BurmaNet News, June 29, 2010

[Editor]

June 29, 2010 Issue #3992

INSIDE BURMA
AP: Rare white elephant captured in Myanmar jungle
Irrawaddy: Junta starts new censorship rules

ON THE BORDER
Irrawaddy: DKBA profits from migrant worker crackdown in Thailand
SHAN: Junta police border outpost attacked by Chinese villagers
BNI: Burmese refugees face problems in Bangladesh

BUSINESS / TRADE
Narinjara: Chinese pressure on Burma to strengthen pipeline security
Global Insight: South Korea, Myanmar agree to jointly develop two gas blocks

REGIONAL
The Australian: Sanctions force departure of Burmese general's student
daughter

INTERNATIONAL
AFP and DVB: UN presses Burma on child soldiers

OPINION / OTHER
The Nation: The weak points of Burma's ethnic resistance groups -
Lt-General Yawd Serk
Irrawaddy: The ghost of elections past-III - Ko Ko Thet
Asia Times: Deception and denials in Myanmar - Bertil Lintner
OpEd News: ASEAN must have a specific evaluation on unfair polls in Burma
- Zin Linn

PRESS RELEASE
BCUK: UN Must Act On G8 Call For Burma Dictatorship To Enter Into Dialogue

____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

June 29, Associated Press
Rare white elephant captured in Myanmar jungle

Yangon - A rare white elephant has been captured in the jungles of
northwestern Myanmar, a mostly Buddhist country where the animals are
considered good omens, state media reported Tuesday.

Forestry officials found the animal Saturday, acting on a tip, in the
jungles of Maungdaw township in northwestern Rakhine state, the New Light
of Myanmar reported, describing the elephant as about 38 years old and 7
feet and 4 inches (2.2 meters) tall.

White elephants, actually albinos, have for centuries been revered in
Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and other Asian nations. They were normally kept
and pampered by monarchs and considered a symbol of royal power and
prosperity.

The elephants are not necessarily white. They can look similar to other
elephants except for certain features like fair eyelashes and toenails,
light-colored hair or a reddish hue to the skin.

The newspaper did not say where the elephant would be housed. It will be
the fourth white elephant held in captivity in Myanmar. The three others
are at the Mindhamma Hill park, in suburban Yangon, where they live in an
enclosure with spiraled pavilions, a manmade waterfall, ponds, trees and
vegetation.

Soraida Salwala, of the Thailand-based Friends of the Asian Elephant
Foundation, said the group normally objects to placing elephants in
captivity but stopped short of criticizing the capture of white elephants.
In Thailand, all white elephants are traditionally handed over to the
country's revered king.

"The white elephant is a sign of great blessings and fortune for the
land," she said, adding that traditional Myanmar and Thai beliefs are
similar on the subject.

Previous white elephants transported from the jungles have been heralded
in lavish ceremonies where the Myanmar's military leaders sprinkle them
with scented water laced with gold, silver and precious gems.

A war was fought in the 16th century between Thailand and Myanmar, then
Siam and Burma respectively, over disputed ownership of four white
elephants.

____________________________________

June 28, Irrawaddy
Junta starts new censorship rules - Ba Kaung

Burmese media has been given minimum space for election related news
recently, but starting next month the space will likely be further
restricted by new censorship rules.

Two months ago, the weekly news journals in Rangoon—an estimated seven
journals, each with an average circulation of between 50,000 to
100,000—offered full pages or special stories on election coverage,
introducing various political parties and their leaders who plan to
contest the election this year.

But beginning in July, Burma's notorious Press Scrutiny Board (PSB) will
reduce election coverage and a newly formed commission will monitor the
news journals to make sure the same rules apply to all—meaning that no
journals will be able to circumvent the censorship rules with their
connections or under-the-table payments, according to editors in Rangoon
who spoke to The Irrawaddy.

Currently, journals are now allowed to submit three or four pages to the
PSB for last-minute news. Next month, they will be allowed to submit only
two pages, which must not include any political news.

Even a 20-page new political publication, the Monitor Journal, which is
run by a regime-favored publisher, canceled its publication last week
after suffering heavy cuts by the censorship board which approved only
four pages. One Rangoon source said that a recent change of officials at
the PSB caused the change in rules, while another editor said it was an
official policy change in the run-up to the election.

“This is not a change by the censorship board itself. This is a policy
shift,” said a Rangoon editor who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The
government initially allowed the media a small space to legitimize its
planned election in the eyes of the public and the international
community. Now it seems to think enough is enough.”

So far, much of the election coverage allowed by the regime has been
focused on not allowing any stories to reflect anti-government or
anti-election opinions or information.

The journals were allowed to publish interviews with political leaders who
want to contest the elections as opposed to those against the election,
such as the majority of the members of Aung San Suu Kyi's disbanded
National League for Democracy (NLD). Intentionally or not, the coverage
was also focused on the split within the NLD over the election, although
the stories never criticized the controversial election laws or the
regime's Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).

Recently, the PSB allowed 1988 nationwide protests to be described as a
“general strike”—a major political event which the regime usually terms
the “88” disturbance. Reflecting the call for “a free and fair” election,
one journal was also allowed to quote a cartoonist, who said: “If the
election is properly held in line with democratic norms and standards, a
major turnout will happen.”

A Rangoon-based reporter said, “That period is over now. We can't say it's
fair if the regime only allows us to report on what the pro-government
parties are saying.”

The latest developments follow election commission rules released last
week that political parties must agree not to say or publish anything that
criticizes the military, government, or civil service personnel. According
to Rangoon media sources, the government is starting the latest round of
censorship to ensure that “the pro-democracy parties” are not allowed to
get their message out to the people prior to the election.

“The government wants to make sure that pro-democracy parties like the NLD
splinter party, the National Democratic Force, Thu Wai's Democratic Party
[Myanmar] and Phyo Min Thein's Union Democratic Party do not get their
message out through the media,” said one editor.

Burmese officials have made it clear that they do not want regional or
international groups to monitor the planned election whose date has not
yet been announced.

With tighter censorship rules, the Burmese public will remain dependent
mainly on radio stations such as the BBC and VOA, as they were during
Burma's last election in 1990.

While censorship is a real concern, others questioned the level of public
interest in the election.

“We're talking about how we are allowed to cover the election, but we may
be missing the fact that people are not very interested in this election,”
said one Rangoon editor.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

June 29, Irrawaddy
DKBA profits from migrant worker crackdown in Thailand - Alex Ellgee

Mae Sot—The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a proxy militia of the
Burmese regime, has seen profits rise at its unofficial “immigration
checkpoint” following Thailand's recent crackdown on illegal migrant
workers, according to a source close to the DKBA.

An illegal Burmese immigrant feed her children at a rubbish dump site near
Mae Sot, Thailand. (Photo: Reuters)
The DKBA checkpoint, locally known as “Gate Zero” and controlled by the
DKBA's 999 battalion, has become the main deportation point for illegal
migrant workers arrested by Thai authorities. Gate Zero is located on the
Thai-Burma border next to the Myawaddy friendship bridge, just across the
Moei River.

“The crackdown has meant more migrant workers are being deported to the
gate, so revenues have gone up,” said the source.

Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva recently issued an official order to
set up a special center for the suppression, arrest and prosecution of
alien workers in Thailand.

In the weeks since the order was issued, thousands of migrant workers have
been arrested throughout Thailand and sent by police bus to Mae Sot, where
their personal details are recorded and they are deported by boat across
the river to Gate Zero.

A social worker based in Bangkok, who recently visited the local
Immigration Detention Centre (IDC), told The Irrawaddy that it is more
full than usual. One bus normally leaves the IDC for Mae Sot on Sunday,
she said, but this Sunday two large buses taking around sixty workers each
left for the border.

According to Burmese nationals who have been through the process before,
upon arrival at Gate Zero the DKBA demands 1,200 baht (US $1 equals
approximately 32 Thai baht) for a deported person's release, and offers a
return trip to Bangkok for 10,000 baht.

Local labor activists believe the proceeds from these fines, which can be
a massive blow to the many poor families struggling to survive as migrant
workers, are split between the DKBA, brokers and Thai officials.

If the deported person cannot pay, they are forced to work every day until
they can raise the money from family or friends. The DKBA also charges 100
baht per day for accommodation and food.

Exorbitant fees are not the only thing the DKBA is extorting from
deportees at the border. There have been reports of girls being sold to
brothels and boys being conscripted into the DKBA army.

Matt Finch, the coordinator of the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), told
The Irrawaddy his researchers had discovered severe human rights abuses
taking place at Gate Zero.

"Workers deported from Thailand via DKBA gates have faced violent and
exploitative abuse, our interviews indicate that they may be subject to
beatings and forced labor,” Finch said.

“Women, especially young girls, who can't pay are particularly vulnerable.
Last year the KHRG documented the case of a teenage girl who was raped
multiple times after a trafficker purchased her freedom from a DKBA gate.”

Commenting on reports of human trafficking at the gate, Paul Buckley of
the UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking, said that if Burmese
migrants “are being deported and handed over by Thai Immigration to DKBA
forces in Mae Sot to be exploited and sold to brokers, this is a serious
violation of the Anti-Human Trafficking legislation in Thailand.”

Speaking from a tiny, rented wooden house on the outskirts of Mae Sot,
Kyaw Oo, 55, told The Irrawaddy that he was recently arrested and sent to
Gate Zero. He said the other people in the “prison” told him a girl had
recently been sent there and the DKBA sold her to a brothel in Myawaddy
without even calling her family to ask for release money.

He also reported that when a 15 year old boy was handed over to the DKBA
at Gate Zero, they also did not call his family and immediately took him
away to be a soldier in the DKBA.

“The boy was very young and was crying so much. He didn’t want to be a
soldier. He wanted to go back to his family. I could see he was terrified
of the DKBA,” said Kyaw Oo.

Kyaw Oo's own story provides a good illustration of the troubles that
await illegal migrant workers from Burma who are arrested in Thailand and
deported to Gate Zero.

When he originally entered Thailand from Burma, Kyaw Oo paid 5,500 baht to
a Burmese “carrier.” He and five other people were led though the jungle
on foot, walking for seven days till they reached Bangkok, where they
hoped to find work. But in Kyaw Oo's first week in Bangkok, Thai police
carrying out the recent crackdown arrived at the home he was staying and
arrested him.

Immediately after his arrest, Kyaw Oo was loaded into a packed police
truck and taken on a seven-hour journey to Tak, Thailand. He said
conditions were almost unbearable for him and the other 53 people in the
truck: it was extremely hot and they did not stop once for a toilet break
or to eat.

Kyaw Oo said that when he arrived at Gate Zero, the people in charge
demanded 1,200 baht for him to be released. When he told them he was
unable to pay, they hit him all over his body with bamboo sticks.

“They asked for money but I am only a poor person, I had already spent all
my money trying to get to Bangkok to find work but was arrested. They
didn’t care and just hit me all over,” Kyaw Oo said, showing the bruises
from where he was beaten.

When they figured out Kyaw Oo really could not afford to pay, the border
guards threw him in a bamboo prison they had constructed to hold
detainees. When he asked for food, they gave him pork curry, which being
Muslim he could not eat, and they beat him again when he asked for
something different to eat.

“They knew I was Muslim, but they gave me pork anyway. Everyone knows
Muslim people cannot eat pork. When I asked for something different they
just swore at me and beat me more,” he said.

Sitting next to him, Kyaw Oo's wife told The Irrawaddy how she received a
phone call from the DKBA officials after her husband's detention at Gate
Zero. They told her that if she did not give them the money in four days
they would kill him. She said she could hear Kyaw Oo being tortured in the
background and was terrified.

“I could hear them putting his head up and down in the water like they do
in the movies. Sometimes they would let me talk to him when he was out of
breath and crying for help,” she said, nearly in tears.

Kyaw Oo estimates there were thirty soldiers working at Gate Zero, who he
believes were intoxicated most of the time. While in the gate area they
would wear plain clothes, but still carry their guns, and when they left
they would change into military uniform.

Their duties included organizing the deportees when they arrived at the
gate, pressuring deportees for money and collecting the money, looking
over the forced labor of those who could not afford to pay and keeping an
eye on those in the prison. Kyaw Oo says the guards would follow detainees
with a gun even when the prisoners went to the toilet.

After four days of being tortured and harassed by what he called “young,
drunk, swearing soldiers,” Kyaw Oo said he could not take any more and
believed that if he did not find money soon he was going to die.

“I am already old; I was not sure how much more my body could take. I was
so desperate I even thought about selling my new child,” says Kyaw Oo.

Unable to bear the phone calls and concerned about her husband’s health,
Kyaw Oo's wife found someone to buy their small wooden home for 1,300 baht
and mobile phone for 400 baht.

After selling everything they owned, she offered the DKBA 1,700 baht, but
they wanted 1,900 baht. For one more day she tried to tell the DKBA their
situation and plead for her husband's release.

“Finally, I could not take it anymore, I just told them we are extremely
poor people and we have sold everything we have in our lives. I said to
them there is nothing more I can do, so either they take the 1,700 baht or
kill him. Finally, they agreed.”

“Now we have nothing—no home and no job,” said Kyaw Oo. “I can’t believe
the DKBA can treat poor people like that and get away with it.” Apparently
they can, and the more migrants like Kyaw Oo who are deported from
Thailand and pass through Gate Zero, the more the DKBA's profits will
rise.

____________________________________

June 29, Shan Herald Agency for News
Junta police border outpost attacked by Chinese villagers - Hseng Khio Fah

A police outpost stationed on the Sino-Burma border was said to have been
attacked yesterday by Chinese villagers, according to local sources.

The incident followed action taken against them by members from the
outpost on 27 June, at 8:00 (Burma Standard Time).

Sources have learned that 16 tolajis (farm tractors) carrying rice from
the Burma territory were blocked by Military Affairs Security (MAS)
officials at the gate and did not return to the owners till midnight. The
tractors were owned by the villagers in Chinese territory, said a source.

The outpost is located near Namwan Bridge between Kongkham village in
China and Namwan village, Mangwiang village tract, Kachin State’s Mansi
Township.

The tractors were said to have been kept until 24:00 though the owners
came for negotiation, said a local resident. “The villagers therefore
raided their outpost, destroyed things in the areas. One of their police
trucks was damaged.”

During the raid, many police officials were also reported helping the
villagers to destroy the truck, he said. “But the MAS officials
fortunately decided not to shoot.”

The officer in charge of the MAS unit has reportedly fled to a neighboring
area after the incident despite villagers’ appeal to take responsibility
for their activities.

But so far there has been no one from the Burma Army has turned up to
solve the problem.

____________________________________

June 29, Burma News International
Burmese refugees face problems in Bangladesh

Teknaf, Bangladesh: Refugees have narrated how in the face of torture and
harassment of Rohingyas by the army and Nasaka of Burma, left their homes
for Bangladesh. “We don’t want to be refugees forever, and will go back to
our homeland when the situation is favourable,” said a refugee leader from
Kutupalong camp.

We are destined to be refugees forever.  So far there has been no hope of
our returning to our homeland.  Sufferings in refugee camps have been
allotted for us as if we were born to undergo the trials and tribulations
of a refugee camp. There is no let-up of our sufferings, he added.

Refugees said, they have been provided with rations since they took
shelter in the refugee camp. But they long for their homes in Burma,
adding that they do not want to be refugees forever. They regretted that
the refugee problem has not been resolved since the UNHCR took it up.

According to sources in UNHCR at Cox’s Bazaar, More than 200,000 refugees
returned home in Burma between 1992 and 2001. At present over 28,000
Rohingyas are living in Nayapara and Kutupalong refugee camps.

On the other hand, 18,000 Rohingya intruders are living in temporary camps
at Leda unofficial camp under Teknaf upazila and about 55,000 in hills
adjacent to Ukhiya TV Broadcasting Center.

Rohingya refuges of Nayapara and Kutupalong official camps are living in
an unhygienic environment.  Ten to 15 people have to live in a room
measuring 10ft in length and 8ft in  width. The room with roof covered
with polythene is fenced by bamboo. The floor of the room is made of
earth. Water during heavy rains fall on the floor through the breaches in
the polythene and remains stagnant there, said our correspondent.

The children living amid squalid and filthy environment fall sick. Pure
drinking water is conspiquous by its absence in the camp.

Saiful Islam Majundar and Fazle Rabbi, in-charges of Nayapara and
Kutupalong camps respectively said that there would be no let-up until a
way for the repatriation of refugees is devised.

The Commissioner of Cox’s Bazaar Rohingya refugee Relief and Expatriation
Md. Feroj Salauddin said the repatriation of Rohingya refugees stopped
after 92 refugees returned to Burma on May 5, 2005. The Burmese government
is not taking any initiative for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees. 
According to the rules of the UNO, no refugees can be sent to their
homeland forcibly if they do not return of their own accord.

The Rohingyas have turned a perennial problem both for Bangladesh and for
themselves.
Deputy Commissioner Giasuddin Ahmed said, besides 28,874 refugees in two
camps at Ukiya and Teknaf, over 100,000 additional Rohingyas are living in
different areas of the district.

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

June 29, Narinjara News
Chinese pressure on Burma to strengthen pipeline security
Kyaukpru: Pressure from the Chinese is forcing Burmese military
authorities to beef up security for oil and gas pipeline projects on Madae
Island in Arakan State, said a police officer.

China raised concerns over security risks at its pipeline projects in
Arakan after a series of bomb explosions at the Chinese hydropower dam
project in Myitsone in northern Burma's Kachin State, the source said.

"The plans of the authorities to strengthen security are now underway
after China expressed concern for its pipeline projects in Arakan after
the deadly bomb blasts at its Myitsone Dam project in April," the officer
told Narinjara on condition of anonymity.

He added that a large police station is now under construction and nearly
100 police personnel will be deployed to guard the Chinese projects on
Madae Island.

The China National Petroleum Corporation began construction in February on
two oil and natural gas pipelines and a deep-sea port on Madae Island in
Arakan's Kyaukpru Township, in collaboration with Burma's Asia World
Company.

Local villagers say, there is anger over the Chinese projects on the
island as the junta and Asia World Company have evicted nearly 50 families
from their homes and confiscated 30 acres of arable land for the projects,
without paying compensation.

The villagers, however, also said that there is no local armed group or
organization that is capable of attacking the Chinese projects in Arakan
State, which has tight security cover. They are concerned that the
security reinforcements for the project will result in more violations and
restrictions against villagers in the project areas.

Currently, there is the Burmese Navy headquarters, three army battalions,
and several police stations in the areas near Madae Island in Kyaukpru
Township.

____________________________________

June 29, Global Insight
South Korea, Myanmar Agree to Jointly Develop Two Gas Blocks - Tom Grieder

Following a visit by a South Korean delegation to Myanmar between 9 and 12
June the South Korean government announced that it has reached an
agreement with Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to jointly exploit two
gas blocks--B-2, located onshore northern Myanmar, and A-7, located
offshore the Arakan coast in the Bay of Bengal. Following the agreement it
is believed that MOGE will allow South Korean firms to operate in the
block. According to IHS Global Exploration and Production Service (GEPS),
the B-2 block has a total area of 19,066 sq. km and is jointly operated by
MOGE and Russia's Silver Wave Energy. The last known activity was in
March, when Silver Wave spudded the Shwe Pinle 3 exploration well. Block
A-7 has a size of 8,224 sq. km in water depths of up to 2,000 metres in
the Rakhine Basin. The block contains one dry well drilled in 1976,
although it is believed to have significant potential for hydrocarbons.

Significance:Since March the South Korean government has been stepping up
co-operation with the junta in Myanmar in a wide range of areas including
trade and investment, training, and technology, both as a strategy of
accessing energy and mineral resources and to advance its regional soft
power and diplomatic position. In the energy sector this strategy has met
with some success. South Korean companies such as Hyundai Heavy have
gained large contracts for offshore engineering works while Daewoo
International is leading the upstream component of the Shwe gas project.
The current agreement is unusual as foreign companies have not frequently
been invited to invest onshore, where discoveries are generally reserved
for domestic consumption. However, the need for investment in onshore
acreage due to MOGE's very low onshore output levels might be opening up
new opportunities, perhaps reflected by Chinese company North Petrochem
Corp. Limited's (NPCC) recent award of Block F in the onshore Central
Burma Basin. The unilateral termination of the production sharing contract
on Block A-7 with Silver Energy in early June--because the company could
not fulfill its commitments--may have paved the way for South Korea to
reach the agreement, although the South Korean delegation appears to have
even broader ambitions, following reports that the two sides also holding
discussions over joint exploration of eight additional blocks.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

June 29, The Australian
Sanctions force departure of Burmese general's student daughter - Bernard
Lane

Like many overseas students, Zin Mon Aye hoped to parlay her accounting
degree into permanent residency. But her days in Australia were numbered
once officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade learned
she was on campus at the University of Western Sydney.

Ms Aye, 25, is the daughter of Brigadier-General Zin Yaw, a senior figure
in the Burmese dictatorship.

Australia is a party to sanctions supposed to put pressure on the regime
by targeting its leaders and their families.

Foreign Minister Stephen Smith decided in 2008 that allowing Ms Aye to
stay in the country would be at odds with Australia's international policy
on Burma.

She is expected to return to Burma within days, having fought Mr Smith all
the way to the full bench of the Federal Court, and lost.

``Sadly, she's being punished for something of which she is innocent,''
said her lawyer, Tony Silva.

According to the court decision this month, Ms Aye said ``she was
estranged from her parents because of her father's association with the
brutal Burmese military dictatorship''.

She said she did not depend on her parents financially and had a full-time
job waiting once she finished her masters at UWS.

Her argument was that Australia's sanctions should not penalise ``adult
children of senior Burmese regime figures, who are not supporters of the
regime''.

The three judges who heard her appeal agreed it must fail, although they
split 2-1 on the degree to which she could challenge Mr Smith's
essentially political decision in the courts.

One judge, Bruce Lander, said Mr Smith's decision directly affected her
right to stay in Australia.

This meant he should have given her procedural fairness by allowing her to
say whether or not she was in fact Brigadier-General Zin Yaw's daughter.
But since her identity was not in question, her appeal had to fail.

The other two judges, Jeffrey Spender and Neil McKerracher, took a more
absolute position on the separation of powers issue.

They said Ms Aye was inviting the courts to second-guess Mr Smith's
sanctions policy. This they could not do.

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

June 29, Agence France-Presse and Democratic Voice of Burma
UN presses Burma on child soldiers

A senior UN official on Monday urged Burma and Colombia to allow the UN to
negotiate directly with rebel groups or guerrillas to secure the
demobilisation of child soldiers.

“Colombia and Myanmar [Burma] do not allow us to have discussions with
non-state actors on recruiting children for implementing plans of action
to release children,” said Radhika Coomaraswamy, special representative of
the UN secretary general for children in armed conflict.

Coomaraswamy said such plans of actions had brought about the release of
thousands of children in Sudan, Philippines, Nepal, Ivory Coast,
Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic.

However, those had come about after the world body was given permission to
negotiate directly with such non-state groups. Coomaraswamy said that
without consent from each government, United Nations officials could not
talk to some 50 armed groups worldwide that enrol children.

Some 250,000 children are exploited in conflicts around the world,
according to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In Burma, however, it is the
ruling government that is widely believed to be the leading recruiter of
child soldiers, despite the practice being illegal under domestic Burmese
law.

A Human Rights Watch report in 2002 claimed that there could be as many as
70,000 child soldiers within the Burmese army. Armed ethnic groups, such
as the Karen National Union (KNU), admit the use of the child soldiers but
claim it is done on a purely voluntary basis.

A UN report presented to the Security Council earlier this month drew up a
list for the first time of armed groups and other organistations that
enrol children.

However, authorities in Myanmar, Somalia, Chad, Democratic Republic of
Congo and Sudan also used children, according to the UN expert.

The report also listed groups accused of killing or sexually abusing
children, including Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Lord’s Resistance Army, which
operates in a triangle between Uganda, Sudan and Democratic Republic of
Congo, the Afghan national police and Nepal’s Maoists.  It expressed
concern about the plight of children in conflicts in 22 countries.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

June 29, The Nation (Thailand)
The weak points of Burma's ethnic resistance groups - Lt-General Yawd Serk

For more than 50 years, the ethnic resistance groups struggling against
the Burmese military government have failed to achieve success. To
identify the reasons for this failure we need to evaluate our weak points.

First, our love for the nation is mainly dependent on each individual
situation and position. We have failed to find a strong unity that would
enable us to reach our goal.

Second, on the political front, we laid out different policy objectives,
with some groups aiming at a federal Burma and others wanting total
independence. These different political ideologies mean we have fought
against one another – a fight that has been fuelled by people's lack of
political knowledge and a lack of education that means many are easily
manipulated.

On the other hand, the educated scholars are reluctant to face the
hardship of struggle, and only provide moral support from the shelter of
their homes. Very few educated people have made the sacrifice to come out
and work for their people.

In addition, many involved in the struggle do not know how to
differentiate between friend and foe. Faced with disagreement and
disapproval, they break up into small factions and bow to the enemy. They
become informants, giving the enemy knowledge of weak points of the
resistance groups. They forget who the real enemy is.

Disagreement and argument are a natural part of internal affairs. But
whatever the disagreement and however big the argument, we should not
break up. We should come face to face, reconcile, compromise and find a
way to beat the enemy. This means paying more attention and care to the
role of alliances.

In the past, we made alliances not with our hearts but with words. These
prioritised the interests of each individual and organisation over the
common interest. When the enemy attacked one group, its ally failed to
help, because it was not being directly attacked. But if the enemy
defeated the first group, its ally would be the next target. This
demonstrates that the role of an alliance should be to help one another
finish off the enemy.

Third, putting individual ego before the national interest means no
unified group can form – there are always splits in the gathering.
Fights broke out among the groups over control of territory, but they
failed to protect the people or rehabilitate country.

We could not beat the enemy because we were distracted by self-interest
and disputes that weakened our unity. It is not the external enemy but the
enemy within that has been responsible for the destruction of resistance
groups. The lesson is clear: we must work towards reconciliation and
building a strong unity via the right policies. Otherwise, there are too
many obstacles on our path to success.

Fourth, if we compare our struggle with that of Vietnamese leader Ho Chi
Minh's, our efforts are no match for his. We need competent political and
military leaders as well as educated people. Our people need the capacity
to develop.

Shan political parties are unreliable, as most of the politicians are
stuck in their houses due to the threats from the enemy. The pressure and
threats from the Burmese regime prevent them from laying out the same
policies as the armed groups do.

If we adopted the same political ideology of self-determination, and
united against the Burmese regime, it would not be difficult to lay out
political strategies. But the ethnic minority groups that wanted to become
part of a federated Burma have not been able to agree with those who were
fighting for total independence. As a result, finding unity has been
delayed. If the ethnic Wa, Palung, Pa-O and Lahu groups could accept that
ethnic nationalities have lived together peacefully in Shan State since
ancient times, then a new federated Shan State is not far away. We can
overcome the difficulties and guarantee the rights of the ethnic groups
through open discussion.

Fifth, when the armed groups began agreeing ceasefires with the Tatmadaw
(Burma's military), they lost political ground. The Burmese regime now has
the upper hand in negotiations with them.

The ceasefire groups mistakenly believed that they would be able to talk
politics with the regime. In the meantime, they thought they would be able
to recruit, boost funds and stockpile weapons. However, the regime has
played a clever game, preventing the ceasefire groups reaching both their
political and military goals.

The regime offered ceasefire talks for two reasons:

1. The internal political conflict intensified in Burma after Aung San Suu
Kyi became more actively involved in the politi cal movement. The regime
needed to solve its internal problems first.

2. In 1989, many ethnic armed groups mutinied from the Burma Communist
Party led by Thakin Pa Thein Tin. At this point, the regime was afraid
that the ethnic groups would form into a single opposition force, so
offered ceasefire agreements in return for concessions. The regime was
desperate to prevent the groups forming an alliance with Aung San Suu
Kyi's National League for Democracy.

(This familiar tactic of the Burmese regime is often characterised thus:
"When it is weak it will kneel down and beg for mercy, but when it is
strong it will ignore your requests and cut off your begging hands.")

Twenty years on since the policy of ceasefires began, the philosophy of
solving political conflicts through political means has not materialised.
Some ceasefire groups have abandoned their beliefs after receiving
economic privileges from the regime, while others have been left in a
dilemma over their political stance. With their political objectives
derailed, they are now reacting to the regime's oppression in an
ineffective day-to-day way. As a result, lasting peace is even further
from their grasp.

Moreover, if the ceasefire groups agree to participate in this year's
election or agree to transform into border guard forces, militia or
police, their original political objectives will have clearly failed. The
2008 constitution is not accepted by all ceasefire groups but by
contesting the election, they will automatically relinquish their
political objectives.

Lastly, so far, the ethnic armed groups have only adopted guerrilla
tactics in the struggle against the Tatmadaw. A large offensive with
military strategy that could match that of the Burmese army has not been
carried out. No central command has been formed, and battalions and
brigades fail to take commands from their headquarters. In contrast to
this weak and ineffective command structure, the battalions of the Burmese
army obey orders from above in all cases. We have to face the fact that
the Tatmadaw is stronger and better in controlling its troops. Even though
the regime's political and human-rights reputation has been shattered,
their decades-long grip on power remains strong.

Lt-General Yawd Serk is chairman of the Restoration Council of the Shan
State.

____________________________________

June 29, Irrawaddy
The ghost of elections past-III - Ko Ko Thet

The Burmese people have had tough luck with elections. No elections they
have had so far has been free, fair and inclusive. The elections, even in
the so-called ‘‘constitutional era (1948-1962),’’ were little short of
‘‘procedural democracy’’ for two reasons—the civil war had disenfranchised
much of the population and the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
(AFPFL) government had admittedly abused its power to win all the
elections.

As such, the demise of Burma’s ‘‘constitutional era’’ can be attributed
not just to extra-parliamentary factors such as civil war but also to the
League’s parliamentary politics which were exclusive in the beginning and
factionalist in the end. Following the 1951-52 elections, the AFPFL was
made aware of its democratic deficits but, having to defend itself in the
civil war of all against all, it missed the chance to improve the
electoral system and parliamentary democracy.

In 1958, Premier Nu admitted that he was wrong to have ‘‘put the cart
before the ox,’’ meaning that his government began large-scale development
and welfare programs before they achieved lasting peace, the most crucial
prerequisite for any country’s development.

The same year Nu’s relinquishing of state power to the ‘‘caretaker
government’’ led by the military chief General Ne Win is seen as a ‘‘dress
rehearsal’’ for the Burmese armed forces’ future interventions in the
country’s politics.

The AFPFL politicians who had emerged from the Thakin movement in the
1930s had worn each other out politically and personally by the end of
1950s. This led to the polarization and implosion of the League, the
polarization of society, and finally to the 1962 military coup by the
‘‘Revolutionary Council’’ led by Ne Win.

As it would turn out, Ne Win’s coup benefited neither side of the Cold
War. Neither would it help Burma since Ne Win’s regime did not fare better
than the AEPFL in containing the civil war and improving the country’s
economy. Locally it was met with mixed reactions. At the forefront of the
opposition to Ne Win’s junta were radical student organizations,
Communists and a few brave intellectuals, in addition to the politicians
and hereditary leaders whose power had been robbed.

On the other hand, many politicians who were marginalized during the AFPFL
years welcomed Ne Win’s move even if they were anxious about his planned
one-party socialist state.
Ne Win’s civilization of his junta, the formation and strengthening of a
nationwide Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), took 10 years. One of
the most significant steps in the process was the drafting and approving
of the 1973 constitution. Out of almost 29 million Burmese people in 1973,
there were almost 14.7 million eligible voters. More than 14 million,
including the overseas Burmese, voted in the 1973 constitutional
referendum.

The countrywide approval rate for the BSPP constitution was doctored to be
90.19 percent. Yet Ne Win’s regime made no pretense of its status in
ethnic areas when it revealed that the approval rate was just 66.4 percent
in Shan State and 66.8 percent in Kachin State. The referendum did not
happen in ‘‘black and brown areas (conflict zones)’’ where about 150
people were kidnapped and 11, killed by the ‘‘rebels.’’

The January 1974 election to the unicameral 451-member ‘‘People’s
Parliament’’ went relatively quietly because there was no opposition
party. All of the candidates in the 451 constituencies were the BSPP
nominees. In all but one constituency, ballots were cast successfully. In
some ethnic areas, the people did not know who they elected. The
Revolutionary Council officially ceased to exit in March 1974 when Ne Win
handed over the power to the newly elected 450-member People’s Parliament,
which formed a 28-member State Council, which in turn selected Ne Win to
its chair.

Apart from a handful of dissidents and some citizens who chose to ‘‘vote
with their feet’’ by leaving the country, the Burmese people by and large
had participated in Ne Win’s subsequent sham elections and contributed to
the mismanagement of the country until one day in August 1988, when people
decided enough was enough. The moment all the Burmese people revolted in
unison, the seemingly monolithic socialist regime cracked.

On September 11, 1988, the BSPP, under enormous pressures of a nationwide
people uprising, held an emergency meeting, formed an election commission
and promised a multi-party election in three months. By that time, the
people’s demand, an immediate regime change to be followed by a
‘‘democracy government,’’ had far outweighed what the BSPP could offer.

A week later, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC),
claiming that the army needed to ‘‘establish law and order to hold
elections so that political change can take place,’’ replaced the BSPP.
The restoration of law and order was particularly harsh and bloody.

The tragedy of the failed uprising is that it resulted in the death of at
least 2,000 protesters and the displacement of at least 10,000 individuals
who fled to the border areas while it ushered in a new era of military
rule that would later become the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC).


>From October 1988 to June 1989, the SLORC issued a series of election

commission, party registration and election laws. The laws disqualified
parties and candidates with connection to ‘‘foreign powers’’ and insurgent
groups. In February 1989, the SLORC’s election committee announced that
the election was scheduled in May 1990, giving political parties a
fourteen-month campaign period. The actual election date, May 27, 1990,
however, was decided much later by the SLORC in November 1989.
A total of 235 parties were registered for the 1990 election. Many of the
parties were said to be after political party prerogatives such as four
telephone lines per party and petrol allocation by the SLORC.

After a total of 102 parties backed off from the election on their own
volition, and 40 parties were disqualified for one reason or another, 93
parties remained to contest in the election. The BSPP was transformed into
the  National Unity Party (NUP) to contend the major opposition party, the
National League for Democracy (NLD) founded by Aung San Suu Kyi.

As early as in 1989, Suu Kyi knew that her party was being systematically
sabotaged by the SLORC. In reality, the SLORC took every measure to keep
the NLD from winning the election. In the run-up to the 1990 election, the
whole country remained under martial law by which a grouping of more than
five on the street was illegal and civilian courts were replaced by
military tribunals in most parts of Burma.

More than once, Suu Kyi’s life was threatened on her campaign trips for
criticizing the BSPP/SLORC and Ne Win. In 1989 alone, no less than 4,000
NLD members and supporters were arrested. By July 1989, the party leaders
Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were under house-arrest. Numerous other opposition
figures, from former Premier Nu to student leader Min Ko Naing, were also
incarcerated.

Other measures by the SLORC to tighten its grip on the electoral process
in 1989 included issuing citizenship identity cards to every Burmese aged
18 and above and checking the citizenships of political candidates. 
Citizenship identification meant that thousands of Burma-born immigrant
Chinese and Indian were disenfranchised.

The 1990 electoral politics were literally amyothar naingan yay or
politics of men — out of a total of 2,296 candidates for 485 seats, only
84 were women.  Out of about 20.8 million eligible voters, more than 15
million (72.59 percent) cast ballots on May 27, 1990. The people, who had
not seen a multi-party election in 30 years, simply believed they were
voting for a regime change.

Ballots were reportedly voided  in several constituencies country wide,
especially in rural areas, where improperly marked ballots were declared 
invalid by electoral authorities.  The SLORC announced that 12.3 percent
of all the votes were voided, one in every eight votes in some
constituencies.

The NLD ‘‘fought the election under the most arduous conditions’’ and
managed to win 59.87 percent of all the votes cast.  The
first-past-the-post-voting system meant that the party swept 392 out of
485 parliamentary or assembly seats, compared to 10 seats won by the NUP,
which got 21.16 percent of all the votes. Candidates from 19 ethnic
minority parties and six independents captured the remaining 83 seats.

As it transpired, the SLORC/SPDC never had any intention of transferring
power to the NLD.  Instead the SLORC/SPDC began systematic operations
against the NLD, using Fabian tactics to wear the party out in twenty
years time, until the party decided to boycott the 2010 election and
ceased to be a ‘‘legal party.’’

Since the SPDC hopes that its electoral process would channel public
discontent to procedural democracy, Suu Kyi’s decision to boycott the
SPDC’s 2010 election may be a vital move for her party’s identity and
continuity as an opposition movement.

On the other hand, there are a number of dissidents, including former NLD
members, who at great personal and political risk, wish to probe the
SPDC’s legislature politics. Their motives are little appreciated,
especially in light of the NLD’s boycott.

While liberal toleration of different political positions remains low
within the Burmese democracy movement, the regime has consolidated its
power and transformed its 24-million strong mass organization, the Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), into a mass political
party, the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), with the sole
purpose of protecting the military oligarchy and winning future elections.

As if this were not enough, the SPDC has since 2003 encouraged the
countrywide formation of Swan Arr Shin vigilante units that could
intimidate the opposition.

Burmese electoralism, and Burmese political culture for that matter, has
always been characterized by the elimination of one opposition by another,
a zero-sum game historically. It is widely expected that the USDP will be
aiming for near-hundred percent seizure of the available 438 parliamentary
seats in the 664-member bicameral legislature.

Yet the USDP’s total success cannot be ascertained. As German political
historian Hans-Bernd Zöllner pointed out, charismatic leadership is an
essential element in the electoral success of any Burmese political party
in history. It was the charisma of Aung San, Nu, and Suu Kyi that was
behind the sweeping success of their parties in 1947, 1960 and 1990
elections respectively.

The USDP, which lacks both legitimacy as a state-backed party and
charismatic leadership, may face more challenges than they have taken into
account in the future, when faced with an opposition from both within and
outside the electoral process.

____________________________________

June 29, Asia Times
Deception and denials in Myanmar - Bertil Lintner

Bangkok - Myanmar's military government issued pro-forma denials after
al-Jazeera aired an investigative report by the Oslo-based Democratic
Voice of Burma (DVB) alleging that Myanmar is attempting to develop
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. But as the international community
weighs the evidence, the regime could soon face United Nations-imposed
sanctions for its military dealings with North Korea.

On June 11, a week after the television network showed the program,
Myanmar's Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that
"anti-government groups" in collusion with the international media had
made the allegation with the goal of "hindering Myanmar's democratic
process and tarnishing the political image of the government". Myanmar "is
a developing nation" which "lacks adequate infrastructure, technology and
finance to develop nuclear weapons", the statement continued.

The North Koreans issued a similar denial, blaming the United States for
the report. Ten days after the Myanmar denial, the official Korean Central
News Agency reported: "The United States is now making much fuss, floating
the sheer fiction that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [North
Korea] is helping Myanmar in its 'nuclear development', not content with
labeling the DPRK 'provocative' and 'bellicose'."

In its next sentence, the report denounced US State Department spokesman
Philip J Crowley for what Pyongyang seemed to consider an equally serious
crime. Crowley, the KCNA stated, had been "making false reports that the
DPRK conducted unlicensed TV relay broadcasts about the World Cup
matches".

While the North Korean statement could be dismissed as comical, the
Myanmar Foreign Ministry's denial is more revealing. It did not mention
Myanmar's program to develop ballistic missiles or the extensive network
of bunkers, culverts and underground storage facilities for the military
that has been constructed near the new capital Naypyidaw and elsewhere
where the North Koreans have reportedly been active.

More intriguingly, the Foreign Ministry found it necessary to deny reports
that a North Korean ship that docked in Myanmar on April 12 this year was
carrying military-related material. The ship, the ministry said, "was on a
routine trip to unload cement and to take on 10,000 tons of Myanmar rice".

However, if carrying only innocuous civilian goods, as the statement
maintains, there would seemingly have been no reason for authorities to
cut electricity around the area when the Chong Gen, a North Korean ship
flying the Mongolian flag of convenience, docked on the outskirts of
Yangon.

According to intelligence sources, security was tight as military
personnel offloaded heavy material, including Korean-made air defense
radars. The ship left the port with a return cargo of rice and sugar,
which could mean that it was, at least in part, a barter deal. On January
31 this year, another North Korean ship, the Yang M V Han A, reportedly
delivered missile components also at Yangon's Thilawa port.

Rogue ties
In November 2008, General Shwe Mann, the third-highest ranking member of
the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council, paid a visit to
North Korea. It was supposed to be a secret trip, but the visit was leaked
to Myanmar exiles and reports of his rounds appeared on several Internet
news sites. During the visit, Shwe Mann was taken to a missile factory and
an air defense radar facility and a memorandum of understanding was signed
to outline the nature of cooperation between the two countries, which only
recently reestablished diplomatic relations.

However, the full extent of the North Korean presence in Myanmar is still
a matter of conjecture. The first report of a delegation from Myanmar
making a secret visit to Pyongyang dates to November 2000, where the two
sides held talks with high-ranking officials of North Korea's Ministry of
the People's Armed Forces. In June 2001, a high-level North Korean
delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Park Kil-yon paid a return visit
to Yangon, where it met Myanmar's Deputy Defense Minister Khin Maung Win
and reportedly discussed defense-industry cooperation.

In 2003, the first group of North Korean technicians were spotted at naval
facilities near the then-capital Yangon. North Korean planes were also
seen landing at military airfields in central Myanmar. Three years later,
North Korean tunneling experts arrived at Naypyidaw, and Myanmar military
sources began to leak photographs of the North Koreans as well as the
underground installations they were involved in digging under and near the
new capital.

On June 24, the DVB reported that a new radar and missile base had been
completed near Mohnyin in Myanmar's northern Kachin State. It is not clear
in which direction the installations are pointed, as Mohnyin is located on
the railway line that cuts through Kachin State and is approximately
equidistant between the Indian and Chinese borders.

Work on similar radar and missile bases has been reported from Kengtung in
eastern Shan State, 160 kilometers north of the Thai border town of Mae
Sai. Since Myanmar is not known to have imported radars and missile
components from any country other than North Korea, the installations
would appear to be one of the first visible outcomes of a decade of
military cooperation.

Until recently reports of such cooperation were met with skepticism among
analysts because Myanmar had severed diplomatic relations with North Korea
in 1983 after three secret agents planted a bomb at Yangon's Martyrs'
Mausoleum and killed 18 visiting South Korean officials, including
then-deputy prime minister So Suk-chun and three other government
ministers. But the two pariah states seem to have built a bond around
their common antagonism with the United States.

Expert confirmation
The DVB investigative report shed new light on the nature of this
secretive cooperation and of Myanmar's nuclear ambitions. Photographs and
documents smuggled out of the country by a defector from the Myanmar army,
Major Sai Thein Win, were scrutinized by international arms experts and
found to be credible.
Among the experts was Robert Kelley, a former Los Alamos weapons scientist
who was a director with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from
1992 to 1993 and again from 2001 to 2005. Now based in Vienna, he
conducted weapons inspections in Libya, Iraq, and South Africa, as well as
compliance inspections in Egypt, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria,
Tanzania, Pakistan, India, and Congo, among others.

Kelley concluded after a careful study of material produced by Sai Thein
Win and other Myanmar military defectors: "Our assessment of multiple
sources is that Burma [Myanmar] is really developing nuclear technology,
that it has built specialized equipment and facilities, and it has issued
orders to cadre to build a program."

It remains to be proven that the North Koreans are involved in Myanmar's
fledgling nuclear program. Even if they are, it is not clear how advanced
Myanmar's program may be. Many skeptics assume the project is an illusion
of grandeur bordering on megalomania among Myanmar's ruling generals.

North Korean involvement in Myanmar's missile program is more certain, but
even so it is unclear that the country's largely unskilled technicians
would be able to produce a missile that works. One intelligence source
described it as more of a "phallic fantasy", a large projectile that
Myanmar's generals would like to show off at the annual March 27 Armed
Forces Day parade. "Just imagine how proud they would be to see a truck
towing a big and impressive missile past the grandstand," the source said.

Western intelligence sources are aware of the current presence of 30 to 40
North Korean missile technicians at a facility near Minhla on the
Irrawaddy River in Magwe Division. At least some of the technicians
reportedly arrived overland by bus from China, to make it appear as if
they were Chinese tourists.

According to a Myanmar source with knowledge of the area: "There are
several defense industries, DI, around Minhla. More importantly, these are
not very far from the Sidotara Dam and suspected DI-20, Pwintbyu and
Myaing. In other words, there are many military activities in that area."

In power-starved Myanmar, it is logical that defense production facilities
have been situated near a power-generating dam. Myaing is where Sai Thein
Win worked as deputy commander of a top-secret military factory before he
defected earlier this year. While Myanmar authorities have denied his
testimonies publicly, intelligence agents swooped on his home town of
Kyaukme in Shan State soon after the DVB report was aired internationally.
His family has been interrogated, but so far no one has been arrested.

On the contrary, the Shan Herald Agency for News, an exile-run news group
in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, reports that Sai Thein Win has become
somewhat of a local hero since he went public with his revelations. "Among
the security officials who visited Kyaukme, one was also reported to have
said that he admired Sai's courage and his 'well done expose'," the news
group reported.

If accurately reported, that sentiment would reflect one reason why Sai
Thein Win decided to defect: Myanmar's experiments with nuclear technology
and missiles amount to little more than a waste of money in a country that
desperately needs more funds dedicated to public health and education.

Meanwhile, the regime's budding cooperation with North Korea threatens to
cost the country more internationally. US Senator Jim Webb, a staunch
advocate of engagement with Myanmar's ruling generals, was forced to
cancel his scheduled visit to the country when he learned al-Jazeera would
air the DVB report while he was there.

As it becomes increasingly apparent that both countries have violated
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which bans North Korea
from exporting all types of weapons, Myanmar could soon be penalized with
more international sanctions. The prospect of that happening - and already
deep dissatisfaction over the close relationship with a pariah regime like
Pyongyang, which is even more isolated than the one in Naypyidaw - is
reportedly stoking resentment among the Myanmar officer corps.

Other officers like Sai Thein Win may therefore be waiting in the wings
for an opportunity to defect and shed more light on Myanmar's deep and
dark nuclear secrets.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic
Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North
Korea Under the Kim Clan. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media
Services.


____________________________________

June 29, OpEdNews
ASEAN must have a specific evaluation on unfair polls in Burma - Zin Linn

The Burmese politicians, who were eager to run in the incoming elections
hoping a political space, were in for a big shock when they saw the
'Election Commission's Directive No.2/2010 dated 21 June, 2010' in the
state's daily papers. The analysts view the junta's poll process as
"Entanglements' for there will be more and more complicated regulations
before the unknown election date.

Political parties in Burma that want to assemble and give speeches at a
designated place must apply to the Election Commission (EC) for permission
at least seven days prior to the event, according to state-run media. The
new 'EC Directive No.2/2010 dated 21 June, 2010' was published on 23 June,
requiring political parties to provide the specific place, date, starting
and finishing time, and the name and address of speakers. The EC will
issue a permit or reject the request at least 48 hours before the
requested date.

Political parties seeking new members ahead of Myanmar's historic
elections were warned in the directive they are not allowed chanting
slogans in procession or giving talks and distributing publications
tarnishing the image of the ruling junta. The directive also says not to
disturb any public places such as government offices, organizations,
factories, workplaces, workshops, markets, sport grounds, religious
places, schools and people's hospitals.

The restrictions are part of the 14-article directive published by the EC
that governs how parties recruit new members. All parties contesting
elections planned for later this year are required to have at least 1,000
members within 90 days of being granted registration.

The EC head, Thein Soe, pronounced last month that international monitors
would not be allowed to observe the elections. After the 2008
constitutional referendum, the junta announced the bill was allegedly
supported by more than 90 per cent of the population, despite complaints
of widespread vote rigging and bullying of voters. Candidates from some
registered parties have also complained that special privileges are being
offered to the Union Solidarity and Development Party headed by Burma's
Prime Minister Thein Sein, while other civilian parties are being hindered
in their campaign processes.

The junta has not declared an election date. So far, out of 42 new
political parties 33 have been approved by the Election Commission and
five existing parties have re-registered to contest in the coming
elections. International criticism has not succeeded to free detained
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party overwhelmingly won the
last election in 1990, but was never permitted to run the office.

Under current election laws made by the military regime, Aung San Suu Kyi
and 2,200 political prisoners are totally disqualified from taking part in
the elections.

Her National League for Democracy party has criticized the laws unfair and
undemocratic and will stay away from the vote. The NLD was disbanded after
refusing to register for the elections by a deadline on 6 May, 2010.

Burma has fallen under military boots since 1962. The regime has earned
the distrustful reputation of being one of the world's worst human rights
violators.

It brutally suppressed pro-democracy movements in 1988, May 30, 2003,
Depayin conspiracy and Saffron Revolution in Sept 2007. There were many
more sporadic crackdowns. The junta has arrested around 2,200 political
dissidents including Burma's Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been
confined to her residence for 15 of the last 21 years.

The regime held a unilateral referendum at gun point on May 10 and 24. The
2008 Constitution, the junta said, was approved by more than 90 per cent
of eligible voters during a referendum in May 2008; just a few days after
Cyclone Nargis devastated the country. The outcome of the referendum was
widely dismissed as a sham, but the regime has ignored calls from the
international community and main opposition party, the National League for
Democracy, to review the Constitution which will cause trouble upon the
Burmese people.

The new elections planned in 2010 will legalize military rule. It is
convinced that the procedure will not be free and fair. Just like the
referendum held at gun-point.

The socio-economic atmosphere is worsening. The junta will not be able to
manage the socio-economic situation, which is failing fast. It will soon
come face-to-face with a "desolate" future if it continues to refuse the
national reconciliation process being urged by the opposition the National
League for Democracy (NLD), the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) and
the exile dissident groups.

NLD and UNA point out that the ratification of the constitution staged by
the Junta is unacceptable. Both declare that the ratification was carried
out against the will of the people and without observing internationally
known norms for referendums. The junta also does not show respect the
successive resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) calling
for return of democratic system in Burma through a tripartite dialogue
between the Junta led by Senior General Than Shwe, democratic forces led
by Aung San Suu Kyi and representatives of ethnic nationalities. From turn
of events it is clear that the junta has no plan to heed the UN call and
to release political prisoners, which is a pre-condition to facilitate the
tripartite dialogue.

Looking at the fact on the ground, there is more belligerences in these
days, more military attacks in the ethnic minority areas, more arrests,
more political prisoners, and more restrictions toward media, more control
on Internet users and civil societies. So, situation needs to be very
cautious and to put more pressure on the regime until the said benchmarks
are carried out.

Today's question for regional groupings such as ASEAN and EU - and
International Community is to think over whether Burma is planning to
become a tyrannical or a democratic state? According to a Burmese saying,
a tiger is a tiger and it never lives on grass. Then, if someone says a
dictator would build a democratic country, it may be an object of ridicule
for the Burmese populace.

There are still arguments for ASEAN to abandon its long standing policy of
non-interference in another country's internal affairs if the affairs of a
country spilled over and affected regional security. ASEAN's policy-makers
have to debate on the Burma Question in the forthcoming ASEAN meetings.
ASEAN should have a specific evaluation of its policy towards Burma under
the military dictatorship for the sake of the association's reliability in
favor of the whole region.

The UN should also urge Asean leaders to make concerted efforts on
democratization in Burma. Burma is likely to come under the international
limelight for its continued detention of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi
and 2,200 political prisoners ahead of its so-called elections for
disciplined democracy.

Timely on 22 June, the United States criticized that elections planned in
military-run Myanmar this year will 'lack international legitimacy'. 'US
believes elections planned for this year in Burma will not be free or fair
and will lack international legitimacy,' the State Department said on the
micro-blogging site Twitter, using Myanmar's former name of Burma.

Majority of Burmese people may definitely agree with the United States'
attitude on the junta's upcoming elections. However they may be
disappointed with ASEAN's passive voice and pro-junta vision towards the
sham opinion polls run by the unprincipled member of the grouping.

http://www.opednews.com/articles/ASEAN-must-have-a-specific-by-Zin-Linn-100623-850.html

____________________________________
PRESS RELEASE

June 29, Burma Campaign UK
UN Must Act On G8 Call For Burma Dictatorship To Enter Into Dialogue

Burma Campaign UK today welcomed a statement by the G8, whose leaders have
just held their annual summit, which calls on Burma’s dictatorship to
enter into 'substantive dialogue’ with Burma’s democracy movement,
including ethnic groups.  By calling for ‘substantive dialogue’ the G8 is
recognising that elections due later this year will not solve the problems
in Burma.

The call by the G8 for dialogue echoes similar statements already made by
the United Nations Security Council, United Nations General Assembly,
United Nations Human Rights Council, EU, ASEAN and USA. It will increase
pressure on the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who is failing to act on
a mandate to persuade the dictatorship to enter into such dialogue.

The fact that the statement specifically calls on the ‘Government’ to
enter into dialogue, rather than calling on ‘all sides’, as statements by
the UN and some governments often do, is also welcome, as it is solely the
dictatorship which refuses to enter into dialogue, not the National League
for Democracy and ethnic groups. This wording puts the blame where it
belongs.
Earlier this month The Elders, which includes former UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan, called on the international community to support a UN-led
effort to start dialogue in Burma, which should lead to national
reconciliation.

The G8 statement also calls for the release of all political prisoners in
Burma, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The fact that the statement explicitly
refers to political prisoners is welcome, following a joint statement in
May by the EU and ASEAN which controversially used the wording ‘those
under detention’ rather than political prisoners, wording which
effectively includes murderers and rapists.

“The G8 have added their weight behind calls for substantive dialogue,
acknowledging fake elections later this year will not solve Burma’s
problems”, said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “Everyone
knows dialogue is the way forward, and it is Ban Ki-moon’s job to try to
secure that dialogue. It is time he got on with the job. It is no use
waiting for the fake elections, as the dictatorship will always use
delaying tactics, and dangle the prospect of democratic change in front of
the international community, in order to avoid pressure for real change.”

For more information contact Mark Farmaner on 07941239640.

The full G8 wording on Burma:

We urge the Government of Myanmar to take the steps necessary to allow for
free and fair elections. Full and inclusive democratic participation is
essential to this. We urge the Government to release without delay all
political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and engage the democratic
opposition and representatives of ethnic groups in a substantive dialogue
on the way forward to national reconciliation.

The full G8 statement is available at:
http://g8.gc.ca/g8-summit/summit-documents/g8-muskoka-declaration-recovery-and-new-beginnings/

About the G8:

The Group of Eight (G-8) is a forum for the leaders of eight of the
world’s most industrialized nations, aimed at finding common ground on key
topics and solutions to global issues. The G-8 includes Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
While the leaders of these countries are in regular contact, they meet in
summit format as the G-8 once a year.