BurmaNet News, July 24 - 26, 2010

[Editor]

July 24 – 26, 2010 Issue #4007


INSIDE BURMA
DVB: DKBA commander’s defiance nudges Karen state towards war

ON THE BORDER
Kyodo News: Japan to take in 32 Myanmar refugees in Thailand for resettlement
Mizzima: Cautious optimism greets Burmese minister’s overtures on labor
rights

BUSINESS / TRADE
DPA: Myanmar and China agree to develop Kachin hydropower plant

ASEAN
Asia Times: ASEAN, Myanmar agree to disagree

REGIONAL
Guardian (UK): Burma junta leader begins controversial five-day tour of India
Mizzima News: India urged to press Than Shwe for rights, democratic reforms

OPINION / OTHER
Khonumthung: Burma’s 2010 elections reveal ugly truths – Lin Myat Thaw Tar
DVB: Retaking power in Burma (Pt. 1) – Elliott Prasse-Freeman
Irrawaddy: Than Shwe may free Suu Kyi before election: Former spy



____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

July 26, Democratic Voice of Burma
DKBA commander’s defiance nudges Karen state towards war – Joseph Allchin

Commander of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army’s (DKBA) 907 brigade Gen.
Na Kham Mwe’s refusal to sign up to the junta’s Border Guard Force (BGF)
proposal, that will see ethnic armies assimilated into the Burmese army,
has led to a rise in tensions as the SPDC is reported to be moving
artillery near to Walay in preparation for an offensive against dissenting
DKBA forces.

On Monday, Karen National Union (KNU) Vice President David Thackrabaw told
DVB that 600 refugees had fled with some already having reached the Thai
border. On Sunday the Karen National Union (KNU) /Karen National
Liberation Army (KNLA) Peace Council, a splinter group of the KNU, was
reporting that 300 women and children had fled the Walay area, heading for
the Thai border.

Whilst a Karen villager in the Thai border town of Mae Sot said: “About
150 villagers from Thay Baw Bo village and over 300 from Mae Ke village
have fled to the border in fear as the government is planning to arrest
commander Na Kham Mwe.”

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council claimed that different factions of the Karen
had united as a result of the impending Burmese threat, adding that
villagers were battle ready to help repel a Burmese offensive.

Thackrabaw also confirmed that the KNU would back DKBA forces resisting
the SPDC. He added that the junta had reneged on initial agreements to
give the DKBA full governing rights over Karen State and that several DKBA
commanders had been “dragging their feet” ever since the BGF agreement was
mooted. He was however uncertain of the size of the rival pro and
anti-junta DKBA factions, with the SPDC likely to fight alongside DKBA
factions still loyal to them.

Prominent KNLA commander Colonel Ner Dah did however tell DVB that it was
too early to confirm any KNLA involvement in any impending conflict,
adding that “things are very confused at the moment”, also stating a
reluctance to give away strategic information.

It has been reported for several months that the usually pro junta DKBA
were vertically split as to whether to support the BGF proposal, which
would mean that SPDC officers would be assimilated at brigadier level in
all ethnic armies while rumours have also circulated that clashes between
the SPDC and DKBA had already occurred.

The KNU/KNLA Peace Council state that medical and humanitarian assistance
would be urgently needed.

Additional reporting by Maung Too

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

July 26, Kyodo News
Japan to take in 32 Myanmar refugees in Thailand for resettlement

Bangkok – The Japanese government will allow 32 ethnic minority Myanmar
refugees living in Thailand to resettle in Japan, sources told Kyodo News
on Monday.

The 32 Myanmar nationals, consisting of six ethnic Karen families, will be
the first refugees to resettle in Japan under its "third country" refugee
resettlement program.

The sources said the 32 Myanmar nationals are due to travel to Japan after
taking a monthlong Japanese language and culture acclimatization program
at the Mera refugee camp in northeastern Thailand near the Myanmar border.

The 32 were selected from among 50 Myanmar refugees at camp Mera who have
expressed the hope of settling in Japan.

The Japanese government plans to take in 90 Myanmar refugees under the
third-country refugee resettlement program over the next three years.

After arriving in Japan, the 32 Myanmar refugees are expected to stay
initially in Tokyo for six months to learn the Japanese language and local
customs. There is no decision yet on where in Japan they will eventually
resettle, the sources said.

Camp Mera, the biggest refugee camp in Thailand, is home to about 50,000
Myanmar refugees who have fled their country, mainly due to armed
conflicts between the Myanmar military and Karen National Union rebels

____________________________________

July 24, Mizzima News
Cautious optimism greets Burmese minister’s overtures on labor rights –
Kyaw Kha

Chiang Mai – Burmese migrant workers responded with cautious optimism to
the words of Burma’s Deputy Foreign Minister yesterday, in which he urged
the Thai Labor Minister not to arrest and prosecute Burmese migrant
workers in Thailand.

Deputy Minister Maung Myint voiced his concern, as reported in Burma’s
state-run New Light of Myanmar, while meeting with his Thai counterpart on
the 15th of this month in the town of Pretcha Chirikan in Thailand.

A five-member Burmese delegation headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister was
visiting Thailand at the invitation of Thailand’s Ministry of Labor for
senior level talks running from the 14th to 16th of this month.

The Migrant Workers Affairs Department, under the National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), welcomed the news, with
In-charge Thet Khaing referencing the occasion as the first ever
compassionate discussion on Burmese migrant worker issues on the part of
Burmese authorities with their Thai counterparts.

“We welcomed it because this is a first ever recognition by the junta’s
minister of his own citizens. Previously, they saw migrant workers as
traitors who betrayed the country, and the workers were bullied and
exploited in various ways,” Thet Khaing told Mizzima.

Thai Prime Minister Aphisit Veijjachiva had issued an executive order
dated June 2nd to “suppress, arrest and prosecute” illegal migrant
workers. Accordingly, Thai officials have arrested illegal migrant workers
daily, said Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (TACDB) Section
Director Myint Wei.

Kyaw Thu, a Burmese migrant worker, said he is glad to hear of
negotiations and discussions on migrant workers affairs by the two
governments and wants to see the issuance of temporary Burmese passports
with reduced fees. Moreover, he would like to see the Burmese government
open passport issuing offices in Thailand.

“We welcome this sort of discussion, but the procedures adopted by the
Burmese government are too complicated. It should be better than it
currently is. They should expedite the passport issuing process by opening
new offices at the places where the workers are living,” another migrant
worker, Zeya, concurred.

Temporary passports have been issued on the Thai-Burma border since early
this year in an effort to legalize migrant workers and eradicate human
trafficking.

“If they made this move with the intention of vote canvassing for the
upcoming election, it will not work,” warned Thet Khaing. “The workers
will not vote for them, [they] see the junta as pushing them to this hard
life, struggling for their livelihood in foreign countries.”

“We should demand the governments extend documents, streamlining the
process. Moreover, a better process and procedure on granting bail to
arrested workers should be established and better medical care given.
These can be achieved if the two governments work in tandem and in
sincerity with good intentions,” he added. “Migrant workers have much
benefited Thailand. And both sides will benefit if side effects such as
human trafficking can be eliminated.”

Human rights and labor organizations estimate that only 900,000 out of
over 2 million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand hold a valid
residential permit. And according to official figures released by junta,
out of nearly one million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, only 90,918
have been issued temporary passports as of May 26th.

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

July 26, Deustche Press-Agentur
Myanmar and China agree to develop Kachin hydropower plant

Yangon - State-controlled companies from Myanmar and China have inked a
deal to build a 1,055-megawatt hydropower plant on the Ngawchanka river in
Kachin province, news reports said Sunday.

The signing of an agreement was witnessed Friday by Myanmar Minister for
Electric Power No (1) Zaw Min and Yunnan Provincial Investment Holding
Group chairman Bao Minghu, the New Light of Myanmar reported.

The project will be implemented in five stages by a joint venture between
China's YPIC International Energy Cooperation & Development Company and
Myanmar's International Group of Entrepreneurs Company.

The Ngawchanhka project is expected to export its electricity to
neighbouring Yunnan province in southern China.

____________________________________
ASEAN

July 26, Asia Times
ASEAN, Myanmar agree to disagree – Larry Jagan

Hanoi – Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win left last week's Association of
Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) summit meeting before a key regional
security forum that likely would have raised the topic of his country's
alleged nuclear ambitions. His early departure underscored the lack of
leverage the 10-member grouping has in pushing military-run Myanmar
towards more transparency and democracy.

Ministers at the meetings where Nyan Win was in attendance stressed the
need for Myanmar's planned general elections later this year to be
credible, urged the release of detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi
and repeatedly raised recent news reports that it had received missile and
possibly nuclear weapons-related technology from North Korea.

Foreign ministers gave Nyan Win an "earful" from the opening dinner
onwards, ASEAN secretary general Surin Pitsuwan told Asia Times Online on
the sidelines of the meeting. "Myanmar listened intently to what was said,
nodding approvingly at times, and agreed to take the region's concerns
back to the top guy," said Surin, referring to junta leader Gen Than Shwe.

ASEAN's top dialogue partners, including the United States, the European
Union and Japan, also weighed in with concerns. "We urge Myanmar to create
the necessary conditions for credible elections, including releasing all
political prisoners, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, respecting human rights
and cease the attacks against ethnic minorities," US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton told journalists just before she left the regional
security meeting in Hanoi on Friday.

Nyan Win said he had to leave the meeting a day early so that he could
prepare to accompany Than Shwe to India later this week. On his return
from India, Nyan Win is scheduled to host North Korean Foreign Minister
Pak Ui Chun, who is to visit Myanmar also this week. Some perceived his
early departure as a diplomatic snub, signaling that Myanmar puts priority
on its relations with India and North Korea.

"We have few carrots that they are interested in and no sticks," said a
Southeast Asian diplomat attending the meeting.

Earlier hopes that Myanmar's accession to ASEAN in 1998 would lead it
towards more political openness and faster economic development through
integration with Southeast Asia's more developed economies have failed to
bear substantial fruit. Mahathir Mohamad, the former Malaysian prime
minister, first raised the prospect of expelling Myanmar from the grouping
after the 2003 brutal attack on Suu Kyi's caravan by pro-government thugs
that killed many of her supporters.

The expulsion option was resurrected by some media after news reports
emerged about the junta's apparent nuclear ambitions, which if true would
be at odds with ASEAN's non-nuclear proliferation treaty. However,
ministers at the meeting said expelling Myanmar was not under immediate
consideration.

"Expelling Myanmar wouldn't achieve anything," Malaysian Foreign Minister
Anifah Aman told Asia Times Online in an interview at the end of the
meetings. "It would only further isolate them ... Of course if Myanmar had
nuclear weapons that would be a totally different matter."

Many ASEAN countries fear that a further isolated Myanmar would only
increase China's presence and influence over the regime. ASEAN must remain
engaged with Myanmar because of China's and India's involvement,
Singapore's Foreign Minister George Yeo told reporters during the
conference.

Public support, private anguish

ASEAN has adopted a mix of public support and private pressure to nudge
Myanmar towards democracy and greater transparency, according to ministers
who spoke with Asia Times Online. However, many were disappointed by the
ministers' final statement, which expressed ASEAN's wish that the
forthcoming elections be free, fair and inclusive but fell short of
recommending the immediate release of all political prisoners.

"Myanmar is holding an election - so they must be given credit for that,"
said Malaysia's foreign minister. "That's progress, and we should not
prejudge it."

The regime has not yet announced a firm election date, but when the polls
are finally held 25% of the new parliament's seats will be reserved for
the military appointees.

"We won't see a sharp break [after the elections] from what it is today,
but we will see an important turning which will lead Myanmar into a
different situation," Yeo told journalists earlier in the week after
meeting his Myanmar counterpart. "Once the generals take off their
uniforms and they have to win votes and kiss babies and tend to local
needs, their behavior will change and the economy will gradually open up,"
he said.

Indonesia, which since 1998 has accomplished a successful transition from
military to democratic rule, has been at the forefront of lobbying the
junta to accept international or regional election monitors to shore up
the credibility of the polls, a suggestion first raised at last year's
ASEAN summit.

Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have offered assistance in training
election commissioners and for those managing the polling stations.
Meanwhile, ministers floated the idea of creating a special ASEAN envoy
position to discuss the elections directly with Than Shwe, a suggestion
that was rebuffed.

"We suggested quite strongly to our Myanmar colleagues that they consider
having ASEAN observers at the elections, bringing in members of the family
into what is really their own domestic affair," Yeo told reporters in
Hanoi.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah told Asia Times Online, "But this has
all been rebuffed by the Myanmar government who says they don't need help
and have had experience in holding elections."

The junta has still not announced when the polls will be held, leading to
speculation about the role soothsayers and numerology may play in deciding
a date. Nyan Win told Asia Times Online that he was the foreign minister,
not the electoral commission.

He later told Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Dipu Monim, with whom he held a
20-minute bilateral meeting, that "we are still hoping that the election
will be in October". However, a senior Myanmar diplomat told this reporter
during a coffee break: "No one really knows the election date, not even
the minister."

Many of the assembled ministers privately told Myanmar representatives
that political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, who has been held under house
arrest for 15 of the past 22 years and is not legally eligible to run at
the polls, should be released if the election is to be considered
inclusive, according to Surin.

Some even suggested she should be released before the election and allowed
to participate, he said. Nyan Win's reply to his Japanese counterpart was
that Suu Kyi would be released in due course and allowed to compete in the
next elections, presumably to be held in 2015.

"We can be quite strong behind closed doors," said Indonesian Foreign
Minister Marty Natalegawa in an interview. The junta cannot overlook the
fact that ASEAN is on the record demanding Suu Kyi's immediate release,"
he said.

ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to this at their meeting in Phnom Penh in
2003 and it was put into the chairman's statement at the time. "If we
don't specifically rescind it then the demand remains in force,"
Natalegawa said. "And the Myanmar leaders can be in no doubt that this is
still the view of all of ASEAN."

Myanmar "definitely wants us to rubber stamp the election results," a
senior Indonesian diplomat said on condition of anonymity. "And while we
will use every opportunity to push the Myanmar authorities to greater
democracy, in the end we will probably end up being a big rubber stamp."

Surin commented: "ASEAN is very much interested in the peaceful national
reconciliation in Myanmar and whatever happens there will have
implications in ASEAN, positive or negative. If [the election results] are
not objectionable, then they will be acceptable."

Larry Jagan previously covered Myanmar politics for the British
Broadcasting Corp. He is currently a freelance journalist based in
Bangkok.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

July 25, Guardian (UK)
Burma junta leader begins controversial five-day tour of India – Jason Burke

Delhi – Burma's military leader, Than Shwe, arrived in India today for a
controversial five-day visit aimed at deepening ties between the
neighbouring countries and gaining international legitimacy for elections
he is expected to call in less than three months.

Shwe, who heads the military junta that has ruled Burma for nearly five
decades, began his tour at Bodh Gaya, in Bihar, east India, one of the
world's most important sites of Buddhist pilgrimage. He then went to
several Buddhist temples in Kushinagar.

Burmese government sources were quoted by Indian media as describing the
trip as "religious in nature". Shwe is expected to hold talks with the
Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, and other senior political leaders
on Tuesday in Delhi before signing agreements on economic cooperation,
drug smuggling and terrorist activities across the India-Burma border.

Observers say being seen with Singh is a big boost for Shwe ahead of the
elections, but critics have dismissed the poll, the first since 1990, as a
sham designed to allow a transition of power to a new generation of
military leaders.

The party of democracy campaigner and Nobel peace prize winner Aung San
Suu Kyi is boycotting the poll as its rules appear to have been written to
exclude her. The results of the 1990 elections, which Suu Kyi's party won,
were ignored by the junta.

In Gaya, Shwe was greeted by activists with posters accusing him of crimes
against humanity. Scores of pro-democracy campaigners demonstrated in New
Delhi. "It is a great shame for the Indian government to welcome [a man]
famous for his criminal acts under international law and his repression of
democracy," Thin Thin Aung, of the Women's League of Burma, told the
Guardian.

Shwe, 77, has been accused of masterminding the ruthless crushing of a
pro-democracy "Saffron revolution" led by monks in 2007, the exploitation
of forced labour, and a systematic repression of basic human rights on a
daily basis.

India once supported the democratic movement in Burma, which the ruling
military authorities call Myanmar, but has more recently worked to
establish economic and military ties with the ruling generals. Indian
officials argue that engagement is a better approach than sanctions.

During his tour Shwe will visit Hyderabad, the Indian information
technology hub, and manufacturing plants.

The Indian invitation is in part motivated by fierce regional competition
for influence. The visit comes just a month after China's premier, Wen
Jiabao, went to Rangoon, the Burmese capital, to sign a range of economic
deals.

"A lot of the western countries would rather India had nothing to do with
Myanmar but it is a neighbouring country where the Chinese have made a
significant investment and there are clear security imperatives for
India," said Rukmani Gupta, of the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis in Delhi.

One fear is of Chinese access to naval facilities in Burma, Gupta said.

India is also a big fuel importer and it is keen to secure its neighbour's
natural gas resources.

However Khin Maung Win, deputy director of the Democratic Voice of Burma,
an opposition newspaper based in Norway, said that India's Burma policy
could not last. "Generations of Indian leaders made sure the biggest
democracy in the world remained a long-standing friend of democracy in
Burma. This current Indian policy is not based on principles but on
short-term interests and compromise, and so is not durable."

Last week, the US state department said it hoped India would press Burma
over democratic reform, engaging the opposition and other ethnic groups in
the country. "We would encourage India and other countries to send a clear
message to Burma that it needs to change its course," said Philip Crowley,
a state department spokesman.

____________________________________

July 26, Mizzima News
India urged to press Than Shwe for rights, democratic reforms

Chiang Mai – As Burmese military leader Senior General Than Shwe continues
his five-day state visit to India, pressure is mounting on New Delhi to
supplant near-term economic and military interests with support for
Burma’s pro-democracy opposition.

Human rights activists and Indian parliamentarians are calling for the
Indian government to take the opportunity of Than Shwe’s visit to press
the junta leader for democratic reforms in Burma.

New York-based Human Rights Watch said in a statement today: “India should
emphasise respect for human rights during the state visit by Burma’s
Senior General Than Shwe,” adding that, “Economic and security interests
should not displace concerns about protecting the Burmese people’s
fundamental freedoms.”

The sentiment was echoed in an open letter over the weekend to Indian
Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh from the Indian Parliamentarians’ Forum
for Democracy in Burma (IPFDB).

IPFDB members wrote that they “are deeply disturbed by the government’s
decision to welcome the state visit of the Senior General Than Shwe of
Burma at this point of time in India. Burma is at a critical juncture now,
as the military junta is preparing for the first general elections in two
decades. Sadly, the planned elections will be neither free nor fair under
the prevailing conditions”.

Citing India’s common rallying call as the world’s largest democracy,
opponents of New Delhi’s state policy argue that the country’s placement
of economic interests above the plight of Burma’s democracy movement
directly refutes its proud tradition as a regional and global
standard-bearer for democracy.

“Conjuring up political parties and fixing their victory while the
opposition and dissidents remain imprisoned or silenced is no democracy,”
Human Rights Watch Asia division acting director Elaine Pearson said of
the existing conditions set by the Burmese junta for its upcoming
elections. “India should demand the same standards of free and fair voting
in Burma that it applies to itself.”

Moreover, Human Rights Watch said that not only was India prioritising the
wrong aspects of state policy, but was failing in its pursuit of an
incorrect policy.

Despite New Delhi now being Naypyidaw’s fourth largest trading partner,
and a major investor in natural resources and infrastructure in Burma,
India was said to be losing the race with China for access to Burmese
markets and resources.

“Even as it loses out in its efforts to counter China’s influence, India
has mortgaged its voice on political and human rights issues in Burma,”
Pearson said. “Than Shwe may think that a trip to New Delhi will be all
about business and military relations, but Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
should make a point to publicly voice principled criticism over the
rigging of Burma’s electoral laws and continued restrictions on basic
freedoms in Burma.”

Rehashing opposition to Burma’s 2008 constitution, activists and lawmakers
assess that anticipated polls elections in Burma this year offer little to
no hope for change in the country’s governance and its responsibility to
its citizens. As such, a reversal of policy is sought to more accurately
reflect the democratic spirit of India.

“Indian leaders should be profoundly discomforted to find themselves in
the same company as chronic human rights abusers like North Korea and
China furnishing weapons to Burma,” Pearson said. “By supporting real
democracy and respect for human rights in Burma, New Delhi can reverse a
flawed – and failed – policy of cynical engagement.”

In the mid-1990s New Delhi began to re-evaluate its foreign policy
regarding Burma, which had hitherto publicly supported the pro-democracy
movement spearheaded by Aung San Suu Kyi. However, Indian leaders, as part
of the country’s “Look East” policy, opted to ramp up relations with
Burma’s military authorities in an aim to reap economic and security
benefits.

Than Shwe is scheduled to depart India on Thursday.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

July 26, Khonumthung News
Burma’s 2010 elections reveal ugly truths – Lin Myat Thaw Tar

Burma’s military junta is enjoying being a media celebrity in the build-up
to elections it previously announced would be held at the end of this year
in an attempt to “guide flourishing democracy”. With the people of Burma
lacking freedom for five decades and experiencing so many wrongs since
1990, the mere advertisement of an election would seem an easy sell. But
the fundamental question is – when will the generals hand over power to a
fairly elected government? The logical answer appears to be not any time
soon.

Most of Burma’s neighbors on balance seem to prefer the outcome of the
election bring a new government to Burma. Yet, no developments are
convincing in the purported move toward democracy and peace, as the junta
has unilaterally pushed their will upon the people. Nonetheless, not to be
discouraged, the generals are marketing their election in the
international arena, in particular during the countless meetings of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Recently, some 22 military
generals retired from their posts in order to contest the elections as
civilians.

The major problem with this election is the prohibition of public assembly
and freedom of speech while thousands of pro-democracy activists remain
behind bars and millions of ethnic minorities remain denied their basic
rights. On top of this, almost all of the state’s media outlets serve as
spin-doctors for the junta’s views and position. And for good measure,
international election monitoring teams and journalists have been denied
entry into the country. In this type of environment, it is certain that
there will be no free and fair election in Burma under the military’s
watchful eye.

Political parties sprouting up to contest in the polling are in the
short-term spoiled by the attention afforded them by exile media groups.
Yet, in the long-term the political picture reflects a typical scene.
While the mood of the people to the election is difficult to discern due
to a lack of freedom, nobody running for office has as of yet developed
any significant policies. Party leaders must develop and promote social,
economic and political policies rather than merely parroting rhetorical
statements and references to models of quasi-democracy. And what of the
supposed ‘third force’? These chameleons have not brought to the table any
new policies either, instead simply bowing to the generals’ will.

Moreover, there is no clear timeframe or procedure to hand over power
after the election. While contestants are obligated to follow the commands
of Senior General Than Shwe, no one knows what will happen next, let alone
when the election will happen and how minority parties will line up
against the regime.

What the generals do without question believe is that they can sell their
brand of democracy to neighboring countries, especially China, India,
Thailand, Singapore and other ASEAN states. And they may well be correct.
As long as gas, teak and minerals are still in demand, international
legitimacy for the Burmese regime is of little interest to its neighbors.

With respect to the election laws and the most recent constitution, they
were unilaterally promulgated by the military. The 2008 constitution
requires parliamentary bodies comprise 25 percent appointed military
candidates. Unsurprisingly, there is zero space for individual liberty,
public participation and consensus decision-making throughout the entire
process.

With respect to economic factors, Burma’s Human Development and
Anti-Corruption Indices are some of the lowest in the world. Though the
country is ranked the second largest narcotic exporter in the world, it
has run budget deficits for more than five decades. There are no
systematic fiscal and monetary policies being implemented. Burma is
neither a sound international trade partner nor an attractive destination
for Foreign Directed Investment (FDI).

With respect to monetary policy, since 1990 Burma has maintained three
genres of foreign exchange: market, fixed and quasi-fixed. As a result,
monetary policy cannot effectively pursue global capital investment and
money markets. Equally, there is zero incentive for the creation of a
vibrant middle class, sustained economic growth or export-driven
development. The elections, thus, are of no interest to the international
economic community.

The empirical fact is that the legitimate leader of the country is Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. The trump card is in her hands. Thousands upon thousands
of democracy activists have been selflessly following her leadership in
both domestic and international arenas. The game is not yet over and her
leadership still overwhelmingly dominates the younger generations of
Burma. The struggle between legitimate and illegitimate democrats will
continue until the military recognizes the imperative of a true democratic
process inclusive of free and fair elections.

____________________________________

July 26, Democratic Voice of Burma
Retaking power in Burma (Pt. 1) – Elliott Prasse-Freeman

Prevailing current opinion is that Burma’s elections this year will be a
charade and the opposition is right to condemn them. Burma, commentators
say, is a totalitarian state controlled by a military clique that has
ruled the country for nearly half a century. But the myth of
totalitarianism should be challenged, as should the assumption that there
is no potential for meaningful social change to exist around the election
process. Because while the conditions for politics in Burma are hardly
ideal, a legitimate opportunity for reconnecting with average people – and
opposing the military’s march toward pseudo-normalcy – exists in this
year’s elections.

The debate requires an accurate understanding of how power in the country
functions, particularly in regards to how it operates to constrain and/or
animate politics. So to examine power, let us begin with a story in two
parts:

The first is that society is so suffused with fear of the state that
Burmese will only whisper about politics, even when they are walking along
a noisy city street. The sheer number of journalistic accounts telling of
this narrative is remarkable (Google the words ‘Burma’ and ‘whisper’
together), and demonstrates its durable and diffuse reality in Burma, not
to mention the media’s ongoing obsession with it.

But the second part of the story complicates the first: if people are
afraid to speak of politics, one might expect lots of men with guns on
those streets. Yet, the thugs refuse to materialize. How can these two
phenomena exist simultaneously? The common explanation is that Burmese
people live under the constant watch of the state, and over time have
internalized the panopticon: there isn’t the need for men with guns at
every corner because people discipline their neighbours by silencing
themselves.

This story is largely true: oppositional politics – which have primarily
involved militating for “human rights”, parliamentary political processes,
and legal reforms – is viewed by people as irredeemably dangerous in
Burma, to be avoided. If politics is like a muscle that needs to be
exercised in order to remain strong, the Burmese collective political
muscles have degenerated over the years.

Juxtapose this first story with another: that of the NGO currently holding
sessions on ‘civic education’ with local community associations,
discussing both procedural and normative issues around democracy. “What is
the right form of government?” “What do other Constitutions around the
world look like? How does ours compare?” “What is the role of an engaged
citizenry?” The NGO is able to hold forums around these kinds of
questions. And while this NGO may be somewhat exceptional – in that it has
etched out an ability over time and with painstaking effort to hold
sensitive activities – it is not Myanmar Egress. By which it is not that
controversial organization that sometimes appears the exception that
proves the rule. Rather, this NGO is more like the others: just one of a
rampantly growing Burmese civil society sector. Estimates have 240,000
organizations delivering social services, running spiritual groups,
assembling cultural and recreation events, and providing community-based
forums for discussions about socioeconomic development. While all of these
groups (Egress included) have to navigate the state in one way or another
– which entails, inter alia, never encroaching into the terrain of the
political – many are effectively independent from state domination. This
story is also true.

How can both stories then exist side-by-side? How can the state evince
seemingly totalitarian tendencies in certain spheres, but abandon so much
space in others? A simple answer is that events in Burma have been
consistently misinterpreted by external critics. They assume that
militarised Burma is a nightmarish reflection of the ‘modern state’, a
hegemonic collection of institutions and structures that centralises and
bureaucratises everything to control and discipline all aspects of
political subjects’ lives.

Burma, however, lacks the population management tools needed to reach into
every corner of its nation and control its citizens. To illustrate: there
are no biometric identity cards, no security cameras on every street
corner; there is neither a robust social security system, nor a
sophisticated taxation apparatus. Indeed, when cyclone Nargis occurred in
2008, communication was so poor that the military had to get its marching
orders by interpreting the newspapers! The Burmese state is a different
animal altogether.

Does this mean the state is not as bad as it is sometimes portrayed? On
the contrary, in many ways it can be even more brutal and despotic in the
absence of these other structures. The key is that Burma’s military-state
deploys resources selectively to create its regime of control, and the
generals prefer control on the cheap. Indeed, realizing totalitarian
control would necessitate sacrificing resources currently expended on
priorities for maintaining political stability: namely, buttressing
military and police apparatuses such that they can quash any perceived
threat, and directing resources toward military families and
business-sector clients.

In Burma, power radiates out of centres and dissipates over geographical
and institutional space, operating through peripheral officials who
dominate political activity, attempt to monopolize violence, extract
resources (through small-scale resource plundering), and maintain social
order through intermediaries (communities themselves). In fact, the
military-state likely sees totalitarian control as actually risky, as it
leaves civilians with few avenues for escape from the state: patronage
networks, maintained through bribes and personal relationships, would be
restricted, likewise would the black market that keeps resources flowing
to places of demand. Whether consciously or not, the military-state has
avoided power relationships that spur collective resistance.

In this way, it is helpful to utilize political scientist Michael Mann’s
typology: the state deploys high despotic power (the ability to crush what
it can see) but low infrastructural power (an absence of institutions that
would allow it to see everything). Where it is strongest, the state
attains significant control at reduced cost: despotic power, while focused
around political expression, leeches into the social realm as well. When
people are significantly dominated politically – and when almost any act
can always be interpreted as a political one – silence comes to deafen
much of the population (punctuated by moments of collective eruptions at
the indignity and oppression of it all – 1988, 1996, 2007 – before silence
descends again). This results in a simple avoidance of political topics;
coded speech when there is speech about politics at all; a lack of trust
in general of those outside of the family; and an absence of ‘social
capital’. In this regard the state gets something for nothing.

Civil society space

At the same time though, because power is not total, there are spaces at
peripheries – both institutional and geographic – for civil society to
grow and function relatively autonomously. Power dissipates
concentrically, both through the three institutional branches of the state
(military, Peace and Development Council [police], administration), and
away from the geographical centres of power (Rangoon, Naypyidaw, major
cities). Therefore, a local commander in a distant Chin state village
(geographical), or a low-level official in the marginally powerful
Ministry of Social Welfare in Rangoon (institutional) may both be distant
from the centres of military-state power.

As a result, these agents retain a certain autonomy to recreate their own
systems of control. Many choose to be as despotic (in the case of
commanders or police) or as uncooperative and/or scrutinizing (in the case
of state administration) as the central state. This is especially true in
ethnic areas where “security threats” are privileged by police or military
on the ground – often agents there are even more abusive than the standard
centralized state. However, many agents cannot afford to replicate the
central state’s will. This is because they are constrained from both above
and below: superiors from above demand a subdued populace, while the agent
must manage patron/client relationships, as well as ensure that conditions
don’t completely deteriorate for the people below.

Many state agents thus must propose a bargain: they reach out to civil
society for assistance. This is somewhat risky: civil society has some
inherent political content – indeed, people getting together to talk about
how to address social problems tends to lead to conversations about the
nature of those problems, which is inherently political. But in the end
the state agent feels the bargain is worth the risk. Civil society
political content is likely too meagre itself to spark rebellion, given
the way that power pre-empts the formation of broader political
consciousness; given the way that collective forms of political resistance
have been put down by the despotic power of the state in the past. And so
the state agents allow civil society participation; not only that, they
often prevent centralized-state penetration of civil society activities:
they lie to their higher-ups, or more accurately, engage in the brilliant
strategy of plausible deniability when interacting with civil society:
‘Just don’t tell me what you’re doing!’

Local state agents therefore simultaneously deploy two contradictory
desires: they want to ensure civil society does not act politically, yet
they also refuse to know what civil society is actually doing! This
results in tense and symbiotic bargains which remain stable only provided
civil society is both apolitical and will always remain so. In other
words: the state vets an organization, ensures it is only delivering
services, and then is compelled by the limits of a system of despotic
power and its own need for plausible deniability to become partially blind
to civil society’s future activities. And herein lies the opportunity.

Let us imagine if civil society organizations began bending the rules. Not
breaking them (holding mass rallies), but simply bending them (beginning
to facilitate covertly political discussions: talking about politics
through other idioms). Given that these pockets of space do exist in Burma
for discussion and perhaps even politics, imagine if there was a mechanism
for imbuing that civil society with political consciousness and get it to
begin disrupting the current ossified bargains.

Part II will explore how this might play out. The argument will not be for
rebellion, but rather that the expected elections may be a first moment in
a slow process of repeated negotiations with, and demands of, the state.
These demands, emerging necessarily from a number of different realms of
civil society, may lead to a potentially radical transformation of power
and society in Burma.

____________________________________

July 26, Irrawaddy
Than Shwe may free Suu Kyi before election: Former spy – Wai Moe

A former CIA-trained Burmese intelligence officer suggests that Burmese
junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe will only release pro-democracy leader
Aung San Suu Kyi and some political prisoners as a last tactic before the
election if he faces strong international pressure.

“If the US and other countries exert strong pressure, he [Than Shwe] may
change in mind and release some political prisoners,” wrote Maj Aung Lynn
Htut, a former Charge d’Affairs at the Burmese embassy in Washington D.C,
in his recent analysis, the “The 1990 Election to 2010 Election in Burma.”

“He often told us [military officials] that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is the
last card he can play in Burmese politics,” he said, adding that if the
international community fails to exert more pressure, Than Shwe will hold
the election without Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD).

He said Than Shwe is worried about calls by democracy activists for him to
be tried by the International Criminal Court and reportedly consulted his
attorney general on the matter.

Before Aung Lynn Htut came to Washington in 2000 as the second
highest-ranking Burmese diplomat in the US, he was a senior officer at the
counter-intelligence department of the Directorate of Defense Service
Intelligence then headed by Gen Khin Nyunt, who was ousted and arrested in
October 2004.

He completed a three-month training program with the CIA in Washington
after he graduated from the elite Defense Service Academy in Pyin U Lwin
in 1987.

As a counter-intelligence officer, Aung Lynn Htut accompanied his boss,
Khin Nyunt, to top meetings of Burmese generals, and he has maintained
contacts with both active and retired officers in Burma's military.

Since Suu Kyi began her involvement in Burma’s democracy movement in 1988,
she has been arrested three times by Than Shwe's regime.

After being detained since her first arrest in July 1989, the junta freed
Suu Kyi on July 10, 1995, announcing that, “The order to restrict Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi to her compound has been revoked as of today.”

Her release came as a surprise since a few days previously Khin Nyunt had
said she would not be released because “the rights of 45 million are more
important than the rights of an individual.”

Observers said the order for Suu Kyi’s release in 1995 directly came from
Than Shwe, three years after he took the office over from his predecessor
Gen Saw Maung.

Suu Kyi was arrested a second time in September 2000 and detained for 19
months until her release in May 2002. On that occasion, Suu Kyi said:
“"It's a new dawn for the country. We only hope the dawn will move very
quickly.”

At the time, the junta said it firmly believed in letting all citizens
take part in the political process. Statements by the junta and Suu Kyi
suggested her release was a result of secret talks between the two sides
during her detention.

Arrested a third time in May 2003 and kept in detention ever since, Suu
Kyi is scheduled to be released when the most recent 18-month extension of
her house arrest ends in November.

However, politicians inside Burma are pessimistic about her chances as
long as the junta has not held its planned election.

“People are talking about a December election, and if Suu Kyi is not
released, then she may be facing an extension of her sentence to three
years,” said Khin Maung Swe, a leader of the National Democratic Force, a
splinter group of Suu Kyi’s NLD.

“The reduction in her sentence to 18 months was on condition that 'she
behaves well',” said Khin Maung Swe.

Meanwhile, Aung Lynn Htut added in his analysis that Than Shwe ordered
Burmese diplomats and intelligence agencies to conduct psychological
warfare against Suu Kyi and the opposition.

This included spreading disinformation about Suu Kyi in the international
community through Burmese diplomats and “popular and educated persons” at
home and abroad.

According to Aung Lynn Htut, it was Than Shwe who spread the idea that Suu
Kyi was not willing to negotiate with the military.

“This is quite believable,” said Aye Thar Aung, an Arakanese leader and
the secretary of the Committee Representing People’s Parliament, an
umbrella group of the opposition and ethnic parties.

“For example, we have recently witnessed people like the so-called 'Third
Force' in Burmese politics telling diplomats and foreign NGO's that
opponents of Than Shwe's election plans are hardliners,” he said.

“Those people say they are neither with the junta nor the opposition. But
in fact their backgrounds show they come from the military elite,” he
said.