BurmaNet News: October 23, 2003

[editor at burmanet.org]

October 23, 2003 Issue #2353

INSIDE BURMA
AFP: Seven students arrested in Myanmar capital: dissident group
Xinhua: Myanmar to become regional transportation hub: PM
US Newswire: Christian Hospital Overrun by Burmese Militia; Attack Occurs
'Next Door' to APEC Summit

MONEY
Xinhua: Myanmar fetches over 17 mln dollars from gem sale

REGIONAL
NST: Mahatir on Burma
AFP: Asian countries still pressing for reforms in Myanmar: Philippines
Mizzima: Burmese Refugees Fight UNHCR for survival

INTERNATIONAL
AFP: China-EU summit to focus on North Korea, Myanmar and Iraq

OPINION / OTHER
SCMP: Much-needed voice to lead Southeast Asia
NCGUB: ‘Roadmap’ Fever
Asia Pacific Defence Reporter: Myanmar and North Korea: Birds of a Feather?


----INSIDE BURMA----

Agence France Presse   October 23, 2003
Seven students arrested in Myanmar capital: dissident group

Seven students have been arrested by Myanmar's military junta for
distributing pamphlets arguing against its proposed political roadmap, a
dissident group said Thursday.

The seven were arrested during the last week of September and are being
held at a military interrogation centre, the All Burma Federation of
Student Unions (ABFSU) said in a statement.

They had been handing out pamphlets issued by the ABFSU arguing that the
junta's democracy "roadmap" announced by Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt
in August did not represent the needs of the country.

The pamphlet called on people to reject the roadmap because it aimed only
to enhance military rule and warned those supporting it would be labelled
"national betrayers."

Khin Nyunt's plan envisages free and fair elections and a new
constitution, but does not mention a timeframe nor opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi, who has been detained since a junta-backed mob clashed with
her supporters in May.

Min Naing, director of the ABFSU's Foreign Affairs Committee, demanded the
immediate release of the students.

"If the regime sincerely wants political development in Burma, it must
allow the political participation of all societal layers, freedom of
expression and freedom of association," he said, referring to Myanmar by
its former name.

"The regimes political roadmap wont be sustained if there are no such
freedoms and civil and political rights.

The government has launched a series of mass rallies aimed at showing
public support for the roadmap, the most recent of which was held in Bagan
and attended by some 25,000 people, according to the official press.

Myanmar's junta has come under enormous international pressure,
particularly by the United States, to release Aung San Suu Kyi and shift
the country towards democracy in recent months.

But the regime escaped a mention at the two-day Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) leaders summit in Bangkok this week, while earlier this
month the regional ASEAN grouping noted "positive developments" in Myanmar
and lent support to the roadmap.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a
member, had in June taken the unprecedented step of calling for Aung San
Suu Kyi's release.


Xinhua General News Service   October 23, 2003
Myanmar to become regional transportation hub: PM

YANGON, Oct. 23 (Xinhua) --Myanmar Prime Minister Khin Nyunt predicted
Thursday his country could become a regional transportation hub as the
infrastructure develops and because of its strategic geographical
location, it stands as a natural land bridge connecting southeast Asia and
South Asia.

Khin Nyunt made the remarks at the opening here of the Ninth Meeting of
Transport Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
attended by all ministers from the ten-member grouping and the ASEAN
secretary general.

Khin Nyunt disclosed that plans are already underway to link India to
Thailand through Myanmar and a survey will soon be initiated to establish
road connection between Myanmar and Bangladesh.

He pledged Myanmar's full support for the Singapore-Kunming Rail Link
project, hoping that the spur line project to Myanmar would receive due
attention and support for such a development would link all the countries
on the rail route.

Calling for emphasizing as much as possible the role of transportation
networks connecting all ASEAN nations in march toward a single ASEAN
market and regional integration, Khin Nyunt stressed the need not only to
implement existing projects but also to undertake new initiatives for the
common goal.

He expressed his country's belief that there can be no economic progress
without adequate infrastructure development, giving an account of
Myanmar's infrastructural construction in the past decade involving
construction of 3,200-kilometer new roads and 161 new bridges --seven
spanning the Ayeyawady river, two across the Chindwin river and three
across the Thanlwin river.

Besides, over 1,600 kilometers of new rail lines have been built, he said,
adding that in the past the transportation network was intended mainly to
link the north and south of the country, and today there are road and rail
networks that connect all corners of the nation and connect Myanmar with
all neighboring countries.

With regard to the aviation sector, he also disclosed that seven new
airports have been built and 21 existing ones upgraded to accommodate
larger aircraft.

Relating to maritime transport, he added that Myanmar has built Thilawa,
Thakayta, Alon and other industrial terminals including new modern
container terminals.

The ASEAN transport ministers meeting will last two days.


U.S. Newswire   October 23, 2003
Christian Hospital Overrun by Burmese Militia; Attack Occurs 'Next Door'
to APEC Summit

MAE SOT, Thailand:  On Oct. 15, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
militia along with the Rangoon-backed DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist
Army) took control of the Mae Ple Do Valley and part of the eastern Dawna
Range in Burma, just west of Maela, Thailand.

A Christian Freedom International (CFI) field hospital was overtaken by
the invading soldiers.

Mae Ple Do Valley is also near the Karen Nationalist Liberation Army
(KNLA) 7th brigade headquarters, which was also overrun.

The Karen, an ethnic group with a significant Christian population, has
been fighting for survival ever since World War II. In recent months the
military dictatorship of Burma has escalated its genocidal campaign
against the Karen.

In 1995 the Rangoon-based junta was successful in its effort to use
religion as a weapon, after it launched an army of Buddhist militants
known as the DKBA. The DKBA targets Christians and Christian facilities.

Naw Baw Baw, CFI's chief medic at CFI Freedom Hospital No.1, said, "this
is our fourth CFI hospital that we have lost within four years. Three were
burned down by SPDC and DKBA forces and the last one we had to abandon and
move all of our supplies and medics to the Thai side of the border."

According to Naw Baw Baw, "The SPDC and DKBA took control of the high
ground on the mountain, one hour and a half walk from Freedom Hospital 1
and they kept firing heavy machine guns such as 120mm, 81mm, 60mm mortars
and RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades). They fired until the hospital staff
had to abandon their buildings."

Freedom Hospital No.1 treated between 1000-1500 patients per month. At
each of CFI's field hospitals there are approximately twelve medics
treating patients in the OPD (outpatient department) and IPD (inpatient
department). Many displaced persons fleeing persecution in the jungles
receive lifesaving treatment at CFI Freedom Hospitals.

Naw Baw Baw said, "Even though we already had to rebuild our hospital four
times in different places (three are burned down and the last one we had
to abandon) we never gave up or got discouraged, but the opposite; we have
more energy. When we saw our people hiding in the jungle near the
riverbank and have to stay, sleep and eat under the tree without shelter,
I felt sorry for them and for myself too. As I am a medic, I really hope
that I can help them with the knowledge that I have and with support from
CFI. Please remember our Karen people in your prayers."

CFI President Jim Jacobson said, "This was a despicable act. I can't
fathom how anyone could attack a Christian hospital serving thousands of
defenseless, innocent sick men, women, and children. This kind of hatred
and religious fanaticism is incomprehensible."

Jacobson said, "...Burma conducted this brutal raid during the APEC
summit. A few hundred miles away, while world leaders including
representatives from Burma, talked about peace and prosperity, minority
Christians were being annihilated. This is one more major reason why the
military dictatorship of Burma cannot be trusted or supported in any way
by the international community."

Casualty reports are not yet available.


----MONEY----

Xinhua General News Service   October 23, 2003
Myanmar fetches over 17 mln dollars from gem sale

YANGON, Oct. 23 (Xinhua) --Myanmar has fetched a total of 17. 95 million
US dollars from sale of 436 locally produced quality gems, jades, pearls
and jewelry at the 12th state-sponsored Mid-Year Gems Emporium, according
to emporium sources Thursday.

The eight-day gems emporium, which began on Oct. 15 and ended Wednesday,
attracted a total of 457 merchants of 176 companies from nine countries
and regions, mostly from China, China's Hong Kong and Thailand. The number
of local gem traders from 146 companies participating in the event reached
381.

Mid-year gems emporium was introduced in addition to the annual ones since
1992  to boost the country's foreign exchange earning. The annual gems
emporium began in 1964 and since then, Myanmar has earned a total of 414
million dollars from the events including both the annual and mid-year
ones, according to emporium statistics.

Myanmar, a well-known producer of gems in the world, is in possession of
nine gems --ruby, diamond, cat's eye, emerald, topaz, pearl, sapphire,
coral and variety of garnet tinged with yellow.

There are three famous gem lands in Myanmar where gems are produced
--Mogok in Mandalay division, Mongshu in Shan state and Phakant in Kachin
state.

To develop gem mining industry, Myanmar enacted the new gemstone law in
September 1995, allowing national entrepreneurs to mine, produce,
transport and sell finished gemstone and manufactured jewelry at home and
abroad.

Since April 2000, the government has started mining of gems and jades in
joint venture with 10 local private companies under profit sharing basis.


----REGIONAL----

New Straits Times (Malaysia)   October 23, 2003
'We should tell US when it is wrong' – Interview with Dr. Mahatir Mohamad
(excerpt)

DATUK Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad was interviewed by Dana Iswara over
Indonesia's TV7 in Yogyakarta yesterday. This is an excerpt from the
programme Mahathir Menjawap.

Q: Why can't the confrontational approach be used to solve the problem
with Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi.

PM: Because it will not solve the problem. The European idea is that when
there is a problem, you must resolve it by deciding who is stronger. The
question of might is right and the strongest will win. That is not the
Asian attitude and culture. We try to resolve things by interacting,
having a good discussion around the table, to find out why. It is easy to
condemn Myanmar for not releasing her but we should look at the situation
in Myanmar and it is not a simple one. They have about a hundred different
tribes, all of whom are armed with weapons. And the Government is not only
dealing with Suu Kyi but also with these people. There is a feeling that
so long as you can have democracy, everything is resolved but you see many
countries which are democratic but they cannot resolve their problems
either. They end up in anarchy. So we should not not adopt the
confrontational attitude of the West and Europeans.


Agence France Presse   October 23, 2003
Asian countries still pressing for reforms in Myanmar: Philippines

Asian countries will continue pressing for democratic reforms in Myanmar,
an issue that was sidestepped in the just-concluded Asia Pacific summit,
Philippine foreign secretary Blas Ople said Thursday.

"There was no discussion of Myanmar during the APEC summit even though
many of those present were known and vocal critics of the government of
Myanmar," Ople said in a statement.

But even though Myanmar was not taken up during the APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation) forum in Thailand, Ople said that sentiment over
that country had not changed.

"The Philippines continues to call for the early and safe release of
(detained Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung Sang Suu Kyi) and for the
start in earnest of democratic reforms in Myanmar," Ople said in a
statement.

"Thailand will have an important role to play in this issue and it can
count on the full support of the Philippines," Ople said, adding "we also
welcome China's own efforts to engage Myanmar."

Ople said he expected new developments over Myanmar including a broader
dialogue facilitated by Thailand.

Western nations have been harshly critical of the authoritarian ruling
military junta of Myanmar following the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi
in May.

However Southeast Asian nations have generally been supportive of Yangon's
new "roadmap" to democracy, which envisages free and fair elections and a
new constitution but does not mention a timeframe or say when Aung San Suu
Kyi will be freed.

Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand are members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) along with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.


Mizzima News (www.mizzima.com)   October 23, 2003
Burmese Refugees Fight UNHCR for survival

New Delhi: Since Monday, angry Burmese refugees have been protesting
continuously against the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)'s self-reliance policy.  About 300 refugees were shouting heatedly
and holding the placards reading "UNHCR: Silent Killer" and "We Need
Resettlement" in front of New Delhi office of the UNHCR for the fourth
consecutive day today. Small children wearing school uniforms and young
girls were among the protestors.

The demonstrating Burmese claim that the UNHCR has been cutting the
assistance to them and has been unrealistically pressuring them to work. 
The refugees rejected what they see as a one-sided policy and are
demanding to be sent to a third country.

"Shelter and food are a great problem for us. They [UNHCR] said to work,
but no one can get a job here. If they can't provide assistance, they must
arrange to send us to a third country ", said Marpi, 23 years, who has
lived in Delhi for two years.

 "They just want to do whatever they like.  Their self-reliance policy is
just an imaginary," added a girl next to Marpi about the UNHCR's policy.

Some leaders of Indian political parties have showed their solidarity with
the Burmese refugees. Mr. Annil Hegde, General Secretary of the Samata
party, said in his speech to the Burmese demonstrators: "We are going to
support the Burmese democracy activists who fled their homeland due to
military junta's human rights violations. Their demands are not criminal,
and this is their basic right. We support it."  The Samata party is a part
of the ruling coalition government in India and its leader Mr. George
Fernandes, known for his sympathy with Burmese democracy movement, is
currently Defence Minister.

A UNHCR local officer has rejected the refugees' demands after meeting
with 5 Burmese representatives.  "In regards to the request for
resettlement, this Office at this time, does not consider this as the most
appropriate durable solution. We are thus encouraging Burmese refugees to
embark on training and self-reliance activities, so that they could be
empowered to improve the quality of their living in Delhi", Wei-Meng-Lim,
the UNHCR Officer in Charge, said in a reply letter to refugees on Monday.

Delhi Police, though has so far allowed the Burmese to demonstrate in
front of the UNHCR on Lodhi Road, arrested the demonstrators in evening
and detained them for a couple of hours in the Lodhi Police Station before
releasing them without charges. Even so, the refugees tried to come back
to the UNHCR office and continued their demonstration.

At the night of October 21st, 24 Burmese refugees slept in backyard on the
grounds of UNHCR office. One refugee from this group, Pa Sui told Mizzima
that they would continue their protest until their demands are met.

On October 22nd, the police managed to disperse the refugees who gathered
in front of UNHCR office till late night.

The Delhi-based UNHCR office issued nearly 900 certificates and provided
Rs. 1400 per month for Burmese who fled the homeland after 1988 military
coup. A part of health care expenses are provided additionally. However,
UNHCR imposed " self-reliance policy" in 2003 by boosting language and
basic computer trainings. Then the UNHCR and its partner NGOs started
cutting the allowances.  There was a 30% reduction in first 6 months, and
a 60% reduction in second 6 months to first 30 person batch.

Refugees, however, have appealed to be sent to a third country after they
experienced hardships getting a job in India.  They complained that some
countries are ready to accept them but that the UNHCR is blocking their
way by not providing an approval recommendation letter.

Some refugees believe that the dubious Indian foreign policy influence in
UNHCR, in which they accuse India appeasing Burma's Generals. "This is a
poor country with high rates of unemployment. How can you get a job only
after a few months of computer training?  We can't compete with the
locals," said a refugee who asked to remain anonymous.


----INTERNATIONAL----

Agence France Presse   October 23, 2003
China-EU summit to focus on North Korea, Myanmar and Iraq

A summit between China and the European Union next week will focus on the
nuclear crisis in North Korea, the lack of democracy in Myanmar and the
tense situation in Iraq, the EU said in a statement Thursday.

"This year, the situation in the Korean peninsula will certainly be on the
agenda, as will developments in Burma and the situation in Iraq," the
delegation of the European Commission in China said in a statement.

Although North Korea and Myanmar are widely considered pariah states,
China, which hosts the summit, is a close ally of both.

The EU will be represented at the October 30 meeting by Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the union's current president, European
Commission President Romano Prodi and EU foreign policy chief Javier
Solana.

The Chinese side will be led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and the
European leaders will also meet Chinese President Hu Jintao.

It will be the first occasion for leaders from both sides to meet since a
new Chinese leadership came to power earlier this year.

At the summit, China and the EU are also expected to sign an agreement for
Chinese participation in the European Galileo satellite navigation system,
the statement said.


----OPINION / OTHER----

South China Morning Post   October 23, 2003
Much-needed voice to lead Southeast Asia

The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum in Bangkok this week gave the
region a new voice on an international stage - Thail Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra. He has stepped into a void seemingly vacant since the
downfall of former Indonesian president Suharto five years ago.

Mr Suharto's stature and forceful style of leadership put him naturally at
the helm of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which makes up the
core of Apec. His presence gave impetus to issues Asean tackled and
provided a face for the rest of the world to recognise.

Since his fall in a popular revolt, the region has struggled to find a
replacement. Through economic decline and stagnation following the 1997
financial crisis, Southeast Asia has lost global prominence to its
northern neighbours, China, Japan and South Korea.

During that time, Asean has also been struggling with two levels of
development, prompted by the joining in the late 1990s of Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam. The dynamic economies of Malaysia, Thailand and
Vietnam have fought out of the slump, leaving fellow Asean members behind.

The ever-present threat of terrorism since the Bali bombings a year ago
has further dampened international enthusiasm for the region. By contrast,
the steady growth of China has meant stable investment potential for
foreign investors.

Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has attempted to fill the breach
left by Mr Suharto, but developed nations have not given him the same
measure of respect because of his frequent outbursts against western
values and attitudes. His resignation at the end of the month to make way
for his deputy, Abdullah Badawi, makes the need for a regional voice more
pressing.

Mr Thaksin is the best person for that role. He capably hosted the Apec
meetings and his succinct concluding remarks in presenting the communique
on Tuesday were stamped with authority.

The billionaire telecommunications tycoon is not popular with human rights
groups for his tough stand on drug trafficking and political and ethnic
refugees from Myanmar. Opponents accuse him of using his media empire to
silence critics and push his own political and social agenda.

But Mr Thaksin also has massive support among Thais and was clearly among
friends when rubbing shoulders with Apec leaders. Efforts to broker a free
-trade agreement with China and bring democracy to Myanmar show he is
interested in regionalism as much as Thailand's national concerns.

Southeast Asia needs a strong representative to further its interests. In
the past week, Mr Thaksin has capably shown he can project the region
internationally in a forceful, yet diplomatic, manner.


NCGUB NewsDesk   October 22, 2003
'Roadmap' fever

"Roadmap" fever is picking up in Burma. Since Gen Khin Nyunt, chief of
Burma's Defense Services Intelligence in his new capacity as prime
minister unveiled, what is described by the state-run media in Rangoon as
"seven-point policies and programs of the State", mass rallies are being
held in different cities all over the country to support his roadmap.

The state-sponsored media said the mass rallies were organized by the
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), an association led
and financed by the generals and responsible for the deaths of many
supporters and members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) when
they were brutally attacked near Tabayin on 30 May.

Major Problems

Despite the claim that people are voicing support for the roadmap, no
known politician, political leader, or political organization has
expressed support for it in its entirety.  This is because there are major
problems associated with the SPDC's National Convention.  The most glaring
problems are the SPDC-prescribed "principles" that guide the
constitution-drafting process at the national convention.  The
"principles" of the draft constitution already prepared by the military
provide unlimited power to the "Commander in Chief" of the Defense
Services who is not subject to the constitution, has the power to appoint
25 percent of all members of the "Union, State, and Regional Assemblies"
as well as the ministers of defense, home affairs, and border affairs.

According to the "principles" the President "must have military
experience" and not have "parents, spouse, or children who are foreign
nationals", and he can appoint military personnel as ministers, as well as
the Chief Ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, etc, without being
obliged to comply with the rulings of the Supreme Court.  The President
also delegates all administrative and legislative functions of the state
to organs of the Union but their functions are not derived from the
constitution.

In addition, the SPDC's draft constitution provides no general safeguards
for the people, no human rights protections, and no guarantees for free
speech or freedom of media and association, and so forth.

For these reasons, many political leaders and parties and ethnic
nationality forces have rejected the National Convention in its current
form.  Since Gen Khin Nyunt announced his roadmap on 30 August major
political institutions and leaders have suggested that changes were needed
to make the convention more democratic and representative.   Some of these
comments are discussed below.

The CRPP

The Committee Representing People's Parliament, formed by political
parties and representatives elected in the 1990 elections to act on their
behalf before the Parliament can be convened, said in a statement, "...
prior to the commencement of the convention, the rules of procedure set
down violated democratic principles and were made without consultation or
agreement.  Every rule was autocratically prescribed. The Convention
committee arrived at decisions completely ignoring suggestions of the
delegates.  Consequently, the delegates and representatives of the
political parties attending the convention found it impossible to
participate and some walked out at a very early stage.  Eventually, the
National League for Democracy (NLD) delegates asked for procedural changes
and decided to stay away from the convention in the meantime.  This
absence was used against the NLD and its delegates were expelled by the
Convention Commission.  From then on, there was no progress and the
Convention ceased to function."

The SNLD

Similarly, in an interview with Democratic Voice Burma, U Khun Tun Oo,
chairman of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the party
that won the second highest number of seats in the 1990 elections, said:
"It is not a question of whether the SNLD will re-attend the National
Convention... We will be able to say whether we could attend the
reconvened National Convention only after examining the method of
reconvening it.  It is important to examine whether it is in accordance
with democratic practices... whether the ethnic nationals could represent
their people freely and the like.  What I mean is if all the people
including Daw [Aung San] Suu [Kyi] and all political prisoners are freed
and if the NLD is allowed to attend the convention, the National
Convention would be convenient for all parties."  When asked by DVB if
things didn't turn out as expected, U Khun Tun Oo said, "What choice have
we got? I have already told you our proposals.  Why should we waste our
time by attending the convention?  All we have to do is not to attend the
convention."

The UNA

The United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) made up of eight ethnic
nationality political parties -- Zomi National Congress, Chin National
League for Democracy, the Mon National Democratic Front, the Arakan League
for Democracy, the Karen National Congress for Democracy, the Kachin State
National Congress for Democracy, and the Kayah State all Nationalities
League for Democracy [with seven of them winning seats in the 1990
elections] -- has also rejected the SPDC's National Convention.

UNA Spokesman U Cin Shin Thang, recounting his meeting with the UN Special
Envoy said that he had told Mr Razali that "if a National Convention
beneficial to the country is really to be convened then first and foremost
it is important that the NLD, the ethnic groups, and the SPDC should hold
free and fair talks prior to convening the National Convention. Next, the
National Convention Convening Commission should be formed with members
mutually agreed to by all parties at the talks. Then, if the National
Convention is to be convened a definite start and end date should be
stipulated. Furthermore, during that time, a transitional government or a
similar form of government should see to the administration of the nation.
If the National Convention is convened after all these matters have been
accomplished, then it could be considered fair and in accord with the
desire of the people and we would accept it. Otherwise, if the SPDC is
trying to revive the old National Convention, which is not in accord with
the wishes of the people, then the people would not accept and it would
not work."

The UNLD

U Htaung Kho Htan, elected representative of Sagaing Division's Tamu
Township Constituency, and a leader of the United Nationalities League for
Democracy (UNLD) -- an alliance of 26 ethnic nationality parties and two
independent elected representatives, which has now been banned by the SPDC
-- told Radio Free Asia that a meeting of the UNLD held on 6 September
made a five-point decision:  (1) The UNLD will not accept the roadmap of
the SPDC, (2) It wants immediate and unconditional release of all
political prisoners arrested between 1988 and now, (3) It believes that
without talks taking place between the SPDC and the NLD, the political
process in Burma will not advance any further, (4) All political parties
should be allowed to be politically active in accordance with democratic
practices, and (5) It wants an impartial inquiry to investigate the
Tabayin incident since it happened in a peaceful and tranquil nation where
rule of law prevails.

The NUP

The National Unity Party (NUP), formerly the Burma Socialist Program
Party, was the favorite of the military in the 1990 elections but has
since lost the favor of the generals.  The party, which is still led by
former military officials, won 10 seats in the elections.  Even the NUP
has avoided expressing support for the SPDC's roadmap.  In a statement
released recently on the 15th founding anniversary of the party, the NUP
avoided mentioning the National Convention, and said the party "profoundly
believes that advancement along the correct path toward the envisaged goal
can be achieved only if the process of democratic transition is
implemented systematically with a focus and belief that all existing
confrontations must be avoided and all internal problems resolved through
negotiation between the parties in the country."

The Cease-Fire Groups

At a "tripartite" meeting held in Panghsang, 13-15 October, three armed
ethnic nationality forces --- the Mong La, Shan, and Wa groups -- which
have concluded cease-fire agreement with the SPDC, agreed on a five-point
position as a prerequisite for the National Convention.  According to
their joint statement, the three armed ethnic forces wanted:  "(1) Freedom
of meeting among leaders of ethnic nationalities prior to the convening of
the National Convention, (2) Delegates to the National Convention to be
chosen freely by each nationality concerned, (3) The National Convention
must be all inclusive and participated in by 'proper' delegates, (4)
Freedom of discussion and freedom of activities during the National
Convention, and (5) To lay down democratic principles in order to
establish a modern and developed new democratic state.  The National
Convention being deemed as central to the resolution of our internal
problems, we have agreed to send delegates to attend it if we are invited
under the principles of Adherence to democratic norms, Equality and
Coordination."

Nai Banya Mon of the New Mon State Party, in an interview with the
Democratic Voice of Burma, said, "It would be very difficult for our party
to accept the invitation to attend the National Convention if it is
similar to the previous one.  The delegates should be genuinely chosen,
they should be freely selected by their own group, and they should have
the right to discuss freely at the National Convention.  Then only will a
reasonable outcome emerge for our country to solve all its prevailing
problems.  We have discovered that the roadmap of new Prime Minister Gen
Khin Nyunt has provided no definite details.  In regard to this condition,
our delegates were not included in the previous National Convention and
the current roadmap has no definite provisions.  That being the case, we
would like to say that our party is adopting a wait-and-see attitude
regarding the new National Convention."

The Kachin Independence Organization, according to a DVB report of 12
September, has urged the SPDC to change the way delegates are selected to
the National Convention.  KIO Central Committee Member James said, "Let's
say that we will be discussing at the National Convention.  We, that is
the KIO, represent an organization that has secured peace.  But, it will
not be purposeful if the KIO and the SPDC are the only two organizations
that discuss the future of Burma.  If political party representatives of
the people and ethnic representatives who represent the ethnic people and
the ethnic revolutionary forces show broadmindedness and understanding to
each other, progress can be made in, for instance, the holding of a
National Convention, drafting of a constitution, and gradually holding of
elections.  We believe that taking everybody's vision into account and
making everybody contribute to the collective efforts are practical and
hence we wrote that letter."

Views of Others

The Australian Federal Parliament Joint Standing Committee

The way SPDC had conducted the National Convention had long been
criticized by the international community.  The Australian Federal
Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Trade's inquiry into Human Rights and Progress Towards Democracy in Burma
found that the Convention was not representative nor a forum for free
discussion and further that the claims of the work of the Convention
outlined by the junta had failed the test of scrutiny.

Special Rapporteur on Human Rights

Judge Rajsoomer Lallah, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, in his report of October 1996 said, "In November 1995, the NLD
withdrew from the convention in protest at the lack of democratic rights
within the forum, removing any semblance of legitimacy the National
Convention might have had. Since March 1996 there have been no further
meetings of the convention. There are no other signs that the SLORC
intends to honor its original pledge and its international obligations (in
particular, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) by
transferring power to those duly elected in 1990."

Inter-Parliamentary Union

The Governing Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva held its
173rd session on 3 October and unanimously adopted a resolution.  The
resolution in part says that the council, "Expresses serious doubts about
the recently presented 'road map', step one of which suggests that the
National Convention to be reconvened; reaffirms its conviction that the
National Convention is designed to prolong and legitimize military rule
against the will of the people, as expressed in the 1990 elections, and
thus stands in direct opposition to the principle enshrined the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights that the 'will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government'."

A Distant Dream

In sum, the SPDC's National Convention hopes to perpetuate the current
leading role of the military in national politics while at the same time
ensuring political opposition and dissidents remain under tight control. 
Hence, it is not surprising to see political leaders rejecting the SPDC
initiative.  No self-respecting legitimate political party in Burma is
expected to declare its support for the SPDC roadmap either. The hope of
gaining political legitimacy through the National Convention will continue
to be a distant dream for the generals as long as they refuse to
compromise.


Asia Pacific Defence Reporter   October 2003
Myanmar and North Korea: Birds of a Feather?
By Frank Downs

Bilateral relations between Myanmar and North Korea were abruptly severed
in 1983, after Pyongyang sent secret agents to Rangoon to conduct a
terrorist attack against a visiting South Korean Presidential delegation.
Formal diplomatic ties have still not been restored. However, with both
facing international isolation and deep-seated economic problems, these
two pariah states seem to have found some common ground. Depending on how
it develops, this relationship could extend beyond mutual support to have
much wider strategic implications.

Relations Before 1983

Before 1983, both North and South Korea had diplomatic missions in Myanmar
(then known as Burma). The two sides actively engaged in open competition
for Rangoon’s support in international forums like the United Nations. If
Seoul sent an official delegation of any kind to Myanmar, then it was soon
followed by a similar group from Pyongyang. Privately, the Ne Win
government expressed exasperation with the succession of special envoys,
parliamentary friendship groups and cultural troupes from the two Koreas
but, in keeping with Myanmar’s avowed policy of strict neutrality in
international affairs, it gave them all roughly equal attention. Both
Koreas were officially recognised (from 1975), and the diplomatic
interests of one were always weighed carefully against those of the other.
Official visits to Pyongyang, such as that by the Myanmar Foreign Minister
in 1982, were usually followed by similar visits to Seoul. China was a
special case, but at the time much the same even-handed policy was
followed with regard to other divided countries competing for Myanmar’s
attention and support, like Vietnam and Germany.

In October 1983, however, this relationship with the two Koreas changed
dramatically. Just before a state visit to Myanmar by the South Korean
president, Chun Doo-hwan, North Korea smuggled three agents into the
country with the help of its embassy in Rangoon. Despite specific warnings
from South Korea’s Central Intelligence Agency, and the extensive security
measures put in place by Myanmar’s Military Intelligence Service (MIS),
the North Korean agents succeeded in planting a remotely-controlled bomb
in the roof of the Martyrs’ Mausoleum. The South Korean party was
scheduled to pay its respects at the outdoor shrine, which was dedicated
to Myanmar’s nationalist hero, Aung San, and those assassinated with him
in 1947 on the eve of Myanmar’s independence from the British. Due to a
bizarre chain of events, the full details of which have never been
revealed, the bomb was detonated prematurely. President Chun himself had
not yet arrived at the shrine, and so escaped injury, but 17 officials
from South Korea, including four Cabinet ministers and the South Korean
ambassador, were killed in the explosion. Fourteen Myanmar citizens were
wounded.

The reaction of the Ne Win government to this outrage was swift and
decisive. The three North Korean agents, who had not yet escaped from
Myanmar, were immediately hunted down. One committed suicide, while the
two others were captured alive (one with injuries resulting from a failed
suicide attempt). One of those captured was later executed, while the
third (who apparently gave the Myanmar and South Korean authorities full
details of the terrorist operation) was sentenced to a lengthy prison
term. (He remains in Rangoon’s Insein Gaol to this day, enjoying special
privileges and studying Buddhism). In early November 1983, after it was
formally determined by the Myanmar authorities that the attack was
perpetrated by North Korean agents with the help of locally-based
officials, diplomatic relations with Pyongyang were severed. The North
Korean embassy was closed and its 12 members of staff were given 48 hours
to leave the country. Such was Ne Win’s anger at the incident, that his
government took the further step of withdrawing recognition of North Korea
as a sovereign state.

In the years that followed, North Korea made a number of attempts, mainly
through intermediaries like China and the members of the Soviet bloc, to
restore relations with Myanmar. It even offered to pay a considerable
amount of money in indemnity and to provide millions of dollars in
economic aid, as a way of compensating for the terrorist attack. Pyongyang
also offered to send a high ranking envoy to Rangoon to offer Kim
Il-sung’s personal apologies. However, for the next seven years, Myanmar
kept the North Koreans at arms length, while gradually strengthening its
bilateral relationship with South Korea. Bilateral trade between Myanmar
and North Korea was permitted to continue (and even grow), but Rangoon’s
reluctance to re-establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang was
strengthened in 1987, when two North Korean terrorists sabotaged a South
Korean airliner, killing all 115 people on board. Ironically, the mid-air
bombing occurred in Myanmar’s air space, over the Andaman Sea, as the
aircraft was travelling from Abu Dhabi to Bangkok. As a result of that
attack, North Korea was added to the United States’ official list of
international terrorism sponsors.

Relations After 1988

After the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, brutally crushed a massive
democratic uprising in 1988, and took back direct control of the country,
the new military regime (known as the State Law and Order Restoration
Council, or SLORC) was severely criticised by the international community,
in particular the Western democracies and Japan. Rangoon also suffered a
range of political and economic sanctions, including a ban on arms sales
from its traditional suppliers.

Despite these measures, since then the Rangoon regime has implemented an
ambitious military expansion and modernisation program. Over the past 15
years, the Myanmar armed forces have doubled in size, making them now the
second largest in Southeast Asia, and the 15th largest in the world. New
command and control structures have been put in place, and capabilities in
key support areas like intelligence, communications and logistics have
been substantially upgraded. The country’s military infrastructure has
been improved. In addition, all three Services have received major
injections of arms and equipment. The Myanmar Army has acquired a wide
range of armour, towed and self-propelled artillery, transport, small arms
and communications equipment. The air force has purchased more than 150
helicopters, fighters, ground attack, transport and training aircraft. The
Myanmar Navy too has expanded dramatically, with new corvettes, missile
patrol boats, offshore patrol boats and riverine craft. Most of these new
weapon systems have come from China and Russia, but there have been a
number of other suppliers, including North Korea.

Formal diplomatic relations between Rangoon and Pyongyang have still not
been restored, and privately Myanmar officials remain highly critical of
North Korea’s terrorist attack in 1983. President Ne Win was personally
very embarrassed by the incident, and soon afterwards instituted a major
restructuring of Myanmar’s intelligence services. The army officer
appointed to reform the discredited MIS was the then Colonel Khin Nyunt,
now the third most powerful member of the country’s ruling body (known
since 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC). Memories
of this turbulent period are thus still fresh in the minds of the current
military leadership. However, faced with continuing arms embargoes, and
the perceived need to obtain a wide range of new weapons and equipment for
its greatly expanded armed forces, the Rangoon regime cannot afford to be
too discriminating in its choice of suppliers. It is also likely that, for
strategic reasons, the SPDC is keen to diversify the source of its arms,
even at the risk of upsetting its close ally, China.

Given the closed nature of both the Rangoon and Pyongyang governments, and
their shared obsession with secrecy about any national security issues,
details of such arms sales are difficult to obtain. However, it would
appear that in 1990 Myanmar purchased 20 million rounds of 7.62mm AK47
rifle ammunition from North Korea. Several observers have suggested that
the ammunition was destined for the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an ethnic
insurgent group based in Myanmar’s far northeast which had just signed a
controversial ceasefire agreement with Rangoon. Given the UWSA’s
continuing involvement in the narcotics trade, which China officially
condemned, it would have been too embarrassing for the Myanmar authorities
to ask China for this ammunition. Also, in late 1999, Rangoon is believed
to have purchased between 12 and 16 130mm M-46 field guns from North
Korea. While based on a 1950s Russian design, these weapons were battle
tested and comparatively cheap. They significantly increased Myanmar’s
long range artillery capabilities, which were then very weak. Other sales
of military equipment may have occurred in recent years.

The first arms deal appears to have been arranged through Thai or
Singaporean intermediaries, probably because of the continuing lack of
formal relations. The latter purchase, however, followed an unofficial
visit to Pyongyang by the Myanmar Army’s Director of Procurement in June
1999. This change of approach reflected the significantly improved ties
between Rangoon and Pyongyang. In both cases, there appears to have been a
strong element of barter trade involved. Myanmar was, and remains,
desperately short of foreign exchange, but produces rice and other primary
products for export. North Korea has a massive domestic arms industry, and
is happy to sell weapons to whichever country wants them. However, it was
facing a widespread famine and, even now, malnutrition is a major problem.
The way was thus open for the Rangoon regime to pay for its North Korean
weapons with rice – even second grade broken rice that was unacceptable
for sale on the world market. The needs of both sides were well served.

It would appear, however, that such barter arrangements have not been
sufficient to meet Rangoon’s wish for more sophisticated, and expensive,
weapon systems. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, in 2002 the SPDC
opened discussions with North Korea on the purchase of one or two small
submarines. One design considered was the Yugo class midget submarine, a
23 metre long diesel electric boat which displaced 70 tonnes dived.
Another was the Sang-O class mini submarine. Displacing 360 tonnes dived,
it could be built for either attack or reconnaissance. North Korea had
already sold two of this class to Vietnam. Rangoon ultimately opted to
purchase the Sang-O, but was reportedly forced to abandon the deal in
early 2003. The Rangoon regime has been interested in acquiring a
submarine for some time, and has even sent a number of Myanmar Navy
officers to Pakistan in recent years to undergo unspecified ‘submarine
training’. However, it appears that the cost of the Sang-O, and perhaps
belated recognition of the technical difficulties of keeping it
operational, seem to have scuppered the deal, at least for the time being.

North Korea may, however, be helping the Myanmar Navy in other ways. In
July 2003 it was reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review that between
15 and 20 North Korean technicians had been seen at the Monkey Point naval
base in Rangoon, and at a Defence Ministry guest house in a northern
suburb of the capital. According to this report, the technicians were
believed to be helping Myanmar to equip some of their naval vessels with
surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). Myanmar currently has six Houxin guided
missile patrol boats based at Monkey Point, each armed with four C-801
SSMs. These weapon systems were acquired from China, however, and if there
were any requirement for repairs or upgrades, Rangoon would probably turn
to Beijing for that help. It is more likely that the North Koreans are
installing SSMs on the navy’s four Myanmar class coastal patrol boats,
which have been built in local shipyards. Displacing 213 tons, these
vessels are 45 metres long and have a compliment of 34 officers and men.
It has long been suspected that they would eventually be fitted with SSMs.

There have also been suggestions that Myanmar, or at least Myanmar
nationals, are assisting North Korea in its clandestine efforts to market
drugs to the rest of the world, as part of a range of illegal activities
conducted by Pyongyang to secure desperately needed hard currency. For
example, the 125 kg of heroin seized from a North Korean cargo vessel off
the eastern coast of Australia in April 2003 was packaged in bags carrying
the Double U O Globe brand, a trademark of narcotics trafficking groups
based in the Myanmar-Thailand-Laos Golden Triangle region. Also, there
have been news media reports, quoting North Korean defectors, that drug
merchants from Myanmar have visited Pyongyang. Some of these visitors have
reportedly advised the North Koreans on how to improve the quality of
their own locally-produced heroin. Although the Rangoon regime is clearly
complicit in narcotics trafficking from Myanmar, it is unlikely that the
SPDC would itself directly provide Pyongyang with heroin for resale.

None of these developments seem to have harmed Myanmar’s bilateral
relationship with South Korea, which has grown rapidly since the Rangoon
regime introduced its new ‘open door’ economic policies in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. There is some evidence that a South Korean company made
at least one shipment of M-16 rifle ammunition to Myanmar soon after the
1988 military takeover. However, probably under pressure from Washington,
Seoul subsequently agreed to observe the arms embargoes that were being
applied against Rangoon. This policy was strengthened after the election
of Kim Dae Jung to the South Korean presidency in 1997. Kim, who had
himself suffered lengthy imprisonment at the hands of a military
dictatorship for dissident views, was a strong supporter of Myanmar’s
democratic leader (and fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureate) Aung San Suu
Kyi. Despite these differences, however, bilateral trade has flourished.
Before the imposition of the latest US economic sanctions, and consequent
adverse impact on Myanmar’s light industrial sector, South Korean
investments in Myanmar were running at about US$120 million. There is even
a small Korean aid program.

The Future

Before July 2003, regional observers were suggesting that, despite signs
of some defence links between Myanmar and North Korea, both sides were
still treating each other with caution. After the further deterioration in
US-North Korean relations, and Pyongyang’s highly provocative declaration
of a nuclear weapons program, it was thought unlikely that the SPDC would
want to rush into a close relationship with Kim Jong-il’s volatile and
unpopular government. However, a number of recent developments have
prompted reconsideration of these views.

Revelations this year of the Rangoon regime’s arms purchases from
Pyongyang, its interest in acquiring North Korean submarines, and the
reports of North Korean naval technicians in Rangoon, all suggest that the
bilateral defence relationship is further advanced than was earlier
believed. Also, since the SPDC’s violent attack against Aung San Suu Kyi
in June 2003, and the very strong international reaction to her subsequent
imprisonment, Myanmar has joined North Korea as one of the world’s most
vilified and isolated states. Some US commentators have suggested that
Myanmar should be added to President Bush’s “axis of evil”, and made to
suffer accordingly. Even Myanmar’s fellow ASEAN states have been critical
of the SPDC’s latest crackdown on pro-democracy elements. In these
circumstances, the Rangoon regime is likely to be feeling even more
threatened and insecure than before, and thus more likely to seek to
increase the deterrent value of its armed forces. If Myanmar’s military
leadership cannot obtain the weapon systems it wants to achieve this from
other arms suppliers, then it may once again turn to fellow pariah state
North Korea.

There have already been a number of disturbing signs that the military
government in Rangoon may wish to acquire strategic weapon systems. In
addition to submarines, the SPDC is believed to want some short range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to defend itself against external intervention.
In the late 1990s, for example, there was an unconfirmed report
circulating among the diplomatic community in Rangoon that China had
agreed ‘in principle’ to sell Myanmar a batch of M-11 SRBMs, similar to
those which Beijing had reportedly provided to Pakistan in the mid-1990s.
However, it appears that none of these missiles, which have a range of
about 300 kilometres, were ever delivered to the Myanmar armed forces.
More recently, there have been rumours that Rangoon may now be interested
in acquiring a number of Hwasong (Scud-type) SRBMs from North Korea.
According to open sources, the latest variants of this missile are capable
of ranges of up to 500 kilometres.

For China to sell M-11s to Myanmar would have been a highly provocative
step that would have severely damaged Beijing’s vital (and currently quite
positive) relationship with Washington. The reaction from Myanmar’s
neighbours, notably Thailand and India, to any such sales would have also
been very strong, and potentially quite harmful to China’s long term
interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet North Korea has few such
concerns. It desperately needs the foreign exchange (or barter goods)
commanded by arms sales that, technically at least, are currently legal
under international law. Based on its past history of such weapons deals,
Pyongyang would probably not be inclined to place much weight on the
feelings of other countries. Indeed, it could argue that the sale of SRBMs
to isolated and poverty-stricken Myanmar would be no more controversial
than the sale of such missiles to Yemen (briefly intercepted on the high
seas by the US and its allies) earlier this year.

The Myanmar armed forces currently have no real strategic rationale for
acquiring submarines or SRBMs. Despite the constant fears of the military
leadership, no country or multinational coalition is likely to attack
Myanmar. Also, at their present stage of development the armed forces
would find it extremely difficult to maintain and operate such complex
weapon systems. However, in the past, the military government in Rangoon
has not been dissuaded by such arguments from embarking on ambitious
purchases of this kind - as evidenced by its purchase in recent years of
MiG-29 interceptors and a nuclear reactor from Russia. Questions of status
and prestige, and the perceived need for a deterrent against its external
enemies, are very strong factors driving Myanmar’s military acquisition
programs. With this in mind, it is conceivable that, one day, the region
may see the delivery of North Korean submarines and SRBMs to the Myanmar
armed forces. This could occur even without the restoration of formal
diplomatic relations between these old enemies.

Of even greater concern to some strategic analysts is the (albeit very
remote) possibility that the SPDC may have drawn the same conclusions from
the 2003 Iraq War as North Korea appears to have done, and will eventually
seek to acquire a nuclear weapon to use as a bargaining chip against the
US and its allies. The small nuclear reactor Myanmar has purchased from
Russia is said to be unsuited for the manufacture of fissile material, but
Pyongyang has the expertise to provide Rangoon with other options. North
Korea also has a record of proliferating nuclear technologies, for example
to Pakistan. The thought of Myanmar abandoning its long-held policy of
support for international nuclear disarmament initiatives, and seeking to
acquire a nuclear weapon, is the stuff of nightmares in the Asia-Pacific
region, and in capitals like Washington. While still highly unlikely, it
is nevertheless a scenario which is made a little more credible by
Rangoon’s continuing fears of external intervention, its growing
relationship with Pyongyang, their shared political isolation and
readiness to do almost anything to survive.