BurmaNet News, September 5, 2008

[Editor]

September 5, 2008 Issue # 3550

QUOTE OF THE DAY
[Suu Kyi] is refusing food supplies in protest against ... her unlawful
detention under the security law. — The National League for Democracy

INSIDE BURMA
AP: NLD calls junta to ensure well-being of Suu Kyi
DVB: Abbot detained in monastery raid
DVB: Directive orders monks to avoid political activity
DVB: Generation Wave activist arrested
Irrawaddy: Corruption rampant in the Delta
Irrawaddy: Exiled dissident visits Burma
Mizzima: Confrontational comments laud Nargis relief effort

BUSINESS / TRADE
Mizzima: Sales hit because of ban on late night business
KNG: Junta forcibly buys paddy from farmers before harvesting
Irrawaddy: Myanmar airways unsafe: UK Gov’t

REGIONAL
DVB: What do the Thai demonstrations mean for Burma?

OPINION / OTHER
Bangkok Post: No counting Suu Kyi out (Editorial)
Harvard International Review: Sino-Indian competition for Burmese oil and
natural gas

STATEMENT
NLD: Special Statement No. 16/09/08 (Unofficial Translation)

PRESS RELEASE
AAPP: Malayone monastery raided; abbot detained

____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

September 5, Associated Press
NLD calls junta to ensure well-being of Suu Kyi

The political party of detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi urged
Burma's military government Friday to ensure her well-being as she
continued to refuse food deliveries to protest her detention.

The National League for Democracy "expressed concern" that Suu Kyi has not
accepted food delivered to her home for almost three weeks, the party said
in a statement.

It did not say whether she was on a hunger strike, a question that has
remained unanswered since the first mention of her refusal to accept food
over a week ago.

The 63-year-old Nobel Peace Prize laureate has been held in detention by
the ruling military junta for 13 of the past 19 years, mostly under house
arrest, and relies on food delivered by her party for sustenance.

Friday's statement called Suu Kyi's action a protest, which had only been
alluded to until now.

"She is refusing food supplies in protest against ... her unlawful
detention under the security law," the party said.

Suu Kyi also wants greater freedom of movement for two female companions
who live with her and help take care of the house, it said. They are
currently not allowed to leave the compound.

She is also protesting that authorities have not allowed her to receive a
monthly medical checkup by her physician as they earlier promised, it
said. A doctor visited Suu Kyi on August 17, but her previous checkup was
in January, the party said.

"Her safety and well-being are the soul responsibility of the authorities
who have unlawfully detained her," it said.

Suu Kyi's lawyer, Kyi Win, was allowed to meet with her for 30 minutes on
Monday, and said she told him that "I am well but I have lost some
weight."

Rumors of a possible hunger strike have circulated widely in Rangoon,
where Suu Kyi's isolation has only increased the mystique that surrounds
her.

Similar hunger strike rumors spread in 2003 and in 1989, but proved untrue.

Supporters have speculated that Suu Kyi is frustrated over the United
Nations' failure to bring about democratic reform in the country, which
has been ruled by the military since 1962.

Suu Kyi canceled meetings with UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari during his
six-day visit to Burma last month, and he left without seeing her.

UN envoys and other senior officials have visited the country nearly 40
times since 1990, and the UN General Assembly has passed numerous
resolutions calling for change.

____________________________________

September 5, Democratic Voice of Burma
Abbot detained in monastery raid

The abbot of Marlayon monastery in Than Lyin township’s Bogyoke village is
being held after a raid on the monastery earlier today, according to the
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.

In a statement released today, the AAPP said a group of around 23 people,
assumed to be government officials in civilian clothing, arrived at the
monastery at 2am in three trucks owned by the township Peace and
Development Council.

They ordered the monks to lie on the ground and keep their faces down
while they spent around 40 minutes searching the monastery.

The group then left, taking with them monastery abbot U Thila Wuntha, 58,
who is in charge of the 17 monks who live in the monastery, and warned the
remaining monks not to leave the monastery compound.

Police stations in Bogyoke village and Than Lyin denied involvement in the
raid and arrest.

Local residents said that the monastery had been close watch by
unidentified people who they believed to be government spies.

____________________________________

September 5, Democratic Voice of Burma
Directive orders monks to avoid political activity

A directive has been sent by the state Sangha Maha Nayaka committee to
monasteries and lecturing colleges in Chauk, Magwe division, ordering
monks not to take part in political activities.

The directive was issued as new monks scholars arrived at the monasteries
around the time of the one-year anniversary of the Saffron Revolution.

A Chauk monk said that the rules stated that monks could not get involved
in party politics or join or participate in the activities of any
organisations that are not sponsored by the Sangha Maha Nayaka.

The directive also urged monks to concentrate on their religious duties
and not to act in a way that could tarnish the reputation of the Sangha.

The rules stated that swift action would be taken against any monks found
to be breaking the law.

The monk said the directive had come from Magwe Division Sangha Maha Nayaka.

Security has been tightened around monasteries in Chauk and monks are
being closely watched, the monk said.

“Last year the Sangha Maha Nayaka issued directives as instructed [by the
authorities]. It is the same this year but security in both Pakokku and
Chauk is quite tight,” he said.

“These Swan Arr Shin and USDA are shaving their heads. I don’t know
whether they are going to beat up monks or not if we protest, but they are
looking at us as if they are going swallow us alive when we go out to
collect alms.”

Monks in Chauk are continuing their boycott of government officials by
refusing alms from them and they have told the abbots of the Sangha Maha
Nayaka to speak out against the SPDC for forcibly disrobing, imprisoning
and torturing monks.

“The abbots must know one way or another that the authorities are
torturing, killing and imprisoning their own monks,” the monk said.

“If they don’t admonish wicked rulers, or if the other party doesn’t
accept it or take it seriously, the abbots themselves have a duty to carry
out a religious boycott,” he said.

“The Sangha Maha Nayaka must be held accountable.”

____________________________________

September 5, Democratic Voice of Burma
Generation Wave activist arrested

Ko Tin Myo Htut, a former political prisoner and current member of the
underground activist group Generation Wave, has been detained by
government authorities, according to a spokesperson for the group.

Generation Wave spokesperson Ko Moe Thway told DVB that Ko Tin Myo Htut,
also known as Ko Kyaw Oo, 32, was arrested early Thursday morning in
Mayangone township by government officials in plain clothes.

"He was arrested on his way to meet up a friend at Amay Ywar teashop near
Bayinnaung junction," said Ko Moe Thway.

"We called his mobile phone after we found out, but we only heard some
people interrogating him on the other end of the line."

Ko Moe Thway said the group has also learned that another unidentified
activist was arrested together with Ko Tin Myo Htut.

Ko Tin Myo Htut was a student activist in the 1988 national wide uprising
and he was imprisoned in Insein prison for five years in 1992 for his
political activities.

Generation Wave released a statement immediately after his arrest,
declaring that the group would not give up its peaceful anti-government
activities.

The group also urged the ruling State Peace and Development Council to
release all political activists in detention and to use dialogue to find a
solution to the country’s political problems.

At least 10 members of Generation Wave have been arrested by the
government so far in 2008.

____________________________________

September 5, Irrawaddy
Corruption rampant in the Delta - Aung Thet Wine

Local authorities in the Irrawaddy delta have been siphoning off
humanitarian assistance meant for refugee communities and have been
selling on the relief supplies for substantial profits, according to
several sources in the cyclone-ravaged delta.

Villagers from Laputta Township also alleged that the victims of Cyclone
Nargis are also conscripted to hard labor in exchange for meager food
rations.

“There is a black market near the Kan-nar Road,” a trader from Ward 7 in
Laputta told The Irrawaddy. “The vendors sell tarpaulins, clothes,
mosquito nets, blankets and other utensils. They don't sell these things
explicitly. First, they negotiate quietly with the buyers. Money is
exchanged guardedly when they reach agreement,” he added.

In order to supply assistance to communities in the cyclone-affected
areas, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) must deal with
local authorities and village headmen, who usually present inflated
figures of people in their villages who are in need. Then they collect
basic foodstuffs such as rice, cooking oil and salt from the humanitarian
organizations mainly based in Laputta.

However, most of these rations never reach the cyclone victims, claimed
the residents in Laputta. The sources added that some village headmen keep
the relief supplies and then take them to sell.

“The black market situation in August is not as good as it was in June and
July,” a youth who had volunteered for 14 weeks for an INGO said. “Now
there are fewer sellers. One month after the cyclone, village headmen were
making good livings selling relief supplies on the black market. Now the
humanitarian aid has run out.”

“However, blankets and mosquito nets are still widely available for
between 3,000 and 5,000 kyat (US $2.50 to $4.50) each,” he added.

“Although the rice-growing season is now finished, there is still a
corrupt market in the trade of machinery and tools,” a villager from
Ka-Nyin-Kone in Laputta Township said.

Village headmen are also allegedly forcing villagers to work in
reconstruction projects such as building roads and schools.

“When the secondary school at Ka-Nyin-Kone was destroyed by the cyclone,
the monks from Min Kyaung monastery handed over a donation for its
reconstruction, including payment for carpenters,” the villager said.
“However, U Sein Myint, the village headman, summoned the villagers and
forced them to work on the construction of the school without payment. If
they failed to do so, they were beaten.”

The villager, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons, said
that the villagers in Ka-Nyin-Kone did not dare complain because the
headman was a close friend of the local military officers.

“On August 7 and 8, U Sein Myint called meetings and said to the villagers
that they can go and complain anywhere they like. But he boasted that he
would still be village headman in 2010. Then he brought along some
soldiers who were stationed nearby to threatened us,” said the villager.

Authorities in Ka-Nyin-Kone are reportedly supporting the armed forces in
the area with wages of at least 20,000 kyat ($18) per soldier per month.

Sources in the delta told The Irrawaddy that apart from openly exploiting
disadvantaged villagers, the local authorities act with the full support
of the local military.

____________________________________

September 5, Irrawaddy
Exiled dissident visits Burma - Wai Moe

An exiled Burmese dissident who recently traveled back to his troubled
homeland said that the purpose of his visit was to gain a better
understanding of the economic and humanitarian challenges facing the
country, not to talk politics.

Zaw Oo, head of the Vahu Development Institute, based in Chiang Mai,
Thailand, told The Irrawaddy that he made a four-day trip to Burma in July
as an economist interested in the weaknesses exposed by Cyclone Nargis,
the biggest natural disaster to strike the country in generations.

The prominent exiled dissident added that he did not discuss politics
during his visit. He also confirmed that he was planning to return to
Burma again in the near future.

Returning to Burma for the first time in nearly two decades, Zaw Oo said
he was saddened by the widespread poverty that he witnessed there.

As a former policy advisor to the National Coalition Government of the
Union of Burma (NCGUB), the government in exile, and director of the Burma
Fund, the NCGUB’s think tank, he was once an outspoken opponent of the
regime. He was also a leader of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front,
an insurgent group formed by Burmese students in 1988.

Some Burmese activists in exile compared Zaw Oo’s trip to one made by
Zarni, co-founder of the Free Burma Coalition, in May 2004. Sources close
to the Burmese authorities said, however, that the two trips were handled
very differently by officials.

During his one-day trip, Zarni met with high-ranking military intelligence
officers, including members of a think tank formed by Brig-Gen Than Tun
and Col Hla Min, deputies of the former spy chief Gen Khin Nyunt.

Zaw Oo, by contrast, met mainly with lower ranking figures, including an
officer of the Military Security Affairs, which replaced the Military
Intelligence Service after the ouster of Gen Khin Nyunt in Oct 2004.
Sources also said that Zaw Oo faced some problems applying for a visa.

Zaw Oo denied this, and said that he was well-treated by the authorities
when he was in Burma. He said that he met with all of the officials he
needed to meet, adding, however, that the meetings were not held formally.

He declined to provide any details about the ranks of the officials he met.

Yin Yin Oo, the sister of Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu and an official
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reportedly played a significant role
in helping Zaw Oo to get a visa, according to sources in Rangoon.

Zaw Oo said that his trip wasn’t like Zarni’s because he didn’t go to
Burma to talk about politics. “I only talked about Nargis and economic
issues there,” he said.

He said that the impact of Cyclone Nargis made many government officials
realize that there is a need for change. He added that UN relief experts
now have ministerial-level access to the government.

He also said that his trip made him realize that many exiles don’t have a
complete picture of the situation inside Burma.

____________________________________

September 5, Mizzima News
Confrontational comments laud Nargis relief effort

Recent assessments by the World Health Organization (WHO) rain praise on
the Burmese government's emergency response following May's Cyclone
Nargis, as well as upon ongoing relief efforts conducted in conjunction
with international actors.

The remarks in question come following the publication of an article in
the WHO's monthly Bulletin for September which refers to a WHO-led relief
effort in Burma after the cyclone of May 2nd and 3rd as a "Groundbreaking
approach to disaster relief."

Specifically, the approach in question centers on the work of Rudi Coninx
of the WHO and the "cluster" strategy. According to the article, the
aforementioned tactic, pioneered by Coninx in Burma, calls on "a group of
relevant UN agencies and others to coordinate specific areas in an
emergency response."

A chief benefit of pursuing such a course of action is said to be enhanced
accountability – a lesson driven home in the wake of the tsunami of
December 2004.

Yet, Coninx is quoted in the Bangkok Post today as saying that even prior
to the coordination of relief efforts with the international community,
the Burmese regime performed admirably it its emergency response.

"In the first week, the Ministry of Health had already sent around 50
doctors from Rangoon General Hospital
Within the first week they had all
the staff necessary... I thought that worked quite well," Coninx
explained.

However, much of the acclaim for both the government's early response and
the later "cluster" approach appears to be relative, as alluded to by
statements from within the WHO establishment itself.

Governmental responses were at least partly determined to be a success in
consideration of the miniscule amount of resources available for rapid
response as a result of the junta only spending 1.4 percent of its gross
domestic product on health resources – that, according to Coninx himself
in the Post.

Further, Sarah Cumberland, writing for the Bulletin, elaborates: "The
unique political situation and the lack of existing data meant that donors
demanded even more informa­tion and accountability than usual, resulting
in what has been considered the most comprehensive survey ever conducted
after a disaster."

Cumberland proceeds to reference Dr. Richard Garfield, whose comments
again focus on the relative nature of the situation inside Burma.
"[S]urveys held after previous disasters have mainly mea­sured aid
provided. How many people received goods? How many villages were visited?
For the first time, Garfield says, this survey asked questions to compare
conditions before and after the cyclone. What kind of sanitation was in
use? How far did people have to travel to seek health care? What kind of
health problems did they have?"

As far as the "cluster" relief approach for the coordination of
humanitarian aid, WHO acknowledges that the success of such an approach
was not possible until three weeks after the disaster, following the
intervention of the ASEAN Secretary General.

According to the monthly periodical and Dr. Nihal Singh from the WHO
office in Burma, a primary impediment to the implementation of the
"cluster" approach in the first weeks following the cyclone was "perhaps
because the Ministry of Health was not clear on the "concept" of the
health cluster and did not feel comfortable working directly with the UN
agencies and NGOs."

However, the positive nature of the WHO assessments are contradicted by
numerous estimates from persons and organizations active on the ground in
Burma in the days, weeks and months following the storm, which resulted in
an estimated 138,000 either dead or missing.

The argument of an effective rapid response on the part of the government
is met which assertions from groups such as Medical Emergency Relief
International (MERLIN), who described the scene a week after Nargis as:
"Seven days on and the situation is desperate." MERLIN is also a founding
member of the WHO's "cluster" network.

And the United Nations as well, for its part, estimated that nearly six
weeks after the killer storm one million survivors in need of aid had
still yet to be reached – a figure also quoted by Human Rights Watch.

As far as the present atmosphere on the ground and its conduciveness to
the relief activities of a broad-based international effort, Global Hope
Network International (GHNI) reaches a strikingly different conclusion to
that of the WHO.

In a statement released today, GHNI describes Burma's delta region as
follows: "Most of the hardest hit places of the Ayeyarwaddy delta still
refuse entry to foreigners. It is a dangerous place to work. Our teams of
national workers continue to risk their freedom and lives by helping the
desperately suffering. People are perpetually hungry and are not getting
enough food to remain healthy."

"Months after cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar, the situation remains
grim and dangerous," adds GHNI.

Estimates as to the length of time needed for relief and rehabilitation
efforts resulting from damage caused by Cyclone Nargis typically range
from three to five years, with the WHO determining that U.S. $2 billion
alone is needed just to rebuild health facilities.

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

September 5, Mizzima News
Sales hit because of ban on late night business

Sales have plummeted in shops in Rangoon after local Burmese junta
authorities ordered closure of business establishments by 11 p.m. Earlier,
the shops remained open till late at night.

The township and ward level authorities in Rangoon issued an order 10 days
ago stating that business establishments have to be closed at 11 p.m. The
shopkeepers complained that the number of customers has decreased and
their business was taking a beating because of the early closure.

 "The volume of sales has declined sharply. The customers have stopped
coming as they cannot sit in our shops peacefully till late at night,"
the owner of a famous teashop in Myenigone said.

"The business is hardly as good as before. The youths used to came to our
shops for chit-chat. Now they do not come because we have to down shutters
early," a teashop owner in Kamayut Township near Hledan junction said.

Similarly, a restaurant owner in Dagon Township, with a live music shows
for entertainment, said that his once famous restaurant was severely
affected by the new order as his customers have stopped coming to his shop
for fear of being arrested when they go out late at night.

"I have two shops. Now I have to close one. The customers have stopped
late night outings for fear of being arrested," he said.

Though the reason behind the new ban is still unclear, shopkeepers
speculated that it was aimed at preventing fresh unrest with the
anniversary of last year's September saffron revolution.

"Though they have not given any reason for the new order, I think, it is
to prevent fresh unrest akin to last September's uprising," Htay Hlaing, a
restaurant owner in Lanmadaw Township, said.

"They said this month is crucial. In September, it seems they don't want
to see huge crowds assembling late at night," a teashop owner in Sanchaung
Township near Dagon Centre, said.

Veteran politician Thakin Chan Tun echoed his views on the new order.

"The order is an order, though the authorities said it is an
understanding. They are afraid of renewed unrest in September. Their fear
is of the people revolting not of increasing criminal cases," he said
wryly.

____________________________________

September 5, Kachin News Group
Junta forcibly buys paddy from farmers before harvesting

Intent on stocking up on rations for the Burmese Army, the military junta
is forcibly buying paddy at reduced prices from farmers before the
agricultural community can harvest the crop at the end of the season in
November. The paddy collection drive is on in villages in Waingmaw
Township in Kachin State in northern Burma, complained local farmers.

Early this month, farmers in Nawnghkying village in Waingmaw Township on
the riverside of Mali Hka (Irrawaddy River) were forced to sell their
paddy and accept 2,000 Kyat equal to US $ 1.7 per Tin (1 Tin = 40.9 litres
in Burmese measurement in volume) of rice, which is four times less than
the prevailing market price of 8,000 Kyat equal to US $ 6.8 per Tin, a
local farmer told KNG.

According to farmers in Nawnghkying, the authorities of Boa Constrictor in
Khatcho village in Waingmaw came to Nawnghkying and ordered each household
to sell two Tins of paddy per acre of paddy field they own. The
authorities of Khatcho Boa Constrictor have already advanced money to the
farmers.

Local farmers added that they have to send the paddy demanded to the
Nawnghkying village administration office (Ya-Ya-Ka) as soon as the
harvest season starts in November. If they cannot send it in time to the
Ya-Ya-Ka office, they have been instructed to send it directly to the Boa
Constrictor in Khat Cho village.

The authorities are forcing Nawnghkying farmers to sell paddy, although
the regime has not provided any support in terms of fertilizer or other
farming equipments, a farmer told KNG today.

Owners of paddy fields, who hired out their plots to others, were also
given the same instructions of selling the paddy demanded to the junta,
added farmers.

There are over 400 households in Nawnghkying village and they have been
farming in the village relying on the water from the Ugang Bum (Ugang
Mountain).

The same situation occurred over the last two years where the authorities
forced the residents to sell 10 Tins from each acre, said a resident.

____________________________________

September 5, Irrawaddy
Myanmar airways unsafe: UK Gov’t - Lawi Weng

The British foreign office has issued an advisory warning it staff not to
use flights operated by Myanmar Airways, Burma’s state-owned domestic air
carrier, because of the airline’s failure to meet international safety
standards.

In a statement released on September 3, the British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) also advised staff to avoid the privately owned
Air Bagan, which sometimes uses aircraft leased from Myanmar Airways. The
warning extends to Myanmar Airways International (MAI) flights that use
Fokker 100 aircraft owned by Air Bagan.

“FCO staff have been advised to avoid flying with Myanmar Airways and Air
Bagan if an acceptable alternative means of travel exists,” reads the
statement.

Air Bagan is owned by Tay Za, a prominent Burmese businessman with close
ties to the country’s ruling junta. In October 2007, soon after he was
placed on a US blacklist targeting cronies of the regime, he was forced to
suspend the operation of flights to Singapore.

According to the British travel advisory, Myanmar Airways International
has a three-month contract with Air Bagan to hire Fokker 100 for flights
from Rangoon to Bangkok and Rangoon to Kuala Lumpur. The contract expires
in November.

The warning is more bad news for Burma’s tourism industry, which has been
trying to recover from the devastating impact of Cyclone Nargis. The
deadly storm, which struck on May 2-3, wiped out several of the country’s
best-known beach resorts.

Ma Khine, a public relations officer for the Myanmar Tourist Board, told
The Irrawaddy on Friday that the government is preparing to launch a major
campaign to attract visitors. The local weekly 7-Day News reported on
Thursday that the regime is planning to reopen all famous resort hotels in
three beach areas by next month.

However, sources in the tourism industry said that the number of tourists
visiting the country has fallen 90 percents since May. They added that
there are virtually no hotel bookings for this year’s high season, which
begins in November.

Tour operators in Rangoon said that the local tourism industry took a
severe hit following the crackdown on monk protesters last September.
Cyclone Nargis, they said, has only added to the industry’s woes.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

September 5, Democratic Voice of Burma
What do the Thai demonstrations mean for Burma?

Political tensions are running high in Thailand, with demonstrators from
the People’s Alliance for Democracy calling for the resignation of the
government led by Samak Sundaravej.

While the likely outcome of the protests is not yet clear, any new
developments could have a significant impact on Thai-Burmese relations and
on the political situation in Burma.

Kavi Chongkittavorn, editor of the Nation, said he did not expect the
demonstrations to lead to another coup.

“I don’t think the army will stage a coup this time. They will stay as
observers for the moment, keeping a carefully eye on developments. For the
moment, the police have a very important role in keeping public order and
I think, in the end, it is Samak who has to decide whether to give in or
not, because at the moment it seems to me that there is a deadlock, with
no way out.

“But with the resignation of foreign minister Tej Bunnag [on 3 September],
Samak’s position is getting weaker every day. I don’t think Samat’s
cabinet will last for long because the government has lost credibility –
the foreign minister is one of the most respected officials in the Thai
government.”

Irrawaddy editor Aung Zaw said it was too early to tell what the outcome
of the demonstrations would be.

“We can’t say anything definite yet. The reason is that PAD also has to
relent. If the two sides continue to square off, I think there could be
the prospect of bloodshed. But, what is extraordinary about this is, in
this country, is that even if there is a big uprising like this, there is
no unilateral crackdown. Diplomats in Bangkok say that if it were in
Burma, it would only last about two days.

“[In 2006] there was a military coup and people said it would not happen
again, but the situation favours a military coup. Although they are saying
that there will not be another coup, no one, including political experts,
can say exactly what will happen in the future. But in this country, even
if there is a coup, people regard it as a national holiday. No one
believes it is as bad as it would be in Burma.”

Aung Zaw contrasted the brutal crackdowns of the Burmese army on
demonstrators with Thailand’s bloodless coup in 2006, where people
welcomed soldiers with flowers.

“Although a state of emergency has been declared, the restrictions that
brings only apply to areas where there are demonstrations while in other
areas the situation is continuing as normal.

“These are the differences between the Thai army and the Burmese army,
Thai politics and Burmese politics, and the thinking in the two
countries.”

But since neither Samak nor his predecessor Thaksin came to power in a
coup but through democratic elections, some international observers have
questioned why the protestors are trying to bring down elected
representatives.

Kavi said he believed the Thai people had a particular concept of democracy.

“For Thai people, democracy is more than the electoral process. In many
countries, the electoral process is one of the most important yardsticks
for democracy. But in Thailand it is only a part of it. And I think a lot
of it has to do with the Thais’ concerns about the morals of their leaders
and the leaders’ good governance. In the case of Samak, I think his
character is highly questionable. There are many court cases pending at
the moment.

“I think Thailand looks at elections as part of a broader conception of
the democratic process but not the only component, while in many foreign
countries, the electoral process is sacred. If you win by one or two votes
you have won, and others have to wait for the next round of election to
come back to challenge the incumbent. And I think in Thailand, people do
not have that kind of patience, so they demonstrate, to expose the
government’s mismanagement, corruption and all that.

“That explains why a lot of people continue to join in the demonstrations
– even though from time to time they are threatened with arrest or the use
of force, they keep coming out in large numbers.”

Aung Zaw said the situation in Thailand could have a major impact in Burma.

“It has a great impact. General Than Shwe and his clique like Thaksin,
Samak and so on - we know this from internal sources. General Than Shwe
once said that he could play politics of Burma with various tricks, by
taking out the Thai-Burmese border trades.

“Moreover, prime ministers Thaksin and Samat have made much of defending
Burma in Thailand, as [Samak] did recently when he went to Burma and said
that the general meditates and is religious and a good person and the
like. He has a reputation as an ambassador for Burma, and the government
of Burma is very worried that his government will collapse.”

Military analyst Htay Aung, who is based on the Thai-Burmese border,
believes that an end to the Samak government could lead to a cooling of
relations between Thailand and the junta.

“If Samak’s government falls, the relationship between the Burmese
military government and Thailand may not be as warm as it has been in the
past. For example, when Thaksin first came to power, he changed some
infantry chiefs and the commander of Brigade 3 whom the Burmese government
didn’t like.

“If this government falls and a new government takes over, the pressure on
the Thai army will decrease and the relationship with Burma’s military
government could become tense.”

Htay Aung said that a victory for the Thai protestors could have a
psychological impact in Burma and could boost moral among opposition
activists.

“If the Thai people are successful, this could be a source of
encouragement for the people of Burma, and the strength of the opposition
against the military government could increase.”

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

September 5, Bangkok Post
No counting Suu Kyi out (Editorial)

Even though it is not yet clear whether Burma's detained opposition leader
Aung San Suu Kyi has staged any form of strike against the failure to
bring change to the country's repressive regime, the international
community must take the signals sent so far seriously. And it must try to
act on it more thoughtfully than it has over the past many years.

The Nobel Peace laureate sent her first signal - seen as a significant
shift from her usually cooperative dealings with the United Nations so far
- when she refused to meet with UN special envoy to Burma, Ibrahim
Gambari, during his latest six-day visit to Burma late last month.

During the past two decades, since the military junta usurped power after
Mrs Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, achieved a
landslide victory in the 1990 elections, the dissident leader had always
welcomed the UN's diplomatic efforts, as she herself believes that only a
dialogue could lead Burma to democratic reform. The problem is that as the
junta pushes on with its so-called roadmap to "disciplined democracy"
which supposedly will culminate in a general election in 2010, it has also
always tried to keep the Lady out of the scene.

With the UN special envoy being confined to the junta's schedule - where
he may go and with whom he may meet - the UN itself risks falling into the
junta's game plan. Burmese dissidents are worried that unless the UN
manages to send out a stronger, clearer message about the roadmap, it may
end up lending legitimacy to the process and obliterate the lawful result
of the 1990 elections altogether.

The viewpoint expressed to Mr Gambari by Thai Prime Minister Samak
Sundaravej is also worrisome. Basically, Mr Samak told the special envoy
that the international community might need to sacrifice Aung San Suu Kyi
if it wishes to see some measure of democracy being allowed to develop in
Burma. Critics are concerned that the Thai PM might raise this idea at the
United Nations General Assembly in New York this month. As Thailand has
assumed its turn as chairman of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, Mr Samak's take on the issue should be a point to ponder, unless
of course the Asean community takes charge of the issue and finds some way
for a more sensible and sympathetic approach to prevail.

With no details of Mrs Suu Kyi's latest condition and stance available
yet, the pressure is on Asean and the UN to find a new way to continue the
dialogue it has opened with all stake holders, especially the opposition
leader, whose legitimate voice must be heard.

If the special envoy's process has hit a dead end, then some new options
must be initiated which may include revitalising the process or starting a
whole new method that would include all stake holders, in particular Mrs
Suu Kyi, and help release the people of Burma from the repression they
have been suffering for such a long while.

____________________________________

September 5, Harvard International Review
Sino-Indian competition for Burmese oil and natural gas

Implications for India's External Relations
Ryan Clarke is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre of International Studies at
the University of Cambridge. He has previously resided and conducted
research in South and Southeast Asia.
Sangeet Dalliwall is a solicitor in London. She has worked as a consultant
in Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Bangladesh,
and Indonesia. She has a LLB (Hons), an LLM, and a postgraduate diploma
from Oxford University.

This article examines Burma's energy market and Sino-Indian competition to
gain access to its vast reserves while seeking to highlight continued
Indian shortcomings. This article argues that although India may be able
to make significant headway with the Junta and obtain a greater stake in
the development of Burma's oil and natural gas fields, attempting to
undercut and dislodge the Chinese will prove to be an ultimately fruitless
task that damages India's long-term interests and ties with ASEAN, other
Asian democracies, and the West. As such, India must re-evaluate its
current policy towards the Junta.

Burma's Energy Market – Few Open Doors for India
The competition between India and China for influence in Burma reflects a
larger jockeying for power between the two Asian giants. Burma's
recoverable gas reserves are around 51 trillion cubic feet due to the
discovery of a large offshore field opposite Thailand and another opposite
Bangladesh. This gas commands a premium for both India and China, as
current crude oil prices consistently rise above US$120 a barrel with some
predicting this figure to possibly even reach US$200. China undoubtedly
uses it political influence in Burma to swing the Junta in favor of some
of its major companies, such as PetroChina, as business and political
interests often intersect in this region and the Junta has a monopoly over
Burma's natural gas sector as well as nearly all other economic activity.
Given India's clear limitations in lobbying for its state-owned firms, it
cannot expect major victories over the Chinese in securing natural
resources in Burma, especially since India recently lost its "preferential
buyer" status on several fields, likely a result of Chinese pressure on
the Junta.

Military planners in China fear an embargo in the event of a war or crisis
with the United States and are keen to reduce China's dependence on tanker
transports through the Malacca Strait and South China Sea. In December
2005, China was awarded rights to natural gas from the biggest fields in
Burma, beating out India. Korean-owned Daewood International, the operator
of the field, selected PetroChina to extract the natural gas, while
state-owned Indian companies control 30 per cent of the field, which holds
as much as 7.7 trillion cubic feet, or 218 billion meters, of gas.
Further, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed six
contracts on production and sharing with the Burma Oil and Gas Enterprise
(MOGE) of the Ministry of Energy from October 2004 to January 2005. The
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) and its subsidiary Dian
Quiangui Petroleum Exploration also work on inland fields, while the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its subsidiary Chinnery Assets
also won contracts to upgrade four old oilfields in central Burma. As of
2006, these projects lead to a total financial commitment of US$163
million. However, this figure is expected to grow considerably as China
has begun to heavily invest in Burma's oil and natural sector.

China's Aim
PetroChina plans to build a gas pipeline from the A-1 block in the highly
promising Shwe field off the coast of Rahine state to Yunnan. The Shwe
field consists of seven blocks of unconfirmed size with the largest being
A-1, estimated to contain between 2.88 trillion to 3.56 trillion cubic
feet of gas. PetroChina has signed a memorandum of understanding with MOGE
to buy gas from A-1 for 30 years, commencing 2009. Further, plans for an
oil pipeline linking Burma's deep water port of Sittwe with Kunming in
Yunnan were approved by China's National Development and Reform Commission
in April 2006 and CNOOC has taken a stake in a Bay of Bengal gas field in
Burma while CNPC is reportedly looking into building a more extensive
pipeline network. With these deals underwritten by arms sales, unwavering
political support, and protection from international pressure to engage in
meaningful reforms, China's energy interests in Burma are unlikely to be
jeopardized anytime soon. On the contrary, if the Junta continues to
become more isolated, China will capitalize upon the development and
expand its base in the country.

Chinese enterprises as well as the Chinese government have financed and
constructed many infrastructure projects in Burma, especially electric
power generation. Between 1996 and 2005, Chinese companies constructed six
hydro-power plants and one thermal power station, with these projects
accounting for about one-third of the entire national capacity. Also, as
of March 2006, there are 11 major ongoing hydro-power projects in Burma
with a total generating capacity of 1734 megawatts. Contracts were signed
for seven of these projects and all were Chinese enterprises. Further,
China has strongly supported the construction of massive state-owned
factories such as textile mills, plywood plants, rice mills, pulp and
paper mills, sugar mills, agriculture equipment factories, and other light
manufacturing facilities in Burma. These factories would not have been
possible without Chinese government financing. However, many of the
factories are racked by corruption and inefficiency, thus potentially
placing a burden on the Burmese government budget and eventually resulting
in bad loans to Chinese stakeholders. These moves made in Burma by the
Chinese have undoubtedly contributed to the preferential access to oil and
natural gas that China enjoys in Burma. Through assisting the Junta in the
provision of vital services such as electricity generation, China is
assisting the Junta in ensuring regime survival. In addition, by
demonstrating a willingness to support what are essentially loss-making
enterprises in Burma, Beijing has demonstrated that it views its presence
in Burma as a long-term one. Given the lack of accountability in China's
authoritarian system, Beijing will continue to invest in high-risk
projects in Burma in order to further solidify its presence without
sparking a major public outcry domestically. This is a luxury that India
does not have.

India's Position in Burma
India has recently been posting growth rates of around 7 to 8 percent per
annum and aims to increase this growth to 10 percent. If this is to occur,
India will need to secure energy resources quickly, especially since
India's population is expected to reach 1.18 billion by 2010, 1.36 billion
by 2020, and 1.57 billion by 2030. India's demand for fuel will rise even
faster than its population growth and although much demand is met through
the use of coal, India's coal reserves are not adequate to support power
development on their own. At present, India only relies on natural gas for
13 per cent of its power generation, but this is bound to change as
India's gas requirements for electricity are predicted to rise to as high
as 199 billion cubic meters by 2030 (India currently consumes roughly 34.5
billion cubic meters). It is also of note that India only produces half of
the natural gas it uses and imports 70 per cent of its crude oil, with
most source nations found in the Middle East and North Africa, both
regions that suffer from much political instability and violence. As India
still lacks a blue-water navy that is capable of safeguarding far-flung
sea lines and the tankers and other vessels that transport these
resources, India is keen to exploit reserves closer to home.

Even though bilateral trade between Burma and India has increased
significantly in the last decade, these gains have not been witnessed in
the strategic energy sector. Some Indian companies, such ONCG Videsh and
GAIL, have been exploiting some of these fields under the Daewoo-led
consortium, but it appears that Chinese companies have been given bigger
slices totaling an area of over 9.58 million hectares that comprise some
of the most promising blocks. Well-known Indian analyst Bajpaee elaborates
on India's dilemma:

"Apart from India's poor relations with Pakistan on its western borders,
the ongoing violence in India's northeast with sporadic attacks on
pipelines and India's poor relations with natural gas-rich Bangladesh and
China-friendly Burma have prevented it from fully exploiting its proximity
to a region rich in energy resources on its eastern borders."

In some instances, India has even been forced to sign on to a "take or
pay" system, where India gives guaranteed earnings to Burma every year,
even if India is not able to access the gas. Nonetheless, India is still
seeking to build a pipeline through Burma to supply the impoverished
states in East and Northeast India. India is also investing US$103 million
in the Kaladan multi-modal transport corridor, which seeks to develop
Sittwe port and links it to Mizoram along the Kaladan River. Although
India was initially slated to be the sole operator of the Sittwe port,
Chinese pressure forced the Junta to withdraw this privilege. Rather than
let the deal go, New Delhi signed what is termed a BTU agreement—build,
transfer, and use. Under the deal, the Indians will still be able to use
Sittwe as an export-import junction for its northeast. But, with the
Chinese set to run a gas pipeline beside the port from the nearby offshore
Shwe field, Beijing would not want a third country in charge of port
operations. Several other pipeline routes are also being discussed.

First: underwater from Shwe to Yechaungbyi village through Rakhine and
Chin states; into Mizoram and Tripura states; entering Bangladesh at
Brahmanbaria through the Rajshashi border into West Bengal to Kolkatta.
Estimated cost: US$1 billion. Second: underwater from Shwe to Palechaung
village in Sittwe township; through Rakhine state into the district of
southern Bangladesh; entering West Bengal into Kolkatta. Estimated cost:
US$1 billion. Third: underwater from Shwe to a liquid natural gas (LNG)
terminal; ship the LNG to West Bengal and Kolkatta by LNG tanker.
Estimated cost for LNG terminal: US$3-5 billion. Fourth: similar to the
first option but traveling through Northeast India thus bypassing
Bangladesh entirely. Estimated cost: US$3 billion. And fifth: underwater
from Shwe to West Bengal into Kolkatta. No published estimate.

The first option is the most likely route. However, given Bangladesh's
objections, India is now contemplating bypassing a third country
altogether, something that would raise costs, as the pipeline would have
to go along the seafloor of the Bay of Bengal and would require larger
pipeline that could reach depths of 2,000 meters. If this project moves
ahead, it will be fraught with risks, as the Bay of Bengal, no stranger to
adverse weather such as hurricanes, will undoubtedly encounter significant
technical difficulties and will take years before it is operational, all
while India's demand for natural gas continues to grow exponentially.
India is also not likely to receive a great share of the natural gas at
Shwe and an uninterrupted supply cannot be guaranteed. Seemingly in
response to these concerns, The Indian energy company Essar is to begin
exploratory drilling for gas and oil at two Burmese sites. One onshore is
near Sittwe in Arakan State. The other, ironically, in the Shwe field in
the Bay of Bengal where two other Indian companies, ONGC and GAIL, have
been frustrated by the Chinese. Arakan State, which has historically been
closed to outside influence, is poised to experience increased development
in the next few years as India and China scramble for energy and use of
the territory as a conduit to their landlocked regions.

Impact on India's Ties with ASEAN: Courting One at the Expense of the Rest?
India's recent pipeline diplomacy with Burma could lead to greater Burmese
independence from ASEAN and as Burma diversifies its gas exports to India
and China, ASEAN's leverage over Burma will be decreased substantially.
China provides Burma with a major global power that will defend its
interests in the international arena while providing capital and trade
benefits locally. Further, India, with its credential as the largest
democracy on earth, provides Burma with even greater independence from
ASEAN. As such, Lall, of the London-based Royal United Services Institute,
suggests that ASEAN spare no effort to make sure that Burma remains within
its influence and to include both China and India in many of the
discussions pertaining to Burma. However, China is unlikely to support any
kind of arrangement that does not grant it preferential access to both
ASEAN and Burma as it views itself as the natural leader in Asia. Recent
strategic moves made by Beijing in South and Southeast Asia, such as the
clandestine construction of a submarine base on Hainan island, the
construction of the Gwadar port in Pakistan's restive Balochistan province
(which clearly has a strategic dimension despite claims by both Pakistan
and China that it is solely a commercial project), and a continued Chinese
military buildup along with repeated incursions near the disputed
Sino-Indian border region, clearly demonstrate that China feels that there
is only room for one Asian giant. Although it does not appear that China
has voiced concerns over India's minor advances in Burma, Beijing will not
sit idly by and watch its influence over Burma erode. Chinese moves to
counter Indian intentions may include further arms sales, zero-interest
loans or grants, and easier market access to the Chinese economy that has
been growing at around 8 to 9 per cent by most accounts since the Deng
Xiaoping era. In addition, China's investment climate is more favorable
than India's due to more established legislation that governs the
regulation of FDI inflows and a perception, right or wrong, that
corruption levels in China are not quite as rampant as they are in India.
This is not to say that India will not make headway in Burma, specifically
in oil and natural gas. However, India will have to reconcile with the
fact that, barring a meltdown or some other disaster such as a war or
prolonged domestic instability, it will play second fiddle to the Chinese
in Burma for the foreseeable future. This should be kept in mind before
New Delhi agrees to its next arms deal for the Junta or protects it at the
United Nations.

Concluding Thoughts
India cannot expect a major victory in Burma in either securing
substantial energy supplies at the expense of China or in making strategic
advances. China has been cultivating an apolitical relationship with Burma
for decades, has showered it with cash and weaponry, and is key to the
regime's survival. This has allowed China to establish the necessary
infrastructure to fully capitalize upon Burma's expanding oil and natural
gas industry and its further investment in other essential infrastructure
projects will ensure that Beijing remains the Junta's partner of choice in
the future. India is unable to compete with China, given its democratic
system of governance, and will have to learn to cope with a China-leaning
state on its eastern flank. This disadvantage can be neutralized through
developing stronger ties with regional democracies such as Australia,
Japan, and Singapore as well as major powers such as the United States and
the more prominent European Union nations. However, this will prove
difficult if New Delhi maintains its current appeasement policy toward
Burma and remains at loggerheads with the United States and the European
Union, both of whom are attempting to isolate the Junta. As such, a
re-evaluation of India's Burma policy is necessary if India is to maintain
its freedom of movement in South Asia and its reputation as a champion of
democracy.

http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1751/1/

____________________________________
STATEMENT

September 5, National League for Democracy
Special Statement No. 16/09/08 (Unofficial Translation)

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, general secretary of the National League for
Democracy, is the daughter of General Aung San, the founding father of
Burma's armed forces, a selfless architect of independence that enabled
Burma to become a sovereign nation, and a martyr of the nation who gave
his life for the country and the people.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is the leader of the National League for Democracy, a
party which won an overwhelming support of the constituents in an election
conducted in a fair and free manner, and she is also a political leader
who is trusted by all the ethnic and democratic forces.

Since 1989, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has persistently called for and
endeavored for the emergence of a genuinely meaningful political dialog so
that a political compromise can be reached and national reconciliation
achieved in the interests of the nation and the people.  For this reason,
the National League for Democracy profoundly believes that Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi must inevitably be involved in all political and development
programs of Burma.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is presently under house arrest, unlawfully being
detained under the "Law to Safeguard the State against the Dangers of
Those Desiring to Cause Subversive Acts".  Additionally, the authorities
introduced measures which are not part of the original restrictions.  It
is, therefore, vital to rescind these measures immediately because Article
9 of that law states that "In restricting fundamental rights of citizens,
the following principles shall be strictly adhered to:

Section 9(b): "Only necessary restriction of fundamental rights shall be
decided".

Section 9(c):  "The duration of such restriction shall be kept to a
minimum", and

Section 9(f): "The person against whom action is taken shall enjoy the
fundamental rights as provided in the Constitution, in so far as these
rights have not been restricted"

We have now come to learn that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi no longer accepts the
food basket which is delivered to her home daily.  The majority of the
people and the National League for Democracy are concerned that this
practice has been going on for about three weeks now.

We have learned that she stopped accepting the food basket because of the
following reasons:

-To protest her unlawful detention under Section 10 (b)* of the aforesaid
law,
-Daw Khin Khin Win and her daughter, who are helping her at home, are
being persecuted and unlawfully being treated as if they are also being
detained under Section 10 (b)
-The authorities had promised to let the family doctor visit her every
month at the time of her detention but they did not let the doctor visit
her between January and August this year.

Hence, we hereby declare that we hold the authorities who are unlawfully
detaining Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to be responsible for her "life security
and longevity".

As per decision made by the Central Executive Committee meeting on 4
September 2008,

Rangoon
Central Executive Committee
National League for Democracy
No. 97B West Shwegondine Street
Bahan Township, Rangoon

The sixth waxing moon of Tawthalin 1370


[*The following footnote is an input by the translator]

Article 10

The Central Board, in the protection of the State against dangers, has the
right to implement the following measures through restrictive order:

(b) If necessary, the movements of a person against whom action is taken
can be restricted for a period of up to one year.

____________________________________
PRESS RELEASE

September 5, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP)
Malayone monastery raided; abbot detained

Malayone monastery, located in Rangoon?s Thanlin Township, was raided
early this morning by 23 unidentified men who were believed to be military
intelligence personnel.

The raid took place around 2 a.m. on September 5 and lasted about 40
minutes. All 17 monks at the monastery were forced to lie down on the
floor while the raid was being carried out. The monastery's abbot, U Thila
Won, 58, was then taken into custody. His current whereabouts remain
unknown and there is no information available regarding his treatment
since his disappearance.

The other monks were ordered to remain inside the monastery following the
raid. Local people who routinely donate food to the monks during their
daily alms round went to police stations in Bogyoke Village and Thanlin
Township to find out what had happened to them. The police simply said
that they did not arrest the monks.

According to witnesses, the unknown men who raided the monastery arrived
in a Dina car owned by the local Township Peace and Development Council
and two pickup trucks.

Malayone Monastery has recently been under close surveillance by suspected
military intelligence agents, said sources.

The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP)

For more information,
Contact to: Ko Tate Naing at (66) 81-2878751
Ko Bo Kyi at (66) 81-3248935