The Limits of a One-way (Top-Down) Route

This leaves unanswered the question of how to bring about serious
negotiations between the government and opposition in the first place.
Most likely, a combination of domestic and international pressure—and the
provision of some kind of exit strategy for the generals—is necessary, to
persuade the military to engage in genuine dialogue. The fact that the
opposition, and the ethnic nationalities in particular, have very limited
leverage vis-à-vis the government, explains the conciliatory nature of the
ethnic initiative, which accepts that Burma will remain under military
rule for the first two years of the transition process.

However, the regime may well refuse to address explicitly political
issues, such as federal constitutions and power-sharing, or even sensitive
areas like human and group rights. In this case, it may be worth
considering whether social welfare and humanitarian issues could be used
to facilitate processes of dialogue, and eventually social and political
transition. In addressing subjects like education, HIV/AIDS or
displacement in the first stage of any confidence-building process,
stakeholders might be brought into needs analysis, planning,
implementation and monitoring-evaluation activities, which could be used
to foster models of collaboration. Cooperation in the humanitarian sector
might later be expanded, and developed into broader, more explicitly
political discussion of state-society and center-periphery relations. A
focus on IDPs in particular, would help to ensure ethnic nationality
participation in the process, as most displaced people are from these
communities.

This approach to negotiation on the basis of concrete issues would require
consultation with and participation from affected communities, local and
international NGOs and UN agencies. This is one example of how elite-level
blueprint-style politics might be complemented by more participatory
approaches, empowering a wider range of actors, including civil society
groups. Given the government’s lack of incentive to engage in dialogue,
such bottom-up approaches may be considered valuable in their own right,
and constitute an alternative vehicle for gradual democratization.

This is the first in a two-part series.

Ashley South is the author of a political history of lower Burma, Mon
Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. His current
research on internal displacement in Burma is funded by the MacArthur
Foundation.