BurmaNet News, December 8, 2009

[Editor]

December 8, 2009 Issue #3855


INSIDE BURMA
DVB: Detained US citizen on hunger strike
New Light of Myanmar: Course no (3/2009) on prevention of recruiting
minors for military services opened

ON THE BORDER
Irrawaddy: More refugees expected when DKBA becomes border guard
Kachin News Group: Impasse between KIO and junta on BGF
The Nation (Thailand): Eastern Burma: the Darfur of SE Asia

BUSINESS / TRADE
Channel News Asia: BH Global Marine forms joint venture with two Myanmar
businessmen

DRUGS
AP: Myanmar destroys $93 million in illicit drugs

ASEAN
Business Mirror (Philippines): India, China embolden Burma junta

INTERNATIONAL
Mizzima News: HRW: Junta needs to do more on child soldiers

OPINION / OTHER
Los Angeles Times: Why Chrysler ads star Burmese dissident Aung San Suu
Kyi – Dan Neil
Le Monde Diplomatique (France): Burma: an election foretold – André
Boucaud and Louis Boucaud

ANNOUNCEMENT
ITUC: "We are Burma" Conference - a human response to a human disaster

INTERVIEW
SHAN: Interview on Kokang



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

December 8, Democratic Voice of Burma
Detained US citizen on hunger strike – Aye Nai

The Burmese-born US citizen currently detained in a Rangoon prison on
charges of fraud is staging a hunger strike, his aunt has said.

Kyaw Zaw Lwin, also known as Nyi Nyi Aung, has met with his family on
several occasions since he was arrested upon arrival at Rangoon
International Airport on 3 September.

He is being charged with carrying false identification and excessive
amounts of the Burmese currency, the kyat.

His aunt told DVB yesterday that he had begun a hunger strike in his cell
in Insein prison.

“He looked very weak and pale when I saw him so I asked if he was OK and
he told me he was on hunger strike,” said Su Su Kyi.

“He said he was doing it in a protest against the government’s imprisoning
of many young people under various unfair charges, and oppressing them
with no rights.

She added that he was also protesting the Burmese junta’s failure to
initiate dialogue with the opposition, and for an end the military
dictatorship.

“I think he stopped eating last Friday [4 December] evening because he
looked fine when I saw him in a court hearing earlier that day,” said Su
Su Kyi. “He is also suffering from bedsores as he has been sleeping on a
hard floor in his prison cell.”

There had been initial speculation following his arrest that the
government were implicating him in a series of bomb plots that hit Rangoon
in mid-September, although these were executed a fortnight after he had
been arrested.

Kyaw Zaw Lwin, himself an activist and former member of the All Burma
Student Democratic Front (ABSDF), has two relatives serving sentences in
Burmese prisons for involvement with anti-junta groups.

Both his cousin and mother were imprisoned on charges related to the
September 2007 monk-led uprising.

Officials at the US embassy in Rangoon, which has been monitoring Kyaw Zaw
Lwin’s case, were unable to comment on the hunger strike.

____________________________________

December 8, New Light of Myanmar
Course no (3/2009) on prevention of recruiting minors for military
services opened

Nay Pyi Taw – The Work Committee for Prevention of Recruiting Minors for
Military Service and UNICEF jointly conducted Course No (3/2009) on
Prevention of Recruiting Minors for Military Service at the local regiment
of Mingaladon Station in Yangon this morning.

The opening ceremony was attended by Chairman of the work committee
Maj-Gen Ngwe Thein of the Ministry of Defence and members, resident
representatives of UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC, Save the Children (Myanmar) and
World Vision (Myanmar), and 33 officer trainees from Tatmadaw (Army, Navy
and Air).

The chairman of the work committee and UNICEF Resident Representative Mr
Ramesh Shrestha delivered speeches. The work committee chairman and
members, resident representatives of UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC, Save the
Children (Myanmar) and World Vision (Myanmar) cordially met officer
trainees and inspected the local regiment.- MNA

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

December 9, Irrawaddy
More refugees expected when DKBA becomes border guard – Saw Yan Naing

Thousands of new refugees from eastern Burma are expected to seek shelter
in Thailand once the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) becomes a
border guard force under the Burmese military regime, says the Thailand
Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), a coalition  that assists refugees on the
Thai-Burmese border.

Sally Thompson, the TBBC deputy director, noted that the joint offensive
by the DKBA and Burmese government troops forced some 37,000 refugees,
mostly Karen, to flee to Thailand when they attacked the Karen National
Union (KNU) Brigade 7 area in June.
Karen refugees walk along a path on the Thai-Burmese border in June.
(Photo: Getty Images)

Among those who fled were refugees seeking to escape forced army
recruitment and force labor by the DKBA, instigated partly in order to
reinforce  troop levels in preparation to become a border guard force
battalion, Thompson said.

“If they [the DKBA] decide to continue such recruitment, then we would
expect to see more arrivals,” she said.

Once the DKBA becomes a border guard force, it is expected that it will
join the Burmese regime in another offensive to capture KNU-controlled
areas in Karen State along the Thai-Burmese border.

Jack Dunford, the executive director of the TBBC,  said refugee numbers
will also increase because many internally displaced people have sought
safe sanctuary in the remaining KNU-controlled areas.

Another factor is whether the junta decides to wage military campaigns
against the ethnic cease-fire groups that refuse to disarm and transform
their troops into a border guard force,  Dunford said.  The regime has
said border guard forces should be in place before the 2010 election.

In the TBBC's latest survey on Oct.  31, it said more than 3,500 villages
and temporary gathering points in Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon states in
eastern Burma as well as Pegu and Tenasserim divisions have been destroyed
or forcibly relocated since 1996, including 120 communities between August
2008 and July 2009.

About 75,000 people have been forced to leave their homes during the past
year and more than 500,000 Burmese are internally displaced, according to
the survey.

“The scale of displaced villages is comparable to the situation in Darfur
and has been recognized as the strongest single indicator of crimes
against humanity in eastern Burma,” said the TBBC survey.

The TBBC provides food and shelter to some 150,000 Burmese refugees in
nine camps along Thai-Burmese border.

____________________________________

December 8, Kachin News Group
Impasse between KIO and junta on BGF

There is an impasse between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and
the Burmese junta on the Border Guard Force (BGF) issue since October, the
deadline set by the regime for transforming all ethnic ceasefire groups to
the BGF. There has been no high level meeting between the two sides since
then, said KIO sources.

KIO officials in Laiza headquarters near the China border in Kachin State
said no meeting has been held because no fresh proposals have come from
either side since October.

The two sides met eight times on transforming KIA to the junta-proposed
BGF in Kachin State's capital Myitkyina between April and September. All
the meetings failed to yield results.

The KIO's final demand was sent to Burmese military supremo Snr-Gen Than
Shwe, which said that the KIO would surrender all weapons if the junta
accepts the basic principles of the Panglong Agreement, the historic
agreement signed on February 12, 1947 for jointly forming the Union of
Burma with multi-ethnic nationalities by Burman leader Gen Aung San and
ethnic leaders--- Kachin, Chin and Shan, and implement it by means of the
agreement.

Dr. Lahkyen La Ja, general secretary of KIO, in earlier meetings the KIO
had also said that it would like to discuss cooperation on only civil
issues like Education, Health and Development with the military
government. The political issues would be discussed with the new
government formed after the 2010 elections, said KIO officials.

So far, the KIO is yet to receive a response from the junta. The next
meeting may be held depending on the junta's reply to KIO's demands, added
KIO officials in Laiza.

The junta's BGF deadline expired over a month ago but there is no fresh
military tension between the regime and KIO, one of largest ethnic armed
groups in northern Burma, according to KIO officials.

But, the KIO's armed-wing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is going
ahead with its military preparation in Kachin State and Northeast Shan
State in the event of an offensive by the Burmese Army, said sources close
to KIA officers.

Fresh military tension, however, is in evidence in eastern Shan State
between Burmese soldiers and the two ethnic ceasefire groups--- the United
Wa State Army (UWSA) and Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army
(NDAA), the military allies of KIO.

The military tension became palpable after the junta rejected the rebel's
nine-point proposal last November. The proposal to the junta on November
14 included the recognition of UWSA's territories and acceptance of its
armed-wing to transform to the junta-proposed BGF in principle.

Local military analysts feel that the junta is worried that the scheduled
2010 elections would be jeopardized if it wages war on ethnic ceasefire
groups, who have rejected the BGF --- like the UWSA, KIO, NDAA and Shan
State Army-North.

____________________________________

December 8, The Nation (Thailand)
Eastern Burma: the Darfur of SE Asia – Jim Pollard

Refugees in the border camps have passed another milestone as the
long-running crisis in Burma drags on. Thailand has been hit by the
negative impacts from wars and civil strife in neighbouring countries for
years, and that pattern shows no sign of ending anytime soon.

 Waves of refugees arrived following the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975
and the advent of communist governments there and in Laos and Cambodia.
The situation worsened when hundreds of thousands of Cambodians poured
over the eastern border in 1979 after the Vietnamese army swept the
horrific Khmer Rouge regime from power in Phnom Penh.

 The humanitarian crisis that suddenly swamped Sa Kaew province dragged on
for over a decade before a peace settlement in Paris opened the door for
Cambodian refugees to return home in the early 90s as a UN peacekeeping
force arrived to oversee a much-touted election.

 In the midst of that high-profile saga, a much smaller influx of refugees
crossed into northern Thailand from eastern Burma. About 10,000 mainly
ethnic Karen fled into Tak province after clashes in their home state in
1984.

 Members of a committee of international groups supporting Indochinese
refugees agreed to go to Mae Sot to help deal with the Burmese influx.
Few thought the problem would last. However, massive rallies against the
Ne Win dictatorship in Rangoon in 1988 led to a bloody crackdown and an
even more brutal military regime, whose methods have slowly transformed
eastern Burma - if not the entire country - into another humanitarian
tragedy.

 The scale of the trauma flared in the mid-90s when the junta reinforced
its military campaign against ethnic armies on its eastern frontier. The
fall of Manerplaw and other rebel bases in early 1995 was followed by
vast forced relocations of villages and the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of people.

 Thailand saw a huge influx of refugees. In 1994, there were 80,000
refugees in 30 small camps. But the massive and ruthless relocation of
villagers in Karen state - who faced summary execution, forced labour and
portering (often through minefields) - spurred a continued exodus to
Thailand.

 Cross-border raids on some camps - seen as harbouring rebel fighters -
forced Thai authorities to consolidate the camps in areas less vulnerable
to attack. By mid-1997 there were 115,000 refugees in nine camps and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was invited to provide
protection services (as Thailand has never signed the UN Convention on
Refugees).

The gradual militarisation and takeover of ethnic territory - and the
serious risks and difficulty in reaching areas targeted for suppression by
the Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) has meant the crisis in eastern Burma has been
little reported by both the Thai and international media.

But the chaos and brutality persists. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium
(TBBC), the biggest of about 20 NGOs providing services to refugees in
border camps, run by the Ministry of Interior and refugee committees, has
been monitoring the crisis zone for years. It says more than 3,500
villages and hiding sites in eastern Burma have been destroyed or forcibly
relocated since 1996, including 120 communities between August 2008 and
July 2009.

"The scale of displaced villages is comparable to Darfur and has been
recognised as the strongest single indicator of crimes against humanity in
eastern Burma. At least 75,000 people were forced to leave their homes
this past year, and more than half a million remain internally displaced,"
it said in a recent statement.

"The highest rates of recent displacement were reported in northern Karen
areas and southern Shan State. Almost 60,000 Karen are hiding in the
mountains of Kyaukgyi, Thandaung and Papun townships, and a third of these
fled from artillery attacks or the threat of Burmese Army patrols during
the past year.

"Similarly, nearly 20,000 civilians from 30 Shan villages were forcibly
relocated by the Burmese Army in retaliation for Shan State Army-South
(SSA-S) operations in Laikha, Mong Kung and Keh Si townships."

The relentless repression and deliberate targeting of civilians - under
the notorious "Four Cuts" policy to cut off food, funds, information and
support to the rebels - has reached a point where eastern Burma is now
seen as Southeast Asia's "new Killing Fields".

Calls for Burma's top generals to be dragged before an international court
for crimes against humanity have grown louder and more frequent in recent
years.

But while former heads of Khmer Rouge face trial in Phnom Penh, the junta
is happily ensconsed in its new capital Napyidaw, buttressed by billions
from its gas pipeline to Thailand and unburdened by ties with China and
Asean, both of which adhere to policies of non-interference.

All of Burma's neighbours have suffered an influx of refugees,
particularly ethnic groups oppressed by the Tatmadaw's violence. Thailand,
at least, has wealthy allies, such as the US, Europe, Australia and
Canada, who help care for the refugees.

Some 16 foreign governments plus international aid groups support TBBC - a
small, efficient outfit that manages nine camps from Kanchanaburi right up
to Mae Hong Son. It provides food and shelter to about 150,000 refugees,
an operation that cost about Bt1.2 billion (US$35 million) last year.

Over the past five years more than 50,000 refugees have been resettled
abroad, mainly in the US, but a similar number has flooded in to replace
them. The Interior Ministry is interviewing these recent arrivals to
determine if they are genuine refugees or opportunists seeking a new life
in the West.

TBBC executive director Jack Dunford has the daunting task of getting
funds from international donors, who have been calling for Thailand to
allow the refugees to work and be more self-reliant. Moves are slowly
being made in that direction with the help of UNHCR and IOM.

TBBC has faced tough times in recent years, with the price of rice soaring
in 2008 and a push by some donors to give more aid directly into Burma,
which receives little humanitarian assistance because of the onerous
restrictions it places on aid groups.

Small rises in three uncontrollable factors - exchange rates, the price of
rice and refugee numbers - "can suddenly add millions" to their costs, but
there is also huge international goodwill.

"It is remarkable that we've been able to do what we've done for 25 years
and that is thanks to the incredible support we've had," Dunford said.

The Englishman said, after a quarter of a century, he and his colleagues
have much to be proud of.

"We have never in 25 years failed to give the refugees a full food basket,
whereas all over the world refugees are getting partial rations."

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

December 8, Channel News Asia
BH Global Marine forms joint venture with two Myanmar businessmen –
Yasmine Yahya

Singapore – Mainboard-listed BH Global Marine has formed a joint venture
with two businessmen in Myanmar.

The firm says the two businessmen are experienced in marine and oil & gas
engineering, and have a strong network in Myanmar.

The company and its two partners will establish a joint venture firm in
Singapore, with a paid up share capital of S$300,000, divided into 300,000
shares.

Each of the partners will subscribe for 35 per cent of the issued share
capital and BH Global Marine will take up the remaining 30 per cent.

The transaction will be funded entirely through internal resources.

The joint venture firm will export various marine-related goods and
products to Myanmar.

BH Global Marine says the venture is synergistic and beneficial to the
company as it will enable the firm to extend its presence in Myanmar.

____________________________________
DRUGS

December 8, Associated Press
Myanmar destroys $93 million in illicit drugs

Keng Tung, Myanmar — Authorities in eastern Myanmar on Tuesday destroyed
more than $93 million worth of methamphetamine tablets and other illicit
drugs seized over the last six months.

Reporters saw nearly 7 million methamphetamine tablets, 1,802 pounds (819
kilograms) of heroin, 22 pounds (10 kilograms) of "ice" — crystal
methamphetamine — and other drugs set ablaze at a ceremony in Keng Tung,
the capital of Shan state.

Myanmar, also known as Burma, produced an estimated 410tos f
opumin208,enug t mke40tos f erin acodig to United Nations figures. The
country is the world’s second-largest producer after Afghanistan, which
accounts for 90 percent of world output.

It is also a major source of methamphetamines. Much of it is trafficked to
neighboring Thailand where abuse of the drug is rampant. Shan state is one
of the country’s centers of drug production and trafficking. The drugs
destroyed Tuesday were seized over the past six months, and included
several large hauls captured in the Myanmar-Thai border town of Tachilek,
according to National Police Chief Brig. Gen. Khin Yi, who is also
Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control.

Speaking at the ceremony, he said Myanmar did not produce the precursor
chemicals used in the production of methamphetamines, but the chemicals
were brought in from neighboring countries. Recently, he added, the drug
producers have been smuggling in pharmaceutical drugs from which they
extract ephedrine, the major precursor.

Khin Yi said Myanmar is working closely with other countries in the region
in the fight against drugs and vowed to achieve the country’s 15-year drug
elimination plan, which was drawn up in 1999.

____________________________________
ASEAN

December 8, Business Mirror (Philippines)
India, China embolden Burma junta – Estrella Torres

Jakarta, Indonesia—The strong backing of emerging economic giants China
and India of the dictatorship is effectively fending off the demands for
democratization of Burma by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(Asean).

Prof. Hank Lim, director for research of the Singapore Institute of
International Affairs, said the junta’s stonewalling is a key stumbling
block to the economic integration of the bloc by 2015.

He concluded there should be a shift in the way the Asean and the
international community deals with Burma (renamed by military rulers as
Myanmar) that goes around the Indian and Chinese support, if they
are to be effective in influencing its democratization.

Otherwise, “There is nothing Asean can do to open up Myanmar. . . it will
never buckle down on Asean demands. It is better to engage than isolate
it,” said Dr. Lim in his lecture here on the Asean economic integration to
journalists.

He said Burma is richer in natural resources, far better than Asean
neighbor Indonesia, since it has only a 68-million population compared
with Indonesia’s 240 million people.

Lim, who teaches economics at Singapore National University, said Burma is
also the only country in Southeast Asia that has borders with India and
China, a strategic location to offer its rich gas resources with a
pipeline that even now is being built at the expense of its poor people,
who are relocated willy-nilly on the whim of the junta.

“Asean should understand that China is now intensifying the establishment
of pipelines from Myanmar will always support Myanmar and same thing with
India, which is now going West using its [geographical] link to Myanmar,”
he said.

He added the US has already realized Burma’s strength as a regional
powerhouse linking India and China and began engaging the military junta
diplomatically. US President Obama recently sent a diplomatic delegation
to Burma to meet with the junta.

“Democratization and stakeholder participation is very basic for the Asean
Economic Community scheme. We need to open up because we can’t do that
with a close government because no foreign direct investment will come
with that type of regime,” said Lim.

He said the commitment of Burma to sign the Asean Economic Blueprint,
which integrates the economies of the 10 member-countries, is a major
positive step. “But how Myanmar can implement its commitment to the Asean
economic integration is another thing, but we must push for diplomatic
engagement rather than isolate it.”

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

December 8, Mizzima News
HRW: Junta needs to do more on child soldiers – Mungpi

New Delhi – The Human Rights Watch said on Tuesday that the training
course conducted by the Burmese military junta to prevent recruitment of
children into the military is “one good step in the big problem” but
insufficient to tackle the issue.

HRW’s comment came as Burma’s military rulers on Tuesday said it has
started the third training course for officers on preventing the use of
child soldiers.

The junta’s mouthpiece, the New Light of Myanmar newspaper, on Tuesday
reported that the training course on prevention of recruiting child
soldiers was attended by 33 officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The newspaper said the training, which started on Monday, was jointly
conducted by the junta’s Work Committee for the Prevention of Recruiting
of Minors in Military Services, headed by Maj-Gen Ngwe Thein, and the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

David Mathieson, HRW’s Burma researcher, said “this is a good first step
but is one step in a very big problem.”

Mathieson said while the figures of child soldiers in Burma might seem
alarming, the patterns in which children are continuing to be recruited
into military services are far more alarming.

The Burmese junta should reinforce the right laws in the military system
and take stern action against corrupt officers. It should issue and order
to strictly keep away children from all forms of military services, not
just by avoiding to send children to the front line, Mathieson said.

An estimated 70,000 children are reportedly serving in the Burmese Army as
well as in armed rebel groups.

According to the HRW, children as young as 11 are often abducted from the
streets in the cities or even from bus and train stations, to be forcibly
recruited as child soldiers.

“The problem is widespread, and if the junta is really serious
 a training
course is a positive first step as the regime recognizes that this is an
issue, but recognizing and  taking a few steps is not enough, there is far
more to be done,” Mathieson added.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

December 8, Los Angeles Times
Why Chrysler ads star Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi – Dan Neil

As a brand, there is nothing worthwhile left of Chrysler. Why not begin to
remake it in the image of what it will become -- globalized,
sophisticated, European -- instead of what it was?
Dan Neil

The newest star of a Chrysler ad couldn't get arrested in this town.

Aung San Suu Kyi is a 64-year-old Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Burmese
pro-democracy dissident who has spent most of the last two decades
detained at her house at Inya Lake, outside of Yangon, Myanmar. Suu Kyi --
who was elected prime minister in 1990, before the military junta
invalidated the election -- was again convicted in a sham trial in August
after a deranged American, John William Yettsaw, swam out to her house,
giving the junta the pretense to charge Suu Kyi with violating the terms
of her house arrest. And again, the world denounced Myanmar.

What does any of this have to do with Chrysler? My very question. This
week Chrysler -- now owned by Italian auto-making giant Fiat -- launched a
high-minded image campaign calling for the unconditional release of Suu
Kyi, who is not exactly a household name in the U.S. The 30-second spot is
a re-creation of a Lancia spot by Italian ad house Armando Testa. In the
spot, we see Nobel laureates -- Lech Walesa, Mikhail Gorbachev -- arriving
for the 10th Summit of Peace Prize laureates in Berlin.

"You can build walls that separate people from people," the voice-over
intones. "But it is impossible to build a wall that separates a man from
his freedom." Now we see a white Chrysler 300 tooling past the wall (Is it
prom night in Berlin?). A soprano sings a set of minor-key scales.
"Because freedom always finds a path to build peace." The car bursts
through a wall, and the exploding bricks are transformed into white doves.

"This film is dedicated to Aung San Suu Kyi, still prisoner in Burma." The
spot fades out on a poster with Suu Kyi's face and the appeal, "Free now
unconditionally."

The end-card slogan: "Chrysler: for a World Without Walls."

Yes, well, in a world without walls, roofs collapse, and when I saw this
commercial I certainly felt as though mine had fallen in on me.

And yet, I caught myself in mid-cynical paroxysm. OK, granted, most
Americans wouldn't know Suu Kyi if she lobbed a grenade at them. I'll also
stipulate that Myanmar is a Double Jeopardy level of difficulty in the
geography category. And then there's the babbling prosody of the
voice-over. Is it really impossible to build a wall that separates a man
from his freedom? I'd say not. And did the scriptwriters overlook the fact
that Suu Kyi is a woman?

Like the current National Geographic and the "I Am. Jeep." spots, the
Chrysler ad perpetuates a trend in advertising of what might be called
nonsense affirmation, a la Eckhart Tolle.

A reasonable objection might be that a Burmese pro-democracy dissident has
nothing to do with Chrysler. And I say, what of it? As a brand, there is
nothing worthwhile left of Chrysler. It has retreated to marketing's
primordial ooze. Why not begin to remake it in the image of what it will
become -- globalized, sophisticated, European -- instead of what it was?
Chrysler is for all intents now an Italian car company. So Chrysler is
right to embrace a larger, less domestically myopic worldview.

Obviously, Fiat-Chrysler's agitations will have zero effect on the Burmese
junta, which has shrugged off decades of condemnation over Suu Kyi. So it
would be easy enough to charge the spot with exploiting her image to sell
scary-looking sedans. If the company wanted to embarrass a regime it might
have picked nearer targets, such as the lack of adequate healthcare for
the poor or continuing disenfranchisement of African American voters.

But that's the beauty of the Suu Kyi message. It's noble yet at a safe
distance. There's not much risk of blow-back. Cynicism is actually a
fairly useful faculty.

Also -- and this is back-of-the-house stuff -- the spot apparently cost
Chrysler next to nothing to produce. A story in this week's Ad Age caused
a kerfuffle when it said, erroneously, that Chrysler had used federal
bailout money to hire an Italian ad agency at the same time it was pulling
the plug on longtime agency of record BBDO Detroit. Not so, responded
Chrysler chief Olivier Francois. It simply, and cheaply, repackaged the
Lancia ad. That's just good business.

Will the spot move the sheet metal? You couldn't sell these cars if you
stocked them like a bass pond with vestal virgins. But I do think it sets
an interesting and positive tone for the brand while the company is,
literally, retooling (Chrysler's new Fiat-based products are a good 18
months away). It aims at a smarter, better educated, more engaged
audience, people who can find Myanmar, on a map. It has all the textures
of Europhilic sophistication -- the opera singer, the Brandenburg Gate,
etc.

It's not about the Chrysler that was, but the one that is about to be.

dan.neil at latimes.com

____________________________________

December 8, Le Monde Diplomatique (France)
Burma: an election foretold – André Boucaud and Louis Boucaud

Elections are due next year in Burma, and they will most probably go
exactly according to the plan of the governing military junta. China,
meanwhile, eager to exploit Burmese natural resources, has kept on good
terms with all factions, national and local
by André Boucaud and Louis Boucaud

Burma’s military junta has bowed to international pressure and promised to
restore democracy. In September 1998 a military coup suspended the
constitution that had governed Burma since 1974, and in 2000 the junta
refused to accept the results of elections it had just lost. Since then,
it has promised democratisation, producing a plan drawn up by General Khin
Nyunt, head of the influential intelligence service, who became prime
minister in 2003.

The plan proposed convening a National Convention that would prepare a new
constitution, but as its delegates were mostly appointed by the junta, the
organisation was boycotted by the democratic opposition. Khin Nyunt was
then ousted from the government by his main rivals, Generals Than Shwe and
Maung Aye. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the junta’s
main decision-making body, rid itself of a man whose personal connections
had made him a state within a state. Like his similarly ousted
predecessors, Khin Nyunt was accused of corruption, peddling influence and
racketeering.

Neither the repeated restructuring of the SPDC after purges by its rival
factions, nor the removal of Khin Nyunt and the dismantling of his secret
services, disrupted the plan. Nor did the relocation of the administrative
capital from Rangoon (now Yangon) to Naypyidaw, in the centre of the
country, in November 2005. The new constitution was finally approved in
May 2008 by a referendum carried out under the exclusive control of the
SPDC.

A few days earlier, cyclone Nargis had struck the south, devastating the
Irrawaddy delta, Burma’s most important rice-growing area, but in spite of
much material damage, more than 80,000 dead and 50,000 missing, Than Shwe
went ahead with the referendum, except in a few severely-hit areas. His
aim was to demonstrate his indifference to world opinion (and his contempt
for the Burmese people), and his determination that nothing should halt
the “democratic” process designed to legitimise the incumbent regime.

The elections to be held in 2010 are supposed to end the “transition
period” that began after the 1990 elections, which the National League for
Democracy (NLD) and its allies won with a comfortable majority. Aung San
Suu Kyi, the secretary-general of the NLD, who to many is the figurehead
of Burma’s struggle for democracy, has spent 14 years under house arrest.
A bizarre incident in which an American intruder entered her house in May
2009 gave the junta an excuse to extend her arrest by 18 months.
No illusions

Suu Kyi has urged her party to reject a biased electoral process and
insist that the constitution be amended, a position on which the
opposition was at first united. Only a few dissenters, some within the
Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP) (1), notably its
secretary Aye Thar Aung, and also a few within the NLD, called on the
people of Burma to vote, without advocating a particular party, as a means
of engaging the military on the ground they have chosen.

Nobody is under any illusions that the result of the elections, like that
of the recent referendum, will be anything but the normal result under a
totalitarian regime, but the idea of taking part is gaining popularity
among the opposition parties, especially the NLD and the Ethnic
Nationalities Council. But with only a few months to go, the junta has not
yet published any information on procedures for the registration of
parties and candidates or on how voting will be conducted and monitored.

The text of the new constitution is not widely available; a few copies
have been offered for sale in Rangoon since February. Among other
provisions, the constitution includes a ban on people with foreign
connections standing for election and a clause that gives the final say to
the armed forces, the commander in chief having the power to dissolve the
parliament in any situation where national security or integrity may be
threatened. This effectively separates the roles of president and
commander in chief of the armed forces, which is not to the advantage of
Than Shwe, who currently holds both positions and would have preferred the
status quo.

Many other senior generals resent the fact that the SPDC has made them
hang up their uniforms and devote themselves to political life. If they
sit in the Burmese parliament, let alone in some local government body,
they will lose the powers and privileges of their present position.
Moreover, they know that they will not all get seats on the National
Security and Defence Council (NSDC), which is to replace the SPDC: they
will lose their place in the queue for promotion and will be overtaken by
their juniors in the armed forces.

To deal with this discontent, Than Shwe has asked several of his most
faithful supporters to set an example by resigning. Eight ministers are
due to step down, including the minister for forestry, General Thein Aung,
and the industry minister, General Aung Thaung (who played an active part
in suppressing the demonstrations by Buddhist monks in September 2007).
The same goes for the mayor of Rangoon, General Aung Thein Linn, who
subdued the monasteries most heavily involved in the struggle and broke
the protests in the city.

The future two-chamber parliament will house 664 representatives, of whom
25% will be nominated from the armed forces. But the NSDC, which will have
ultimate authority over Burma’s destiny, will only have 11 members: the
president and two vice-presidents, the commander in chief of the armed
forces and his second in command, and a handful of ministers (mostly
former generals) responsible for the interior, foreign affairs, defence,
finance, border regions and forestry. Although the president will be
elected by the two chambers, they will choose a man who is or has been
commander in chief of the armed forces. One of the two vice presidents,
who will also be elected by the two chambers, must be a member of an
ethnic minority.

In this, the junta acknowledges the importance of Burma’s ethnic
minorities (see box opposite) but it is still trying to curb their
political influence. This is clear from the way that every demand put
forward by the representatives of these minorities during the sessions of
the National Convention has been rejected.
‘Special regions’

The junta needs political structures to represent it in the elections in
order to gain credibility in the eyes of the international community. In
the early 1990s Than Shwe created a popular organisation for this purpose,
the Union Solidarity Development Association. Today the former
psychological warfare officer is well aware that there is nothing better
than parties representing ethnic minorities, which have been at war with
the central government for many years, to lend the regime an air of
democratic legitimacy.

However, under the new constitution, Special Regions 1, 2 and 4
(territories of ethnic minorities along the Chinese border) only have the
status of “self-administered division”. This has raised tensions along the
internal border between two of these regions (2 and 4) and the rest of
Burma.

In 1989, after the implosion of the Communist Party of Burma, which had
enjoyed Chinese support and whose troops were mountain-dwellers from
ethnic minorities, the junta negotiated ceasefires, on the initiative of
General Khin Nyunt. Under the pretext of a return to the national
community, the militant groups were to be allowed to keep their arms and
manage the areas in which they lived (the “special regions”) until the end
of the negotiation process when, in exchange for peace, they would lay
down their weapons and establish their own political structures.

But over the last few years, the Burmese army, under the leadership of
General Maung Aye, who is vehemently opposed to the ceasefire policy, has
continued to exert pressure on the militants to disarm without receiving
anything in return.

In December 2008 there were more clashes as the Burmese army tried to
drive wedges between the special regions to isolate them. The Wa people of
Special Region 2 responded quickly, sending detachments of the United Wa
State Army to reinforce Akha, Lahu and Shan groups under the command of
Sai Lin, their chief ally, in Special Region 4. Their mission was to
defend the strategically important town of Mong La. The Wa also imposed a
curfew on the crossing of the few bridges that span the rivers in Special
Region 2. Meanwhile, the Burmese army stationed 4-5,000 troops along the
River Salween and built blockhouses on the heights above the bridge of Tai
Ping, on the road to Mong La. And Sai Lin’s troops dug trenches and
reinforced their checkpoints.

In early 2009 tensions rose still further. The UWSA stopped the
construction of a bridge over the Salween (at Taweungieng in the Mong Hsu
sector) that was intended to facilitate access to the Wa territory. The
UWSA also snubbed the central government by disarming the escort of Ye
Myint, Burma’s head of military affairs security, when he visited the Wa
headquarters at Panghsang.

The Burmese army has continued its show of strength, especially in the
eastern part of Shan State, where Kyaw Phyo, the general in charge of the
Kengtung command area, frequently parades his armoured convoys and
Chinese-made artillery. In April, the SPDC reminded all concerned that the
new constitution would place all armed forces under the authority of the
Burmese army. Nevertheless, General Ye Myint suggested in June that the
former communist militants should form themselves into border guard
battalions under the command of Burmese officers. The militants refused
and, unable to bear the loss of face any longer, the junta quickly found a
new angle of attack, taking its frustrations out on the Chinese groups in
the Kokang area, part of Special Region 1.
Show of strength

The Burmese army was already in the area because of frequent internal
disputes over the past 18 years between the many clan chiefs whose
militias make up the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. The
coalition of militias in Kokang was disbanded in August, after which there
was a repeat of the events of 1993, with a similar outcome: the Kokang
leader Pheung Kia Shin (Peng Jiasheng) was expelled from Burma following
the Burmese army’s victory. China did not respond actively to this limited
incident.

Now everything depends on the determination of the Burmese generals in
dealing with the other armed groups, and especially on the circumstances
of the next clash. The Shan State Army-South, commanded by Colonel Yord
Serk, whose strongholds and camps are against the Thai border in the
southern part of Shan State, is stepping up recruitment and officer
training. Like the democratic opposition, the Shan resistance has rejected
the forthcoming elections. It is the largest armed force still fighting
the junta and its influence now extends over two-thirds of Shan State,
where it is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign.

In spite of the tension, it is not certain the situation will develop into
a full-scale conflict. It would not be in the interests of any of the
parties involved to go all the way, and moreover China would never allow a
conflict to develop on its doorstep that might undermine its economic and
strategic interests, or its influence. China has said clearly that it will
not interfere in Burma’s internal affairs in any way. And although it
provides indirect support to Burma’s ethnic minorities, it is also the
principal military, diplomatic and financial ally of the Burmese
dictatorship on the international scene.

China is balancing the authorities in Naypiydaw and the ethnic minorities,
constantly encouraging or restraining one side or the other to suit its
own interests.

Burma has a considerable asset: offshore gas reserves. It is the main
export outlet for the Chinese province of Yunnan. It also offers access to
warm seas, avoiding the bottleneck of the Malacca Straits, and a direct
route to the Middle East and its oil, as well as to Africa. India also has
an eye on Burma’s natural resources and on its potential as a market for
Indian exports. The junta knows how to take advantage of the competition
between foreign powers, including Russia.

China is already heavily involved in investment, infrastructure
construction and agricultural development programmes in Burma. To fight
the drug trade, a matter of great concern, the Chinese authorities have
tried over the last three years to convince the Burmese to grow crops
other than the opium poppy. They have taken advantage of deforestation in
Special Regions 2 and 4 to establish rubber tree plantations managed by
Yunnan provincial government enterprises, which have been given a
monopoly, in exchange for agreeing to purchase the entire latex harvest.
Whole villages have been mobilised to work thousands of hectares in the
mountains, covered with young rubber trees as far as the eye can see.

The abundant supply of local labour is being supplemented with hundreds,
maybe thousands, of Chinese workers, brought in by two enterprises, Hong
Yu and Nong Chang. This is worlds away from traditional agriculture.
Automatic watering systems have been introduced to ensure the growth and
productivity of the trees; electric pumps and hundreds of kilometres of
pipes bring water up from the bottom of the valleys. But many mountain
dwellers are angered at seeing their land sold to the Chinese (in Special
Region 4, although the local leader Sai Lin owns half the land, the other
half has been allocated to Hong Yu) while they are reduced to being
labourers, especially as the planting programme is being used to justify
ever-increasing Chinese immigration into Shan State and into the rest of
Burma, including Karen (now Kayin) State.
Modern and Chinese

China is flooding the Burmese market with its exports and pillaging
Burma’s natural resources. Exports of teak, which had been prohibited,
started again in Kachin State in 2008. Huge quantities of coal from
deposits discovered in Shan State in recent years are being shipped to
China. China has invested in hydroelectric dams, especially in Kachin,
Shan and Karen States. It has not hesitated to step in where Thailand
(facing budgetary constraints owing to the global economic crisis) has
pulled out of projects such as the Ta Sang dam on the River Salween.

To secure abundant energy reserves, Beijing took Burma’s gas away from
India in 2005 and now plans to build pipelines to carry gas and oil from
terminals in the deep-water port of Kyaupkyu, on the island of Ramree, off
Arakan (now Rakhine) State, all the way to Kunming in Yunnan Province, by
2012.

China takes a pragmatic long-term view, maintaining relations with every
political group in Burma, so as to be able to able to adapt to any change
of regime. It has sent emissaries to meet the different factions of the
democratic opposition and the ethnic minorities, rather than simply
receiving their delegations. And while maintaining a special relationship
with the main groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement, it has
recently shown an interest in the Shan resistance army (2).

China is taking the ethnic minorities into account, but for reasons other
than those of the Burmese dictatorship. The junta still refuses to
contemplate independence, or even greater autonomy, for the ethnic
minorities, but needs them more than ever to legitimise its hold
on power.

According to one democratic opposition leader with contacts close to the
government, the team that will run the country after the 2010 elections
has already been chosen: General Than Shwe will be president and the
vice-presidents will be his strongest supporters, Aung Thaung, the former
industry minister and Aung Kham Hti (3), the most charismatic of the
leaders of the Pao ethnic minority. General Maung Aye, Than Shwe’s current
number two, will be commander in chief of the armed forces, assisted by
General Thura Shwe Mann, a faithful supporter of Than Shwe, who is often
talked of as his eventual successor. If things go to plan, the junta will
not only ensure the stability of the armed forces but consolidate its own
power.

____________________________________
ANNOUNCEMENT

December 8, International Trade Union Confederation
"We are Burma" Conference - a human response to a human disaster

Brussels, -- The conference "We are Burma - A human response to a human
disaster" due to be held in Brussels on 12 December at the KVS Flemish
theatre will highlight the appalling human and trade union rights
situation in the country. The ITUC, which has been active for many years
in tackling the dramatic situation in Burma, will be fully involved in the
conference. Guy Ryder, General Secretary of the ITUC, and Rudy de Leeuw,
President of the Belgian national trade union centre the FGTB, will speak
at the conference to present their organisations' view.

For nearly 50 years, the south-east Asian state of Burma has been in the
yoke of a military dictatorship that has subjected the majority of the
population to a life of abject poverty. Forced labour, the genocide of
minorities, widespread human and trade union rights abuses, forced
displacements, child soldiers, rape...all are part of the daily
repression.

The ITUC has always protested against the intolerance of the Burmese
regime towards any act of dissidence or opposition. Maximum international
pressure against the ruling military junta is more necessary than ever.
"The persistent repression and blatant attacks on the most fundamental
rights by the Burmese junta are simply unacceptable," stated Guy Ryder.

"We are Burma" is an event that will bring together thinkers, politicians,
artists, media and social actors to encourage individuals in their own
small way to take responsibility for the situation in
Burma. The dual purpose of the evening is to bring attention to the
Burmese situation among European circles and to highlight the work being
done in the field by NGOs whose members risk their lives delivering cross
border aid, relief, health services and educational programmes inside
Burma.

At the "We are Burma" evening event short video documentaries shot inside
Burma and first hand accounts from activists will illustrate the desperate
situation in the country. As the population face the daily reality of
forced labour and the repression of fundamental freedoms, Maung Maung,
General Secretary of the FTUB (Federation of Trade Unions - Burma,
affiliated to the ITUC) will talk of his own experience of the underground
struggle of Burmese trade unionists. Philosophers, artists, politicians
and journalists will show how it is possible to get involved and help
change the situation. Filip Kowlier, Tom Pintens, Sioen, Pieter-Jan De
Smet, Jan Hautekiet and Rick De Leeuw, Dieudonne Cabongo, Willy Claes,
Patrick Ouchène among others will provide the musical entertainment for
the evening.

All proceeds from the evening event will go to the Thai-Burmese
not-for-profit association Blood Foundation, which organises education
projects in the country, where access to education is so desperately
lacking.

Keynote speakers: Aung Htun (BurmaVJ), Steve Gumaer, Guy Ryder, Maung
Maung, Marie Arena, Bart Staes, Rudy de Leeuw, Moe Bu, Robin Ramaekers.

For more information see : http://www.weareburma.net

KVS ( Koninklijke vlaamse schouwburg) BOL 146, rue de Laeken 1000
Bruxelles, Ã  20h.

ITUC Report : "Burma : Trade unionists brave the tightrope" Despite the
risk of torture and imprisonment, trade unionists operate underground to
come to the aid of Burmese workers. They inform thousands of people about
their rights and help to fight against forced labour, a scourge still
widespread under the military regime. Burmese trade unionists also assist
migrant workers in Thailand.

To read the full report: http://www.ituc-csi.org/union-view-burma.html

The ITUC represents 170 million workers in 157 countries and territories
and has 312 national affiliates. http://www.ituc-csi.org
http://www.youtube.com/ITUCCSI

CONTACT: Mathieu Debroux, ITUC
Tel: +32 476 621 018
Tel: +32 2 224 0204
e-mail: mathieu.debroux at ituc-csi.org
e-mail: press at ituc-csi.org
ITUC Press Department
Tel: +32 2 224 0204
Tel: +32 476 621 018
KVS
Tel: +32 2 210 11 12

____________________________________
INTERVIEW

December 8, Shan Herald for News
Interview on Kokang

The following interview was given by Qiu Shanhe, a Kokang expert close to
the leadership that was overthrown by the Burma Army in August.

1. Some researchers say in the last twenty years, The Peace and Democratic
Front (PDF) have only focused on economic development and failed to tend
to political matters. That is why they fell into the “trap” set by the
Burmese army. How do you respond to such criticism? What is your
explanation?

To my understanding, the members of The Peace and Democratic Front (PDF)
has put in the utmost effort in the last twenty years to improve the lives
of the people. A lot of time and effort has been put into the development
and construction of the local economy, but that doesn’t mean they have
forgotten about political matters. I remember they took part in the
National Convention and had many good proposals. However the Burmese
military government chose to ignore them. Perhaps they were not effective
or they suffered bad luck, but I do not believe they ignored political
issues.

2. How is this war different from the war in 1992? Or how are they
similar? Why weren’t they able to learn lessons from the war in 1992 and
the Mongkoe incident in 2000? Why wasn’t it possible to avoid this war?

I think the war today is very different from the war in 1992. To my
understanding, the war in 1992 was purely a civil war, although it was
also provoked by Burma. According to scholars and many who are interested
in Sino-Burmese border affairs, this was not a civil war.

On the day of their coup, Bai Xuoqian and his gang were defeated in a few
short hours by Kokang law enforcements. Bai Xuoqian escaped into the
Burmese military sub-district. When Bai was running away, the Kokang law
enforcements asked Chairman Peng Jiasheng whether they should shoot Bai.
Chairman Peng’s answer was to let him go. There are people in China who
believe this account to be true.

I believe Bai Xuoqian’s coup was only the first step in the Burmese
military’s plan to eradicate the political power of the Kokang nationals.
Bai Xuoqian was only a puppet. If Kokang had accepted the Burmese Army’s
proposal to transform their army into a Border Guard Force, then this war
could have been avoided.

The Mongkoe incident was even more different. The Junta swooped in during
the civil war in Mongkoe. The group of over three hundred people led by Li
Nimen were deceived by the Junta and voluntarily handed over their weapons
to the Burmese army. In the end, they were brutally killed by the Burmese
Army. Not one survived.

3. People are saying in the past ten, twenty years, the focus has been on
business and cooperation within the alliance have been neglected. It is
speculated that this is the reason why the peace alliance is in a passive
state and at a disadvantage. What are your views on this? Is there any
right or wrong? Can you point out any changes that should be made?

I think the third question is similar to the first one.

4. Which of the following are major factors that contributed to the
Burmese army being able to take over Kokang in three days?
a. Internal discord and struggles for power.
b. Too trusting and abiding of the mainland ( China ).
c. Over confidence in the alliance and hopeful of their assistance.
d. Over confidence in one’s own army.

I think all four factors you mentioned, more less, have some relevance to
what took place.

a .. Rather than calling it a civil strife, it is more like there was a
traitor amongst them. That traitor was bribed and used by the Junta. This
accelerated the break out of the war.

b..To my knowledge, the peace alliance along the Sino-Burma border all
trust China implicitly. The alliance believed in the bond of common
history and ancestors. They believed China would step in during crucial
times. They are still using views from forty years ago to look at the
problems today. They forgot how the Burma communists were abandoned and
how China and Vietnam were friendly but ended up in war. The foreign press
reported that the Burmese government claimed they had the support and
approval from China to attack Kokang. Kokang would never have imagined
that this was an act of cooperation between China and Burma. According to
a reliable source, this was an act of individual departments in China.
They disregarded the well-being of their country and fellow nationals and
were taken in by the Burmese army. A line from an article put it really
well, “Oil pipes are more important than blood ties".

c...From what I know, Kokang abided by the agreement of the alliance, so
Kokang believed the members of the alliance would honor their promise. As
it turned out, the other members of the alliance chose to be bystanders.

d..I believe the Kokang army are capable of battle. They knew it was a
battle that could not be won, but the Kokang army still persevered and
fought. Due to interference from outside parties, they evacuated from
battle to avoid further injuries and harm.

5. What is the likelihood of recapturing Kokang? What are the main
factors? Who would be the key people directly involved?

Regarding possibly recapturing Kokang, from my understanding, the Peng
family has had its strength sapped significantly by this war. While they
still care for and are greatly concerned for Kokang’s people, they do not
have the desire to revisit this dispute over Kokang. However, perhaps one
day there will be a new generation of young Kokang that will seek to
revive Kokang’s great cause.

6. What support has China previously provided? What was accomplished? Why
can China not accept " Peng "?


>From my understanding, during this Kokang war, the local government and

local people of China sympathized with Kokang’s great misfortune, and
provided humanitarian support. One person involved said that two days
before the Burmese army opened fire on Kokang, the junta sent a special
envoy to a high ranking Chinese official, offering a bribe of around USD 3
million. Also, Bai Xuoqian had previously used large sums of money to
bribe the junta’s northeast regional commander as well as the sub-regional
commander living in Lao Kao. At the same time, Bai also bribed police
officials in Lincang’s Narcotics Control Division to blame Peng for
possession of drugs and firearms. In reality, while Bai Xuoqian was
colluding with both the junta and Chinese narcotics control officials, he
was also the one engaging in the trading of drugs. Bai himself, his wife
and his son all use drugs.

7. It is rumored that the “Wa“ and the “Mongla” do not allow “Peng” to
stay with them. Is this true? Can this be verified? Why would this be the
case?


>From what I know, Kokang abided by the agreement of the alliance, so

Kokang believed the members of the alliance would honor their promise. As
it turned out, the other members of the alliance chose to be bystanders.
In the end, they would not even take in the brothers of Peng, in fear of
the Pengs bringing war unto them.

8. Given the situation with the Wa, what will happen to the SSA, KIA and
Mongla? What preparations should they be conducting?

Because the junta is constantly seeking to divide, disintegrate and
utilize every means to destroy, so what happened to Kokang could happen to
any other group.

9. Since the time that he first took office, Peng has vigorously clamped
down on drug-related activities, instead focusing on developing the
economy and improving the living standards of Kokang’s people. Peng’s
conduct and actions were known to all of the foreign organizations in
Kokang. Particularly in terms of clamping down on drug activities, Peng’s
actions not only received the praise of both China and Burma, but also
gained the approval of the international community. What the Burmese
government is saying today is in conflict with what actually happened.

10. What other forces are in Kokang borders besides DA GA SA?

During the battles, besides Da Ga Sa (Regional Operations Command Laogai),
the 99 infantry (Light Infantry Division # 99), 16 infantry (Military
Operations Command #16), and the Kun Nong (Kunlong) infantry also
participated. As of now, no information has been heard on their
retreating.

11. Is it true that Bai Xuoqian is a puppet of the junta and does not have
general population’s support? Is there any proof of this? What views do
you have on the future of Bai ? Do you have any predictions for the future
of Kokang’s people?


>From what I know, the people of Kokang recognize that it was Bai Suochen

that betrayed Kokang. Even as of today, there are a large number of Kokang
refugees at the Chinese border who are afraid to go back home. Bai is just
a chess piece used by the Burmese army, a puppet. Now that the junta has
achieved what they wanted, Bai Suochen no longer has much value. So, Bai
faces a situation where he is basically on his last legs. The people of
Kokang face exploitation by the junta and repressive rule, so their lives
will only become filled with more suffering and difficulty than before.

12. The Junta is pressuring Meng La (Mongla), Bang Kang (Panghsang), and
SSA. What are your views on their future? What are the most important and
practical preparations they should do at this time? What advice do you
have for them?

There are rumors along the Kokang and Chinese border that the law
enforcement officials in Lincang of Yunnan Province are taking advantage
of the battles led by the Junta. According to one victim, innocent
refugees who escaped into China during the battles who possessed any money
were arrested under the charge of drug trafficking by officials in
Lincang, Yunnan. Various underhanded tactics were used to threaten and
attack the refugees in order to pilfer their possessions. Large fines were
also handed out. Who knows how many refugees suffered such an unreasonable
and cruel fate.

Therefore the other members of the alliance should view Kokang as a
warning. They must not harbor any hope or fantasies about China. China has
very clearly stated that they are not a refuge for conflicts in Burma.
Especially after the battles in Kokang, people should see how dark and
corrupt Chinese officials are. National interests are no competition
against jewels and cash. I whole heartedly advise everyone that finding
another way out is the wisest thing to do.