BurmaNet News, August 4, 2010

[Editor]

August 4, 2010 Issue #4012


INSIDE BURMA
SHAN: NLD leaders meet imprisoned ethnic leaders’ families
DVB: Newly-formed youth group urges voters to boycott Burmese election

ON THE BORDER
Irrawaddy: Women's access to health care increased: Researchers

BUSINESS / TRADE
Mizzima: Ivanhoe Monywa mine evades sanctions via Singaporean bank

HEALTH
Mizzima: Kachin State HIV rates at least 16 times the national average

INTERNATIONAL
Inner City Press: With UN under fire for inaction on Myanmar, Japan is
offered Good Offices post, sources say, rejects it so far

OPINION / OTHER
World Politics Review: India's flawed Myanmar policy – Vishal Arora
Irrawaddy: US must show strong leadership in Burma policy – Editorial
Council on Foreign Relations: Elections and opportunity in Myanmar –
Joshua Kurlantzick

ANNOUNCEMENT
NED: Call for applications: Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowships



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INSIDE BURMA

August 4, Shan Herald Agency for News
NLD leaders meet imprisoned ethnic leaders’ families – Hseng Khio Fah

Some leaders of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD)
party are reported to have made a visit to family members of different
imprisoned ethnic leaders at the home of a Shan ethnic leader in Rangoon
yesterday.

On 3 August, a group of NLD members led by U Win Tin and U Tin Oo, along
with other members including Dr. Nay Win Myint, U Naing Naing, Ms Cho Cho
Thin were said to have met with family members of Khun Htun Oo, Chairman
of Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which was the second
largest winning party in the whole of Burma and the winning party in Shan
State in the 1990 elections; as well as Sai Nyunt Lwin aka Sai Nood,
general secretary of SNLD, Sai Hla Aung and Pu Gin Xin Thang, Chairman of
Zomi National Congress (his son and nephew are in jail) and mother of Tin
Saw Aung, Rakhaing youth leader, according to Sai Lake, the defunct SNLD’s
spokesman.

The meeting took place at Khun Htun Oo’s house with the NLD
representatives arriving at 10.30 and staying for just over an hour, he
said.

U Win Tin was said to have spoken to the family members of the need for
them to remain strong and told them they should be proud of the detainees’
stand and not to mourn as ‘just as every politician has his day to go to
jail, likewise he has the day to be released,’ he said.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have always stood beside the ethnic
nationalities, never ignoring issues about ethnic affairs since it was
recognized as political party. The party will also never leave the ethnic
nationalities behind even thought it was no longer recognized as a
political party because it believes that all ethnic nationalities should
have equal and autonomous rights under a genuine union.

“We are happy that they [NLD leaders] came and encouraged us,” said the
spokesman for the families. “I also think that if all ethnic nationalities
were to come and meet often to exchange opinions and ideas it would be
very productive.”

In May, the SNLD had to make an official announcement that it would not
re-register to contest in the upcoming general elections unless its party
chairman and other imprisoned leaders are released.

Khun Tun Oo, party leader and elected MP for Hsipaw, is currently serving
a 95-year term in Burma’s northernmost town Putao, while general secretary
Sai Nyunt Lwin aka Sai Nood is serving 85 years in Kalemyo, Sagaing
division.

The two were detained along with other 7 leaders on 8-9 February 2005 on
charges of treason, defamation, setting up of illegal organization and
violation of the 5/96 Law prohibiting people from criticizing the
constitution drafted by its rulers. The draft was “ratified” by an
overwhelming 92% of the country’s eligible voters in May 2008, according
to junta announcement.

____________________________________

August 2, Democratic Voice of Burma
Newly-formed youth group urges voters to boycott Burmese election

The All Burma Youth Union, ABYU, which was formed today, has urged all
Burmese voters to collectively boycott the junta's 2010 election. The ABYU
calls for the election boycott because the Burmese people have suffered
poverty, hunger, and low standard since 1962 under successive military
regimes in Burma and the 2010 election is nothing but the military
clique's preparation to prolong their hold on power. ABYU spokesman Ko
Aung Myint said the group was formed with youths from all parts of the
country with the aim to rid the country of servitude and to build a
democratic State.

“If we approved the election process, if we cast our votes, then it will
be like officially allowing the military to continue the dictatorship and
hold on to power for generations to come. We should not accept any
election held anytime according to the 2008 dictatorial and biased
constitution. We absolutely cannot accept the constitution. We would also
like to urge [the Burmese people] not to accept the constitution.”

That was an explanation by Ko Aung Myint. The ABYU declared that it will
continue its endeavours in accord with its fundamental principles such as
democracy, peace, youth rights, national equality and unity, and to be
modern and developed.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

August 4, Irrawaddy
Women's access to health care increased: Researchers – Lalit K Jha

Washington — A community-based maternal health delivery program has
dramatically increased access to maternal health care for internally
displaced women in eastern Burma, say American researchers.

The study carried out by researchers from the prestigious Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health found that there was a 10-fold increase
in the proportion of women assisted at delivery by workers skilled in
providing emergency obstetric care, because of the MOM Project (mobile
obstetric medics).

The researchers believe that the MOM Project could be a model for maternal
health care delivery in settings where resources are extremely limited.
The study appeared in the Aug. 3 edition of the journal PLoS Medicine.

"The MOM Project's focus on task-shifting, capacity building and
empowerment at the community level might serve as a model approach for
delivering needed maternal health care in severely constrained areas,"
said Luke Mullany, lead author of the study and an associate professor at
the school's Center for Public Health and Human Rights.

Conducted in collaboration with four ethnic health organizations working
along the Burma-Thailand border, the MOM Project provided a three-tiered
network of community-based providers, which included traditional birth
attendants to improve antenatal care services, health workers to provide
supplies and prevent post-birth complications and maternal health workers
who were responsible for oversight and training, as well as providing
emergency care.

According to the analysis, 72 percent of women received antenatal care
after implementation of the MOM Project, up from 40 percent prior to the
start of the project.

Postnatal visits within seven days following delivery doubled, while
contraception use increased from 24 percent to 45 percent, reducing unmet
need for contraception by 35 percent.

"Innovative alternatives like the MOM Project are urgently needed in a
wide range of settings," said Chris Beyrer, a senior author of the study
and director of the Center for Public Health and Human Rights.

Such projects can bring services directly to displaced women and can be
delivered outside traditional settings, he said.

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

August 4, Mizzima News
Ivanhoe Monywa mine evades sanctions via Singaporean bank – Thomas Maung Shwe

Chiang Mai – Myanmar Ivanhoe Copper, the blacklisted joint venture that
runs Burma’s largest mine, uses Singaporean bankers to evade Western
sanctions against Burma when it receives payments for copper from the
controversial Monywa mine, a copy of a copper sales contract reveals.

Monywa, a city in Burma’s northwestern division of Sagaing, is about 140
kilometres from Mandalay on the eastern bank of the Chindwin River.

An April 2010 contract for the sale of copper produced at the Monywa
copper mine obtained by Mizzima shows that the Myanmar Ivanhoe Copper
Company Limited (MICCL), which runs Burma’s largest mine, uses a
Singaporean bank account to circumvent Western sanctions against Burma
when it receives overseas funds used to purchase copper produced at the
controversial mine.

The document shows that funds for the purchases are to be sent to “the
account of Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB) with Overseas
Chinese Banking Corporation, Singapore, a beneficiary MICCL account at
MICB”. Like MICCL, MICB (aka Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank) is
also on the US government’s list of entities blacklisted for their links
to the Burmese ruling junta.

Critics have accused the Singapore-based Overseas Chinese Banking
Corporation (OCBC) of assisting the Burmese regime in hiding the
tremendous wealth it receives from natural gas sales.

Citing confidential sources, the legal rights NGO, Earth Rights
International, first reported last year that OCBC is one of two
Singaporean banks with which the Burmese regime deposits the billions of
dollars it receives from the lucrative Yadana natural gas project
involving France’s Total, the American giant Chevron and Thailand’s
state-owned oil firm PTTEP.

In a follow-up report released last month, ERI, citing recent documented
testimony of Sai Thein Win, a military scientist who defected from Burma,
said the hard-currency proceeds stored in Singapore, instead of being used
to pay for desperately needed health care or education “enabled the
country’s autocratic junta to maintain power and pursue an expensive,
illegal nuclear weapons programme while participating in illicit weapons
trade in collaboration with North Korea, threatening the domestic and
regional security balance”.

Sean Turnell, an economist at Sydney’s Macquarie University and editor of
Burma Economic Watch, told Mizzima his internationally recognised research
had found that as with natural gas revenues, revenues from state-owned or
co-owned mining projects were inaccurately recorded in Burma’s national
budget using a deliberately flawed exchange rate.

Turnell said: “All foreign-exchange revenues accruing to state-owned
entities in Burma are recorded at the country’s grossly overvalued
exchange rate. This has the effect of hiding the vast part of these
revenues [more than 90 per cent] from Burma’s public accounts, and allows
foreign exchange to be secreted away offshore for the regime’s private
use, and at the expense of the people they exploit and misrule. It is
difficult to conceive of a worse example of large-scale state larceny,
anywhere in the world.”

Canadian Friends of Burma (CFOB) executive director Tin Maung Htoo, a
long-time critic of Ivanhoe’s activities in Burma agreed with Turnell’s
assessment. The exiled activist and survivor of the August 1988 anti-junta
protests told Mizzima he was not surprised to see definitive evidence of
what he had long suspected.

“Now we have absolute proof that Ivanhoe’s Burmese operations have
resulted in millions of dollars going to a secret offshore
junta-controlled hard-currency fund,” Tin Maung Htoo said. “We’re certain
that this money is not being used for badly needed social services but
instead going for the Burmese generals’ personal use, military weapons
buying sprees and clandestine missile and nuclear programmes.”

Mizzima has also found evidence that supports Tin Maung Htoo’s belief that
funds from the Monywa mine have been diverted to offshore Singapore
accounts since Ivanhoe’s joint venture with the Burmese regime first
started producing copper in 1998. A 1999 paper written and presented by
then-Indochina Goldfields (previous name for Ivanhoe Mines) president
Daniel Kunz stated that MICCL used a Singaporean bank to facilitate the
sale of copper produced at the Monywa mine. Kunz also stated that the
MICCL bank account in Singapore was overseen by unnamed “trustees”; Kunz
again repeated this information in a similar 2001 paper presented at a
Colorado mining conference.

Tin Maung Htoo said the documented evidence of MICCL’s using a Singaporean
bank to skirt Western sanctions was yet one more reason why the Canadian
Government of Stephen Harper should investigate Ivanhoe Mines’ Burmese
operations and their controversial exit from Burma. He said “Ivanhoe Mines
has conducted themselves in a thoroughly disgraceful manner for many
years, Ivanhoe’s senior executives, several of whom were on the board of
MICCL, were clearly in a position to be aware that their joint venture was
deliberately evading sanctions. Ivanhoe must be investigated for its
actions and punished for any legal violations the firm or entities it
controlled have committed.”

The activist said that as the Canadian government was a supporter of the
people of Burma, he looked forward to a thorough investigation of Ivanhoe
adding, “we hope that Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon and his
colleague International Trade Minister Peter Van Loan conduct a thorough
probe of this matter as soon as possible”.

As evidence of what he called Ivanhoe’s “total disregard for human
rights”, Tin Maung Htoo brought up what he calls the “despicable pro-junta
comments” made by then- Ivanhoe president Kunz in September 2000.
In an interview with a Canadian journalist, Kunz defended the junta,
describing the situation in Burma as such: “There are 146 different ethnic
groups that have been at civil war for decades and decades. It’s
complicated. The military government, unfortunately, is probably the only
form of government that can deal with such a complex problem.”

Ownership of Ivanhoe’s 50 per cent stake in MICCL still mired in controversy

Ivanhoe Mines and its controversial chairman Robert Friedland, aka “Toxic
Bob”, are accused by CFOB of secretly selling its 50 per cent stake in
MICCL, the joint venture that operated Burma’s Monywa copper mine to
cronies of the Burmese regime linked to Chinese weapon’s firm Nornico and
mining giant Chinalco. A trusted source with insider knowledge of Burma’s
recent wave of privatisations confirmed to Mizzima that this was indeed
what happened late last year.

Last month the exiled news service Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB)
reported that Norinco will give the Burmese mobile military howitzers
(artillery pieces) in exchange for copper from the Monywa mine, something
Khun Myint Tun, a senior member of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy called “deeply disturbing”. Khun Myint Tun and the NLD also
called on the Canadian government to investigate the allegations
surrounding Ivanhoe’s departure from Monywa.

If Ivanhoe’s 50 per cent stake in MICCL was indeed sold or given to
cronies of the junta this was a violation of Canadian sanctions against
Burma. Canada’s financial and investment restrictions targeting Senior
General Than Shwe’s regime were significantly strengthened following the
crushing of the September 2007 popular uprising led by Burmese monks.

In February 2007, Ivanhoe placed its 50 per cent stake in MICCL under the
direction of an ostensibly “independent trust”, which was given the task
of selling Ivanhoe’s Burmese assets. Despite repeated requests from media
and human rights groups Ivanhoe has so far refused to disclose the
individuals or firms that operate or oversee the trust.

In a statement posted on the Ivanhoe’s website on June 30, Ivanhoe denied
the trust had sold its stake in MICCL. The firm however refused to show
any proof the stake had not been sold, something Tin Maung Htoo told
Mizzima “is a clear sign Ivanhoe is deceiving the Canadian public about
what happened to its stake in Burma’s largest mine”.

NLD urge Quebec pension plan to probe Ivanhoe’s Burmese activities

Reached for comment on the latest revelations surrounding Ivanhoe Mines,
Khun Myint Tun, an exiled NLD member of the parliament elected in 1990 and
close ally of Suu Kyi, called on the Quebec pension plan, the Caisse de
dépôt, one of Ivanhoe’s five biggest shareholders at 7 per cent, to use
its significant holdings to force Ivanhoe Mines to fully disclose what had
happened to its Burmese assets. He also urged the Caisse to probe details
surrounding the December 2003 arrest of Ivanhoe’s Burmese driver.

Ko Thet Lwin, a driver employed by Ivanhoe Mines was jailed and sentenced
to a lengthy prison term after his boss, Andrew Mitchell, a senior Ivanhoe
geologist in Burma, demanded to be driven to Suu Kyi’s home.

After driving to Suu Kyi’s lakeside residence both Ko Thet Lwin and
Mitchell were detained by the soldiers who act as her jailers. Mitchell, a
British national was quickly released, but Ko Thet Lwin, according to his
family, was sentenced to seven years in prison for doing what his superior
had foolishly ordered him to do. Burma’s New Light of Myanmar later
published a story claiming that Ko Thet Lwin was on drugs and had
kidnapped his boss; something Khun Myint Tun calls “a total fabrication”.

Ko Thet Lwin was last known to be jailed in Burma’s notorious Insein
prison in early 2007. Khun Myint Tun, himself a former political prisoner,
and other human rights activists fear Ko Thet Lwin died in the May 2007
massacre of more than a dozen prisoners at Insein by jail guards after the
roof blew off the prison during Cyclone Nargis.

Khun Myin Tun told Mizzima: “I urge Quebec Premier Jean Charest and
Michael Sabia [Caisse chief executive] and the other trustees of the
Caisse de dépôt to use their significant stake in the firm to force
Ivanhoe to reveal all they know about the events involving Ko Thet Lwin’s
arrest and what has since become of him.”

“I’m sure the people of Quebec would be astonished to learn that their
hard-earned wages were being invested in Ivanhoe Mines, a ruthless and
unprincipled firm run by the notorious Robert Friedland,” he said.

____________________________________
HEALTH

August 4, Mizzima News
Kachin State HIV rates at least 16 times the national average – Phanida

Chiang Mai – HIV-positive prevalence rates in areas controlled by
cease-fire groups in the northern Burmese state of Kachin are more than 16
times the average for the country, resulting in concerns a disaster is
imminent if the region fails to receive sufficient help, an NGO said of
its quarter-long survey of the problem.

Since 2008, the Burmese junta has denied health organisations access to
the region to help battle the virus that can lead to Aids, and this year
direct-help programmes were stopped.

The regional NGO conducted a survey of HIV infection rates in two special
regions in Kachin State for about three months. It found that at least 11
per cent of the regions’ total population was infected with the virus.

The average nationwide HIV infection rate is 0.67 per cent of the
population or 242,000, the World Health Organisation report said, citing a
survey in 2007.

Kachin Special Region 1 (Panwa, Kanpitete, Chibway) is controlled by the
New Democratic Army (Kachin) and Kachin Special Region 2 (Laiza, Maijayan)
is controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO).

“The survey says that it is highly critical of health standards in the
region. Most of the HIV victims are young people, between 15 and 35 years
old. In my area, there are about 500 HIV patients,” a KIO official said on
condition of anonymity.

The direct-help programmes of NGOs for HIV carriers were stopped this year
and there were existing restrictions on health organisations entering the
region, so the situation had become very serious, the official said.

“KIO is a revolutionary organisation, so we don’t have enough money to
battle Aids. It would be good if AZG could help the region effectively.
But, their help is not enough. Moreover, the junta does not allow NGOs to
enter the region and there are drug-related cases as well,” another KIO
official told Mizzima, referring to the Dutch medical aid organisation,
AZG.

In 2008, AZG, tried to enter Liza, which is under KIO control, to conduct
programmes to battle the spread of Aids but former North Command chief
General Ohn Myint, denied access, a ban that continues.

“If the efforts are decreased, the disaster will be very serious. The
situation demands extra efforts. We need to take time to educate
residents”, an employee from a regional NGO said.

Former KIO chairman Bran Saing announced that one of the reasons the
cease-fire deal was signed with the Burmese military junta was his serious
concern that Aids would have a great impact on the region, a KIO official
recalled.

“We don’t have enough doctors and health-care-educated people, so though
we battle against Aids, we do not succeed”, he told Mizzima.

____________________________________
INTERNATIONAL

August 3, Inner City Press
With UN under fire for inaction on Myanmar, Japan is offered Good Offices
post, sources say, rejects it so far – Matthew Russell Lee

United Nations – Facing questions of what the UN has accomplished on
Myanmar through its “Good Offices” mandate, since Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon's chief of staff Vijay Nambiar has filled the post, the Good
Offices are being offered to a variety of Japanese officials, sources tell
Inner City Press.

When Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu left, he was reportedly offered the
Myanmar “Good Offices” post.” Takasu turned it down; Japanese mission
sources, while fully believing that Takusa would be offered a senior UN
post, say that he is going to retire.
Others say that the UN Myanmar post, which Ibrahim Gambari vacated when he
went to UNAMID in Darfur, is now being offered to two other Japanese
diplomats, including the highest placed one in the UN system. With Ban
Ki-moon in Japan this week, watch this site.

This comes as questions have built up, without being answered, about the
UN's “Good Offices” on Myanmar mandate, particularly since Nambiar took
over from Ibrahim Gambari. Inner City Press has repeated asked for
information about the work and accomplishments in any. On June 22, Inner
City Press asked:

Inner City Press: on Myanmar, there’s a lot to be said, but there’s a
recent report, Bloomberg and Jane’s Intelligence Review, which is
respected in the field, giving more credence to Myanmar developing nuclear
weapons. A whistleblower, to coin the phrase, has left the country and has
produced photographs of a facility near the new capital. Does the UN have
any, either the good offices role? What is the UN’s knowledge of that,
given that the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is unable to
inspect? And two, what really has been accomplished through this good
offices role in the past six months? We have heard very little, and that
may be part of Ms. Ahlenius’ critique.

Spokesperson Martin Nesirky: First, the Secretary-General has been
outspoken about what is going on in Myanmar, first on the elections, the
need for the elections to be transparent and inclusive, and for all the
political actors to be able to take part if they so wish. He’s also been
very outspoken on the need for the release from house arrest of Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi. Also, on the first part of your question, this is something,
whether allowed into the country to inspect or not, the International
Atomic Energy Agency would be keeping an eye on, and let’s see what the
agency has to say about that. [He later added that the IAEA had said: “The
IAEA has seen the media reports and continues its analysis of information
on Myanmar, as it does with information on other countries.”]

The next day, July 23, Inner City Press followed up, as "one reporter" --

Inner City Press: Yesterday, during the response by Ms. [Angela] Kane and
[Catherine] Pollard, they declined to say, to respond to this part of the
[Inga-Britt] Ahlenius memo that said — it is only one country among many
but it was the first one listed, Myanmar — and the senior UN official who
spoke later, for some reason, declined also to discuss it. I guess I want
to ask you, what have been the accomplishments of the good offices mandate
since Mr. [Ibrahim] Gambari let it go, and another official took it over.
What has been done? There has been an ASEAN [Association of South-East
Asian Nations] meeting, various countries have spoken about the election.
Has the UN made any comment? What’s the UN doing on Myanmar?

Spokesperson Nesirky: We’ve made comments in answer to you and to others,
and I said just to you the other day that there are important elements
here; the need for transparent and inclusive elections, that’s absolutely
critical. There is also the need for political prisoners, including Aung
San Suu Kyi, to be released unconditionally and quickly. And we continue
to work, as I also said to you before; the good offices [team] is not one
individual, if you like, it’s people working behind the scenes. Not
everything that happens is in the public eye.

Well, that is true. At the same time that Takasu left, Japan's
representative on the UN's Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions Misako Kaji also left, despite her term running
through December 2010. While Japan quickly nominated Akira Sugiyama to
replace her, this “clean sweep” of Japanese at the UN has caught the eye
of some. Watch this site.

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

August 4, World Politics Review
India's flawed Myanmar policy – Vishal Arora

New Delhi -- Last week's visit to India by Burma's military ruler, Gen.
Than Shwe, during which several bilateral agreements and treaties were
signed, highlighted the tensions in New Delhi's policy toward the isolated
Southeast Asian country. The red carpet welcome that New Delhi accorded to
Than sparked protests by Burmese refugees, who in addition to denouncing
Than as a murderer and dictator, argued that a democratic Burma would
better serve India's strategic interests.

India once openly supported the Burmese democracy movement led by Aung San
Suu Kyi. But in the 1990s, it changed course and stepped up engagement
with the military junta based on strategic interests. Almost two decades
later, according to many analysts, New Delhi has not achieved any of its
three main strategic goals in Burma.

Åshild Kolås, of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, identified India's
primary interests with regard to Burma as increasing security in the
border regions "through generous military assistance and agreements on
counterinsurgency cooperation," promoting New Delhi's "Look East policy"
by "building overland transportation routes from northeast India to
Southeast Asia and the Bay of Bengal," and finally, "countering Chinese
influence."

With regard to military cooperation, Kolås said, Burma, officially known
as Myanmar, has failed to deliver help that New Delhi needs to confront
insurgent groups in India's northeast that operate from across the Burmese
border. "Even if the Burmese military were capable of delivering,
sustaining cross-border militancy is a much better bargaining chip for the
regime," she explained.

Kolås added that India's Look East policy was reckless, since "opening up
to a country in crisis may offer few benefits while increasing challenges
such as drug trafficking (opium, heroin and methamphetamines), weapons
smuggling, human trafficking and the spread of HIV/AIDS."

She went on to say that India had "no chance of competing with China for
any 'favors' from the Burmese regime," because Burma and China had
stronger converging interests. China sees Myanmar as a transport route for
oil and gas that bypasses the Strait of Malacca. Meanwhile, she explained,
the Burmese regime wants to maintain China as a key ally due to its status
as a permanent member with veto power in the U.N. Security Council.

Burma's preferences are apparent in its recent strategic choices. Benedict
Rogers, in his book, "Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant," claimed that
in 2007, Than granted Beijing special privileges for exploiting Burma's
natural resources, agreeing to sell newfound gas from the Shwe gas fields
to China, even though a competing Indian bid was more attractive
financially.

Renaud Egreteau, an analyst from the University of Hong Kong, agreed with
Kolås, arguing that India could not go beyond a tactical and targeted
partnership because of "Burma's nationalistic agenda, which sees India as
a credible counterweight to China, but not more."

Satyabrat Sinha, assistant professor at the Department of Peace and
Conflict Studies at Sikkim University in northeast India, said that
Burma's advantageous bargaining position exacerbates New Delhi's
predicament: The Burmese junta knows that India cannot afford to "lose"
Burma to the Chinese, nor can India allow the security situation in its
own northeast to deteriorate.

Egreteau further explained that, given Burma's "nationalist and xenophobic
legacies and policies," the Burmese regime can keep Asia's globalizing and
democratizing trends at bay to remain the master of its own foreign
policy, including toward India. He added that a vocal policy of opposition
to the Burmese junta had little chance of success, given Burma's
geopolitical environment. That explains "the tactful Indian policy of
discreetly courting and engaging a Burmese military that will remain
Burma's key policymaking player in the next decade."

However, Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, from the Calcutta Research Group,
argues that India's "all-carrot policy" vis-à-vis the military junta in
Myanmar has not paid off. "[India's] Sinophobia may be based on certain
developments taking place in [its] immediate neighborhood, but [India's]
policies to deal with the growing Chinese presence in the region smacks of
immaturity." Chaudhury compared India's failure to formulate an
independent Burmese policy to its decision-making on Iran policy, which he
described as being "outsourced" to Washington. India voted against Iran in
the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005, allegedly coerced by the
United States as part of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.

Kolås believes India could play a larger role in encouraging reforms in
Myanmar by engaging in a critical dialogue with the regime as well as with
the opposition, and by providing international humanitarian assistance to
Myanmar through the U.N. She also suggested that India would be
better-positioned to support international and regional efforts to
encourage political reforms in Myanmar were it to join a global arms
embargo against Myanmar and cease cooperation for counterinsurgency
purposes.

Chaudhury said that human rights diplomacy may or may not be a major issue
in the foreign policy-making of a country. But India's pride in being the
world's largest democracy is incompatible with remaining "oblivious to the
continuous rights violations in Myanmar, and indirectly or directly
[legitimizing and strengthening] an authoritarian regime in its
neighborhood in the name of . . . national interest and national
security."

Despite these flaws, New Delhi's policy on Burma continues to be driven by
the fear of having a hostile neighbor with Chinese influence in the east,
in addition to its archrival Pakistan on the western border.

Vishal Arora is an independent journalist based in New Delhi, India. He
writes and researches on politics, culture, religion and foreign relations
in South Asia. His articles have appeared in the media in India, the U.S.,
the U.K. and the UAE. He can be contacted at vishalarora_in at hotmail.com.
____________________________________

August 4, Irrawaddy
US must show strong leadership in Burma policy – Editorial

In a recent letter to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a bipartisan
group of 32 senators urged the White House to increase the effectiveness
of its Burma policy. The letter called on the US government to “support
the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inquiry to investigate
whether crimes against humanity and war crimes took place” in
military-controlled Burma.

The new Burma policy adopted by the Obama administration, a combination of
increasing engagement and maintaining economic sanctions, was launched
with the hope of yielding positive results. But the US can acquire no
leverage on the Napyidaw government while the generals know they have the
support of China and Russia in the UN Security Council.

In the absence of greater pressure from the world community, the junta is 
working hard to ensure its continued control over the country and the
oppressed Burmese people by means of the upcoming "elections," which by
every indication will be neither free nor fair.

The United States has long term national interests and a strategic focus
with many countries in Asia, such as Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran,
while its new Burma policy moves unhurriedly and hardly noticed. Under
Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and his deputy, Scot Marciel—the
highest-ranking American diplomats in the Obama administration effort to
engage Naypyidaw—visited Burma and met detained pro-democracy leader Aung
San Suu Kyi.  But their efforts seem to have lost effectiveness and focus
because of the limited time  remaining before the election.

For instance, the Obama administration has not yet selected a candidate
for the post of special envoy to Burma, despite a public announcement of
the planned new appointment by Philip J. Crowley, assistant secretary at
the Bureau of Public Affairs, in early June. In fact, the appointment of a
US special envoy is part of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act 2008,
signed into law by President Bush and approved in a bipartisan vote which
also had the support of Barack Obama, then a senator.

Meanwhile, many have expressed their frustration over the shortcomings of
US leadership on the Burma issue.  Among them is Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro,
the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Burma from 2000
to 2008. He wrote in a July 23 commentary in the Washington Post that the
US must make its Burma policy a high-level priority. “Without the kind of
pressure the United States can bring to bear multilaterally, the junta
will have no incentive to come to the table, let alone change its
behavior,” he wrote.

The White House must show its commitment to bringing democracy to Burma by
appointing a special envoy as soon as possible to work together with the
other two envoys from the EU and UN. The US envoy could start work by
embracing the call by UN special envoy Tomás Ojea Quintana, to create a
commission of inquiry through the United Nations to investigate crimes
against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed by the junta.

Apart from the support shown by the 32 US senators, nearly 60 members of
the US House of Representatives also wrote in June 2009 to President Obama
urging him to raise the issue of crimes against humanity in Burma before
the UN Security Council.

Using its transparency legislation as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the US also can pressure oil, gas and
mining companies that are operating in Burma and registered with the US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to publicly disclose their
payments to the Burmese regime. The revenue barely registers in the
government's accounts, suggesting the cash is diverted into projects such
as the nuclear program supported by North Korea. Thus, the US should fully
enforce existing US sanctions to target Singaporean and Dubai banks that
do business with the regime.

The US should also work to impose a global arms embargo on Burma.

The US administration must again display strong leadership in its Burma
policy. Then global and regional friends of Burma, and the Burmese people,
will believe that Washington is serious about its commitment to democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.
____________________________________

August 3, Council on Foreign Relations
Elections and opportunity in Myanmar – Joshua Kurlantzick

After taking office in 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama decided to use
Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) as his Asian experiment in reversing
Bush administration policy. As it did with Iran and Sudan, the Obama
administration engaged with Myanmar's junta, although it did not push to
end sanctions Congress passed in the late 1990s in response to massive
human rights abuses. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has made
two trips to Myanmar over the past year to try to spur dialogue about
critical issues like the upcoming national elections, which will probably
take place in late fall. They would be Myanmar's first since the 1990
polls won by the party of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, though the
military never allowed that party, the National League for Democracy
(NLD), to take its seats.

Engagement has delivered some results. A willingness to talk with the
regime in Myanmar has signaled to the other members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that Washington is committed to upgrading
relations with Southeast Asia. The previous U.S. administration had
allowed its poor relations with Myanmar to prevent it from meeting all
ASEAN leaders.

And by attempting to engage with Myanmar, the White House at least
demonstrates to its Asian allies that it is willing to listen to them,
since many Southeast Asian nations have long advocated an
engagement-oriented approach to the junta.

But just as sanctions delivered few results, engagement also seems to be
delivering little, despite Campbell's good-faith efforts. The junta sent
relatively low-ranking officials to meet with Campbell during his visit in
May, a sign the regime is not taking the dialogue seriously. The junta
also issued draconian regulations that essentially barred Suu Kyi from
participating and forced the NLD into such a restricted position that it
chose to boycott the poll. The junta then disbanded the party altogether.

Most worryingly, the regime appears to be pushing ahead with a reported
nuclear program. The junta has in recent years built increasingly close
military ties to North Korea, whose foreign minister just concluded a
four-day visit to Myanmar. A report released in January by the respected
Institute of Science and International Security revealed that the junta
had been importing a range of items that had little civilian use in
Myanmar, and could be used for nuclear or missile technology. Several
months later, al-Jazeera and the Democratic Voice of Burma, working with
defectors and nonproliferation experts, reported that the junta is mining
uranium and amassing technology that could only be used to develop a
nuclear program.

Though many U.S. officials doubt the junta has taken serious steps toward
building or acquiring a nuclear weapon, the strategy makes sense, since
actually building a nuclear weapon would inoculate the xenophobic junta
from outside pressure. American officials who once dismissed any nuclear
claims now admit there is enough suspicious evidence that other countries
must press the junta far harder to reveal more about its cooperation with
North Korea and about why it is purchasing and building--and seemingly
hiding—dual-use nuclear technology, especially since it has signed the
treaty declaring Southeast Asia to be a nuclear-free zone.

How Elections Could Matter

Despite the junta's intransigence with the United States, this year and
next still promise a rare opportunity for the United States to play a
larger role in Myanmar, and possibly gain some leverage over the regime.

And Myanmar has become increasingly important, as rivalry between regional
powers increases. Myanmar sits in a strategically vital location in Asia
and possesses some of the region's largest reserves of oil and gas. As a
result, its future path is critical to the region, and to vital U.S.
partners like India and Thailand.

Though the national election will undoubtedly be tightly controlled by the
junta, which wants to maneuver its handpicked parties into power so that
senior military officers can still wield influence from behind the scenes,
some opposition politicians believe the election offers the best chance to
change the direction of a country mired in political and economic stasis.
As the International Crisis Group notes in a report on the run-up to the
election, on the actual election day, the regime in Myanmar may very well
allow voting to be relatively free and fair, as it did in 1990.

The junta has said that it will allow all parties contesting the election
to have observers watching the counting. And though the NLD has chosen to
boycott the election, a reasonable decision given the constraints placed
upon it and Suu Kyi, the party was divided internally, with some younger
members believing that, despite the restrictions, the NLD should have
competed and reminded voters--and the regime--of its popular strength.
Even with the NLD not competing, some NLD members have broken off and will
contest the poll, as will a range of other small parties.

Together, these parties may deliver a handful of relatively
independent-minded legislators. Though their freedom to act in parliament
will still be constrained by the military, these legislators could build
the foundation for a civilianization of the country and, down the road, a
greater opening of the political system. If Myanmar moves toward a greater
role for civilians in governance, it may allow a wider range of
interlocutors with the United States and other regional powers. This could
lift some of the veil of secrecy and xenophobia surrounding the
government, perhaps even opening the way for greater U.S. influence.

Even more important, a serious humanitarian crisis now looms in Myanmar's
ethnic minority regions, mostly located in the north and east of the
country. These areas are patrolled by a range of ethnic minority armies,
the most powerful of which, the United Wa State Army, has over twenty
thousand men under arms and has supported itself by building one of the
largest narcotrafficking organizations in the world. The junta wants to
essentially disarm the ethnic minority militias roaming many of these
areas, to make them part of a regime-controlled border guard force; until
now, the junta had maintained fragile ceasefires with many of these ethnic
insurgents. Not surprisingly, many insurgent groups do not want to lay
down their arms, and several are boosting their arsenals, getting the cash
to buy new weapons by upping drug sales.

There is now a real possibility of an outbreak of armed conflict in these
regions, a conflict that would spark massive refugee flows, and, most
likely, higher rates of HIV/AIDS and narcotrafficking, both of which
flourish amid the instability and chaos of Myanmar's frontiers. Renewed
conflict could destabilize the whole region, including parts of China,
India, and Thailand--reason enough for Washington to be concerned.

Most worryingly, if such instability spreads, any nuclear components,
fuel, or products built or imported by the junta could easily fall into
the hands of criminal networks, insurgents, or even terrorists operating
in the lawless areas of Myanmar's north and east.

Policy Options

U.S. options toward the regime in capital city Naypyidaw remain limited
given the junta's isolation; the United States' distance from Myanmar; and
the relative importance of other regional actors like China, India,
Singapore, and Thailand. The junta does seem to crave Washington's
recognition, in part to use the United States to hedge against China's
influence in Myanmar. These options remain limited despite (justifiable)
congressional interest in Myanmar's ongoing human rights abuses. Congress
has imposed tough sanctions, yet other than isolating the junta's bank
accounts in places like Singapore and Dubai, which are viable options,
there is little more Congress can do to punish the regime.

Beyond these types of financial measures, the United States can use the
potential crisis in Myanmar's ethnic areas to work more closely with
Beijing to stabilize its border regions with Myanmar. In contrast to the
Korean peninsula, Myanmar offers a real opportunity for U.S.-China
cooperation, since Washington and Beijing have fewer hard security
conflicts in Myanmar. And the potential dangers Myanmar poses to China are
high, in the form of drugs, HIV infections, and refugees flowing across
Myanmar's borders. Already, China has shown more willingness to cooperate
on Myanmar, helping facilitate U.S. meetings with the junta and more
publicly rebuking Naypyidaw for fomenting instability than it would ever
dare do with Pyongyang.

Together, Washington and Beijing could boost humanitarian aid into the
ethnic minority areas. It could be delivered either across the borders
from China or Thailand, where there is already a sophisticated
infrastructure for moving aid into Myanmar, or from inside Myanmar itself.
Washington and Beijing could also increase outside contacts to the ethnic
minority armies to monitor nontraditional security threats and help broker
a renewed truce that allows for greater aid, prevents renewed conflict,
and keeps Myanmar's borders stable. Finally, the United States and China
could monitor Myanmar's potential nuclear program and, eventually,
increase the pressure on Naypyidaw to reveal far more about its
intentions, since Beijing certainly does not want the junta building a
nuclear infrastructure.

Beijing's concerns could open a window for cooperation at a time when the
U.S.-China relationship seems increasingly strained, particularly over
Southeast Asia. Washington should be ready to seize the chance.

Weigh in on this issue by emailing CFR.org.

____________________________________
ANNOUNCEMENT

August 4, National Endowment for Democracy
Call for applications: Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowships

Washington, D.C. – The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program at the
Washington, D.C.-based National Endowment for Democracy invites
applications for fellowships in 2011-2012. The program enables democracy
activists, practitioners, scholars, and journalists from around the world
to deepen their understanding of democracy and enhance their ability to
promote democratic change. Dedicated to international exchange, this
five-month, residential program offers a collegial environment for fellows
to reflect on their experiences; consider best practices and lessons
learned; conduct research and writing; engage with counterparts; and
develop professional relationships within a global network of democracy
advocates.

The program is intended primarily to support practitioners, scholars, and
journalists from developing and aspiring democracies; distinguished
scholars from established democracies may also apply. A working knowledge
of English is required. All fellows receive a monthly stipend, health
insurance, travel assistance, and research support. The program does not
fund professional training, fieldwork, or students working towards a
degree.

The program will host two five-month fellowship sessions in 2011 - 2012:
October 1, 2011 - February 28, 2012 (Fall 2011) and March 1 - July 31,
2012 (Spring 2012).

Deadline: Monday, November 1, 2010.  For more information and application
instructions, visit
http://www.ned.org/fellowships/reagan-fascell-democracy-fellows-program.
Applications will be accepted through our online application system
beginning August 1, 2010 at http://fellowships.ned.org.