BurmaNet News, July 14, 2010

[Editor]

July 14, 2010, Issue #4000


INSIDE BURMA
Irrawaddy: Political parties struggle on
Mizzima: Author Nan Nyunt Swe dies at 87

ON THE BORDER
BBC: Burma rebels to walk free after 12 years in Indian jail

BUSINESS/TRADE
DVB: North Korean FM to visit Burma
AP: Foreign investment in Myanmar tumbles

HEALTH
Mizzima: Truth and official lies about dengue in Burma’s hot spots

REGIONAL
Thai News Agency MCOT: Nationality identification center set up for
Myanmar labourers

OPINION / OTHER
Irrawaddy: Burma’s road to 3G Democracy – Min Zin

INTERVIEW
Irrawaddy: 'National reconciliation is essential'

PRESS RELEASE
USCB: U.S. House of Representatives unanimously extends sanctions on
Burma’s military junta



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

July 14, Irrawaddy
Political parties struggle on – Ba Kaung

Just before Thu Wai, the chairman of Democratic Party (Myanmar), arrived
on an organizing trip at Dala Township in Rangoon recently, he found
police in civilian clothes waiting for him.

“What is your business here?” Thu Wai asked the police.

“We are here to help you if necessary,” a policeman said. In fact, they
were there to intimidate people interested in his party.

“When policemen in civilian clothes showed up, the people were frightened
and afraid to approach us,” Thu Wai said. “We heard that some of the
locals were also questioned by authorities after we left.”

Thu Wai's party is one of the pro-democracy political parties contesting
the country's first elections in twenty years. Some parties are now making
tours across the country trying to increase their membership and explain
their policies.

Party leaders like Thu Wai say that party activities are more difficult to
carry out following the latest election rules prohibiting parties from
displaying flags or marching and chanting slogans in procession before or
after a meeting.

The Peace and Diversity Party in Rangoon and the potentially largest
ethnic party, the Shan Nationals Democratic Party (SNDP), also have
reported the presence of security personnel in their meetings with local
people.

Nay Myo Wai, the leader of Peace and Diversity Party, told The Irrawaddy
on Wednesday: “I organized a political talk in North Okkalapa Township in
Rangoon last month. The police arrived saying they just wished to observe
the situation. But seeing them, people did not show up.”

The SNDP, which plans to contest 40 out of 50 constituencies in Shan State
and in several constituencies in Burma's northern Kachin State, made an
organizing trip to a number of townships in Shan State last month and
faced similar situations.

“As soon as a walkietalkie beeps, the people know that intelligence
personnel are among them. So they leave,” said Sai Tun Aye, an SNDP
member.

All parties seeking seats in the national parliament are required to have
at least 1,000 members within 90 days of being registered to contest in
the polls.

Party officials of the Democratic Party( Myanmar) and the Peace and
Diversity party said that they have now enough members and will submit
their list to the election commission this week.

Nay Myo Wai said he will submit a list with about 1,200 members, perhaps
by Thursday.

Election rules require a 500,000 kyat (US $500) fee for each candidate who
contests in a constituency.

“Money is the most difficult issue for us now,” Thu Wai said. “My party
wants to contest at least 300 seats out of 320 in the National Parliament.
But we have no money. I now have only 100 candidates who can pay the fee
themselves. Others who wish to be candidates for our party are searching
for money on their own.”

“We will contest mainly in lower Burma and only in major cities in ethnic
areas,” he said.

With a strong campaign by the Union Solidarity and Development Party
(USDP) led by regime Prime Minister Thein Sein, some pro-democracy parties
are considering an informal electoral alliance in order to better their
chances at wining seats.

News reports this week said that the Rangoon-based National Democratic
Force, the Democratic Party (Myanmar) and the Union Democratic Party (UDP)
would form an alliance.

But, NDF, a splinter party led by former senior members of the disbanded
National League for Democracy (NLD) and the Democratic Party (Myanmar),
said there was no specific plan for an alliance.

Khin Maung Swe, the political leader of the NDF which received government
approval to participate in the election last Saturday, said, “At the
moment, we still have no concrete plan to form an alliance with any party.
We have to wait and see until after the candidate registration at the
election commission.”

Another NDF official said the party would focus on seats for
constituencies in major cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay and also in
the capitals of Kachin State, Shan State and Mon State.

Rejecting the idea of an electoral alliance, Nay Myo Wai said: “If the
pro-democracy parties share a democratic spirit, then it should be
automatically understood that they won't contest in the same areas and
townships.”

“People won't admit that they don't have no enough candidates to field due
to financial difficulties and a shortage of man power. So are spreading
word that they won't contest in ethnic areas so as not to compete with
ethnic parties. It is just to woo the ethnic people.”

Thirty-eight new political parties and five existing parties plan to
contest the elections sometime later this year.

The Obama administration on Monday said the Burmese general election
process is “flawed” and that the military government has not taken any
step towards establishing democracy in the country.

The election date has not been set and the regime has maintained tight
restrictions on political dissent  in the country and has not provided any
working space for political parties to communicate with the public.

“The nearer the election, the more difficulties we have,” Thu Wai said.

____________________________________

July 14, Mizzima News
Author Nan Nyunt Swe dies at 87 – Khai Suu

New Delhi – Writer Nan Nyunt Swe, aka U Aung Thein, died early yesterday
evening at his home in Yankin Township, Rangoon, a relative said.

He is the father of comedian and political prisoner Zarganar (tweezers),
aka Thura, 49, who is serving a 35-year prison term in Myitkyina prison in
Kachin State.

“He died naturally at five o’clock this evening after suffering from a
mild fever last night. This evening he didn’t wake up again from a nap
after having some food”, Ma Nyein, sister-in-law of Zargana, told Mizzima
yesterday.

“I feel very sorry for him as he died while his son was away from home. He
wrote many articles on Burmese culture”, the journalist Maung Wun Tha
said.

Sayagyi (master) Nan Nyunt Swe was born in 1923 to father U Htet and
mother Daw Shwe Saing in Yathat village, Sinmyiswe Township, in the Pyi
district of Pegu Division.

He served in the Information Department (Central Motion Picture) from 1948
to 1953 and joined the Ministry of Culture in 1953. He attended political
training at Mingaladon Central Political Institute in 1967 and cadre
training at Hmawbi Agricultural Training Institute in 1967.

He published the Metta Taythan poems in 1968, the Sasoman poems in 1978,
compiled biographies and wrote articles on music in classics and pop. He
also wrote under the pseudonym, Thu Kha Mein. He was married to Thakinma
(mistress) Daw Hla Kyi aka writer Yuwaddy Kyi Oo in 1955 and had three
sons: Wunna (deceased), Tay Za and comedian Thura.

Ma Nyein said that family members were trying to inform Zarganar, who was
arrested in June 2008 after speaking to foreign media about Cyclone Nargis
and providing assistance to victims and was charged under electronics,
state security and video laws. He was given a 35-year jail term. His
mother Daw Hla Kyi died of liver disease at the age of 83 in March last
year.

Sayagyi Nan Nyunt Swe will be cremated at Yeway cemetery at 11 a.m today.
He is survived also by two grandchildren.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

July 14, BBC News
Burma rebels to walk free after 12 years in Indian jail – Subir Bhaumik

Calcutta – A group of 34 Burmese rebels held in an Indian jail for 12
years have entered a plea bargain in a Calcutta court to pave the way for
their release.

They admitted immigration offences after prosecutors dropped more serious
gun-running charges.

They claim they were lured in February 1998 to India's Andaman islands by
an Indian military intelligence officer who offered them sanctuary.

But on arrival, six of their leaders were shot and the rest detained.

The officer left the Indian army immediately after the incident and is
said to have settled down in Burma, giving rise to suspicions he may have
been a double agent for Burmese intelligence.

Accepting the plea bargain on Tuesday, a judge sentenced the rebels to
three-and-a-half years in jail and imposed a $128 (£84) fine.

The rebels, from Burma's Arakan area, have served their sentence and can
be freed once they pay the fine.

"We don't have any money, so we look forward to the Burmese community in
India to pay for our release. After all they have borne our legal
expenses," said Thein Oung Gyaw, one of the rebels.

Ten of them are from the Karen National Union and the other 24 are from
the National Unity Party of Arakan, both fighting for separate homelands
in Burma for the Karen and the Arakanese people.

India's Central Bureau of Investigation took seven years to draw up formal
charges.

The rebels were shifted to a prison in Calcutta from the Andamans after a
leading human rights lawyer, Nandita Haksar, intervened.

____________________________________
BUSINESS/TRADE

July 14, Democratic Voice of Burma
North Korean FM to visit Burma – Francis Wade

North Korea’s foreign minister is due to visit Burma in the next 10 days
prior to his possible return to a regional security forum in Hanoi on 23
July after a two-year hiatus.

Few details are known about Pak Ui Chun’s scheduled trip to Burma, which
comes as party of a three-country swing through Southeast Asia, Kyodo news
reported. It follows an investigation by DVB that last month revealed
extensive military trade between North Korea and Burma over the past
decade, as well as Naypyidaw’s attempts to develop a nuclear weapon.

While Burma has denied the nuclear allegations, it has made little mention
of apparently warming relations with Pyongyang. Several sightings of North
Korean technicians have been made in Burma since a high-level delegation
led by North Korea’s vice foreign minister Park Kil-yon visited the
country in June 2001, and DVB has unearthed evidence of major weapons
sales to Burma.

A number of suspicious North Korean cargo ships have also docked at ports
close to Rangoon; the last reported incident was in April this year,
following which North Korean missiles and radar systems were seen being
transported from Rangoon to military bases in the north. The Burmese
government said however that it was a routine offloading of rice from its
ally.

The US and EU has spent the past four years attempting to isolate
Pyongyang in retaliation to its first nuclear test in 2006. UN sanctions
were intensified in May 2009 after it tested another nuclear bomb, and
analysts have warned of a potentially destabilising alliance between North
Korea and Burma, two of the world’s so-called ‘rogue states’.

North Korea hasn’t sent a senior-level delegate to the ASEAN Regional
Forum for two years, and the 2009 event in Thailand, which came on the
heels of its nuclear test, was instead attended by a lower-ranking foreign
ministry official. The forum – billed as the principal event for security
dialogue in Asia – invites delegations from the 10-member Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as 17 other countries, including
China and North Korea. US secretary of state Hillary Clinton will also
attend.

It is not clear whether Pak Ui Chun has officially accepted the invitation
from Vietnam: North Korea is likely nervous of any scrutiny over its ties
to Burma, particularly in light of a UN embargo that bans all weapons
exports, as well as heated discussion of its alleged torpedoing of a South
Korean warship in March, which it has repeatedly denied.

South Korea has been busy trying to convince the forum to censure North
Korea for the sinking, while the UN last Friday issued a presidential
statement condemning the incident, which killed 46 sailors.

____________________________________

July 14, Associated Press
Foreign investment in Myanmar tumbles

Foreign investment in Myanmar, one of the world's poorest and most
authoritarian countries, dropped more than two thirds last fiscal year
amid the global recession and as economic sanctions on the military-ruled
nation continued, according to government figures.

A statistical report from the country's Ministry of National Planning and
Development that was seen Wednesday said foreign investment in the 12
months through March 2010 fell 68 percent to $315 million from $985
million the previous year.

Up-to-date information on Myanmar's economy is difficult to come by and
the few official figures that become available are often regarded as
unreliable. Though a substantial gas exporter, the revenues barely
register in the government's accounts, suggesting the cash is diverted
into projects favored by its ruling generals, according to Burma Economic
Watch, a group based at Australia's Macquarie University that studies
Myanmar's economy.

Myanmar, also known as Burma, saw seven new foreign investments during 12
months, four of which were in its oil and gas sector. These resource
extraction investments _ three from Malaysia and one from the United Arab
Emirates _ were worth $278.6 million and accounted for more than 88
percent of the total investment during the fiscal year.

Thailand spent $15.25 million in the hotel and tourism sector, China put
$15 million into the mining sector and Hong Kong added $6 million to the
manufacturing sector during 2009-2010, the government report said.

The United States and the European Union have imposed economic sanctions
against Myanmar to pressure the military government to improve human
rights and release detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Sanctions, including banning U.S. companies from investing in Myanmar and
banning Myanmar exports to the United States, were first imposed in 1997.

Since Myanmar liberalized its investment code in 1988, it has attracted
large investments in hydroelectric power, oil and gas and mining _ mainly
from neighboring countries such as Thailand.

Meanwhile, Myanmar's exports rose 12 percent to $7.6 billion in year
through March from $6.78 billion the previous year, according to the
report. Imports dropped 8 percent to $4.18 billion from $4.54 billion.

The government report said that natural gas exports, which accounted for
about 38 percent of all export revenue, increased 9 percent to $2.56
billion from $2.35 billion. Myanmar gas exports go to neighboring
Thailand.

Myanmar is believed to have a large amount of unmeasured trade, mostly
goods smuggled across its land borders, especially with eastern neighbor
Thailand and northeastern neighbor China

____________________________________
HEALTH

July 14, Mizzima News
Truth and official lies about dengue in Burma’s hot spots

Chiang Mai – The spread of dengue fever is posing a serious health risk to
people in Burma, especially as it spreads through the epidemic hot spots
of Irrawaddy and Pegu divisions and Karen and Mon states.

Since yesterday, Mizzima’s Kyaw Kha has been speaking with residents and
health authorities in these worst-hit regions to see how they are coping
with the often fatal mosquito-borne disease.

Irrawaddy Division

The total number of dengue cases reported in the division from January to
the middle of this year was 1,221 and the death toll was 18, according to
combined figures from the divisional health department, the state-run run
Pathein People’s Hospital, and Mawlamyeinkyun Township Hospital and
People’s Clinic.

The fever had a particular impact on Pathein Township and nearby villages.
The number of victims treated at Pathein People’s Hospital until July 3
was 561, nine of whom were children between the ages of six and 14 who
died, according to the divisional health department. Dengue has spread
through 27 townships, affecting victims from villages in Pathein,
Mawlamyinekyun, Laputta, Kangyihtount, Thapaung, Kyaungkone, Einmae and
Phyarpon, a senior departmental official said.

In the dengue affected area of Mawlamyeinkyun, local authorities were
preparing to use anti-mosquito spray and educate residents about the
fever, but in unaffected areas, such preventative measures had been
neglected until now, a township health department spokesman said.

A doctor from a People’s Clinic said, “The most obvious symptoms are high
body temperature, joint pain and swelling of the blood vessels. Some
patients were able to recover simply by taking medicines regularly for
about three days but some required injections [for the pain]. We give
injections to patients free of charge.”

In the dengue season, health departments should spray anti-mosquito
chemicals in the potential areas of dengue transmission and the public
should be educated about the fever, the doctor said. He advised the public
to eliminate standing water, the main place mosquitoes breed, and to take
care of environmental hygiene.

Mon State

The total number of cases reported in the state’s 10 townships from
January to July 3 was 1,236 and the death toll was 11, according to the
state health department.

The most seriously affected areas were villages in Moulmein Township, in
which 222 people suffered but none died of the fever. In Thanphyuzayat
Township, 211 people contracted dengue and one died. In Mudon and Paung
townships, respectively 179 and 145 people contracted the disease.

One of 124 patients who contracted the fever in Chaungsone died, four of
99 in Thaton, three of 93 in Beling Township, one of 66 in Yay Township
and one of the five in Kyaikhto Township died after contracting dengue. In
Kyaikmayaw, 91 people contracted the disease. Most of the fatalities were
children between the ages of four and 12, according to the state health
department.

A doctor at the infectious diseases department of Thaton Hospital told
Mizzima: “In our region, patients have been presenting at the hospital for
treatment since April and most 
 are from rural areas. The children who
died 
 were also from the villages.”

“They [parents and sufferers] thought that it was just a normal fever and
presented after suffering for three days, with severe joint pain. I think
more people were infected this month and more still will contract the
fever next month,” the doctor said.

A Thaton health authority staff member said it was implementing protection
measures such as spraying repellant in mosquito-breeding areas, pruning
bushes and educating people about dengue, but residents said the
protection measures had been either ineffective or non-existent.

“They never came to us even to speak or educate people so we can’t hope
that they will carry out labour-intensive work such as pruning bushes,” a
Nankhae villager said.

“They did come few days ago to spray mosquito repellant for a little while
but it was all just for show and they never came again. I think that they
came to take photos to publish in newspapers to show they were taking
action,” the villager said.

Thaton General Hospital staff said there were dengue victims at Chaungsone
Hospital in the state, but Mizzima was unable to contact the hospital.

Pegu Division

The total number of cases reported in the division’s 11 townships from
March to July was 188 and two died in that period, according to the
divisional health department.

The most severely affected area was Pegu Township, in which 67 people
suffered the fever, but there were no fatalities. One of 45 patients in
Nyaunglaypin and one of the 27 victims in Dike Oo died of the fever. Ten
people from Thanappin, 10 in Waw, seven in Shwekyin, seven in Taungoo,
four in Kyaukdaga, four in Htandapin, four in Kawa and three in Kyaukkyi
contracted the fever.

The contagious disease has been present in the division since March and
case numbers rose sharply in June. Division- and township-level health
teams said they were implementing protection measures such as repellant
spraying and educating the people about the fever, but again local
residents rejected the claims.

A high-school teacher from Minnyi Quarter in Taungoo told Mizzima: “I have
lived in this quarter for 10 years. Whatever the season, dengue or
malaria, they have never come to educate the public or spread
mosquito-repellent spray.”

Because Pegu health teams had failed to educate the public about this
infectious disease, transmission was out of control, a doctor at Pegu
General Hospital said.

During the monsoon’s heavy rains, mosquitoes breed in stagnant water that
collects, so people should take care of environmental hygiene at ponds and
water tanks around the home, the doctor said.

“Health departments of these regions know dengue fever is very common 

during the rainy season. So, if they are dutiful to control the
transmission of the disease, the transmission rate will be low. Otherwise,
the rate will double”, he told Mizzima.

Karen State

As many as 516 people from six townships in the state contracted dengue
fever in the first half of this year, and of those two from Hlaingbwe
Township died. State health officials said cases have increased since last
year.

The worst-hit township was Pa-an, with 208 patient admissions. There were
137 such cases in Kawkereik, 85 in Myawaddy, 12 in Kyainseikyi and two in
Papon.

Outbreaks in the state started in February and 261 cases have been
recorded up to May. Last month alone there were 255 more cases, officials
said.

The state health department this month launched an awareness campaign and
preventative measures including pest control in wells and ponds, Karen
State Indigenous Medicine (alternative medicine) department head Aung Aung
said.

“These cases are increasing as it is a seasonal disease. The signs and
symptoms of this disease cannot be detected immediately but take time.
Most of the cases are found in rural areas”, he told Mizzima.

A local farmer from Myainggalay village in Karen State said: “Our locality
is a  mosquito-infested area. They [Aedes, the genus of two types of
mosquito that carry dengue] are too big. It made us itch and was painful.
Those who got the fever visited Pa-an hospital for treatment but no one
[official] came here and gave treatment to us.”

Lack of proper preventative health care measures by the government in
these rural areas and poor transport and infrastructure may lead to many
more deaths from dengue, a staff member from the Pa-an social welfare
departmental dispensary said.

“Most of the villagers are unaware of the deadly nature of this disease
and don’t take the fevers seriously when the signs and symptoms arise,” he
said.  “There are no clinics or dispensaries in rural areas for them to
receive treatment even if they are aware 
 the health department never
sends health workers to these places.”

____________________________________
REGIONAL

July 14, Thai News Agency MCOT
Nationality identification center set up for Myanmar labourers

Ranong – Myanmar and Thailand have cooperated to set up an identification
centre for Myanmar labourers in Ranong, a southern province on Thailand's
west coast.

It is the first such cooperative centre on Thai soil after similar units
were previously located in Myanmar.

Labour Minister Chalermchai Sri-on on Wednesday welcomed Myanmar Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs U Maung Myint and other delegates who
travelled from Victoria Point in Myanmar, which Thais call Koh Song, for
talks on identification processes of Myanmar labourers, a part of
Thailand’s measures to tackle the problem of illegal workers.

The measure will help register illegal labourers and facilitate effective
repatriation.

Under the nationality identification processes, the Thai authorities will
give two-year licenses for Myanmar labourers to stay in Thailand, awaiting
repatriation.

Mr Chalermchai and  U Maung Myint visited the centre set up to identify
nationality and issues border passes in Ranong. About 400 Myanmar
labourers have undergone identification processes.

The centre is expected to register illegal labourers in time. From July10,
2009 to July 10 this year, 122,147 Myanmar labourers or 300-500 persons
per day went through identification processes in Tha Chi Lek, Victoria
Point (Koh Song) and Myawaddy.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

July 14, Irrawaddy
Burma’s road to 3G Democracy – Min Zin

Writing about the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the
19th century that “the most perilous moment for bad government is when it
seeks to mend its ways.” As evidenced by the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, his theory still
proves correct two-hundred years later.

Today in Burma, Snr-Gen Than Shwe's military junta is superficially
purporting to mend its ways by calling an election. Is this a potentially
perilous moment for his regime? Or is it just another sign of resilient
tyranny?

Burmese history instructs that the perceived prospect of an opening in the
country's closed political system, or of a political realignment,
emboldens the public to rally behind opposition movements and against the
regime.
For example, in 1988, Ne Win’s unexpected resignation, and his support of
a change from one-party rule to a multiparty system, greatly boosted the
public’s expectation and confidence that meaningful reform could occur and
helped the opposition groups rally public support behind their causes.

But the political environment surrounding the 2010 elections may not
provide a similar strategic opening for opposition groups to expand their
political space. This time around, Than Shwe has taken every possible
measure to send a clear signal to the people of Burma that there will be
no real change in power after the 2010 elections, and the public should
not entertain any false hopes.

For one thing, Than Shwe is revealing his election plan step-by-step,
including the yet-to-be-announced election date, in order to show both
that he is in complete control of the pace of the campaign and that the
election will not be a momentous event.

In addition, the 2008 constitution, the 2010 election laws, recent
Election Commission directives and the press censorship board’s increased
restrictions on election coverage by local journals have confirmed that
the elections are not an opportunity for regime transition, let alone
change. Instead, they are a sly attempt to achieve regime durability.

But election cheerleaders, including some diplomats, foreign experts,
think-tank groups and, of course, domestic apologists, keep screaming that
the 2010 elections could bring some form of political liberalization, and
for that reason both the opposition parties and the general public should
participate.

Their arguments follow three related lines of discourse: “The election is
the only game in town”; “Something is better than nothing”; and “National
League for Democracy (NLD) members are not the only democrats in Burma.”

The question we must ask with respect to each argument is: Will
participation in the election for this reason lead to genuine political
transition and economic development, or will it help provide the semblance
of legitimacy the junta craves?


The Election is the only Game in Town

Wrong. To begin with, it cannot be claimed that the election is the only
game in town when most of the main opposition parties have chosen not to
participate. Even if the 2010 elections, and the new government based on
the 2008 Constitution, were the only game in town, they would not provide
the path to meaningful reform in Burma because they would not bring about
the required state-building effort, a process in which all key
parties—democratic opposition groups as well as ethnic resistance
groups—rally together and make their voices heard.

The NLD, who won the 1990 election by a landslide, decided not to renew
its party registration under the regime’s “unjust election laws” and not
to contest the elections. In addition, no less than ten ethnic ceasefire
groups refused to disarm and join the elections.

Several of these ceasefire groups held a meeting in May at the
headquarters of the United Wa State Army near the China-Burma border,
during which the groups reportedly agreed, for their own reasons, to
support the NLD’s decision not to compete in the election—saying that an
election under the 2008 Constitution would offer no guarantee of ethnic
rights in Burma.

As the intractable conflicts between the regime and the NLD and the armed
ethnic groups linger on, the center of political gravity will not likely
shift toward the regime’s election game plan. Especially given the fact
that, according to several media reports, public interest in the 2010
election is very low.

If history serves as a guide, the 2010 elections could be compared to
Burma's 1920s dyarchy elections, organized by the British colonial rulers
in an unsuccessful attempt to pacify the country’s nationalistic surge.
The opposition parties did not deem this election the only game in town,
and some boycotted the polls. When the pro-independence conflicts
continued following the election, the boycott did not cost its advocates,
who had held their moral high ground.

A contrasting historical example is the 1947 election, which differed
significantly from the dyarchy elections because two key players—the
British colonizers and the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL)
led by Aung San—reached a prior agreement to hold the elections as a
power-sharing step toward independence.

Under these circumstances, although the 1947 election may not have been
the only game in town, it was a mainstream political game. Therefore,
parties such as the Red-flag Communist Party of Burma, the Karen National
Union and U Saw’s Myochit (Patriotic) Party that boycotted the election
suffered the cost of being sidelined from mainstream politics.

Burma's history, therefore, appears to instruct that a consensus between
key opposing players on the process and goal of transition is a
prerequisite to making an election credible and its outcome legitimate.
Only then will polls deescalate conflicts. And only then will they be “the
only game in town.”

There is certainly no such consensus in 2010, nor does one appear to be on
the horizon.

In an article that appeared in The Irrawaddy online in early 2008 (The
2010 Election Challenges ), this author argued that the incompatible goals
of the military elite and the opposition, including ethnic minorities,
will not be transformed by the new Constitution and the 2010 election. The
regime's imposition of the one-sided 2008 Constitution and the unfair
process being played out for the upcoming 2010 elections will not likely
minimize the cost of conflict for the military. The most visible costs
will be the continuation of international isolation and further damage to
the country's economy.

The opposition—democratic forces as well as ethnic groups—will continue to
fight for the goal of national reconciliation and ethnic autonomy, but
they understand that they are likely to find themselves ineffective within
the new government's institutional procedures that favor the military's
domination.

Therefore, the opposition groups will have to pursue alternative courses
of action following the election, including public mobilization,
international advocacy and possibly even renewal of guerrilla warfare in
the borderlands. And the generals will use the same method of coercion
against the people even after the 2010 election, so the existing
grievances and public hostility towards the military will be compounded
and antagonistic civil-military relations will continue.

In fact, political transition is not likely to take place within the
framework of a military-imposed constitution. Even amendments made to the
constitution in the hope of gradual reform will not be possible within
military-dominated parliamentary debate and a new power arrangement. Such
reform could happen only if the status-quo is challenged by public
pressure from the outside and a negotiated settlement is reached with the
military.

Thus, the NLD was right when it argued that the regime's proposed election
is not the only game in town, and was right not to re-register and contest
an election governed by unfair and unjust election laws that bar more than
2,000 political prisoners from the electoral process, including NLD party
leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

However, although the election is clearly not the only game in town, it is
one front being fought in the opposition's overall battle for democracy
and human rights. Thus, as this author argued in The Irrawaddy more than
one year ago (Burma’s Opposition Must Wage Proxy Fight ), the NLD was
wrong in its unwillingness or incapacity to diversify its pro-democracy
struggles and avoid a split within the party by setting up or at least
allowing a proxy party to exist.

In this respect, the NLD itself could learn a lesson from the history of
Burma's independence struggle.

In 1936, the radical group Dobama Asiayone (We Burman Association) formed
the Komin Kochi (Our King, Our People) party as its proxy to contest that
year's elections with the aim of fighting against the existing order from
within parliament as well as from without. Although Komin Kochin won only
three seats in the election, their formation of a proxy attempt
demonstrates that even the most radical opposition elements realize that
it is worthwhile to diversify one’s struggle, especially when it helps to
hold an opposition party together.

But the NLD leadership, instead of allowing (or even encouraging) those
who would like to set up a political party to contest the 2010 elections,
vilified the moderates within the group and caused the split.

It seems that the NLD leadership is not strategic enough to be aware of
the advantages the whole movement could gain by franchising the forms of
its struggle, rather than centralizing them. Their tendency to put all of
their eggs in one basket led to a strategic blunder that could have
long-term consequences for the opposition.

Broadly speaking, however, it would not be fair to assume such a policy
decision was solely the outcome of the NLD leadership’s independent
choice. In Burma's political environment, responses are shaped not only by
past repression and grievances, but also by political culture, and this
illiberal environment strengthens value-loaded or principle-centric
cultural norms that lead to inflexible decision making.

In addition, it should be cautioned that even if the NLD leaders were
strategically savvy enough to diversify the forms of their struggle,
positive results would not be guaranteed.

For instance, it is widely believed that Kachin Independence Organization
(KIO)’s attempts to diversify their struggles by forming proxy Kachin
parties such as the Kachin State Progressive Party, the Northern Shan
State Progressive Party and the United Democracy Party (Kachin State),
have thus far been unsuccessful because the regime’s election commission
has delayed the approval of these parties.

A proxy party even informally blessed by the NLD leadership may have met
the same fate. However, it should not have stopped the NLD from making a
worthwhile attempt at strategic franchising, at least to avoid the split.

Something is better than nothing

That depends on how the election cheerleaders define “something.”

It is understandable that people living in the pluralistic Western world
get excited when they hear the word “election.” However, the junta's
election will not unleash a torrent of political changes and are not a
panacea that will heal past wounds. They are a ploy to prolong and
legalize the military regime's rule indefinitely.

The 2010 elections will, however, contribute to changes in the format of
governance. The military regime has extensive experience with dictatorial,
one-party rule, but the governing format following the election will be a
new experiment for them. The new government will be a hybrid with two
power centers—military and political. Regardless of who pulls the strings,
this could lead to either a serious internal split or miserable
inefficiency of the ruling body.

In other words, there will be tensions between the regime's desire for
military supremacy and the new political procedures required by the hybrid
parliamentary system. Will this be a crack in their power base that the
opposition can take advantage of?

Although some advocates argue that the new hybrid system is in itself a
trend towards liberalization, the nature of the power rivalry within the
post-2010 ruling party will not necessarily lead to a new opening for the
opposition groups in the short run, or democratization in the long run.

Even if it does eventually lead to democratic reforms, the question is how
long will this process take? It may be too long to have any strategic
relevance for opposition movements operating within the country and
abroad, and for the long-suffering people of Burma.

Since the new Constitution has placed the military atop an untouchable
altar, the tragic conditions that have led to extreme poverty, forced
relocation, forced labor, child soldiers, political prisoners, internally
displaced persons, refugees flooding into neighboring countries, rape and
other human rights violations—all of which are associated with the
military's unchecked power, interests and behavior—will remain unresolved.

The 2010 elections will not even bring meaningful economic reforms,
because the military and its cronies will continue to disrupt and distort
the country's market economy, such as it is.

And since the elected parliament’s legislative power will be restricted
and because it will not be able to oversee the military or the
military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), no civilian
mechanisms will be available to redress the continued corruption and
economic mismanagement.

In addition, unless the military concedes the ceasefire status quo in
ethnic areas, or makes some accommodations in its forced disarmament
strategy, after the election the prospect of negotiated political
resolution with major ethnic ceasefire groups will remain bleak, and
therefore the risk of renewed civil war, or widespread guerrilla warfare,
cannot be ruled out.

So what exactly is the “something” that is better than nothing that the
election cheerleaders envision resulting from the election?

It seems obvious that these advocates (especially foreign observers) apply
the O’Donnell/Schmitter textbook approach to Burma without understanding
or considering Burmese history and political culture.

They claim that it is pragmatic to promote the theory that elections—no
matter how flawed—have a slippery slope tendency toward democratization
and therefore could be a path to change and liberalization. Then they mock
the committed activists inside Burma as an irrelevant force.

But the cheerleaders’ overstatement of the election’s significance in the
Burmese context, and their optimistic, linear view of liberalization and
follow-up democratization, is theoretically simplistic and does not
conform to Burmese history.

The pro-election advocates who believe that just getting a foot in the
door is an important step should pay heed to Aleksandr Gelman’s warning
that: “Liberalization is an unclenched fist, but the hand is the same and
at any moment it could be clenched again into a fist.”

NLD members are not the only democrats in Burma

This is True. Not every democrat in Burma is or was an NLD member. And the
emergence of political parties, no matter how limited the political space
they have to operate, is something to encourage because it may lead to
political competition.

But it does not necessarily follow that every new party that is not
directly aligned with the regime represents the public interest and will
positively influence the direction and power structure of the country.

In fact, advocating this position is tricky, because it is basically an
extension of the “third force” argument.

The “third force” refers to an array of groups who claim to steer a
neutral path between the NLD and the regime. Most of these groups,
however, lean more toward the positions of the junta in their outspoken
anti-sanction views and open support for the 2010 elections.

When the election laws were published, many old faces resurfaced and
resumed their political activities. Excluding the junta-backed USDP party
and its cronies-turned-candidates, most of the newly formed political
parties under regime’s election laws are being founded by former
activists, NLD splinters and small ethnic groups.

Any attempt at lumping them together and promoting them as the new
opposition, however, is at best premature optimism and at worst an
ill-conceived attempt to undermine the role of committed activists from
the NLD, the Shan National League for Democracy, the 88 Generation
Students and the monks.

Unlike these groups, who have long struggled for democracy and human
rights in Burma, the so-called “new players” do not speak out against
injustices suffered by the citizens at the hands of junta, let alone
represent and fight for the rights of the general public.

It is not the “emerging new players” who are struggling to combat forced
relocation, forced labor, child soldiers or HIV/AIDS on the ground level.
And it is not the third force parties who are calling for national
reconciliation as a necessary goal for the country’s future direction. It
is still the NLD and their supporters who are at the forefront in
representing and fighting for the public.

In fact, third force advocates, both domestic and abroad, snipe at the
NLD's grassroots struggles, claiming they are confrontational, failed
stances. This is nothing more than elitist arrogance.

Moreover, the emergence of civilian players will not necessarily promote a
liberal environment and values such as tolerance under the new hybrid
system.

The most intimate example from Burmese history is that of the pre-war
politicians, with whom the British shared power from the 1920s through the
1930s. It was U Saw, the native Burmese civilian premier, who called upon
the British Governor in the early 1940s to take repressive actions against
“extreme politicians” in order to avoid disorder, and later ended up
assassinating Aung San and his cabinet members in 1947.

Paul Collier was dead right when he claimed that democratic politics as
often practiced in the countries of “the bottom billion” (i.e. hybrid
systems that allow elections with repression) tends to attract candidates
with criminal records.

And those who promote the option of emerging third force players without
stating clearly what it means to be a democrat confuse the moral clarity
of people’s struggle against dictatorship.


Than Shwe's 3G Democracy

The debate about whether participation in the upcoming election is a
legitimate means to accomplishing opposition goals is both healthy and
necessary, but it should not be forgotten that while pro-democracy, human
rights and ethnic rights advocates are arguing among themselves, Than Shwe
is not wasting any time fueling his “disciplined-flourishing democracy”
with the 3 Gs of of Guns, Goons and Gas.


>From killing his own citizens when it suits his purposes to the pursuit of

nuclear weapons that threaten neighboring countries; from the thugs of the
Union Solidarity and Development Association and Swan Arr Shin to the
ex-military candidates of the newly formed USDP; and from selling off the
hydrocarbon and other natural resources of his country to promote his
personal interests, Than Shwe is determined to utilize all means necessary
to prove de Tocqueville’s theory wrong in 21st century Burma and hold onto
power.

No matter if the regime is clenching or unclenching its fist, the
dictator-in-chief is making sure that it is his hand at work. Some may see
participation in the elections as an opportunity to sever that hand. But
more likely they are simply playing into it, and they risk being crushed
when the fist clenches once more.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist living in exile.

____________________________________
INTERVIEW

July 14, Irrawaddy
'National reconciliation is essential' – Ko Htwe and Dr. Than Nyein

Dr. Than Nyein graduated from medical school in 1963 and worked as a civil
servant until 1988, when he was forced to resign due to his involvement in
the popular uprising of that year. He joined the National League for
Democracy (NLD) in January 1989 and was elected as the member of
parliament for Rangoon's Kyauktan Township the following year. He was
arrested for the first time in 1997. In 2004, he was arrested again and
incarcerated until September 2008.
In May, he co-founded the National Democratic Force (NDF) after the the
NLD was forcibly dissolved for refusing to take part in this year's
election. He is now the chairman of the NDF, which  registered on June 24
to compete in the election. The party's application was approved by the
Election Commission (EC) on July 9.

Irrawaddy reporter Ko Htwe interviewed Dr. Than Nyein recently to discuss
his party's policies and future activities.

Question: How do you think you will do in the election?

Answer: It is very unlikely that we will win in a landslide as we did in
1990, but we will do our best under the present circumstances.

Q: Why do you think an overwhelming victory is unlikely?

A: There are many limitations. The first is time. Our party registration
was just approved by the EC. As the election is to be held within this
year, we will have very little time for campaigning. Another one is
financial constraints. Candidate fees are [US $500], much higher than they
were in the last election, and it is very difficult to find funding.

Another problem is the media. We have not received fair treatment. We have
been interviewed many times by the domestic media, but much of what we
said was censored, and some media have even rejected us. We have relied on
the domestic media to reach out to people, but it has not been as
effective as we expected. The exiled media has been biased, too. For
instance, some media groups said they wanted to speak to us about our
party, but in fact, they were against us, so it became more like rumor
mongering than a real discussion. I think we need to be careful about
dealing with this kind of situation.

Q: Which parties will be your main opponents?

 A: Any party that competes with us wherever we contest the election will
be our main opponent. I can't say anything for sure right now, as we
still can't say exactly where we will contest and don't know which other
parties will contest where.

Q: Does this mean that the NDF will only contest the election in some areas?

A: We can't work equally in all areas throughout the country. We don't
have enough candidates. We have strong supporters in some places and we
are not so popular in some other places. The strength of local support for
our political course is more important than anything we can do, so we will
contest the election in areas where our supporters can work efficiently.

Q: What do you think of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)?

A: Well, I believe everybody knows the background of the USDP. It was
spawned by the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which is a
government-backed organization. It is not very nice to see that incumbent
ministers are currently involved in the USDP. The Tatmadaw (armed forces)
has already taken 25 percent of the parliament seats. What we want is a
fair competition for the rest of the seats with equal participation by
all. That's how it should be if we are genuinely marching towards
democracy.

Q: Do you think there's a level playing field?

A: Everybody knows whether it is level or not. There's no need to say
anything more about that.

Q: During the 1990 election period, political parties formed alliances.
Does the NDF have any plan to form an alliance?

A: I think it would be pretty difficult to form an alliance, since we
don't have much time left. In principle, we would prefer not to compete
directly with political parties that have a genuine will to create a true
democratic Burma, so we will try to consult with them as much as we can in
the time we have left.

Q: Which parties will you consult with?

A: There won't be many. We still have to make decision in our party as to
which parties we are going to consult. We will also be learning about
other parties, too.

Q: Which ethnic parties do you think you might cooperate with, and what
kind of policies should they hold [as potential partners]?

A: Our position on ethnic parties will be different from that of the NLD
in the 1990 election. What I mean is that we don't have any plan to
heavily compete against ethnic parties in different states and
ethnic-controlled territories. We just want them to know what they should
be doing and do what they have to do dutifully. Of course, exceptions
exist in some places. For example, there are some areas in some states
where we have supporters. In such cases, we will ask our members there to
consult and cooperate with pro-democracy and ethnic parties focusing on
those areas.

Q: The EC that has yet to approve the registrations of the Kachin parties,
including the one led by Dr. Tu Ja. What do you think about this?

A: It is their parties' own affairs and this issue should be resolved by
the parties and the EC.

Q: What is your position on national reconciliation?

A: National reconciliation is the main issue and it is an essential part
of our party's policy. We have already accepted that without national
reconciliation, problems between ethnic groups and races cannot be settled
and a peaceful co-existence will not be possible in the long run. We will
pay attention to this issue as much as we are allowed.

Q: It was recently reported that you still support Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Is that right?

A: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has worked with us and led us for more than 20
years. We could never question her good will for the country. She is a
leader that we will always respect.

Q: How will you maintain the policy of her party, the NLD?

A: We have worked for the NLD for over 20 years. It is not a stranger to
us. However, since it decided not to register for the coming election, its
legal status became null and void on May 6. One can't possibly argue that
from that time on, no matter how much we wished to continue working as a
political party, we couldn't do so in practice. We were with the NLD until
it was dissolved. After that, we didn't see ourselves as related to the
NLD anymore. Whether or not the NLD will continue to exist as a political
party is up to other NLD members.

Q: Do you mean the NDF's policy doesn't have any relation to the NLD's
Shwegodaing Declaration?

A: The Shwegodaing Declaration was mainly written by Ko Khin Maung Swe and
me, together with Ko Sein Hla Oo. We fully believe in the policies in the
declaration. Today, we are talking about the declaration as it was written
and don't define it as we want. We said in the declaration that we need to
resolve political problems through dialogue. This will always be true. The
need for dialogue never dies. As long as we have differences, between two
persons or among many people, we will need dialogue. We will always uphold
this principle.

With regard to the election, we didn't say in the declaration that we were
not going to contest the election. We said that we would consider
participating in it if our conditions were met, but we didn't say that we
wouldn't compete if these conditions were not met. In fact, there is no
need to define our statement that way. If we said it like that, it would
just be a wishful definition. We stressed in the declaration that we would
never abandon our people—that the NLD would never leave the democracy
struggle and an election was a political landmark that we had to go
through on our way to democracy. We are doing today as we said in the
declaration.

Q: What is the NDF's position on political prisoners?

A: Our demand for political prisoners is the same as before. We were also
political prisoners. Our call for their immediate release is something we
can never change. The authorities have pledged many times for the
inclusiveness of the election, so we'd like to urge them to act
accordingly as soon as possible so that all stakeholders will be able to
participate in the election. The release of all political prisoners would
indicate the credibility of the election to a certain extent. If it
doesn't happen, once our party candidates have the chance to sit in the
parliament after the election, our first proposal will be for their
release and for amnesty.

Q: Burma is earning billions of dollars from the sale of its resources,
but most of it has been spent on the military, with very little going to
the health and education sectors. What will your party do to change this
situation?

A: There is no transparency, so we don't know exactly how much income we
have and how much we spend on which sectors. There is no way we can find
out about this, so there's not much we can say about it. However, if there
is a parliament in the future, the government will have to submit its
expenditure and annual budget to the parliament, so we will then try to
say what should and shouldn't happen.

____________________________________
PRESS RELEASE

July 14, U.S. Campaign for Burma
U.S. House of Representatives unanimously extends sanctions on Burma’s
military junta

Washington, DC – The U.S. Campaign for Burma, a leading coalition of
Burmese activists in exile and American human rights campaigners working
to promote freedom, justice and democracy in Burma, today welcomes and
supports the unanimous decision of the U.S. House of Representative to
extend sanctions against the military junta that rules the Southeast Asian
country of Burma with guns, threats and oppression, and conducts crimes
against humanity under a system of impunity. The House Joint Resolution 83
(H.J. RES. 83), the renewal of import restrictions contained in the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, was introduced by Congressmen
Joseph Crowley (D-NY), Peter King (R-NY), cosponsored by 20 additional
House Members and approved by a voice vote today.

“The U.S. Congress is sending a clear message to the junta. Sanctions will
not be lifted until and unless there are real changes in Burma including
the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all
political prisoners, and the establishment of a meaningful political
dialogue,” says Aung Din, a former political prisoner and the Executive
Director of the U.S. Campaign for Burma. “This is also a clear signal that
the U.S. Congress will not recognize the junta’s sham election or its
outcome,” Aung Din continues.

In 2003, after the regime’s failed assassination attempt against Aung San
Suu Kyi during her organizational tour in Depayin in middle Burma, in
which pro-junta thugs attacked, beat, and killed members of her party, the
U.S. Congress imposed strong and comprehensive sanctions on the junta by
passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. Measures included in the
Act are an import restrictions, a ban on loan and assistance from
international financial institutions, freezing assets of the junta and
their families, expansion of the visa ban to members of the junta, its
militia, and those responsible for killing Aung San Suu Kyi’s supporters.
The import restrictions, which have effectively stopped the flow of
hundreds of millions of dollars every year to the generals’ pockets, is
the only measure required to renew annually. An identical resolution has
been introduced in the Senate and cosponsored by 68 Senators, led by
Senators Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA).  The Senate
companion bill is expected to be voted soon.  Since 2003, the U.S.
Congress has never failed to extend the measure as the situation in Burma
has not improved and does not satisfy the concerns of the United States.

While putting Aung San Suu Kyi and over 2,100 democracy activists and
Buddhist monks in prison, and continuing an aggressive military campaign
against ethnic minorities, the junta has been trying to finalize its plan
to create a permanent military dictatorship through a sham constitution
and a showcase election this year. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National
League for Democracy (NLD) that won a landslide victory in the 1990
election, and its allied ethnic political parties decided to boycott the
election and call on the international community to not recognize it. Aung
San Suu Kyi, NLD and ethnic allies have called for the junta to stop its
unilateral action and start negotiations with democracy forces through a
tripartite dialogue between the military, NLD and ethnic representatives.

Media Contact: Jennifer Quigley at (202) 234 8022