BurmaNet News, May 11, 2010

[Editor]

May 11, 2010, Issue #3959


INSIDE BURMA
DVB: Rangoon photographer ‘was tortured’
AP: Aung San Suu Kyi asks for her freedom
IMNA: Contaminated water supplies lead to deaths
Khonumthung: Election Commission trains school teachers
Mizzima: Election Commission delays KSPP approval
Irrawaddy: Prime Minister, Ministers set to resign

BUSINESS / TRADE
People’s Daily (China): Gold prices in Myanmar soar over weekend
Xinhua: Myanmar marine exporters blamed for not realizing target

OPINION / OTHER
Amnesty International Briefing: Myanmar’s 2010 elections
Huffington Post: Hope and humanitarian space in Burma - HRW


____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

May 11, Democratic Voice of Burma
Rangoon photographer ‘was tortured’ – Yee May Aung

A man arrested along with his father for photographing the aftermath of
the deadly Rangoon bombings on 15 April has been tortured and denied food,
his mother said.

Rangoon-based Sithu Zeya, and his 55-year-old graphic designer father,
Maung Maung Zeya, were arrested by government officials shortly after
three grenades exploded during the ‘Thingyan’ water festival celebrations
last month, and are being held in separate Rangoon police stations.

The wife of Maung Maung Zeya told DVB that she was yesterday allowed to
visit their son for the first time since he was arrested.

“[Sithu Zeya] was arrested for taking some photos and video footage of the
scene,” Yee Yee Tint said.  “He was denied food for the first two days of
the five-day interrogation. He also said was beaten twice during the
interrogation and his ear has been ringing since.”

He has been charged under the Unlawful Associations Act and is due to
appear at Mingalar Taung Nyunt township court in Rangoon on 18 May. His
family were told that Sithu Zeya’s laptop and other belongings seized when
he was arrested would be returned, although this is yet to happen.

His father is being held in Bahan township police station in Rangoon and
will appear in court on 17 May. Yee Yee Tint said that he faces three
different charges, while the family has asked for assistance from legal
expert Aung Thein.

“I don’t fully understand their situation but the Burma police chief [Khin
Yi] during his press conference [on 6 May] said that they were arrested
for taking video footage of the incident,” she said. “I am quite sad that
[the authorities] let the bombers remain at large but detained people for
just taking video footage.”

Nine people died in the incident, which was the worst attack in Rangoon
since 2005. It preceded a number of other bombings around Burma, focused
mainly on controversial hydropower projects.

Police have arrested one suspect for the Rangoon attack who belongs to the
exiled opposition group the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, who rose to
prominence in 1999 after raiding the Burmese embassy in Bangkok and
holding 89 people hostage.

____________________________________


May 11, Associated Press
Aung San Suu Kyi asks for her freedom

Yangon - Myanmar's detained democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi is making a
final bid for freedom, lawyers said Tuesday after submitting a request for
a special appeal against her house arrest.

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate has already lost two appeals against an
August 2009 conviction, most recently at the country's High Court in
February. Her last legal option is the Special Appellate Bench, a
multi-judge panel in the remote administrative capital of Naypyitaw.

Lawyers filed their appeal Monday at the High Court, which will decide
whether to forward the case to the special court for consideration, said
attorney Nyan Win.

The 64-year-old Suu Kyi has been under house arrest for 14 of the past 20
years. In August 2009, she was convicted of violating the terms of her
house arrest for briefly sheltering an American who swam uninvited to her
home, and she was ordered to serve three years in prison with hard labor.
The trial drew global condemnation.

Suu Kyi's sentence was commuted to 18 months of extended house arrest,
which would keep her detained through elections planned for later this
year. An initial appeal was rejected in October 2009 and upheld by the
High Court in February.

Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy Party, which won the country's
last election in 1990 but was not allowed to take power, was disbanded
last week after refusing to register for the upcoming polls.

The party has denounced new election laws as undemocratic and declined to
register as required, which meant it was automatically dissolved.

U.S. envoy Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia,
met with Suu Kyi for nearly two hours Monday at the end of a two-day visit
to Myanmar.

He did not reveal details of their talks, but praised her nonviolent
struggle for democracy.

"She has demonstrated compassion and tolerance for her captors in the face
of repeated indignities," he told reporters. "It is simply tragic that
Burma's generals have rebuffed her countless appeals to work together to
find a peaceable solution for a more prosperous future." Burma is another
name for Myanmar.

In talks with senior junta officials, Campbell said he conveyed
Washington's "profound disappointment" with events leading up to the
election.

____________________________________


May 11, Independent Mon News Agency
Contaminated water supplies lead to deaths in Ye township

Widespread reliance upon unclean waters supplies during this year’s hot
season has lead to the outbreak of a deadly diarrhea illness in several
villages in Mon State’s Ye Township.

Residents of villages situated near Ye town, including Zeiphyu Taung
village, Azin village, and Chaung Taung village have reportedly been
suffering from cases of diarrhea since late April 2010. Several
individuals have already died from the illness.

During protracted hot seasons, such as this year’s, public wells in Mon
state villages often run dry, forcing residents to purchase water from
providers outside their communities.

IMNA’s field reporter learned that local water supplies in Ye town and its
neighboring villages gave out in April of this year. Unfortunately the
water supplies available for purchase this year are contaminated, and
diarrhea illness continues to spread.

A doctor from Ye town who works at the local hospital informed IMNA, “In
Chang Taung village and Azin village, some villagers have died. 2
villagers from Choun Taung already died because they suffered from
diarrhea, but in Ye town no one has died yet, but many people have arrived
at the hospital”.

“In Ye town hospital, many people were suffering [from the illness], but I
don’t know the number, because some victims just stayed at the hospital
for a few days. When I was at the hospital, two of victims were the same
as me [sick with the same diarrhea illness]. It was mostly happening to
adults,” said a recently recovered Ye town man.

He also informed IMNA that the medical staff at Ye town hospital has been
providing family members of victims with preventative vaccinations to
prevent the spread of the illness within households.

IMNA’s field reporter learned that all of the villages in the Ye town
region contain Burmese government-run health departments; however, these
health departments have yet to make any attempt to educate their
communities about the recent diarrhea outbreak. Villagers reported that
they have received no information about hygiene or living practices that
might halt the spread of the illness, or how victims already suffering
from infection should be cared for.

____________________________________


May 10, Khonumthung News
Election Commission trains school teachers

With general elections in the country round the corner, the Election
Commission office in Falam Township, Chin state western Burma is imparting
short term training for work related to the polls to school teachers since
April.

“The training began last month and is related to the 2010 elections,
military and Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) affairs,”
said a woman teacher in Falam town.

“High school teachers are being called as the first batch for the training
by members of the Election Commission and headmasters. After completion of
training of high school teachers, middle and primary school teachers will
follow suit. Each batch will have 10 trainees,” said a local school
teacher.

The short training also entails teachers having to persuade their students
to cast votes for USDA party in the forthcoming election. It will also
explain about how USDA was established and its main objectives, he added.

An educational refresher training course is conducted in Chin state during
the summer session but this time the authorities have replaced it with the
election short training programme.

Although the junta has allowed party activities officially to the USDA,
other parties do not have the same privilege and cannot campaign
officially.

____________________________________

May 11, Mizzima News
Election Commission delays KSPP approval

Chiang Mai – Inordinate delay by the Burmese Election Commission (EC) to
grant approval to the Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) led by former
Vice-Chairman of ‘Kachin Independence Organization’ (KIO), has
considerably delayed organizational work.

“We are awaiting party registration from the Commission to start
organizational work. We feel that there is deliberate delay in granting
registration. Many other parties have been approved,” KSPP Chairman Dr. Tu
Ja said.

KSPP applied for registration to the Election Commission on April 5 but
has not been approved though over 20 parties which applied later have got
theirs.

The Election Commission has not yet permitted the KSPP, Shan State (North)
Progressive Party, United Democracy Party (Kachin State) and Ethnic
Nationalities Development Party to float their parties.

The military regime announced that the EC had granted permission to 27 out
of a total of 31 applicants till May 6.

EC Chairman Thein Soe invited KSPP’s four-member delegation led by
Chairman Dr. Tu Ja and Secretary Tu Yaw to his office in Nay Pyi Taw on
May 7 and told them to wait, KSPP Secretary Tu Yaw said.

“They told us not to worry about permission. It will be certainly granted.
Don’t worry, please wait, he said. They requested us to wait as they are
still negotiating with KIO,” he added.

The KSPP, the National Unity Party (NUP), Union Solidarity and Development
Party (USDP) and the United Democracy Party (Kachin State) are contesting
the election.

Like the KSPP, the United Democracy Party (Kachin State) has not been
approved but NUP and USDP led by serving Prime Minister Thein Sein are
into organizational work and electioneering in Kachin State, local
residents said.

Meanwhile, KIO, which is still refusing to transform its armed force into
the Burmese Army controlled Border Guard Force (BGF) is providing military
training in Mai Ja Yan and nearby villages in areas controlled by KIO’s
3rd Brigade.

Similarly KIO General Secretary Dr. La Ja, Capt. Zau Bauk Thang and Capt.
Bran Taung organized a mass rally in Mai Ja Yan on the Sino-Burma border
yesterday, it is learnt.

KIO dispatched its reply to the junta on April 22 refusing to accept BGF.
It rejected it again when they met junta’s Communication Postal and
Telegraph Minister Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw, Northern Command Commander Maj.
Gen. Soe Win, Auditing General in Nay Pyi Taw Maj. Gen. Lun Maung, No. 1
Industry Minister Aung Thaung and Deputy Minister of Home Affairs Brig.
Gen. Phone Swe on April 28.

____________________________________


May 11, Irrawaddy News Magazine
Prime Minister, Ministers Set to Resign

Prime Minister Thein Sein and other government ministers who are leaders
of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) will resign from
their government posts this month, according to sources in Naypyidaw.

The resignations will affect almost all top ministers within the
government including Htay Oo, minister of Agriculture and Irrigation; Zaw
Min, minister of Electric Power-1; Aung Thaung, minister of Industry-1;
Thein Zaw, minister of Telecommunication, Post and Telegraph; and Kyaw
Hsan, minister of Information.


Prime Minister Thein Sein, left, inspects a sample of cement produced at
Myodaw Cement Plant in Pyinyaung village, in Mandalay on April 29. (Photo:
AP)
Sources said the resignations would probably be announced by Thein Sein
during a press conference in Naypyidaw, the headquarters of the USDP. The
USDP was approved by the Union Election Commission last week.

Following the resignations, the ruling junta is expected to appoint a new
prime minister and ministers. Officials in Naypyidaw said announcing a new
cabinet would likely take place after the regular first-quarter meeting of
the junta and senior government official, which could be later this month.

Earlier, Lt-Gen Myint Swe, the chief of Bureau of Special Operation-5, was
mentioned as the possible head of a temporary government in the pre- and
post-election period.

The formation of the USDP with Thein Sein and other senior government
officials is seen by most observers as violating the junta's own electoral
laws, which ban government officials or staff from taking part in
political parties and using government property for political purposes.

On Friday, the Union Democratic Party in a press release said that the
prime minister and ministers should not be playing a role in the USDP
while they are government officials and questioned if they used government
property during the organization of the political party.

On Tuesday, according to state-run-newspapers, Thein Sein was in the
Irrawaddy delta along with the junta’s No.2, Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye. His
delta tour coincided with an official visit of Kurt Campbell, the US
assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. Other
junta leaders including Htay Oo, Kyaw Hsan, U Thaung met with Campbell in
Naypyidaw on Sunday.

Local sources said Kyaw Hsan, who is in charge of the USDP campaign in
Sagaing Division, has met with local division organizers. Thein Zaw has
reportedly made similar campaign organization trips to Kachin State, as
have other ministers to different regions of the country.

There are few signs, so far, that the general public is taking an interest
in the election. The date of the election has still not been announced by
the government.

The former main opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), led by
Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, decided not to take part in the election,
saying it lacked credibility and was undemocratic. Former NLD leaders who
met with Campbell on Monday urged the US to keep pressure on the junta to
release all political prisoners and not to recognize the election results.

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE


May 11, People’s Daily Online (China)
Gold prices in Myanmar soar record high over weekend

Gold prices in Myanmar have soared to a record high, trading at 626,000
Kyats (about 630 U.S. dollars) per tical (about 15.24 grams) over the last
weekend, the local weekly Yangon Times reported Tuesday.

The current gold prices, which is up from 612,500 Kyats (615 U. S.
dollars) in the beginning of this month, broke 2009's highest record of
623,000 Kyats, the report said.

The high gold prices have revived the gold market in the country which
cooled down in April, it said.

Meanwhile, Myanmar currency value has risen to a record high against the
U.S. dollar since mid-April, trading at 980 Kyats per dollar in the
domestic market.

The Myanmar Kyat value went up significantly against the dollar from
normally above 1,000 Kyats per dollar to the present exchange rate.

Financial experts linked the record high of Myanmar currency value in
exchanging with U.S. dollar with the increased flow of foreign currencies
in the domestic market, the slow flow of export and import goods, fall of
border trade and coolness of economic transactions that brought down the
value of U.S. dollar.
____________________________________


May 11, Xinhua via People’s Daily Online (China)
Myanmar marine exporters blamed for not realizing target for 2009-10

The Myanmar authorities have blamed marine product exporters for not
reaching the export target of 700 million U.S. dollars set for the fiscal
year 2009-10, saying that only 88 trading companies out of 185
accomplished the performance.

According to the Fishery Department on Monday, some of the companies even
exported nil during the year despite holding of the export licenses.

The authorities warned of punishment against such failure.

According to official statistics, Myanmar's marine export was registered
at 496.39 million U.S. dollars in 2009-10, achieving 70. 91 percent of the
export target of 700 million dollars.

However, the authorities granted 124 other companies to strive for the
realization of marine products export target in the present fiscal year
2010-11.

Of the companies, eight companies have secured rights to export fishes to
European countries starting from 2010 after experts of the European Union
(EU) Commission inspected respective companies' production status in the
country.

The companies are allowed to freely export fishes to 27 EU countries,
while previously the exports were restricted to respective bilateral
agreements reached between the companies and the exporting countries.

In 2008-09, the country's marine export had dropped to 483 million dollars
from 560 million dollars in 2007-08 due to the impact of 2008's May storm,
the global financial crisis and the flash surge of hard currency exchange
rate.

China topped Myanmar's marine export country line-up, followed by
Thailand, Japan and Singapore.

The other marine products exporting countries include Middle East
countries, European Union countries, South Korea, Japan and Argentina.

Myanmar's fishery sector remained as the fourth largest contributor to the
gross domestic product and also the fourth largest source of foreign
exchange earning during the past five years.

With a long coastline of over 2,800 km and a total area of 500, 000
hectares of swamps along the coast, the country has an estimated
sustainable yield of marine products at over one million tons a year.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER


May 11, Amnesty International Briefing (ASA 16/007/2010)

The following remarks were given by Benjamin Zawacki, Amnesty
International’s Myanmar Researcher, at the Royal Institute of
International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, on 11 May 2010.

Myanmar’s 2010 Elections: A Human Rights Perspective

Introduction

On the heels of elections in the UK, perhaps interest is piqued for a
discussion on elections elsewhere, even if the only obvious similarity
between the UK and our subject today, is that the voices of the electorate
in both countries deserve to be heard and respected.  As you are all
aware, later this year Myanmar will hold its first national elections
since 1990, when the NLD party led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a
resounding victory, but was denied the opportunity to take office.  In the
two decades since that time, those elections have dogged the government of
Myanmar both domestically and internationally.  This year’s elections thus
present an opportunity for the government to place 1990 firmly behind
them, pursuant to its self-styled ‘Roadmap to Democracy’.

The roadmap has not lived up to its name, thus far essentially leading the
country in circles.  Recent signposts include the announcements in
February 2008 that elections would be held sometime in 2010, and that a
new draft constitution had been completed.  Three months later, in the
wake of devastating Cyclone Nargis, that Constitution was supposedly
approved by over 90% of the electorate, in a referendum characterized by
voting forced or otherwise manipulated by the authorities.  Then, in what
can be seen as an elections-related move, one year ago this week Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi was arrested for violating the conditions of her house arrest,
after an uninvited visitor trespassed on her property.  Already detained
for nearly 14 of the past 20 years, she was subsequently sentenced to 18
additional months—or just long enough to keep her out of the way on and
before election day.  This year has seen the promulgation of Electoral
Laws—which declare the 1990 polls officially void —and the NLD’s decision
to boycott the elections.

Ethnic minority political opponents

And these are just the most widely reported signposts, to say nothing of a
situation that is less well-known but certainly no less critical to human
rights in Myanmar and to the elections later this year.  That is, the
situation for Myanmar’s 135 ethnic minorities—and the first of Amnesty
International’s three main elections-related concerns.

The coming elections highlight a major challenge that has confronted—and
confounded—every Myanmar government since independence more than 60 years
ago: ensuring the assent, or at least the compliance, of the country’s
ethnic minorities with its political program.  For most of the last six
decades, Myanmar’s rulers have used a combination of force and negotiation
to this end.  In the context of the elections, the government has
alternately encouraged and warned ethnic minority political organizations
to take part, with most remaining undecided or noncommittal.  Myanmar’s
government is struggling to ensure that those represented by armed groups
still fighting with the army are either defeated or “brought back into the
legal fold” before the elections.   The army and allied militias have
waged offensives against several armed opposition groups—as well as
clearly unlawful attacks on civilians—from the Karen, Shan, and Kokang
ethnic minorities.  As a result, over 45,000 persons from these ethnic
minorities were displaced during 2009 and the Kokang’s armed group was
defeated.

The offensive against the Kokang is especially significant in the context
of the Myanmar government’s newest strategy of converting the existing
armed ethnic groups that have agreed ceasefires into Border Guard Forces
(BGF) under army command.  Offered pay, perks, and official legal status,
roughly half of the groups have agreed, while the others—including the
swiftly defeated Kokang—have refused.  The elections will further clarify
how the aspirations of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities will be represented: by
armed insurrection, through non-violent political action, or both.

Indeed, as a February report from Amnesty International reveals—and in
contrast to a prevailing international misconception—a significant part of
Myanmar’s peaceful political opposition is made up of ethnic minorities. 
Over the past several years at least, Amnesty’s research shows that ethnic
minority political opponents and activists have been systematically
repressed by the Myanmar authorities.  Among the human rights violations
perpetrated against these individuals and groups as means of repressing
political activity have been arbitrary arrests, unfair trials resulting in
imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial executions.  As elections
approach, this reality is not only of concern to Amnesty, but must be both
understood and taken into account by the international community.

Observers outside Myanmar often divide opposition to the government
between, on the one side, a political struggle led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and the NLD, and on the other side, insurgency, carried out by a variety
of ethnic minority armed groups.  While this perception has increased as
the elections have drawn closer, it over-simplifies the situation,
understates the work done by peaceful ethnic minority political opponents,
and ignores the high price they pay for challenging the government.  In
terms of party and electoral politics, a substantial portion of the NLD’s
membership and leadership consists of ethnic minorities, while
ethnically-based political parties have proven resilient as well.  It is
often forgotten that the second-most successful party in the 1990
elections was the Shan NLD, an ethnic minority party with similar aims to
those of the NLD.  Likewise in terms of political activism: The first
monks to march in the 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’ were ethnic minority
Rakhine, while the campaigns against the draft constitution and referendum
in 2008 were as vigorous in the ethnic minority states as in Myanmar’s
central regions and urban centres.

Amnesty’s February report establishes that Myanmar’s political opposition
is widespread geographically and ethnically diverse.  It reaches two other
conclusions:  First, the number of political prisoners in Myanmar is
likely to be substantially higher than the 2,200 figure currently in
use—and about 10% of which is made up of ethnic minorities.  This is
because, while we have names for each of those 2,200 prisoners, Amnesty’s
report reveals that there are certainly many more—anonymous—whose names
and cases we don’t know.  Second, as elections approach, it is not enough
that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners be released,
that the NLD’s members and supporters be free to exercise their right to
boycott, and that a human rights-friendly resolution be found to the
Border Guard Force issue: authorities must also cease their repression of
Myanmar’s ethnic minority political opponents.  While these violations of
human rights are unacceptable in any context, anywhere, in the run-up to
national elections in Myanmar, attacks against the freedoms of expression,
peaceful assembly, and association should be of immediate concern to the
international community.

Electoral Laws

This would be a good moment to note—perhaps to your surprise in view of
how these remarks were titled—that as a matter of blanket policy Amnesty
International does not take a position on elections: neither on whether
they should or should not be held, nor on whether they are free and fair
or otherwise.  Rather, Amnesty assesses what governments do and not how
they are formed—in this case, the past and ongoing actions of the
government of Myanmar in preparation for elections later this year.  One
such action, and Amnesty International’s second major concern, was the
government’s promulgation two months ago of five Electoral Laws and four
Bylaws.  Provisions of these laws are in clear violation of human rights
principles and standards, and when viewed as a group, clearly attack the
three freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association.  These
rights are enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and are
indispensible to elections.

This comes as no surprise, for the 2008 Constitution, upon which the laws
are based but which will not come into force until after the elections,
itself provides for clear violations of human rights.  Indeed one of the
Electoral Laws provides that parties must declare that they will
“safeguard the Constitution”.   Among the more serious human rights
aspects and implications of the Constitution—elaborated upon in Amnesty’s
2008 Briefing Paper—include the President being effectively above the law;
impunity for past crimes by government officials;  and a total suspension
of “fundamental rights” during indefinite and undefined states of
emergency.

The Electoral Laws continue this trend, being discriminatory on the basis
of political opinion, and violating other human rights.  At the most basic
level, whole segments of Burmese society are arbitrarily excluded.  Those
the laws disenfranchise include “persons serving a prison term under a
sentence passed by any court”, “persons found to be of unsound mind”,
“persons who have not been declared free from insolvency”, and “persons
prohibited in accordance with the Electoral Laws”.

These categories are so broad in their potential definitions as to make
exclusion from the voting lists highly subjective.  Presumably it is the
newly established Election Commission that is charged with determining who
is “of unsound mind” and who is “prohibited in accordance with the
Electoral Laws”.  As for undischarged insolvents, economic or financial
status should be no bar to full political participation.  And perhaps of
most obvious and central concern to Amnesty International is the provision
disenfranchising “persons serving a prison term under a sentence passed by
any court”.  This includes the more than 2,200 political prisoners in
Myanmar, many of whose convictions arose not from any recognizably
criminal act, but rather are arbitrary and based on the legitimate
exercise of rights.  Though again subject to the interpretation of the
Election Commission, this provision likely applies to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
as well.

It should be noted that members of religious orders—including Myanmar’s
estimated 400,000 Buddhist monks—are also explicitly barred from voting. 
While such has been the case since Myanmar’s independence, meaning that
these new Electoral Laws do not per se disenfranchise them, this
prohibition perpetuates discrimination based on their religion or status.

All of these provisions apply to standing for election as well, as do
several additional ambiguously worded categories of those who cannot run. 
All are similarly discriminatory, and in addition violate the freedoms of
expression, peaceful assembly, and/or association.  First, if translation
serves, are persons:
•	convicted for failing to act in accordance with to the Electoral Laws
before or after the promulgation of the Constitution, and who have not yet
been declared free from restriction by concerned authorities.
This would seem to allow a retroactive application of the Electoral Laws,
so as to include persons detained or arrested for opposing the 2008 draft
constitution or its referendum.  In February 2008, the government passed a
law prohibiting any criticism of the draft constitution or the process by
which it was written.   Amnesty International is aware of at least 55
current political prisoners whom this provision would exclude from
standing in the elections, to say nothing of former political prisoners
who “have not yet been declared free from restriction”.

Next are persons:
•	“who owe allegiance to a foreign government 
”;  or
•	who as individuals or as members of an organization, obtain and utilize,
directly or indirectly, assistance from a foreign government, religious
organization, or any other foreign organization or individual.
These provisions are more restrictive than they may initially appear, as
they are drafted in an overly broad fashion and could be subject to
interpretations by the authorities that amount to violations of human
rights.  The Myanmar government routinely accuses its domestic critics of
being in the pay or otherwise under the influence of foreign actors, and
blames international interference for national discontent and dissent. 
Nearly any real or perceived contact with foreign organizations—including,
as Amnesty’s February report details, with media outlets—is enough to
bring legal repercussions: in this case, prohibition from standing in the
elections.

The fourth provision—though admittedly drafted prior to the NLD’s decision
to boycott the election, but presumably long after the monk-led Saffron
Revolution—could be cited in any attempt to prevent boycotts.  Persons:
•	“who as individuals or as members of an organization, use, abet, incite,
or encourage the use of religion as a pretext for delivering speeches or
making declarations to vote or not to vote, or for other political
purposes”.

And fifth, a classic catch-all provision that could apply to both ethnic
minority political and armed groups, as well as to non violent opposition
organizations in the central regions and urban centres:
•	“members of an organization declared as an unlawful association
according to any existing law; organizations and individuals whom the
State has declared to have been engaged in terrorist acts; organizations
and members in armed revolt against the State; or persons against whom
there is sufficient grounds of having links with the said organizations or
with its members”.

Many of these provisions also apply to barring a person from continuing as
a member of the new legislatures, if subsequently found to fall into one
or more of these categories.  Another, “being declared to cease to be a
citizen in accordance with the relevant law”,  is particularly concerning
as being discriminatory against members of the Rohingya ethnic minority,
who are already denied citizenship.  In recent months, Rohingyas have been
issued temporary identification cards, which as per the Electoral Laws,
allow them to vote—but which do not afford them citizenship.  This
subsequent provision thus suggests, subject to interpretation, that they
could not actually serve in the legislatures.

Of the five Electoral Laws promulgated thus far, the one which has
received the most attention internationally has been the Political Parties
Registration Law, primarily on account of its effects on Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi and the NLD.  Its discriminatory nature and violations of the freedoms
of expression, peaceful assembly, and association, are clear and reach
more deeply into the political process than those relating to voting or
running in the elections.  Many of those provisions also pertain to
joining, remaining in, forming, or maintaining a political party. 
“Persons serving a prison term under a sentence passed by any court”  is
one such provision, which applies not only to Daw Suu Kyi but to Myanmar’s
other 2,200 political prisoners as well.  Moreover, similar to concerns
expressed above with respect to ambiguous language, party organizers and
members must be free from foreign interference and “influence”, both
“direct and indirect”.   It has been pointed out by a notable Myanmar
observer that “influence” is present neither in the last Electoral Laws of
1988 nor in the 2008 Constitution, and has a very broad meaning in the
Burmese expression used.

This law also provides that parties having direct or indirect contact with
“armed insurgent groups”, “terrorists”, or “unlawful associations” face
deregistration.   The first two terms would seem to apply
primarily—although not exclusively, given the politicized determination of
who counts as a terrorist—to Myanmar’s ethnic minorities.  As Amnesty’s
February report demonstrates, many of Myanmar’s ethnically-specific
political parties have an armed wing, and most armed groups observing
ceasefires have not agreed to the government’s demand to become Border
Guard Forces.  While this provision might reasonably apply to such groups,
it could also be used to discriminate against—and deregister—an individual
or group the government merely accuses or perceives as having “direct or
indirect” contact with “terrorists”.  Indeed, the third term of this
provision concerning “unlawful associations”, brings to mind the many
groups both in Myanmar and in exile, both ethnically-specific and
otherwise, that work peacefully for change but are routinely deemed
unlawful and repressed by the authorities.

As mentioned above, among the Electoral Laws promulgated is one
establishing an Election Commission, which in turn has implicit
authority—and if history serves as a guide, the political will—to further
violate human rights, including freedom from discrimination and  freedoms
of expression, peaceful assembly, and association.  The Commission is
empowered to postpone the election in a constituency, or part of a
constituency, where election preparation is “not possible due to lack of
security”.   Though again ostensibly a reasonable provision, what
constitutes “lack of security” is subject to both very broad
interpretation and potentially outright manipulation.  Moreover, in these
insecure areas, “if 51 percent of all the voters in the electoral roll
have cast their votes, a valid election shall be deemed to have been
held”.   With the Border Guard Force issue still outstanding in many
ethnic constituencies, and with increased mobilization of troops on
several fronts in recent months, these provisions could lead to the
discriminatory denial of political rights in areas in which opposition to
the government is particularly strong.  This in turn, could affect the
outcome of the elections.

Lastly, the Electoral Laws list a number of offences and penalties, among
them—a most blatant violation of freedom of expression—attempting to
persuade persons to vote or not to vote in the elections.   Another
provision is almost identical, but adds that doing so “on grounds of race
and religion” is specifically prohibited.   While of course drafted prior
to the NLD’s decision to boycott the elections, these provisions would
likely make illegal any public call to their supporters or to other
parties to join them in boycotting.

Commission of Inquiry

Amnesty International’s third and final concern in the context of
Myanmar’s 2010 elections is not in direct relation to the elections
themselves.  Rather, consistent with the organization’s focus on the
conduct of governments as opposed to their formation or composition,
Amnesty is concerned that the new government will not place accountability
for grave human rights violations of past governments on its agenda.  This
is because, in addition to the way in which the elections are shaping up,
Article 445 of the 2008 Constitution codifies immunity from prosecution
for officials for past human rights violations.   This provision clearly
signals a continued unwillingness to investigate serious human rights
violations and bring perpetrators to account.

In view of this commitment to impunity, Amnesty International takes the
opportunity of this forum at Chatham House to add its voice to the growing
call internationally for a Commission of Inquiry into crimes against
humanity and possible war crimes in Myanmar.

As many of you are aware, in his most recent report to the UN Human Rights
Council in March, the UN Special Rapporteur for the situation of human
rights in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana, called for consideration of such a
Commission.  And since then, Australia, the UK, and the Czech Republic
have all signaled their support.

Commissions of Inquiry are not new either to Myanmar or to Amnesty
International.  In 1997, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
formed a Commission to investigate forced labour in Myanmar, and called
upon Amnesty International and several other organizations to provide
expert testimony.  Using terminology that was only then being developed to
characterize crimes against humanity, the ILO concluded in their report
the following year that forced labour in Myanmar was “widespread and
systematic”.  It also concluded that, as Myanmar had ratified ILO
Convention No. 29, the government was in breach of its international legal
obligations regarding forced labour.  Although the government refused from
the start to cooperate with the Commission, including denying it access to
the country, it did pass in 1999 a law explicitly banning forced labour.

Unfortunately, that law has not been enforced, as was made clear in a June
2008 report from Amnesty International, entitled Crimes against humanity
in eastern Myanmar.  In addition to forced labour, Amnesty documented
other widespread and systematic violations of human rights of the ethnic
minority Karen population through unlawful killings, torture and other
ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and various
forms of collective punishment.  At that time, partly in view of political
realities militating against the likelihood of seeing a Commission of
Inquiry established, Amnesty recommended that the UN Security Council
“consider visiting the country, including eastern Myanmar, to obtain
first-hand information on the situation on the ground”.   While many of
those realities still exist—China and Russia being unlikely to support the
idea on the UN Security Council, and the utter failure of the UN Human
Rights Council a year ago to address allegations of similar crimes in Sri
Lanka—Amnesty believes that the political tide is slowly turning.  Should
a Commission confirm that crimes against humanity and other crimes under
international law have been committed since 1 July 2002, the Security
Council should refer the situation to the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to determine whether to open an investigation. 
Alternatively, the United Nations or other body could establish an ad hoc
international or internationalized criminal tribunal to investigate and
prosecute crimes under international law.

It should also be noted that all states have a duty to exercise universal
jurisdiction over such crimes.   Should suspects from Myanmar decide to
travel, the potential role of national authorities of other states that
could investigate and prosecute them should not be undermined.

At present, the prospect of international justice for victims from Myanmar
appears to be a long way off—and despite its report, Amnesty would not
wish to prejudice the findings of a Commission.  It does, however, support
the statement of the UN Special Rapporteur: “Given the gross and
systematic nature of human rights violations in Myanmar over a period of
many years, and the lack of accountability, there is an indication that
those human rights violations are the result of a State policy”.

Even as the government of Myanmar prepares to hold its first national
elections in 20 years, it is taking no steps toward accountability for its
past human rights violations, and in fact is sending clear signals that it
has no intention of doing so.  More importantly, it continues its
perpetration of crimes against humanity and possible war crimes against
its people.  2010 must see an international community prepared to promote
and protect human rights in the context of Myanmar’s elections, and to
work for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into crimes that no
government—elected or otherwise—should be permitted to commit with
impunity.

END/

____________________________________


May 11, Huffington Post
Hope and Humanitarian Space in Burma   - David Scott Mathieson,
Burma Researcher for Human Rights Watch

Bangkok--Two years ago, in early May 2008, Cyclone Nargis destroyed much
of Burma's Irrawaddy Delta and parts of its former capital city Rangoon
with 160 kilometer winds and a massive storm surge, killing more than
140,000 people. The ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) then failed to help, prioritizing their iron-clad grip on
the country over the well-being of the Burmese people. They refused visas
to international emergency relief workers, set up roadblocks to stall and
in some cases seize aid, and expelled foreign reporters who were bringing
the desperate situation to light. Only after the completion of the SPDC's
charade referendum on a new constitution did they finally allow
international aid to reach the storm victims.

But thousands of ordinary Burmese didn't wait. Many organized friends and
colleagues, pooled their resources, and went to the affected areas to help
distribute food and water, build shelters, tend to the injured, bury the
dead, and assist survivors rebuild. They were myriad groups of private
citizens such as engineers, doctors, rock stars, businessmen, travel
agents, religious leaders, and others from all over in Burma who came to
help any way they could.

In those desperate days after the cyclone, these brave Burmese thumbed
their noses at their repressive government frozen by its inability to
switch from brutality to compassion. One Burmese aid worker remarked: "It
was Cyclone Nargis which created the space for us to engage in
humanitarian work, not the government."

Hundreds of new ad-hoc civil society groups bloomed and grew, and
networked to sustain the response. But there were limits, again set out by
the SPDC: the military punished those who helped but then felt compelled
to criticize the government's poor response. The famous comedian Zargana
and twenty other community aid workers were arrested, hit with trumped up
charges, and thrown into prison with long sentences - Zargana got 35 years
- where they continue to languish, largely forgotten.

Optimism flourished in the months after the cyclone, with some foreign
observers believing growing international aid response would help
normalize aid relations and lead to a deeper understanding with SPDC
leaders about the need for international assistance and expertise in
development. The Tripartite Core Group of the SPDC, UN and ASEAN was
presented as a model to expand operations throughout Burma.

Two years on, those hopes have not been realized. Humanitarian aid workers
inside Burma told Human Rights Watch the major dividends from the Cyclone
Nargis have not translated into expanded access for assistance in the rest
of the country. One foreign aid worker remarked that "if the generals just
took their boots off people's throats, Burma [and its development] would
take off," he said.

Burma remains a development basket-case. It has the worst maternal
mortality rate in Asia after Afghanistan. One-third of the country lives
below the poverty line. The SPDC's limitations on operations of aid
agencies contribute to Burma's status as one of the lowest per capita
foreign aid recipients in the world, with only US$2.80 per capita. By
comparison, neighboring Laos receives close US$50. Major health and
livelihood challenges remain in the central dry zone of Burma, and in
former opium growing areas of Shan state. Severe malnutrition affects many
of the one million stateless Rohingya Muslims in Northern Arakan state. In
eastern Burma, the world's longest running civil war has displaced
millions, and access by aid workers is constrained by government
restrictions, fighting and landmines. Major humanitarian aid donors like
the European Union and Australia balk at finding new ways to deliver cross
border assistance to conflict zones, despite the urgent needs.

Meanwhile, the SPDC is estimated to hold more than US$5 billion in foreign
reserves and receives an estimated US$150 million per month in revenues
from natural gas exports, but it hardly shares this largesse with its
people. What limited assistance the Burmese government does provide is
non-transparent, and channeled through its surrogates and contracts
awarded to politically connected companies close to the military, such as
Asia World, Htoo Trading, and Max Myanmar; all three companies are on
Western sanctions lists. The regime spends most of the country's wealth on
military hardware, infrastructure, and building the new capital city at
Naypyidaw. The international community needs to better calibrate and
coordinate targeted financial sanctions against the regime leadership and
their close business associates to exert pressure on this state
perpetrated perfidy. Only increased pressure on the leadership's interests
and income will compel them to observe more responsible distribution of
resources.

The real hope for expanding humanitarian space in the country rests with
Burmese civil society itself. International donors and UN agencies should
find ways to increasingly support their efforts, while ensuring that
assistance does not benefit the military, or the companies of military
families and favored tycoons. The people of Burma are the real hope, and
the only solution, to their country's problems.

David Scott Mathieson is Burma researcher for Human Rights Watch