BurmaNet News, April 7, 2004

[Editor]

April 7, 2004 Issue # 2451

INSIDE BURMA
Irrawaddy: Attack on Burmese Embassy in Malaysia Condemned by Junta
Kao Wao News: Aids threat growing in southern Mon state
DVB: Appeal lodged for 3 Burmese sentenced to death

BUSINESS / MONEY
Asia Times: Bumpy road Thai-China trade efficiency

REGIONAL
Associated Press: Disgruntled Myanmar nationals attack embassy in
Malaysia, injure senior diplomat, raze building
Reuters: Arson Attack Guts Myanmar's Malaysia Embassy

OPINION / OTHER
Irrawaddy: Pariah Partners in Arms
Mizzima News: Compromising with the Burmese Generals
FEER: Perennial Poser

LETTERS
FEER: Inconsistencies

PRESS RELEASE
Asian Legal Resource Centre: Abuses of migrant workers in Thailand


INSIDE BURMA
___________________________________

April 7, Irrawaddy
Attack on Burmese Embassy in Malaysia Condemned by Junta - Pauline Jasudason
Associated Press/Kuala Lumpur

Three men armed with firebombs, machetes and an ax attacked Burma’s
embassy in Malaysia Wednesday, hacking one senior official and starting a
blaze that destroyed the building, officials and witnesses said.

Police arrested the three suspects, Burmese nationals who had been turned
away from the embassy on Tuesday after demanding that officials endorse
documents claiming that a relative was a freedom fighter in the country,
also known as Burma.

The three were from Burma’s Rohinga ethnic group who believed the
documents could help them win political asylum status from the UN High
Commission for Refugees, a police official said.

They returned about 9:30 am Wednesday, scaled the embassy’s outer wall and
began shouting demands and waving their weapons, including plastic bags
filled with gasoline, Myint Thein Win, the mission’s second secretary,
told reporters.

The eight officials on duty locked themselves inside the embassy, and when
a senior diplomat went outside to talk to the attackers, he was attacked
with the ax and suffered head and hand injuries, Myint Thein Win said.

"They started to throw petrol in plastic bags at the building and set
fire," he said. "They tried to burn the ambassador’s car. The minister
counselor was attacked with an ax."

Police arrived soon afterward and arrested the four suspects, who would be
charged with attempted murder, arson and not having proper travel papers.
The other embassy staff escaped without injury, Myint Thein Win said.

Burma's military government condemned the "premeditated and dastardly
attack" and announced that security at its diplomatic missions worldwide
has been stepped up.

They started to throw petrol in plastic bags at the building and set fire.
They tried to burn the ambassador’s car. The minister counselor was
attacked with an ax. —Myint Thein Win, Burmese embassy’s second secretary

"The Myanmar [Burma] government is fully confident that [the culprits]
will be punished with the full force of the law for this cowardly attack
on the embassy and for the assault on one of its members," it said in a
statement issued in Rangoon.

A Kuala Lumpur Fire Services Department official said more than 30
firefighters were dispatched to the embassy—in the diplomatic district of
downtown Kuala Lumpur—shortly before 10 am and found the small two-story
building ablaze.

The fire was brought under control within about 30 minutes, but not before
"the office block was destroyed," the spokesman said.

Witnesses, including an Associated Press photographer, described the
building as being completely gutted by the fire.

Tens of thousands of immigrants from Burma live in Malaysia, which is one
of Southeast Asia’s wealthiest countries and a magnet for migrant workers.
Malaysia also attracts hundreds of asylum seekers who claim they face
persecution from Burma’s military rulers.

The fire is the second security breach at a diplomatic mission in Kuala
Lumpur in the past eight days, though they appear to be unrelated.

On March 30, someone threw an explosive device at Australia’s High
Commission in the city, scorching an outer wall but causing no major
damage or injuries. Police said the device was a bottle filled with
firecracker powder. No arrests have been made.

_____________________________________

April 6, Kao Wao News
Aids threat growing in southern Mon state - Taramon and Lita Davidson

HIV infection in Ye township

According to a township hospital blood test report taken between 2001 to
2003, over one thousand individuals are infected with AIDS/HIV in Ye
township alone, there are 10 townships in Mon State.

“Because many HIV patients don’t visit the hospital, the figure could be
more than what the official records say.  The local hospital does not
provide free treatment, but will to those who can afford to pay bribes to
the health workers”, Su-Rein, a community leader from the city said.

According to one local medic, “Approximately ten thousand people in Ye
township could be HIV positive, many suffer from AIDS but hide their
condition from fear of discrimination”.

“Many victims are not able to go to the hospital but suffer in isolation. 
About 5% of 200,000 total populations in this area are HIV positive,” Nai
Soe, a community leader in Ye said.  Some AIDS patients who can afford it
have a doctor visit their house for treatment.

But according to Care Myanmar health worker Nai Rehmonya from Ye township,
there are 250 AIDS patients in Mon State, 57 of which are in Ye township.
Care Myanmar has launched a campaign awareness program about the deadly
epidemic around Mon State.

Rehmonya said there is no counseling available between doctors and
patients on how to deal with the situation. No preventive education on
AIDS is reaching the marginalized communities, where a radical approach is
needed to address the AIDS problem in the whole of the country, but
migrant workers in Mon State, a high risk population, need access to
health facilities and education, given that migrant workers from Burma
make up the largest percentage of migrant labourers in Thailand.

Statistics on AIDS in Burma is difficult to verify, UN Reports have been
criticized by many, especially BBC’s Larry Jagan who claims that the UN’s
reports are 2 years behind, where 2 percent of the population could be
infected. AIDS expert Dr. Chris Beyrer states that 4 percent of the
population could be infected; some think it may be as high as 7 percent. 
See full report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1562405.stm

Burma is one of the poorest countries in the region and receives the least
help from NGOs compared to Thailand and Cambodia in fighting the disease;
few donors are willing to assist a country under a military dictatorship.
(Please see: Treat Asia
http://www.amfar.org/cgi-bin/iowa/asia/index.html)

If at least 3 percent are infected, over a million people will need access
to some kind of drug treatment. But having access to drugs is a pipedream
considering the World Health Organization’s recent launching of its 3
million by 2005 ART program to 34 high burden countries. Burma, the
highest rate of HIV in Southeast Asia is not even in the lineup to receive
help.

The military government needs to face up to facts and present their case
in the upcoming International AIDS convention to be held in Bangkok in
July 2004. "A coordinated national response is now an absolute priority if
transmission through commercial sex and injecting drug use is to be
curbed," UNAIDS said in its December epidemic update. (Yangoon, Reuters,
March 19, 2004)

Intravenous drug users and the worst hit in Burma have been getting some
help, Médecins Sans Frontières has introduced the first antiretroviral
(ARV) treatment program in the country which began in February 2003 in
Yangon, where it was first detected in 1988; by October 2003, but only 80
people are under treatment (MSF international homepage).

But other segments of the population lack access, especially migrant
workers, those working in the mines, fishing industry and the sex
industry. When compared on a global level it should be cause for grave
concern because Burma’s lack of access to professional care and
antiretroviral drug therapy for treating people with AIDS will profoundly
affect the future of the country.

“Lack of access to antiretroviral therapy (ART) is a global health
emergency. To deliver antiretroviral treatment to the millions who need
it, we must change the way we think and change the way we act.” LEE
Jong-wook, Director-General, World Health Organization, recently said.

Northern Ye Township of Mon State captures the magnitude of the problem;
Mi Pakao Mu from Lamine said many women including some of her friends in
the village got HIV from their husbands who worked in Singapore and
Malaysia before they got married. Most of them have died from the disease
leaving their widows infected and alone to bring up their children.  To
make matters worse, the community frowns on people who have AIDS and the
infected families try to cover their stories to avoid being stigmatized.

In Mon state, northern Ye township is the most HIV infected region because
many people in these areas work as migrant labourers, a high risk
population that moves around a lot and visits brothel houses for pleasure.
 Nai Rehmonya estimated that about one hundred people die every year in Ye
from the deadly disease.

_____________________________________

April 6, Democratic Voice of Burma
Appeal lodged for 3 Burmese sentenced to death

Lawyers representing three Burmese citizens who were given death sentence
by Burma’s military junta, State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
lodged an appeal at the Central Court in Rangoon on 6 April.

U Shwe Mahn, Naing Minn Kyi and U Aye Myint were sentenced to death on 29
November 2003 by a district court in Rangoon for allegedly giving false
information on the forced labour practice in Burma to the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) along with other six political activists.

Naing Ngwe Ya, one of the lawyers representing the nine defendants argued
that the authorities found no incriminating evidence against the accused
and they all should be released unconditionally.

Other six defendants including an editor of the sports journal ‘First
Eleven’ Ko Zaw Thet Htway were accused of plotting to assassinate the SPDC
leaders.

Source: Democratic Voice of Burma, Oslo, in Burmese 1430 gmt 6 Apr 04


BUSINESS / MONEY
_____________________________________

April 8, Asia Times
Bumpy road Thai-China trade efficiency - David Fullbrook

CHIANG RAI, Thailand - Last year's free-trade agreement (FTA) between
China and Thailand has provoked both hope and fear in northern Thailand's
Chiang Rai province, feelings exacerbated by efforts to make road, river
and rail routes between the two countries, via Laos and Myanmar, faster
and more efficient. Indeed, with better transport comes increasing
opportunity as Thailand becomes an export route to the world for China's
isolated hinterlands.

And trade with China is not one-way - Thai exports of tropical fruit such
as durian, along with commodities such as rice, rubber and palm oil, are
rising.

Trade with China through Chiang Rai currently is worth about 6 billion
baht (US$153 million) a year, with Thailand officially enjoying a 1
billion baht surplus. A sharp increase is expected as infrastructure and
trade monitoring improves, with the balance likely to tip in China's
favor.

"We are not sure if the surplus really goes to Thailand, because border
trade is not yet under the international trade system - some goods that
come from Laos or Myanmar may actually originate in China," said Sermchai
Kittirattanapaiboon, president of the Chiang Rai Chamber of Commerce.

Regardless, goods from China are spreading quickly along shelves in
Thailand thanks to the FTA. Some stores even are stocked only with Chinese
products.

According to Sermchai, such is the rising tide of Chinese exports, and
Thais must learn to adapt, riding the wave rather than trying to turn it
back. "Thailand must find more goods to export, encourage Chinese
companies to invest in Chiang Rai, [and encourage] Chinese tourists and
Thais with skills and knowledge to invest in China. Thailand needs to
position itself as a service center for China and as a gateway to the West
for China," Sermchai said.

Gains for Chiang Rai and the rest of Thailand will outweigh the pain of
reinventing the economy in the long term, said Wuttilert
Narawitthayanurak, general manager for shipping agency Northern Intertrade
and Service's Chiang Saen port bureau. "Overall I think the positive
impacts will outweigh the negative impacts," he said. "There will be more
jobs, more Chinese tourists and more Chinese businessmen" in Thailand.

That said, Chiang Rai harbors big hopes that many more Chinese tourists
will arrive overland, especially if visa-free travel is approved. If so,
"the permit will allow them [Chinese tourists] to visit for a week, which
will give them just enough time to visit the sea, which many have never
seen," said Wuttilert.

FTA doesn't please everyone
Not everybody is pleased by the FTA, however. Traders fume that
commodities such as rice, oil and gas take a month or longer to reach
Chinese customers because they must be shipped via Laem Chabang, a deepsea
port near Bangkok, to Shanghai. Exporting directly from Chiang Rai to
China's Yunnan province would be cheaper and much quicker, and though
officials such as Sermchai use every opportunity to promote new trade
routes, for now the situation remains the same.

In addition, Thai exporters think China needs to work harder at
implementing the deal. "Communication between Beijing and local government
is not clear. So, for example, this means local authorities are still
collecting taxes abolished by the FTA," said Wuttilert. By the time the
roads, ports and factories are finished, bureaucrats in all four countries
may have ironed out most of the trade kinks - at least that is where hopes
lie. Problems impeding trade on the Thai side involve many government
agencies, including trade offices and safety inspectors, which are not in
Chiang Rai province where they should be, said Wuttilert.

Banking is another bugbear, however, Wuttilert offers a solution:
"Standardizing banking practices for trade between the two countries would
greatly help in solving trade problems," he said.

Still, many Thais worry that Chinese imports will destroy local factories
and efforts to grow temperate produce in the northern provinces. They also
fear competition from Chinese entrepreneurs. Chinese businessmen are
already buying businesses or starting new ones in Chiang Rai and beyond.
This year, work will start on an industrial park near the Golden
Triangle's Chiang Saen, which will house "clean" factories paid for by
Chinese investors.

By 2007, with the clearing of reefs and rapids crucial to fish breeding,
300-tonne freighters will move down the Mekong River plying between
Jinghong, China, and a new port that will replace Chiang Saen's old,
congested port. Canalization may follow, allowing vessels five times as
large as the current 100-tonne limit to sail among the two countries.

"Once completed, the [new port] will benefit Chiang Rai and China trade,
providing more opportunities and security for local people," said Sriprom
Homyog, Chiang Rai's vice governor.

River trade has problems, though. Sailing is restricted to every third day
as China diverts water to fill two new Mekong dams in Yunnan province. At
least six more will follow over the next decade. As an alternative, "the
Thai government and private sector are seeking to develop land routes",
said Wuttilert.

New trade routes are faster, less hassle
Faster roads are crucial for Thailand's tropical fruit, which can perish
on the three-day boat trip to Jinghong. A trip between Thailand's Mae Sai
border post via Myanmar's Kyaing Tong and Yunnan province's largest city,
Jinghong, now takes about 12 hours, rather than two or three days, after
the rebuilt Route 3 West was officially opened in March.

Export formalities will consume less time too. "A one-stop service center
will also be built on 200 rai [32 hectares] of land, opening next year.
Already a temporary center has been established," said Sriprom.

Bumps remain, though. "Domestic politics in Myanmar are, however, a
problem, as the road passes through different ethnic territories. Hence
the Thai government's efforts to improve relations with Myanmar and foster
a better political climate there through the Bagan process and roadmap,"
said Wuttilert.

A less-troubled alternative will be completed in 2006. Work on Route 3
East through Laos, linking Chiang Kong, another Chiang Rai Mekong port,
with Jinghong, should start this year. The $90 million bill for the
project will be footed by China, Thailand and the Asian Development Bank.

Next year the Kunming-Jinghong six-lane highway will open. A new four-lane
highway also will bypass Chiang Saen, with its medieval temple ruins,
running direct from the new port, being built a few miles south of town,
to Chiang Rai and other highways leading south.

Chiang Rai is earmarked for railways as well. "Some studies have been done
and the government even started buying land for the route, but this
stopped because the government is considering switching the Thai railway
gauge to the wider Chinese gauge," said Sermchai.

China, however, is considering building a railway through Laos into
central Thailand. "I expect the [Chinese] railway will be finished in five
to six years," said Sriprom.

Whichever comes to pass, a new rail route will connect Mekong ports and
Mae Sai to Laem Chabang, which offers a shortcut to world markets for
central China, up to four weeks away from clogged east coast ports by
sclerotic roads and rail freight.


REGIONAL
_____________________________________

April 7, Associated Press
Disgruntled Myanmar nationals attack embassy in Malaysia, injure senior
diplomat, raze building - Pauline Jasudason

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia - Three men armed with firebombs, machetes and an
ax attacked Myanmar's embassy in Malaysia Wednesday, hacking one senior
official and starting a blaze that gutted the building, officials and
witnesses said.

Police arrested four suspects - three attackers and an alleged accomplice
- all members of Myanmar's Rohingya ethnic Muslim minority who had been
turned away from the embassy on Tuesday after demanding that officials
endorse documents they believed would help them win U.N. refugee status,
officials said.

They returned about 9:30 a.m. (0130 GMT) Wednesday, when the three scaled
the embassy's outer wall and raided the building, threatening staff with
their weapons and waving plastic bags filled with gasoline, Myint Thein
Win, the mission's second secretary, told reporters.

"They started to throw petrol in plastic bags at the building and set
fire," Myint Thein Win said. "They tried to burn the ambassador's car. The
minister counselor was attacked with an ax."

The minister counselor was hit in the arm and head and a security officer
was cut with a large knife.

Police arrived and arrested the four, who would be charged with attempted
murder, arson and not having proper travel papers, Kuala Lumpur Police
chief Mustapha Abdullah said.

Myanamar's military government condemned the "premeditated and dastardly
attack" and announced that security at its diplomatic missions worldwide
has been stepped up.

"The Myanmar government is fully confident that (the culprits) will be
punished with the full force of the law for this cowardly attack on the
embassy and for the assault on one of its members" it said in a statement
issued in Yangon, the capital.

More than 30 firefighters extinguished the fire within an hour. Afterward,
an Associated Press reporter and photographer saw that the front part of
the building had collapsed. The roof and walls were still standing, the
interior was burned out.

Tens of thousands of immigrants from Myanmar live in Malaysia, which is
one of Southeast Asia's wealthiest countries and a magnet for migrant
workers. Malaysia also attracts hundreds of asylum seekers who claim they
face persecution from Myanmar's military rulers.

Deputy Internal Security Minister Noh Omar, who toured the site, said the
attackers were Rohingyas who were in the process of applying for political
asylum from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and who wanted the
embassy to verify a document from the Myanmar government that could help
their application.

"The Rohingyas did not have the original so there may have been a little
argument," Noh said.

The UNHCR declined to comment, saying it was checking details of the
attack with police.

The fire is the second security breach at a diplomatic mission in Kuala
Lumpur in the past eight days, though they appear to be unrelated.

On March 30, someone threw a bottle filled with firecracker powder at
Australia's High Commission in the city, scorching an outer wall but
causing no major damage or injuries. No arrests have been made.

"This is an isolated incident which was not influenced by any group and
has no connection with the small explosion at the Australian embassy,"
Mustapha said.

_____________________________________

April 7, Reuters
Arson Attack Guts Myanmar's Malaysia Embassy - Jalil Hamid

Kuala Lumpur - Three Myanmar refugees armed with an axe, a knife and
containers of petrol attacked a diplomat at their country's embassy in
Malaysia on Wednesday before starting a blaze that gutted the place,
officials said.

The Muslim Rohingyas climbed the embassy walls around mid-morning,
seriously injuring a staff member with the axe before dousing the building
with fuel and hurling burning rags to set it alight.

The attack was the second in recent days on foreign embassies in Kuala
Lumpur. The Australian High Commission was struck late last month by a
small explosive device that caused no damage.

"Myanmar condemns the premeditated and dastardly attack against its
embassy in Kuala Lumpur," the Myanmar government said in a statement from
Yangon. It added that security had been raised at its missions around the
world.

Malaysian authorities said police would beef up the protection of foreign
embassies by stepping up daily patrols.

Two Myanmar diplomats were injured in Wednesday's attack, with
minister-counsellor Myint Thein Win requiring hospital treatment for arm
injuries, Malaysian Deputy Internal Security Minister Noh Omar told
reporters at the scene.

Noh said police had arrested four men, the attackers and another Rohingya
who was outside the embassy, on charges of attempted murder, arson and
illegal entry.

The men had been to the embassy a few times to try to have a document
authenticated, he added.

"But this time around, they had planned the attack, with three of them
climbing the perimeter wall," Noh said.

BLACKENED BUT STANDING
The two-storey concrete structure in Kuala Lumpur's leafy diplomatic
suburb of Ampang was left blackened and severely damaged but still
standing.

Noh said the attack by Myanmar's Muslim Rohingyas was an isolated event
and had nothing to do with the March 30 incident at the Australian High
Commission.

"This is an internal affair between the embassy and its citizens," he said.

Muslim-majority Malaysia has been on high alert for possible terror
attacks since before the September 11, 2001 strikes against the United
States.

Though none has taken place, dozens of Malaysians have been arrested at
home and in the region on suspicion of militancy.

Rohingyas form the largest group of asylum seekers in Malaysia, with the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimating their
number at more than 10,000.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said late last year that the
Rohingyas were definitely from Myanmar and should be sent back there.
Yangon disputes their origin and refuses to allow their return.

About a quarter-million Rohingya refugees fled predominantly Buddhist
Myanmar in 1992, mostly to neighboring Bangladesh, saying they were
persecuted under the military government.

Most returned home later that year under UNHCR supervision, though around
20,000 remain crammed in camps in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar district.

Myanmar Prime Minister Khin Nyunt paid a three-day visit to Bangladesh
which included talks on the refugee issue. (Additional reporting by
Jahabar Sadiq)


OPINION / OTHER
_____________________________________

April 7, Vol 12, No. 3, March 2004, Irrawaddy
Pariah Partners in Arms - Andrew Selth

It has long been suspected that North Korea supplies Burma with weapons.
But recent unconfirmed reports that the two secretive states are
negotiating a nuclear deal are unsettling.

Bilateral relations between Burma and North Korea were severed in 1983,
after Pyongyang sent agents to Rangoon to conduct a terrorist attack
against a visiting South Korean presidential delegation. Diplomatic ties
have still not been restored. Over the past few years, however, these two
economically stricken but highly militarized pariah states seem to have
found some common ground.

THE JUNTA is believed to have purchased about sixteen 130mm M-46 field
guns from North Korea in late 1998.  Depending on how it develops, this
relationship could extend beyond mutual support to have wider strategic
implications. Reports that the Rangoon regime has sought to acquire
strategic weapon systems like submarines and ballistic missiles from
Pyongyang have aroused concern in regional capitals and in Washington.
There have even been suggestions that North Korea is secretly helping
Burma to build a nuclear reactor, raising the spectre of a future atomic
weapons program that could be used by Rangoon as a bargaining chip against
the United States.

Conventional Arms
Burma’s leaders have not forgotten the 1983 attack but, faced with
continuing arms embargoes by their traditional suppliers, and the
perceived need to acquire even more weapons for the armed forces, or
Tatmadaw, Rangoon cannot be too discriminating. North Korea offers an
attractive alternative source of arms and military equipment. Pyongyang
feels no qualms about defying the international community and selling arms
to a regime like the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC. The
items in its inventory are comparatively cheap, and North Korean arms tend
to be based on tried and tested Russian and Chinese designs. As such, they
are of a similar pattern to weapon systems already in the Tatmadaw’s order
of battle. They are often at the same level of technical sophistication,
making them easier to maintain and operate. It is also possible that for
strategic reasons the ruling junta wishes to diversify the source of its
arms, even at the risk of upsetting its close ally, China.

Given the closed nature of the Rangoon and Pyongyang governments, and
their shared obsession with secrecy about any issues connected with
national security, details of such arms sales are difficult to obtain.
However, it would appear that in 1990 Burma purchased 20 million rounds of
7.62mm AK-47 rifle ammunition from North Korea. This ammunition was
probably destined for the United Wa State Army, which had just signed a
ceasefire agreement with the Rangoon regime. Also, in mid-1998, the junta
is believed to have purchased about sixteen 130mm M-46 field guns from
North Korea. The frequent visits of North Korean freighters to Rangoon in
recent years, and the secrecy surrounding their cargoes, have led to
speculation that other deliveries of arms and military equipment have
occurred. These suspicions have been strengthened by reports of North
Korean technical experts visiting Burmese military bases.

A secret meeting to discuss the missile deal was reportedly held in
Rangoon in August 2003

In July 2003 it was reported that about 20 North Korean technicians had
been seen at the Tatmadaw’s main naval facility at Monkey Point in
Rangoon. They were believed to be helping the Burma Navy to equip some of
its vessels with surface-to-surface missiles, or SSM. Burma currently has
six Houxin guided missile patrol boats, acquired from China in the 1990s.
Each vessel is armed with four C-801 anti-ship cruise missiles. It has
been speculated that similar SSMs would be mounted on the three new
corvettes that have been built at Rangoon’s Sinmalaik shipyard, and
recently commissioned. It is more likely, however, that the North Koreans
were installing SSMs of some kind on the navy’s four new Myanmar class
coastal patrol boats. It has long been suspected that they would be fitted
with missiles to give them a greater offensive capability.

The first of these arms deals appears to have been arranged through Thai,
Singaporean or possibly even Chinese intermediaries. The delivery of the
130mm field guns, however, followed an unofficial visit to North Korea by
the Burma Army’s Director of Procurement. A Burmese government delegation
made another secret trip to North Korea in late 2000. This was followed in
turn by the visit to Rangoon in June 2001 of a high-ranking North Korean
delegation, led by Vice Foreign Minister Pak Gil-yon. This visit, which
preceded the arrival of North Korean technical experts at the Monkey Point
naval facility, was reportedly to discuss cooperation in the defense
industrial field. The changing nature of these contacts clearly reflects
the rapidly improving ties between Rangoon and Pyongyang.

The arrangements made for the sales of both the AK-47 ammunition and the
130mm field guns appears to have included a strong element of barter
trade. This is also likely to be the case with any SSM sale. Burma was,
and remains, short of foreign exchange, but produces rice and other
primary products for export. For its part, North Korea has a massive arms
industry, and is happy to sell weapons to whichever country wants them.
During the mid-1990s, Pyongyang was facing a widespread famine and even
now malnutrition remains a major problem. The way was thus open for the
Rangoon regime to pay for its North Korean weapons purchases with rice,
timber and marine products. There have even been suggestions that Rangoon
has provided Pyongyang with narcotics in return for arms. Whether or not
this is true, it would appear that barter arrangements have not been
sufficient to meet Rangoon’s wish for more sophisticated, and expensive,
weapon systems.

Strategic Weapons
The Tatmadaw has been interested for some time in acquiring a submarine,
and has sent a number of Burma Navy officers to Pakistan to undertake
"submarine training." In early 2002 the junta reportedly opened
discussions with Pyongyang on the purchase of one or two submarines.
Designs considered included the Yugo class midget submarine and the Sang-O
class mini submarine. Rangoon ultimately opted to purchase one Sang-O
class boat, but was forced to abandon the deal in late 2002. It appears
that the cost of the submarine, and perhaps belated recognition of the
technical difficulties of keeping it operational, scuppered the project.

The junta is believed also to want short-range ballistic missiles, or
SRBMs. In the late 1990s, there were rumours circulating among the
diplomatic community in Rangoon that China had agreed to sell Burma some
M-11 SRBMs, similar to those which had earlier been provided to Pakistan.
More recently, there have been unconfirmed reports that Rangoon is
interested in acquiring a number of Hwasong (Scud-type) SRBMs from North
Korea. A secret meeting to discuss such a deal was reportedly held in
Rangoon in August 2003, while another was supposedly held in Phuket,
Thailand, in October that year. The latest variants of this missile are
capable of ranges of up to 500 km with a 770 kg conventional warhead.

The submarine sale seems to have been shelved for the time being and, even
if a missile deal has already been struck, any delivery of SRBMs is likely
to be some years away. They remain a worrying prospect, but of even
greater concern to strategic analysts is the possibility that the junta
may have drawn the same conclusions from the 2003 Iraq War as Pyongyang
appears to have done, and is now seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon to
use as a bargaining chip against the US and its allies.

Nuclear?
In November 2003 the Far Eastern Economic Review suggested that Pyongyang
had taken over from Moscow as the source of Burma’s nuclear technology.
North Korean technicians were reportedly seen unloading large crates and
heavy construction equipment from trains at Myothit, "the closest station
to the central Burmese town of Natmauk, near where the junta hopes to
build a nuclear research reactor." In addition, North Korean civil
aircraft have reportedly been seen landing at military airfields in the
area. The implication of the article was that Pyongyang was providing
equipment and materials to build a nuclear reactor. These developments
coincided with the arrival in Rangoon of representatives of the Daesong
Economic Group, a sub-division of Bureau 39, which is responsible for a
range of clandestine activities on behalf of the North Korean leadership.
The small research reactor Burma hoped to get from Russia was said to be
unsuited for the manufacture of fissile material, but Pyongyang is able to
offer Burma other options, and has a record of proliferating nuclear
technologies.

In a separate report, it was stated that 80 Burmese military personnel had
departed for North Korea in November 2003 to study "nuclear and atomic
energy technology." If true, this story would appear to confirm
Pyongyang’s readiness to share its nuclear expertise with Burma. Yet the
Tatmadaw has taken delivery of artillery pieces, and probably acquired
other conventional weapons from North Korea, including SSMs. Some training
in North Korea in their maintenance and use would be a logical part of any
arms deal. It can also be assumed that any SRBM sale to Burma would be
accompanied by training programs in North Korea. It does not automatically
follow that all members of the Tatmadaw leaving for Pyongyang are going
there to study nuclear technologies—peaceful or otherwise.

The junta has firmly denied that it has any plans to acquire missiles
(presumably SRBMs) or weapons of mass destruction. Without a trace of
irony, a regime spokesman has asked, "Why would Burma want to develop WMDs
(weapons of mass destruction) when the country needs all her strength and
resources in pursuing a peaceful, stable and smooth transition to a
multiparty democracy and an open-market economy?"

The nuclear reactor, which is still one of the regime’s priority projects,
was said to be for "peaceful research purposes." The spokesman further
stated that Burma had no ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and firmly
rejected the idea that it would ever threaten any of its neighbors.
Predictably, the international reaction to this statement has been mixed.

The thought of Burma seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon is the stuff of
nightmares in the Asia-Pacific region, and in capitals like Washington.
Given Rangoon’s strong record on international disarmament initiatives,
however, the potential repercussions of such a dramatic policy change,
plus the massive costs and enormous practical difficulties involved, it
must still be considered highly unlikely. Nevertheless, it is a scenario
that is made more credible by Rangoon’s continuing fears of external
intervention, its growing defense relationship with Pyongyang, their
shared political isolation and the readiness of both pariah regimes to do
almost anything to survive.

This article is drawn from A Selth, Burma’s North Korean Gambit: A
Challenge to Regional Security? SDSC, Canberra Papers on Strategy and
Defence No.154 (ANU, Canberra, 2004).

_____________________________________

April 7, Mizzima News
Compromising with the Burmese Generals - Aung Naing Oo

“Should the pro-democracy groups compromise with the Burmese junta?” “Yes,
they should,” is the answer from a selected group of some twenty Burmese
opposition politicians, activists and academics. But they all cited
various reasons as conditions for compromise.

Many exiled officials of the National League for Democracy (NLD) agreed
that there should be compromise. “It should be made with anyone, including
the Burmese military,” said a NLD Member of Parliament (MP).

Indeed, one should recall that U Tin Oo, now the imprisoned Vice-President
of the NLD, quoted Burma’s independence hero General Aung San regarding
reconciliation with the junta. “There is no eternal adversary or friend in
politics,” he said. “Only eternal interests,” added another MP,
emphasizing the need for mutual gains.

But their condition for compromise is the political dialogue. “Compromise
is not possible without dialogue,” declared an NLD official. “No dialogue,
no compromise,” said another NLD representative. According to him, NLD has
had the door open for dialogue since its inception, where compromise will
occur.

This sounds very reasonable. But one cannot help but wonder if it is
really a compromise. And if this is the NLD’s definition of compromise “no
matter how powerful and conciliatory it may be,” it is clear that the
party has failed to break the Burmese generals’ entrenchment. But given
the conditions under which they have had to operate since it was formed in
1988, it is unfair to heap blame on the NLD. And the NLD officials are not
alone in this.

“The future political path the country chooses should be based on the
results of a genuine dialogue,” said Aung Moe Zaw, Chairman of the exiled
Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS), echoing the NLD. But he
understands the need for a compromise solution in Burma. “Compromise is
the nature of political negotiation,” the DPNS leader emphasized.

Another opposition politician talked about the need for a secure political
climate for compromise to occur. “How can we come up with a compromise
solution without the freedom of assembly and discussions?” lamented the
opposition leader. Aung Htoo, General-Secretary of the Burma Lawyers
Council, supported the opposition politician. He said, “Foundations for
the prevalence of law and safe political environment are indispensable
conditions for opposition groups to compromise with the junta.”

Furthermore, one activist argued that the regime should indicate in kind
how it wants to compromise with the opposition. He outlined a few things
including the release of political prisoners and picking of a time for
negotiation. One NLD MP pointed out that his party adopted the policy of
broad-mindedness toward the junta as a key political precept. Yet another
politician emphasized the critical question of political will in regard to
compromise.

All of these are undeniably crucial to compromise. However, only two
respondents talked about the lack of courage on the part of all
protagonists in compromising with each other. They said that it (the lack
of courage) has been the main reason as to why dialogue has not taken
place, thus the non-realization of a compromise solution. They challenged
whether all those involved in Burma’s conflict would prioritize the
interests of the nation ahead of their own.

“There should be compromise because all 50 million Burmese have suffered
for more than 40 years,” said Bo Bo Kyaw Nyein, former student activist
and son of Burma’s former Deputy Prime Minister in U Nu’s government, U
Kyaw Nyein. He fears that if a compromise solution is not reached during
this generation, the all-round deterioration will slide further down the
abyss. But he cautioned that a compromise without Aung San Suu Kyi would
not deliver a lasting solution to the country’s conflict.

An exiled Burmese who follows the situation in Rangoon closely said that
all factions in Burma have a responsibility to make compromise a reality.
He said that they should take into account the worsening social and
economic conditions in the country. He also called for an alternative to
the current standoff. “More than 15 years of political confrontation has
produced nothing,” he said. “All sides have the responsibility to get out
of this situation.”

Will compromise be part of Burma’s political conflict in the prevailing
situation? One cannot tell but it is certainly the key to a smoother
transition to democracy. Nor can one fathom if all parties involved in the
conflict have acknowledged the reality in the country, a necessary
condition for entering into a compromise.

Without doubt, the NLD has offered a compromise solution were they to
enter into negotiations. But the negotiations have yet to take place. One
must therefore wonder out loud whether a reverse trend is possible, that
is, compromise first and then dialogue in order to persuade the reluctant
military. But one Burmese academic reminds us that all factions see
compromise as a sign of weakness. “This sort of mental obstacle does not
bode well for a compromise solution in Burma,” he said.

“The problem is not that they don’t want to compromise but that they want
to set conditions favorable to themselves,” said another academic. To
demonstrate this, he pointed out the fact that both parties – the junta
and the NLD - have made maximum demands. Obviously, this leaves only a
margin for compromise.

>From a conflict analysis point of view, the conflict in Burma has yet to
reach the “ripe moment” for all sides to negotiate a solution. According
to Professor William Zartman, in the book “Elusive Peace” which he edited,
three conditions must come together to make the best time for negotiation
in a conflict: a mutually hurting stalemate, valid spokespersons and
formula for a way out.

Like it or not, Burma has more than one formulas, including roadmaps
proposed by various stakeholders. All sides have more or less legitimate
representatives. But we may lack the first condition; the political
impasse may not have hurt the Burmese regime enough to compromise with the
opposition. Certainly under this circumstance, a lot of courage will be
essential to compromise with the Burmese generals.

_____________________________________

Issue Cover Dated March 25, Far Eastern Economic Review
Perennial Poser - As the U.S. and Europe prepare to review sanctions, a
new report advocates engagement - Murray Hiebert

BURMA'S MILITARY LEADERS are back in the spotlight as the United States
and Europe consider renewing, or even ratcheting up, their annual
sanctions against Rangoon. Once again attention is focusing on the junta's
failure to move forward on democracy and open a meaningful dialogue with
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. But the efficacy of Western policy is
also being closely examined.

The debate has been prompted in part by a new study drafted by a group of
Burma specialists, who argue that U.S. sanctions have not achieved their
aims and have been counter-productive in moving the country toward
democracy. The publication of the report seems to suggest that there's a
growing sense among influential specialists that the U.S. needs to rethink
its Burma policy. But the continuing anger in the U.S. and Europe about
the junta's refusal to release Suu Kyi from house arrest makes it unlikely
that Western governments will soften their isolation policies any time
soon.

The report advocating engagement with Rangoon was released on March 5,
just ahead of hearings in the U.S. Congress at which administration
officials will almost certainly be pressed to renew economic sanctions.
The three hearings are due to be held before mid-April. Across the
Atlantic, European Union officials are being lobbied by human-rights
activists to impose stiffer sanctions when they review their common policy
on Burma before the end of April.

The 101-page report released by the National Bureau of Asian Research, a
Seattle-based think-tank, argues that U.S. sanctions have undermined
reformers within the Burmese military who might be inclined to seek a
compromise with Suu Kyi. If anything, the authors write, U.S. sanctions
have "strengthened the resolve of the opponents of reform in the
military."

"The big reason trade sanctions are unlikely to have the impact that
Congress would like is that the Burmese regime has quite skilfully . . .
worked to build up trade and alliances with its neighbours," argues
retired academic John Badgely, who edited the essays. The Burma expert
says there's now "almost no consequences to the U.S. pressure" because of
Rangoon's growing economic ties with its Southeast Asian neighbours, China
and India.

But this pro-engagement argument seems to have had little influence in
Washington. Pointing out that Suu Kyi is under house arrest and "unable to
participate in public, political life," U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell declared on March 10 that the U.S. "will continue to apply
pressure" for her release. He added that he would again this year be
"looking at the sanctions issue very, very carefully." Two days later,
President George W. Bush hailed the Burmese opposition leader as "a
courageous reformer."
Bush signed an import ban against Rangoon into law last July 28, just two
months after a violent attack against Suu Kyi and her followers in
northern Burma. She has not been seen in public since. Under the
legislation, the sanctions expire after a year unless Bush renews them.
Some hints that the stand-off between the military and Suu Kyi might be
nearing resolution emerged after Prime Minister Khin Nyunt recently told a
United Nations envoy that he was committed to releasing his rival and
beginning political talks.

PUSH FOR MORE SANCTIONS
But these reports have done nothing to soften Washington's resolve. If
anything, the U.S. Congress would like the administration to lobby U.S.
allies to cooperate to step up Rangoon's isolation. "The task before the
Bush administration is to make a sustained, high-level effort to convince
our allies in Europe and Asia to move towards similar import sanctions
against Burma's ruling 'thugocracy'," says Democratic Congressman Tom
Lantos. Senate Republican whip Mitch McConnell recently condemned Thailand
for its stepped-up business investment in Burma. "Our friends in the
region have to do more," insists a Senate aide working on Asia.

The EU, which last year did not follow the U.S. lead and impose trade
sanctions, may consider increasing pressure when it completes its annual
"common position" on Burma in late April. A spokesperson for the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Ireland, which is chairing the EU this
year, says "revisions," including sanctions against Burma's timber and gem
exports, are being considered by those drafting this year's policy
position.

But Burma's neighbours, just like the authors of the report, believe
engagement would be more effective in dealing with the regime's military
leaders. "The problem is how to get them out of their shell, not further
isolate them," says a senior Southeast Asian diplomat.

_____________________________________

LETTERS

Issue Cover dated April 8, Far Eastern Economic Review
Inconsistencies – Donald M. Seekins, Nago, Okinawa

While well-aimed sanctions could play a role in promoting Burmese
democracy [Perennial Poser, Mar. 25], the measures signed into law by
American President George W. Bush last July have succeeded only in hurting
ordinary Burmese (especially women garment workers laid off because of the
ban by the United States on imports from Burma), while leaving the
military junta unscathed.

And why hasn't the U.S. government taken the step of ending American oil
giant Unocal's participation in natural-gas projects in Burma, which bring
the junta millions of dollars of revenue annually? It's hard to take
Washington's Burma policy seriously when it is filled with such
inconsistencies.

_____________________________________

PRESS RELEASE

April 7, Asian Legal Resource Centre
Abuses of migrant workers in Thailand

Statement on 'Abuse of migrant workers in Thailand' received by Commission
on Human Rights

The written statement of the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) on 'Abuse
of migrant workers in Thailand' (E/CN.4/2004/NGO/22) will be distributed
today at the 60th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
in Geneva.

The full text of the statement follows.

This year, ALRC submitted 30 written statements to the Commission, on
topics as diverse as caste discrimination in Nepal, food scarcity in
Myanmar, custodial deaths and torture in India, extrajudicial killings in
Thailand, policing in Pakistan, the National Human Rights Commission of
Sri Lanka, and impunity in Asia.

The complete list of statements, with full texts and links to the original
versions, can be viewed on the ALRC website, at
http://www.alrc.net/mainfile.php/60written/.

1. In the middle of May 2003, local authorities in Mae Sot, on the border
of Thailand, illegally detained and later murdered six legal Burmese
migrant workers, Thein Han, aged 28, Thein Naing, 44, Aye Min, 22, Ngwe
Lay, 19, Maung Maung, 24, and Ah Nya Tha, 22. The men were kept bound at
the front of a village headman's house before they were lead away to their
deaths. The headman was later charged with the murders, and released on
bail. No others were charged, despite numerous witnesses to the event, and
circumstantial evidence suggesting that law enforcement officials were
heavily involved. Most witnesses and relatives of the victims have since
been sent back to Myanmar, and the trial is being held without any legal
counsel representing the plaintiffs.

2. Murders, rapes, abductions, torture and other abuses of Burmese migrant
workers in Thailand have occurred with alarming regularity for many years,
particularly in the Mae Sot district of Tak province, but for a long time
only cases of extreme brutality were ever made public. In January 2002,
for instance, the bodies of at least 21 persons were found in the Mae
Lamao stream. No one has ever been brought to account for that atrocity,
which the Asian Legal Resource Centre raised before the Commission in a
written statement during the fifty-ninth session (E/CN.4/2003/NGO/149). In
the past year, abuses have increased, as impunity has spread in Thailand
with new government policies favouring extra-judicial killing, and because
migrant worker's rights have been further curtailed. The Asian Legal
Resource Centre has this year made a separate written submission to the
Commission on the extrajudicial killing of at least 2500 alleged drug
traffickers in Thailand during 2003.

3. In 2003, the Asian Legal Resource Centre brought its concerns to the
attention of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants,
noting that immigration officials, police, and other officials in Thailand
abuse illegal migrants at time of arrest, in detention centers, and during
deportation. These abuses include extortion, physical and sexual assault,
and murder. These activities by the police lead others to commit the same
offences without fear of the consequences. The following cases illustrate:

a. On 13 April 2003 a gang controlled by the police and civil defence
force beat an unnamed Burmese man to death at a Bangkok public bus
station. The man had apparently stumbled into an argument among the gang,
and they turned on him. Uniformed members of the civil defence force stood
and watched, before calling some nearby police, who took the victim to a
detention centre while still alive. The next morning his dead body was
taken away in a truck. No action was reportedly taken against the
perpetrators, despite numerous witnesses to the attack.

b. In early April 2003, police in Phop Phra district, Tak Province,
detained an unnamed Burmese man they found working illegally. They put him
in a cage at a village checkpoint that was used to keep dogs. During the
day he managed to get out and tried to run away. The police soon caught up
with him, and called him to come back; he turned and began to walk back
towards the police, at which point one shot him in the chest. A local man
who witnessed the killing informed other Burmese workers; the murdered
man's body was found in a field the next day.

c. A security guard raped and killed 25-year-old Thandar Hlaing in Mae Sot
on 31 August 2003. Police arrested him only after over one thousand angry
co-workers went on strike and attacked the man. He later admitted to the
crime, however attempts by witnesses to reveal that at least two other
persons may have been involved have been suppressed.

4. The rape and murder of Thandar Hlaing is exceptional in that police
soon secured a confession from the culprit. One of the reasons in this
instance was the reaction of the others at the factory where she worked.
In Mae Sot, there are some 150 factories, of which 80 per cent make
garments and 95 per cent of the workers are Burmese; the number of Burmese
workers in the town is estimated to be at least 80,000. Employers,
immigration officials, the police and other powerful persons and
authorities cooperate to deny these persons their most basic rights, as
follow:

a. All migrants from Myanmar, whether legal or illegal, face the risk of
being deported at any time. Most employers retain their workers' labour
permits. When the police check for documents, these persons only have
photocopies, and can be arrested because according to regulations they
must carry the originals. Workers deported to Myanmar can also be charged
and jailed for up to seven years if found that they left the country
illegally.

b. Employers alert the authorities when they do not want the workers any
longer, or when they ask for their rights, such as the minimum wage. It is
easy to sack the workers, who are unlikely to receive compensation, and
are usually deported immediately. In most cases, those seeking additional
money have been paid at around half of the minimum wage. In June 2003, 420
legal migrant workers from the King Body Concept Company were fired and
immediately deported to Myanmar after demanding to be paid according to
regulations, and calling for improved working conditions. In violation of
domestic law, the immigration office sent them back to Myanmar without any
investigation of the dispute. Similarly, on 16 December 2003, police
arrested over 260 legal migrant workers on strike and planning to sue
their employer for insufficient pay, after 25 of their number were sacked.
Police reportedly surrounded a monastery where the workers, including
about 200 women, were staying after they had decided not to continue work
at Nasawat Apparel Company, and to file charges against the factory. The
police beat the workers before taking them to the Immigration Detention
Centre for deportation. The owner of the Nasawat Apparel Company, Kwanchai
Wimut, had previously had police beat and deport workers who had attempted
to organise strikes, and had had his security men sexually harass women
workers. On 25 November 2003, prior to the workers' walkout, drunken
police had also entered the women's quarters and threatened them sexually.

c. No safety equipment is issued and nor is the health and safety of
migrant workers a subject of interest for employers. Workers do their jobs
without electrical shock resistant boots, gloves for cloth cutters, nose
covers for knitting workers, covers for steam iron operators, gloves for
dying operators of artificial flowers, or respiration protection for
pesticide farm workers and button press operators. Almost no compensation
is paid to victims of workplace accidents. Nor is any provision made for
urgent medical assistance. For instance, on 28 August 2002, a 15-year-old
boy sweeping corn grains in front of a storage yard was nearly cut in two
by a factory pay loader. He had to wait for two hours to go to a hospital;
he died soon after and his family received 15,000 Baht (US0) compensation.

d. Accommodation provided by factories is poor. There is overcrowding,
insufficient rooms and toilets with little privacy. Unhygienic living
conditions cause tuberculosis among workers. Fire-fighting courses are
seldom held, and instead photos of previous courses are generally shown.

e. Working hours are excessive: on average, 60 to 75 hours a week. Leave
is seldom given, even on religious days, when the rest of Thailand shuts
down. During periods when factory owners are trying to meet contract
deadlines, they may force workers to continue without sleep for days on
end. Chalermpol Paiboonpol, the owner of Siriwat Garment Factory in Mae
Sot, forced his 75 legal Burmese workers to work for 41 hours without rest
from 19 to 21 September 2003. The workers had been on the job around 14
hours per day since September 1. When the workers refused to do any more
overtime, the employer called the police, who threatened to send the
workers back to Myanmar. Eventually, interventions by the Labour Welfare
Office, National Human Rights Commission and others led to a compromise in
which only half of the workers were fired on September 24, a day before
the expiry of their work permits, but all were underpaid. The National
Human Rights Commission informed the Asian Legal Resource Centre in
writing that the case was settled satisfactorily according to domestic
law, but that as the Government of Thailand has not signed any
international agreements pertaining to migrant workers, nothing could be
done in keeping with those standards.

f. Children of migrant workers also end up working at gas stations, small
factories, fisheries, construction sites, agricultural plantations,
garment factories and handicap workshops. In factories, for instance, they
work as winding machine operators and cleaners for knitting companies,
paint toys and crush gemstones. Child workers earn around 800 to 1200
Baht/month (US$ 20-30). Children whose parents are alien workers cannot
attain permits in Thailand, as they are under age. Hence they are not
eligible for medical treatment, and seldom get a chance to study in a
school.

5. The organisers of strikes and human rights defenders have also
increasingly become targets. In December 2003, employers had posters on
two members of the Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association, Moe Swe and Ko Phyu,
who had been involved in many of the above mentioned actions in 2003,
plastered around Mae Sot. The police were reported to be looking for the
men, who have since gone into hiding. The men are exiled activists from
Myanmar, who, if deported would certainly face lengthy prison terms and
torture.

6. Accordingly, the Asian Legal Resource Centre recommends the Commission,
and in particular the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants,
to:

a. Assist the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand to establish an
office in Mae Sot to oversee the rights of all migrant workers, and open
telephone hotlines that migrants can contact to report abuses and request
assistance, including counselling, legal services and refuge. The National
Human Rights Commission should also be involved in establishing a body to
resolve workplace disputes between employers and migrant workers, as none
exists at present.

b. Insist that the Government of Thailand ensure that domestic law is
upheld with regards to migrant workers, legal or illegal, as it is to Thai
citizens. In particular, persons responsible for murder, rape or other
heinous abuses of migrant workers must be prosecuted, as must factory
owners violating pertinent labour laws. Reasonable efforts should be made
to locate family and friends in cases of murder, and inform them of their
right to participate in criminal investigations and legal proceedings.

c. Seek a guarantee from the Government of Thailand that victims and
witnesses of human rights violations coming to trial will be protected
against retribution by accused perpetrators. These individuals should also
be granted immunity from penalties for illegal immigration. Under no
circumstances should victims or witnesses of human rights violations be
held in detention facilities.

d. Call upon the Government of Thailand to ratify the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, and the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Relevant national
laws and policies should be brought in line with these Conventions, along
with all previously ratified international conventions and treaties, and
institutions established and reformed to ensure their effective and speedy
implementation.

e. Pressure the Government of Thailand to permit organisations providing
assistance to migrant workers to conduct their activities openly and
legally.

f. Intervene to ensure the safety of human rights defenders Moe Swe and Ko
Phyu.

For more information, please contact:
In Hong Kong, Sanjeewa Liyanage: + (852) - 2698-6339

Asian Legal Resource Centre, 19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building, 998 Canton
Road, Kowloon, Hongkong S.A.R.
_____________________________________