BurmaNet News, April 10 - 12, 2004

Editor editor at burmanet.org
Mon Apr 12 14:45:40 EDT 2004


April 10-12, 2004 Issue # 2454

INSIDE BURMA
AP: Former Myanmar President Sein Lwin dead at 81
DVB: Burmese Democracy Party Urges Repeal Of Law Protecting Convention
NMG: RCSS: National Convention is a sham
Mizzima: 15 more eyewitnesses of Depayin ambush languish in Shwe-bo

GUNS
UN Wire: U.S. Examining Possible North Korea-Myanmar Missile Sales

BUSINESS / MONEY
Xinhua: ASEAN Regional Forum Support Group Meeting Opens In Burma

REGIONAL
AP: China's premier reportedly orders restudy of controversial dam, but
officials say they know of no change

INTERNATIONAL
Nation: Burma rebuts Shan, Karen rape claims

OPINION/ OTHER
Mizzima News: Is it too early to embrace the regime's game plan?
Mizzima: Will Aung San Suu Kyi See Her Freedom Soon?
Nation: Making sure Burma’s road map does not become a road trap
Irrawaddy: Sein Lwin "The Butcher of Rangoon" Dies in Poverty


INSIDE BURMA
_____________________________________

April 10, Associated Press
Former Myanmar President Sein Lwin dead at 81 - Aye Aye Win

Yangon: Sein Lwin, who served briefly as Myanmar's president in 1988, has
died, a state-run newspaper reported on Saturday. He was 81.

Sein Lwin had a reputation for being the brutal henchman of late dictator
Gen. Ne Win and was best known for suppressing anti-government activities.
He led a bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1988.

Unconfirmed estimates said that hundreds of protesters were killed during
his short time in office.

A brief obituary in the Myanma Ahlin daily did not give the cause of
death. Family members, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he was
recently treated in Singapore for a serious but unspecified stomach
ailment, and returned Friday to Myanmar, where he died the same day at
Yangon General Hospital.

Sein Lwin, who retired from the army with the rank of brigadier general,
first made a name for himself in 1950 when he commanded the unit that
tracked down and shot dead the leader of a rebellion against the central
government by the country's ethnic Karen minority.

After army commander Ne Win staged a coup against a civilian government in
1962 and established a single party regime, Sein Lwin quickly became one
of the country's most influential and feared figures.

He headed the army unit that shot dead Rangoon University students
protesting Ne Win's rule on July 7, 1962, just four months after the coup.

Other violent operations for which he was responsible included the deadly
suppression of workers' protests in 1972 and demonstrations by students
and Buddhist monks in 1974 in connection with the funeral of former U.N.
Secretary General U Thant.

Sein Lwin also became a top leader in Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program
Party, and served in various Cabinet positions under Ne Win, including
transport minister, home minister and religious affairs minister.

Long-simmering discontent over Ne Win's mismanagement of the economy
erupted into massive street demonstrations in 1988, forcing the dictator
to step down from his public posts in an effort to stem the political
turmoil.

Sein Lwin then became chairman of the ruling party and the country's
president on July 27, 1988, but the pro-democracy protests grew. Instead
of negotiating, Sein Lwin tried to end the protests by force, and the
capital became a bloody battleground.

His effort to end the chaos having failed, he resigned from the presidency
on Aug. 12, 1988. He was succeeded by a civilian, Maung Maung, who in turn
was ousted by the military after just a month in office.

The new military regime then moved to end the demonstrations with a
massive show of force and continues to hold power today. The post of
president was abolished by the junta.

Sein Lwin was out of the public spotlight after stepping down, but
remained close to Ne Win, who died in disgrace in December 2002 after
members of his family were charged with trying to foment a coup against
the ruling junta.

Sein Lwin is survived by wife and seven children.

_____________________________________

April 12, Democratic Voice of Burma
Burmese Democracy Party Urges Repeal Of Law Protecting Convention

The National League for Democracy (NLD) has urged the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) yesterday to immediately repeal the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) Law No 5/96 which states that
whoever violates any prohibition of the law, on conviction, be punished
with imprisonment for a maximum of 20 years.

The law was signed by then SLORC Chairman Sr Gen Than Shwe and promulgated
after the National Convention was adjourned in 1996. The NLD statement
affirmed that if the National Convention is to be reconvened then the law
needs to be repealed as soon as possible. Thakhin Soe Myint, NLD Central
Executive Committee member, read an excerpt of the statement.

(Thakhin Soe Myint - recording) Whoever violates any prohibition contained
in Section 3 shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a
term of a minimum of five years to a maximum of 20 years and may also be
liable to a fine.

If any organization or any person on the arrangement or abetment of any
organization violates any prohibition contained in Section 3, such
organization may be -

a. suspended for a period to be specified;

b. abolished; or

c. declared as an unlawful association under the Unlawful Associations' Law.

All funds and property of an organization against which action is taken
under Section 5 may also be confiscated.

These are the penalties. In accordance with the above-mentioned law, the
people have utterly no right to discuss anything related to the National
Convention. At the time of convening the National Convention in 1993 such
law did not exist. In order to freely discuss matters at the National
Convention relating to the emergence of a State Constitution, the NLD, on
behalf of the people, urges the SPDC to revoke Law No 5/96.

Central Executive Committee

National League for Democracy. (End of recording)

That was an excerpt from the original NLD statement. Thakhin Soe Myint
continued to say that the authorities will know the people's true desire
only when the law is revoked.

(Thakhin Soe Myint - recording) The law was promulgated only after the
National Convention was adjourned in 1996. That is why the law needs to be
repealed before the National Convention is reconvened. The populace must
be allowed to talk and discuss about it. They must be able to discuss
about the National Convention freely without any fear. (End of recording)

That was Thakhin Soe Myint. When DVB asked whether NLD Chairman U Aung
Shwe and Secretary U Lwin, two of the four NLD leaders who have been under
house arrest, have received invitations to the SPDC's National Convention,
Thakhin Soe Myint replied that the news was groundless and questioned how
could anyone know when they themselves do not? Furthermore, Thakhin Soe
Myint criticized the authorities for sending invitations to the NLD
elected representatives in the various states and divisions without
informing the NLD party leaders.

_____________________________________

April 10, Network Media Group
RCSS: National Convention is a sham

Political wing of the armed Shan rebel group, the RCSS (Reconstruction
Council for Shan State) expressed that the National Convention is just a
‘sham’ that would only lead to legitimize the role of military in future
Burma amid legally recognized party the SNLD (Shan National League for
Democracy) is taking into account whether to attend government’s proposed
convention.

“What we see is it is not genuine National Convention because the SPDC
will deceive each and every party. It could not be able to solve relevance
problems in the country for genuine peace and it will lead the military
regime to rule the country forever,” a spokesperson of RCSS, Nan Khae Seng
said.

The RCSS is a political wing of SSA which is one of the remaining
arms-group who do not negotiate with the military junta.

Meanwhile the Burmese military government distributed invitation letters
for the National Convention to the elected representative of SNLD who won
majority of the seats in 1990 election in its Shan State. However the SNLD
is yet to reply to government and assessing the situations whether to
attend the convention that is going to be started on 17th May 2004.

The spokesperson also believes that all political parties in Shan State
including the SNLD will respect the will of the Shan people that expressed
in 1990 election. However if the military government is not willing to
allow what these representatives want to do, no right decisions can be
made for the people.

“Choosing the representatives for the National Convention, the military
government should not hand pickup and select whoever they want. It must be
elected by the people so that representatives will know what people want.
Who represents who is in fact problem, for example, selecting one or two
school teachers from a village along with ex-military persons does not
sense at all because these person do not have enough preparation and lack
of political awareness. Because of that mean of selecting representatives,
they can do nothing more than nodding their heads,” Nan Khae Seng said.

Apart from these problems, it would not reach to a genuine peace for the
country because holding the national convention in urgent while the
negotiation with the KNU, KNPP are still in process, she added.

Burma’s military government has recently announced restarting of National
Convention which was halted since 1996 while the cease-fire negotiations
between government and Burma’s major rebel groups KNU and KNPP are just
started.

Khu Rimond Htoo, the secretary of KNPP (Karenni National Progressive
Party) also expressed their party’s view on the National Convention. “All
representatives of Karenni should be allowed to attend the National
Convention. It should not only KNPP nor KNLP. Likewise other ethnic groups
should also be allowed. Then, it will be real representative of the
people. That’s what the KNPP want to see.”

Burmese government also sending invitation to some leader of Aung San Suu
Kyi’s party, National League for Democracy (NLD), the government is yet to
make any confirmation on whether they will invite party leader Aung San
Suu Kyi to the National Convention.

_____________________________________

April 11, Mizzima News
15 more eyewitnesses of Depayin ambush languish in Shwe-bo Prison - Zin Linn

"If one of your beloved ones disappeared or was detained in a premeditated
attack such as at Depayin, would you have enough patience to stay silent?"

This is the bursting question being asked inside Burma.

[Due to limitations of space please visit:
http://mizzima.com/archives/news-in-2004/news-in-apr/11-apr04-06.htm  for
the entire article – Ed]


GUNS
_____________________________________

April 9, U.N. Wire
U.S. Examining Possible North Korea-Myanmar Missile Sales - Steve Hirsch


Washington: U.S. officials are looking at whether North Korea might be
trying to sell missiles to Myanmar, a Bush administration official told
U.N. Wire today.

The issue of potential cooperation between the two pariah states was
addressed March 19 during a meeting of officials, including
representatives from the intelligence community, National Security Council
and State Department.  These officials meet periodically on
nonproliferation issues and looked at the North Korea-Myanmar question
following press and intelligence reports raising the possibility of
cooperation between Pyongyang and Yangon, the official said.

U.S. officials believe North Korea has offered Myanmar surface-to-surface
missiles going beyond multiple rocket launchers, with a range of more than
100 miles.  The missiles could have WMD capabilities, depending on
configuration.  The officials, however, believe Myanmar is "decades" away
from a nuclear weapon capability unless someone sells the country a
warhead.  They also are not concerned about biological weapons, but the
situation with chemical weapons is less clear.

This source said U.S. officials are fairly confident no transfers have
been authorized and said Myanmar has said it has not accepted the North
Korean offer so far.  It is believed that the North Koreans would be
interested in a combination of cash and barter — items such as rice or
teak — in return for the missiles.


BUSINESS/MONEY
___________________________________

April 11, Xinhua
ASEAN Regional Forum Support Group Meeting Opens In Burma

Yangon: A meeting of the intersessional support group of ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) on
confidence-building measures, co-chaired by Myanmar (Burma) and China,
opened here Monday (12 April).

At the two-day official meeting, the participants will exchange views on
developments in the political and security situation in the region and
hold discussions on non-traditional security issues covering cooperative
measures to counter terrorism and other transnational crimes of concern
such as maritime security, drug trafficking, combating AIDS, SARS (severe
acute respiratory syndrome) and other pandemics.

Future direction of the ARF including enhanced role of the ARF Chair and
ASEAN Secretariat's role in the ARF will also be discussed. The result of
the meeting will be submitted to ARF foreign ministers who will meet in
Jakarta, Indonesia in July.

The meeting is being attended by senior officials from the forum's 23
members including the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and
its dialogue partners - China, Japan and South Korea as well as Australia,
Canada, the European Union, India, New Zealand, Russia and the United
States. The ARF was established in 1994 to foster dialogue on political
and security issue in the Asia-Pacific region.


REGIONAL
_____________________________________

April 12, AP
China's premier reportedly orders restudy of controversial dam, but
officials say they know of no change

China's premier reportedly has ordered the government to reconsider
controversial plans for a dam on a river shared with Thailand and Myanmar,
but the official in charge of the project said he knew of no decision to
cancel it.

Any decision to scrap plans for the dam on the Salween River would delight
environmentalists who have lobbied against it and please Thailand and
Myanmar, which are planning their own dams and object to the Chinese
project.

The Salween plans are the latest in a series of dozens of dams across
China designed to harness water for a developing country of 1.3 billion
people that is racing to provide its fast-growing cities with the water
and electricity they need.

Premier Wen Jiabao sent the plan back to lower-level officials, noting
that such projects "cause great concern in society," the newspaper Ta Kung
Pao in Hong Kong reported. The newspaper, which has close ties to the
Beijing government, didn't say what changes Wen told the officials to
make.

But the director of the Nu River Power Bureau, Li Yunfei, said he was
still working on the project and had not heard of any changes. The Salween
is known in Chinese as the Nu.

"The premier's viewpoint on the project is 'scientific research, proper
development,' as far as we know," Li said.

Officials of the National Development and Reform Commission, which in
August recommended approving the project, couldn't confirm the report. The
press office of China's Cabinet declined to comment, and other offices
contacted in Beijing did not respond to inquiries.

The Salween is one of three great rivers that originate in the Himalayas
and traverse China's southern borders with Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam.
Its Chinese name means "Angry River."

The other two are the Mekong and the Yarlung Zangbo. The Salween and the
Yarlung Zangbo are the last two major rivers in China that haven't been
dammed for hydroelectric projects. China is building six generating
stations on the Mekong.

The Three Rivers National Park, which covers parts of China, Thailand and
Myanmar, was declared a UNESCO World Heritage site last year.

Environmentalists say the area is one of the last pristine sections of
wild ecology in overpopulated, fast-developing China. The government says
the area has some of the richest biodiversity in the world and is home to
unique species of plants and animals, including the Yunnan snub-nosed
monkey, Asian elephants and wild oxen.

The area also is popular with whitewater rafters.

Ta Kung Pao said Wen's comments about the dam raised expectations that
Beijing might reconsider ambitious hydroelectric plans, despite chronic
power shortages in many parts of China.

Wen and other top Communist leaders recently have begun promoting a more
"people-oriented" concept of economic development. They say resource and
transport shortages suggest the breakneck growth rates of recent years are
not sustainable.

But a rejection of the Salween River projects would be especially
significant, countering China's feverish pace of dam building as part of
plans to shift away from polluting coal as a source of power.

The 13 dams proposed for China's section of the Salween River would have a
total generating capacity of 21.32 million kilowatts, according to state
media.

That would surpass the Three Gorges Dam in central China, which is the
world's biggest hydroelectric project and is due to have a capacity of
18.2 million kilowatts when finished in 2009.

Conservation groups and others in China have agitated against such
gargantuan projects.

But the Three Gorges went ahead despite such widespread opposition and
dissent within China's legislature, which usually routinely approves
policies of the Communist leadership.

China has promoted the Salween River dams as a chance to reduce poverty in
the remote region, inhabited mainly by ethnic minorities such as the Lisu,
Miao and Yi.

Thousands of workers will be needed to build roads and bridges as well as
the dams.

"Our government, together with the 490,000 Lisu minority people living in
the canyon, are looking forward to a chance to becoming well-off, just
like the rest of the country," said Li, of the Nu River Power Bureau.

He argued that smaller dams already built on tributaries of the Salween
had caused little damage.

"Even if the plan for the 13 power stations was denied, I don't think we
should give up," Li said. "We just have to find a balance between
conservation and improving people's lives."


INTERNATIONAL
_____________________________________

April 10, The Nation.
Burma rebuts Shan, Karen rape claims - Subhatra Bhumiprabhas/ Pennapa
Hongthong

Burma yesterday refuted allegations that its military uses sexual violence
against ethnic women, saying that the status of women in Burma remains
among the highest in the world.

Speaking at the 60th Session of UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva,
Burma's delegate said it had never been its policy to condone violence
against women, committed by civilians or members of the armed forces. The
rape allegations were made in two books, 'Licence to Rape' and 'Shattering
Silences' written by Shan and Karen women.

'In Myanmar [Burma], women are treated with respect and have never been
subjected to degrading treatment,' she said.

The Burmese delegate made the statement in response to testimony by Nang
Hseng, a representative from the Women's League of Burma. Hseng told the
session that sexual violence against Shan, Karen and other ethnic women by
soldiers was continuing while the perpetrators go unpunished.

'Out of the total 173 documented incidents [in 'Licence to Rape'], in only
one case, and I repeat, [in] only one case was the perpetrator punished,'
Hseng said.

She urged the UN commission to call for an end to the military junta's
policy of using rape as a weapon of war.

Burma's delegate told the commission that investigations into the
allegations had been thoroughly carried out by authorities and only five
cases turned out to be true.

'Action has already been taken against the perpetrators in accordance with
the existing laws,' she said.

In June 2002, the Shan Women's Action Network and the Shan Human Rights
Foundation jointly released a 'Licence to Rape' report, documenting rapes
and other forms of sexual violence by the Burmese troops in Shan state
against more than 600 women and girls.
'Shattering Silences', released this month by the Karen Women's
Organisation, documents 125 cases of sexual violence committed by the
Burmese military in Karen State from 1988 to 2004. High-ranking military
officers committed half of the rapes, according to the report. Gang rapes
accounted for 40 per cent of the cases and in 28 per cent of the cases,
the women were killed after being raped.


OPINION/ OTHER
_______________________

April 11, Mizzima News
Is it too early to embrace the regime's game plan? - Nyo Ohn Myint

In recent months the SPDC has launched its plans for a renewed National
Convention. It is clearly meant to gain support from the international
community, and the convention appears set to go ahead with or without Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD).

The SPDC is clearly using the National Convention for its political
purposes by giving the appearance of it taking the first steps towards
political development while not allowing the opposition parties any true
freedom.

The international community has tried to embrace the SPDC magic show led
by General Khin Nyunt even though major issues are missing from the
agenda.  Many countries, including regional players, are showing their
commercial interests up-front, convinced that solutions are being sought
for Burmese humanitarian issues. And in this way, these countries hope to
gain a future foothold into the potential resource rich economy of Burma.
The reality is that Burma is a failed state and is one of the poorest
countries on the globe. The international community is unwilling to admit
that the current regime is responsible for this mess, and instead is ready
to deliver aid programs through the regime.

The SPDC track record when it comes to economic policy and humanitarian
programs is totally unacceptable, and the country urgently requires
spending in its critically depleted health and education sectors. And yet
Burma's defense budget is one of the highest in the world when compared to
the nation's GNP. During the past few years, the regime has unnecessarily
bought vast quantities of advanced military hardware, including combat MIG
29s and sophisticated offensive artillery pieces.

The regime never changes its budget focus and yet the British government
and other EU countries continue to help finance humanitarian projects in
Burma. This has had the effect of allowing the regime to expand the
military and increase political suppression against the democratic
movement and the NLD. International aid money for humanitarian projects
indirectly supports the regime by giving the junta greater financial
resources to be spent on extending its power. The regime continues to
spend on its defensive budget and pours millions of dollars into the
military intelligent network used primarily to suppress the NLD and other
supporters of the democratic movement within Burma.

We have seen a collective failure by the international community in being
unable to prevent the regime's state sponsored terrorism against Daw Aung
San Su Kyi and her supporters, highlighted in the attack that took place
near Depayin in May, 2003. As a result of this attack, dozens of democracy
supporters and NLD members were brutally killed and the leaders of the
party have been illegally detained. Despite this, most members of the
international community still refuse to accept reality and chose to ignore
the regime's criminal activities. Instead, they provide humanitarian
assistance as a reward for announcing the National Convention. The
international community is supposed to ensure that the regime does not
threaten the NLD again and it must collectively push for an investigation
into the government-guided crime against the NLD. The international
community embrace of the National Convention move is not a productive one,
but serves only to strengthen the regime, allowing it to commit new crimes
against the democratic movement.

The Burmese democratic movement needs not only sympathy for suffering
through the regime's crimes, but also proactive support from the
international community. The lack of legitimacy in the regime's own
National Convention plan will result in the international wish list of
reform going nowhere. The immaturity shown by the international community
in providing humanitarian assistance does more harm than good under
current political conditions. The carrot and stick strategy should be
carefully reviewed by the international community before any further harm
is done to democratic reform in Burma.

The author, Nyo Ohn Myint, is Coordinator of Global Burma Campaign of the
Foreign Affairs Committee of National League for Democracy (Liberated
Area).

___________________________________

April 12, Mizzima
Mizzima: Will Aung San Suu Kyi See Her Freedom Soon? - Aung Naing Oo

Like it or not, as the fate of Burma’s transition process depends on her
release or continued detention, the question about her possible release
has been crucial in ending the political standoff in Burma.

Of late, there has been so much hype about the possible release of Burma’s
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. UN Special envoy Mr. Razali announced
it to the outside world upon his return from Rangoon early last month that
she would be free by Thingyan, the Burmese New Year. Burma’s Foreign
Minister Win Aung told the reporters in Bangkok on April 3 that she could
see her freedom before May 17, the date the junta has set for the
resumption of the constitutional convention suspended since 1996.

Like it or not, as the fate of Burma’s transition process depends on her
release or continued detention, the question about her possible release
has been crucial in ending the political standoff in Burma. It is
therefore no surprise that there have been numerous media reports and
speculations. And that has made Aung San Suu Kyi’s release nearly
impossible for the regime to go back on its words.

But will she actually see her freedom for the fourth time in 15 years?
Will her freedom be short-lived as the three previous occasions? Will she
or her National League for Democracy (NLD) participate in the National
Convention as it is intrinsically linked to her release? Will we see the
repeat of confrontation and violence in the future?

So far, nothing concrete has come out from Rangoon. It is too early to say
anything concrete at this stage. Indeed, there are more questions than
answers, which only the Burmese junta can answer. But how, when and
whether she will be released will determine the future political course of
a nation that has stood still for decades.

There are several scenarios as to her probable freedom and their
implications.

Scenario 1: Aung San Suu Kyi is released during or after the Burmese New
Year. This may not tell the whole story. But it may be conducive to her
party’s participation in the convention. She and the NLD will not have a
lot of time for preparation before May 17. One may, however, assume that
there would have been some kind of agreement between the junta and herself
beforehand as to how the transition should transpire. Although it is not
an ideal solution, this scenario can be considered best, giving the
current political situation in the country.

Scenario 2: She is released a few days before the second meeting of
‘Bangkok Process’ to be held at the end of April. Though this can be seen
as publicity stunt by the junta, the release can still be regarded as a
good sign – simply because she can now make public statements regarding
any issues, including possibly rebutting regime’s statements.

And if she is released under this scenario, negotiations may have taken
place, without which her freedom will be meaningless. If she is released
without any negotiation on substantive issues including the convention,
NLD may not participate in the convention. As a result, the cycle of
confrontation - possibly in the form of state-sponsored violence such as
the Depayin Massacre on May 30 last year - is likely to continue.

Scenario 3: Aung San Suu Kyi is freed after the Bangkok meeting and before
May 17. This may not be a good sign. Further, if NLD is to participate in
the convention at this time, the party will have very little time to
prepare although there is not much to prepare when it comes to the debate
on the constitution proposed by the junta. She or NLD may choose not to
participate in the convention citing the unchanged nature of the
convention. Besides, the junta’s invitation is extended to only the
original participants of the 1993 Convention. This has already ruled out
Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation in the process, essentially depriving the
party of choosing its delegates freely. Under this scenario, the junta can
go ahead with the convention and heap the blame on her and NLD for staying
away from the convention. This is also a formula for the continuation of
the conflict.

Scenario 4: She remains under detention. The regime keeps its initiative
and resumes the convention without NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi. Nothing
further needs to be said under this scenario.

The Burmese may be in for a rude awakening. Undoubtedly, scenario 3 is the
most likely event even if she is released at all before May 17. We cannot
rule out scenario 4 either. There are several reasons why this should
happen.

Firstly, the choice of location for the convention is in a village called
Nyaung Hnapin, near Hmawbi, a garrison town, and away from the city center
such as Rangoon. The site would not have been selected if the junta had
not anticipated public outrage for convening the convention without NLD
and Aung San Suu Kyi.  The location of the site also keeps any possible
leak of discussions to the outside world and the media – an ideal
condition for the junta.

Secondly, the convention hall is the place where the Union Solidarity
Development Association, the group believed to be behind the May 30
massacre last year, holds its meetings. This is a subtle remainder to the
delegates that the junta is determined to get its way around any obstacles
should anyone underestimates its intent.

Thirdly, as mentioned earlier the regime has not allowed political parties
to choose their own candidates for the convention. The invitations that
have been sent out are for individuals only. This is the crux of the
matter.

Fourth, the most crucial point is that the junta has so far failed to
indicate how the convention will be held or whether previous procedures
have been changed. And whether Rangoon will compromise on the proposed
constitution is equally important.

The list can go on. But the key argument here is that the regime has
planned to keep the initiative and process under complete control. Aung
San Suu Kyi’s release without negotiations poses kernel threat to this
plan. As the convention is the best way out for the junta from the
political impasse, it will make sure that she or NLD can do no harm to the
process.

If scenario 3 is the chosen path for the regime, it will earn the junta
kudos from the neighbors, especially the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (Asean) and others who are toeing the line to go into Burma
because the junta has released Aung San Suu Kyi and resumed the
convention. And it will strengthen the grouping’s argument with EU that
Burma should be made part of ASEM in October this year. It may not matter
at all for these countries whether the process has been transparent or the
situation can spiral back into confrontation and violence.

The junta may accomplish its objectives but the conflict in Burma will
certainly continue under scenarios 3 & 4.

Aung Naing Oo is a Burmese political analyst living in exile.

___________________________________

April 12, The Nation
Making sure Burma’s road map does not become a road trap

Burmese democrats are worried that almost coinciding dates for the second
meeting of the Thai government’s Bangkok Process and for Burma’s National
Convention to draft a constitution, as the first step of the junta’s “road
map to democracy”, mean that these initiatives may be a “road trap plan”
in long run.

There are legitimate reasons and bitter experiences leading to such
concern on the part of the Burmese democracy movement.

The most important political processes of the road map drawn up by Burma’s
ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) include the drafting of
a constitution in an unspecified time; holding a public referendum on the
new constitution, and organising fresh elections under the constitution.

The road map was developed solely by the junta. The rules to play its
“road map” game are imposed by force. Coercive measures include the arrest
of National Convention delegates for freely expressing their views. But
the experiences of more than four decades have convinced the Burmese
people not to easily accept the rules of the game imposed unilaterally by
the military.

The National Convention, which held its first constitution-drafting
session in January 1993, will reconvene on May 17. In fact, it may need
only days, not even months, to complete the constitution because 104
so-called constitution principles have been laid down since 1994.

However, everyone who has studied the 104 principles agrees that these
principles are undemocratic and a foundation for the perpetuation of
military rule. One of the guiding principles in drafting the new
constitution is that the military must be granted a leading political role
in future. Another of the constitutional principles specifies that a
candidate for president, whose election is also undemocratic, must have
military experience.

Elected representatives and leaders of election-winning parties have said
that they will not participate if the National Convention is reconvened
solely on the SPDC’s terms. In the mean time, the SPDC has used various
measures to secure participation from some of the armed ethnic groups with
which it has agreed to cease-fires, who were consistently portrayed by the
junta as terrorists.

Many of the genuine people’s representatives have been put behind bars,
but the SPDC will try to complete writing the constitution by getting
endorsement from illegitimate delegates coerced to say only “yes” to the
junta.

Many Burmese remember the way military rulers organised the referendum on
adoption of the 1974 totalitarian constitution, the second in “modern
Burma”. Support of allegedly 90 per cent-plus of participants was gained
by transforming “no” votes to “yes” votes.

During the 1990 election, in which the military-backed National Unity
Party was defeated, Burmese people proved that their vote would go only to
democracy. Therefore, any referendum on the new constitution will never be
a democratic one. If the referendum were democratic and people could
exercise their voting rights freely, it is almost certain that no
junta-proposed constitution would get through. The SPDC will create a sham
referendum to follow up their sham National Convention.

Fresh elections are another major concern for Burmese democrats. Some 93
political parties participated in the 1990 election and 27 were
successful. But since the early 1990s, the Election Commission has
de-registered 20 election-winning parties and dismissed many elected
representatives. Among those who have been barred from running in new
elections following their dismissal are many well-known figures. Aung San
Suu Kyi was barred from contesting even the 1990 election. Illegitimate
delegates to the National Convention will probably be transformed into
“legitimate” candidates in any future election. But no Burmese wants to
endorse an election held in such circumstances.

During interviews in exile, many Burmese democrats make it clear that they
are not blocking any proposal that may pave the way for a political
breakthrough. The demand of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and
other election-winning parties is simply for a fair process, so that they
will not be trapped at any stage. Before the NLD boycotted the National
Convention in late 1995, it first demanded that unfair rules of the game
should be revised. The same demand is being made today. Democrats have
expressed readiness to participate in the Nation Convention if the rules
create a level playing field.

When it becomes clear that support and cooperation from Burmese people and
their legitimate representatives is absent, the junta manoeuvres
international players so that their road map wins some credibility.
Instead of initiatives by the United Nations, the SPDC has agreed to a
proposal by the Thai government (headed by a prime minister questioned for
his business interests in Burma) to host an international forum, now known
as the Bangkok Process. The road map and the Bangkok Process were
announced almost simultaneously last year.

To make a positive contribution to the Burmese democracy movement,
participants in the Bangkok Process should include envoys of the Burmese
democracy movement. They should be the ones to present the concerns of
Burmese democrats and to persuade the junta to be part of – not the sole
leaders of – the democratisation process. International diplomats should
also be able to provide inputs regarding their vision of democratisation
in Burma, so that they will not be “trapped” in the Bangkok Process.

Ordinary Burmese people and democrats, who not only experience
malpractices by the military in all aspects of their life but also suffer
the most from the military, doubt whether the proposed road map will lead
to democracy. Their disapproval of the junta’s plan should be interpreted
simply as a demand for fair rules in Burma’s political processes.

The aim now should be to prevent the road map becoming a “road trap”.
International diplomats who show solidarity with the junta by joining the
Bangkok Process when it reconvenes can also show their solidarity with
Burmese people by acting on behalf of the pro-democracy movement.

Khin Maung Win
The writer is Deputy Director of the Democratic Voice of Burma.
___________________________________

April 12, Irrawaddy
Sein Lwin "The Butcher of Rangoon" Dies in Poverty - Aung Zaw

Sein Lwin, 81, briefly president of Burma in 1988, died in Rangoon last week.
Sein Lwin

A state-run newspaper reported on Saturday that the retired
brigadier-general, who was accused of having taken charge of the
suppression of the pro-democracy uprising in 1988, died in Rangoon General
Hospital. The cause of death was not specified, but family sources said
that he died from cancer.

Sein Lwin was a loyal and obedient soldier according to close friends and
relatives.

He was appointed both chairman of the ruling Burma Socialist Programme
Party, or BSPP, and the country's president on July 27, 1988 amid mass
civil street protests. Sein Lwin, regarded as a hard-liner, only fueled
the anger of ordinary Burmese people. During his short tenure street
protests swelled despite increasingly violent responses from the military.

The newly appointed president imposed martial law. He also promised to
tackle corruption and open up the opportunities for private business. But
it was too late.

Sein Lwin, then aged 65, quickly earned the moniker "The Butcher of
Rangoon" for his brutal suppression of successive student-led
demonstrations in the capital. After serving 17 days, he resigned from the
presidency on August 12, 1988.

Sein Lwin waved his hand above his head and the shooting began. Hundreds
of students fell down while others ran for their lives. —Tint Zaw, a
student activist in 1962

Sein Lwin joined the army in 1943 and was regarded as a tough soldier who
was absolutely faithful to his superiors. He earned swift promotions.

On August 12, 1950, the 27-year old Major Sein Lwin and his troops
surrounded a party that included Karen leader Saw Ba U Gyi and killed him
along with Saw Sankey and their bodyguards. It was a triumph for young
officer, who kept Saw Ba U Gyi's gun as a souvenir.

In July 1962, four months after Ne Win had taken control of Burma in a
coup, students at Rangoon University staged a demonstration protesting
stiff regulations imposed by the authorities.

The government ordered Lt-Col Sein Lwin, by then a field commander of the
4th Burma Rifles, to the Rangoon University campus to quell the unrest.
Sein Lwin did not hesitate. A former student at the scene, Tint Zaw
recalled: "Sein Lwin waved his hand above his head and the shooting began.
Hundreds of students fell down while others ran for their lives."

The next day, the Student Union building was demolished with explosives.
It remains a subject of some controversy as to who ordered the shooting.
Ne Win, who died in 2002, denied that he was responsible. His close
associate Brig-Gen Aung Gyi, who still lives in Rangoon, was also involved
in the operation, critics and sources in the Tatmadaw, or armed forces,
said.

Regardless, the incident did not hurt Sein Lwin’s carreer. In 1983, the
loyal soldier and obedient party hack became deputy general-secretary of
the BSPP.

After his resignation as chairman of the BSPP and president of Burma in
August 1988, "The Butcher" maintained his friendly relations with retired
dictator Gen Ne Win.

The Butcher was broke and living off the charity of relatives."—Rangoon
source

"Sein Lwin visited Ne Win’s house almost every week," said Thakin Chan
Tun, a retired politician in Rangoon. According to member of Sein Lwin’s
family, the two normally discussed religion and meditation.
When The Irrawaddy telephoned his house last year, a relative said the
former president was meditating and wouldn't be available to talk to the
press. There is no record of him ever having talked to the media in the
past.

The relative said that Sein Lwin began reading religious books and seeking
advice from monks after he retired from politics. He was also interested
in astrology. Like many other former high-ranking officials of the BSPP,
Sein Lwin kept a low profile in the capital.

As chairman of the State Law and Order Order Restoration Council, or
SLORC, from 1988 to 1992 Gen Saw Maung treated his retired superior Sein
Lwin favorably.
But under the current military regime, "The Butcher" was broke and living
off the charity of relatives, an informed source in Rangoon said. He had
appeared with Gen Ne Win at the Sedona Hotel for the latter’s birthday
party in 2001.

Following the arrest of Ne Win's son-in-law and three grandsons on charges
of conspiring to seize power, cronies and faithful followers of the former
strongman came under intense pressure. Reportedly, several 4WD vehicles
and escorts provided to Sein Lwin by the government were revoked.

Thakin Chan Tun, who met Sein Lwin a few months ago at a mutual friend's
birthday party, said that he looked "healthy and fine" talking to friends.
He seemed aware of the current situation in the country but was not very
interested in it. His focus was religious meditation.

When The Irrawaddy asked Chan Tun whether Sein Lwin deserved the moniker
"The Butcher of Rangoon" he replied that Sein Lwin was not the only one
who involved in killing peaceful demonstrators in the 1988 uprising.
"Everyone was involved," he said.



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