BurmaNet News, August 11, 2010

[Editor]

August 11, 2010 Issue #4017


INSIDE BURMA
Reuters: Myanmar opposition party threatens to shun polls
AP: Myanmar designates constituencies for Parliament in step closer to
election

ON THE BORDER
Irrawaddy: Border closure may last longer than expected
Mizzima: Fresh DKBA troops reject junta Border Guard Force

BUSINESS / TRADE
Kantarawaddy: Junta, Chinese investors forge ahead with Salween dam

REGIONAL
LiveMint.com (India): Myanmar, via Delhi

OPINION / OTHER
Irrawaddy: Can the opposition remain relevant? – Min Zin
Irrawaddy: Coup is possible if regime party doesn't win – Aung Zaw
The Hindu: Crafting a richer India-Myanmar partnership – Rajiv Bhatia

PRESS RELEASE
HRW: Burma: EU should endorse international war crimes inquiry
Canadian Friends of Burma and BCUK: Canada under increased pressure to
support UN inquiry into war rimes


____________________________________
INSIDE BURMA

August 11, Reuters
Myanmar opposition party threatens to shun polls – Aung Hla Tun

Yangon – One of Myanmar's biggest political parties threatened on
Wednesday to pull out of this year's long-awaited elections if there were
signs of foul play by the ruling military in the run-up to the polls.

The Union Democracy Party (UDP) is considered one of the frontrunners in
the opposition camp.

"We will try our best to make the upcoming elections free and fair. If we
believe that it cannot become a free and fair one, we will decide to drop
out," UDP chairman Thein Htay told Reuters.

Forty parties have registered with the military-appointed Election
Commission (EC) but it has yet to decide which will be allowed to take
part in Myanmar's first civilian government in almost half a century.

At least seven parties are believed to be proxies of the military, which
will retain control of key ministries and enjoy a 25 percent quota of
parliamentary seats under a new constitution. The armed forces chief will
be more senior than the president.

Phyo Min Thein, a leading pro-democracy figure in Myanmar, quit as UDP
chief last week and derided the election as a farce.

No date has yet been set for the election. Myanmar's opposition, both at
home and in exile, is split. Some have decided to take part, seeing it as
a small sign of democratic progress, others have opted for a boycott.

Thu Wai, chairman of Democratic Party (Myanmar) and a former political
prisoner, said a boycott would play into the hands of the junta and give
legitimacy to the regime.

"If we dropped out in this situation, it surely would make the regime very
happy," he told Reuters. "We wouldn't dream of withdrawing."

His view contrasts with that of detained Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San
Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy party refused to register
with the authorities in protest at what it called "unjust" election laws.
It has since been dissolved.

The party won the 1990 election by a landslide, but was never allowed to
rule.

Many parties have accused the regime's military intelligence unit of
spying on and trying to intimidate their members. Thu Wai said party
officials, whose candidacy was only known to the Election Commission, were
visited on Wednesday by intelligence agents.

"We came to know that it was the Election Commission that transferred the
information about our members to the intelligence personnel. They used it
to intimidate our members," he said.

Many other parties are led by leaders of a 1988 pro-democracy uprising, a
series of protests the army used deadly force to put down. Many potential
candidates who have served prison time could be excluded, although that is
not yet clear.

(Editing by Martin Petty)

(For more news on Reuters India, click in.reuters.com)

____________________________________

August 11, Associated Press (CP)
Myanmar designates constituencies for Parliament in step closer to election

Yangon, Myanmar — Myanmar's Election Commission has designated
constituencies for the national and regional parliaments, state media
announced Wednesday, moving a step closer toward the general election
promised for sometime this year.

The country's ruling junta has yet to announce the date for the polls, the
first since 1990 when the party of detained pro-democracy leader Aung San
Suu Kyi won a landslide victory but was not allowed to take power.

Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party is boycotting the polls
because of what it calls unfair and undemocratic election laws. It was
disbanded in May because it refused to register.

State television announced that the Election Commission, the governing
body for the polls, has designated constituencies for the two-chamber
national Parliament, as well as regional parliaments. Details were to be
disclosed in state-run newspapers Thursday.

The 440-member House of Representatives will have 330 elected civilians
and 110 military representatives, while the 224-member House of
Nationalities will seat 168 elected candidates and 56 nominated by the
military chief.

Suu Kyi has told colleagues she suspects the reason the date for the polls
has not yet been set is that "there could be some problems among them,"
meaning members of the ruling junta.

She made the remark during her meeting with her lawyers Wednesday at her
lakeside house.

She also told her lawyers that rule of law in the military-led Myanmar is
very weak and stressed that no system will work unless there is rule of
law.

Nyan Win, one of the lawyers and a spokesman for her NLD party, told
reporters that Suu Kyi said the weakness of rule of law is an important
issue for all of the country's people, and not just her group.

"No system will work without any rule of law," he quoted her saying.

Several parties which plan to run in the polls are already critical of the
official process. Forty political parties have registered to contest the
elections, and six others are awaiting approval to run.

The leader of the Democratic Party said that the group complained Tuesday
to the Election Commission that police are intimidating its members.

Police visited party members' homes in Yangon and asked for personal data
and photographs, said Thu Wai, the party's chairman. "This amounts to
intimidation. Party members don't want to deal with the police and some
members could resign for fear of harassment."

Thu Wai, 77, is a longtime democracy activist and former political
prisoner, while the party's executive secretaries include former Prime
Minister U Nu's daughter Than Than Nu, former Prime Minister Ba Swe's
daughter Nay Yee Ba Swe, and Cho Cho Kyaw Nyein, the daughter of a former
deputy prime minister.

Thu Wai said his party sent in a list of over 1,000 members last month as
required by the political party registration law and the Election
Commission had shared the information with police.

"Special Branch police are applying pressure on political parties that are
popular among the public (because) the junta-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party is not faring well," Thu Wai said Wednesday. "Since we
decided to contest the elections, we have anticipated a lot of problems.
However, the hurdles and problems are much larger than we expected."

The chairman of another party, the Union Democratic Party, resigned last
week, saying the elections would not be free and fair.

Phyo Min Thein, another former political prisoner, said the junta was
restricting campaigning.

He said the Union Solidarity and Development Party was receiving
preferential treatment from the Election Commission and that local
officials were helping it recruit members, while other political parties
faced myriad legal restrictions.

____________________________________
ON THE BORDER

August 11, Mizzima News
Fresh DKBA troops reject junta Border Guard Force – Kyaw Kha

Chiang Mai –  A wave of officers and soldiers from battalions of the
junta-allied Democratic Karen Buddhist Army have joined a rebel brigade
that has rejected the junta’s offer – in effect a demand – for it to bring
its troops under Burmese Army command within a special border force in
eastern Burma, according to Karen officers.

The troops joined the 5th Brigade led by Colonel Saw Lar Pwe, some DKBA
officers said, of the brigade that has rejected the junta’s proposal –
made to all Burmese ethnic minority groups – to transform their armed
wings and be led by the junta’s army commanders within the Border Guard
Force (BGF).

According to the Karen Information Centre yesterday, Brigadier General
Than Soe, commander of Military Operations Command Eight based in
Kyarinnseikgyi Township in Karen State, had given Saw Lar Pwe an ultimatum
to bring his troops into the BGF by today.

Dissent against the BGF idea, however, appeared to be growing today as
DBKA Colonel Saw Chit Thu led 19 soldiers from the DKBA’s 999th Brigade to
join the 5th Brigade’s Kalo Htoo Baw strategic command. They took with
them more than 20 weapons including rocket-propelled-grenade launchers,
M-16s automatic rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, AK-47 assault rifles and
grenades, a DKBA officer said.

Meanwhile, DKBA Quartermaster Sergeant Saw Palo also today led a separate
group of soldiers to join the 5th Brigade, the officer said.

“They took their families. We will offer them their former positions. We
already have arranged for their security”, an officer from the 5th Brigade
said.

As part of a ceasefire agreement with a number of ethnic militia groups
around the country, the junta gave the DKBA special rights to control a
region in eastern Burma’s Karen State, to collect taxes and to conduct
businesses.

Although top DKBA officers accepted the junta’s proposal to bring its
troops into the BGF, some factions have sought to reject the proposal on
concerns about being disarmed. Colonel Saw Lar Pwe had made clear he was
against the proposal.

On learning of this, a convoy of senior junta officers, including Military
Affairs Security commander Lieutenant General Ye Myint, set out for
Myawaddy on the Thai border last Thursday to “persuade” the rebel brigade
to accept the BGF offer. Their vehicles however were ambushed at a
checkpoint by Christian-led Karen National Union (KNU) forces, leaving at
least one junta soldier dead.

Naypyidaw had planned that the DKBA would join the BGF next Wednesday in a
formal ceremony, which was to follow another ethnic Karen group, the Karen
Peace Force (KPF), who were set to join on Monday. It designed that a BGF
battalion would have 326 soldiers, 30 of which were to be commanders and
non-commissioned officers form the Burmese Army.

Tension has been growing between the Burmese Army and the DKBA for months,
amid rumours that some DKBA soldiers would rather return to the forest
than adhere to the junta’s plan.

And according to Phaan District KNU chairman Padoh Saw Maw Aye, soldiers
from DKBA battalions were trying to contact the KNU to rejoin its ranks
after breaking away in 1994, Phaan District KNU chairman Padoh Saw Maw Aye
told Mizzima.

“We accept our Karen people. Some contacted us. If they serve in the KNU,
we will accept them. Even if they don’t want to work with the KNU, we will
arrange safe places for them to live with their families”, Padoh Saw Maw
Aye said.

Lieutenant Colonel Likethaint, the commanding officer of battalion seven
under the 999th Brigade, which had decided to join the BGF, told Mizzima:
“The soldiers, who rejoined the KNU sealed their fate. If something goes
wrong, we can’t save them. They’ve chosen their path.”

The DKBA was formed by Myaingyingu abbot Thu Zana after it split from the
KNU in 1994 over claims that the KNU’s Christian leadership was biased
against Buddhist members of its militia. The DKBA then signed a ceasefire
agreement with the junta.

Military experts estimate the DKBA’s troop strength at more than 7,000.

____________________________________

August 11, Irrawaddy
Border closure may last longer than expected – Wai Moe

Mae Sot — After a meeting last week between Thai and Burmese officials
failed to resolve the impasse over Burma's decision to close the border
crossing at Mae Sot, Thailand, it appears that businessmen, traders and
migrant workers will have to continue their anxious wait for the border to
reopen.

Burmese military officials led by Lt-Gen Khin Zaw, chief of the Bureau of
Special Operations-4 overseeing the coastal and southeast regional
military commands, met Thai officials of the 4th Infantry Division, which
is based in Tak Province and is tasked with securing nearly 2,000 square
kilometers of Thailand’s border.

At the meeting, Khin Zaw would reportedly not guarantee the border would
open in the near future. Confirming the suspicions of some observers, he
said the dispute between the two countries over a Thai construction
project maintaining the bank of the Moei River is not the only reason for
closing the border. Border security concerns due to tensions over the
Burmese regime's Border Guard Force (BGF) plan are also an issue.

“The Burmese general [Khin Zaw] told his Thai counterparts at the meeting
that Burmese troops will launch an offensive against splinter groups of
the DKBA [Democratic Karen Buddhist Army] if there is resistance on the
BGF,” said a Thai military source who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He
also gave notice to Thai military officials that some accidents could
occur on the border during the attacks.”

A Burmese intelligence officer in Myawaddy also told The Irrawaddy
recently that the border may not reopen soon because the situation is
complicated, and suggested that different reasons forced Naypyidaw to keep
the border closed.

“This time the order came from top generals in the capital. So even a
regional commander such as Maj-Gen Thet Naing Win could not decide to open
the border,” the officer said. “The dispute over construction on the river
is quite a small issue—the Thai-Burma relationship and security along the
border are the main reasons for closing the border.”

“The generals also ordered commanders here to take action to avoid more
DKBA splinter groups and not allow those that have already deserted to
unify with the KNU [Karen National Union] in the strategic region on the
border with Thailand,” he said.

Following the border closure on July 18, the Burmese junta reinforced its
troops in the DKBA’s mobilized areas. Thai intelligence sources said they
believed several light infantry battalions from the north of Burma are now
deployed on the Thai-Burmese border, joining with other troops stationed
there.

Thai intelligence sources said a DKBA splinter group of an estimated 1,200
troops led by Col. Saw Lah Pwe, also known as Mr. Beard, was moving to the
south of Myawaddy because government troops were hunting them. The sources
said Saw Lah Pwe's troops intended to join other troops in the Three
Pagoda Pass area of Mon State.

Security analysts said Naypyidaw is quite concerned that a DKBA
unification with their former comrades in the KNU could return the
situation on Burma’s strategic eastern border to the tumultuous period
before the fall of the KNU’s headquarters in Manepalaw in 1995. Manepalaw
had survived the Burma army’s offensives until the KNU’s Buddhist troops
split and formed the DKBA.

In addition, the Burmese generals in Naypyidaw believe that control over
the their eastern border is important to deter external as well as
internal threats. According to Burmese military sources, the generals
often say at meetings that a “powerful country” could attack Burma from
the east, noting Thailand’s close cooperation with the United States in
military affairs.

Along its border with Thailand, the Burmese military has reportedly
deployed four regional military commands, two light infantry divisions,
one regional operations command, seven military operations commands, three
sector operations centers, five artillery operations commands, two
air-defense operations commands and six missile operations commands.

Meanwhile, in July the Thai government gave its approval to the Royal Thai
Army to spend 10 billion baht (US $ 313 million) to form the new 7th
Infantry Division with 25,000 troops to be based in Chiang Mai. The Thai
government also gave the army permission to spend 5 billion baht ($156.5
million) to purchase 121 armored personal carriers and 350 million baht
($11 million) to purchase a reconnaissance airship, Thai media reported.

According to Matichon newspaper, the Thai Third Army commander, Lt-Gen
Thanongsak Apirakyothin, said on the forming new division: “It's based on
our assessment of the threats in the western and northern parts of the
country.”

____________________________________
BUSINESS / TRADE

August 11, Kantarawaddy Times
Junta, Chinese investors forge ahead with Salween dam

Opposition from civic groups, notwithstanding, the Burmese military junta
and Chinese investors are forging ahead with the construction of the
Salween river dam and hydropower plant in Karenni state.

Civic groups claim the project is having an adverse impact on the
environment and is causing human rights violations, according to a
politician, who monitors the Karenni political situation.

He said, "There are no more villages, no more farms and Karenni people at
the dam site. They chose these areas that could not hurt people, where
villages have already been forced to relocate in 1996, while the other
projects like Hat Gyi dam project were suspended by the Karen National
Union and Thai nongovernmental organizations."

In recent months, opposition organizations like the Karenni Development
Research Group (KDRG) submitted a report requesting the regime and Chinese
investors to consider the dam's environmental impact and to tackle
problems created by human rights violations.

The Salween river dam at Ywa Thit village in Maese Township, it will
produce an estimated 600 megawatts of electricity.

However, "There has been no transparency and no consultation with the
local Karenni people about this project, which will submerge large tracts
of land along the Salween, the original homelands of thousands of Karenni
refugees sheltered in Thailand," said KDRG.

Speaking to Kantarawaddy Times on March 2009, a spokesperson of the BRN,
said that the dam projects will only earn revenue for the Burmese junta
but will not benefit the masses. As a consequence of these projects, human
rights violations will be rampant in the project sites, said the Burma
River Network (BRN).

Ko Aung Nge said, "The major aim of the dam projects was to earn money for
the military junta. Our people have to face many difficulties once the
dams are built. Army battalions will follow to set up bases in the areas
after the dams are constructed.  Human rights violations will follow as a
result."

Meanwhile, the military regime and Chinese investors have sent to Kyauk
Kyin near Ywa Thit village, hundreds of workers from central Burma to
construct roads. Construction materials have begun to be transported to
the dam site.

The regime has discussed progress on the Salween projects and other
hydropower dams with the Chinese Datang (Yunnan) United Hydropower
Developing Co. on the basis of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on
January 7, 2010.

The junta and Datang's MOU have also agreed to dam the Thabetchaw and Pawn
rivers in Karenni State to produce 110 megawatts and 130 megawatts of
electricity respectively.

____________________________________
REGIONAL

August 11, LiveMint.com (India)
Myanmar, via Delhi – Akshai Jain

A news agency run by a small team of journalists in exile is slowly
finding its place in mainstream media.

New Delhi: There are no nameplates at the entrance of this nondescript
two-storey building in the Delhi suburb of Vikaspuri—just an array of
bells for different floors, none of which elicits a response.

But two flights up, the newsroom of Mizzima, one of the three largest
independent Myanmarese news agencies, buzzes with activity. A line of
reporters sit stacked next to each other along the walls. Above them are
images from the monks’ protests of 2007 in Myanmar—the Saffron Revolution,
as it was called. A caption to them reads: “Days of defiance, 2007.”

Defiance is Mizzima’s stock in trade. These exiled journalists produce a
monthly journal and run four websites—one each for news in English and
Myanmarese, one for video, and one for photos. According to Soe Myint,
Mizzima’s editor-in-chief, the sites get a total of 15,000 unique daily
visitors. Apart from the Delhi office, Mizzima also has bureaus in Kolkata
and Thailand.

Late last month, the head of the Myanmarese junta, Than Shwe, came to
India for a five-day state visit, symbolic of the increasing closeness
between the two countries. In order to not embarrass their guest, who
heads one of the world’s most repressive regimes, the Indian government
kept the media at bay. There were no press conferences, and journalists
weren’t allowed into the venues he visited.

But for Mizzima, journalism has always been challenging. Its premises, for
instance, are spartan, but they work. An air conditioner barely cools the
room, but nobody seems to mind. The murmur of conversation fades in and
out between the frenetic sound of fingers flying over Myanmarese and
English keyboards.

In another part of the office, the three-member video team, crammed into a
narrow corridor, works on clandestine footage from the full moon ceremony
at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon that has just come in, turning it into a
short video.

Every room of the apartment, in fact, shows a new enterprise. The design
department, the administrative wing, a small studio and a room for
interns, who sit cheek-by-jowl with each other.
There’s little fuss or ceremony here. There are no televisions, the
reporters don’t have visiting cards, the small lobby is also used for
interviews and the editor’s desk is just a little larger than those of the
others. The work at Mizzima is quiet and no-nonsense—and, like the country
that it tracks, stealthy
.
The beginnings

The apartment has been filling up gradually over the years. Mizzima
started 12 years ago with a single laptop and three reporters: Myint, his
wife Thin Thin Aung, who handles the bureau in his absence, and Win Aung.
All of them were student activists who fled Myanmar soon after the 1988
uprising.

“We didn’t even have an Internet connection,” reminisces Myint about the
early years, over video chat from the Thailand bureau, where he is at
present. “We’d have to go to STD booths in the local market to work.”

Myint’s exit from Myanmar was dramatic. He’d fled Yangon after the
crackdown and lived “in the jungles” for the next two years. Then, in
1990, he hijacked a Thai Airways flight from Bangkok to Yangon, forcing it
to land in Kolkata. He received a lot of sympathy for his cause and was
imprisoned only briefly.

In India, he started working with the Myanmarese service of Voice of
America, and in 1998, with money he’d managed to put aside, he started
Mizzima. The name derives from a Pali word, referred to the middle or
moderate path.

Mizzima’s initial work consisted of organizing seminars on media and
democracy. The “real work”, Myint says, started in 2002, when with funds
from friends the agency started hiring people and exploring new media.

Their recruiting ground was the small refugee community in Delhi, mostly
settled in Vikaspuri. These migrants were desperately poor, surviving on
meagre stipends from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). They had no reporting skills, and they needed to be trained. But
Mizzima offered not only work, but a refuge in a new, hostile city, and
even a way of dealing with the realization that they’d probably never be
able to return home.

Flight to freedom

The petite Khaing Su is Mizzima’s newest hire. Her journey mirrors that of
most Mizzima reporters, but she’s also an exception, having been a
journalist with a weekly journal in Yangon before she fled to India last
August.

In Yangon, Su’s official reporting had been innocuous, but secretly she’d
send photographs and videos to her brother, who worked with Voice of
America in Thailand.

Her first batch of reports on the effects of cyclone Nargis on towns along
the Yangon river went unnoticed, and emboldened, she did a set of
interviews of people displaced by the cyclone. That was her undoing.
Police landed at her doorstep. They didn’t arrest her, but the visit
scared her parents enough for them to ask her to flee Myanmar.

Thus began a cross-country journey, sleeping in hostels in small towns,
avoiding police informers, finally entering India through the Mizoram
border and arriving via a network of friends in Delhi.
Su came across Mizzima by chance, when on a visit to the Bodella market in
Vikaspuri she came across one of their advertisements. Today, she reports
in Myanmarese on a variety of stories. “The reporting is very difficult,”
she says in halting English. “Most Burmese are reluctant to talk on the
phone.” Even the shortest stories can require 10-15 phone calls. “But
now”, she says, “I can write what I want to write.”

Life in Delhi isn’t easy. Her salary of Rs6,000 from Mizzima is meagre,
and she and her husband, also a political refugee, are hoping that the
UNHCR resettlement programme will take them to either Europe or the US.
“Please don’t print my photograph,” she says. “It could put my family back
home in danger.”

By 2005, Mizzima had established a hidden network of reporters inside
Myanmar, “all recruited through a network of friends and family”,
according to Myint. For the enormous risks they were taking, reporters
were paid between $150 and $500 (`6,945 and `23,150) per month.

In the mainstream

The Internet made getting information out of Myanmar much easier.
Mizzima’s reporters now use a network of proxy servers and social
networking sites to evade strict government controls.
Mizzima’s biggest achievement, according to Myint, was its coverage of the
Saffron Revolution and the devastation wreaked by cyclone Nargis as it
tore through Myanmar in May 2008.

The reportage shocked the world, and it brought Myanmar and Mizzima into
notice. “In 1998, we had no clue about what was happening in the country,”
Myint says. “But just 10 years later, we’d managed to bring Burma into the
mainstream media.”

That attention also brought funding from agencies such as Washington
DC-based National Endowment for Democracy and London-based Open Society
Institute, as well as an award in 2007 from the International Press
Institute.

“The work they’ve done has helped paint a completely different picture of
Burma from the official one,” says Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, a
Myanmar-watcher and a political scientist at Rabindra Bharati University,
Kolkata.

Do Mizzima’s activist roots affect the credibility of the news it puts
out? “No,” says Chaudhury, “but it does occasionally make them paper over
some of the deep ethnic divides that exist in Burmese society.”

Reporting on Myanmar has been, and continues to be, challenging. “Every so
often, the Burmese government applies pressure on India to shut us down,”
Myint says. In 2003, this led to the reopening of charges against Myint in
the hijacking case. In 2007, a series of crippling cyber attacks, which
Myint suspects were orchestrated by Myanmar’s junta, brought down
Mizzima’s websites.

Than Shwe’s visit, he believes, does not augur well; life will only get
more difficult for Myanmarese refugees in India in the next few years.
“But these are problems we’ve faced in the past, and are ready to face
again,” he says.

What about a long-term plan? Where do both of them see Mizzima five years
from now? “We’ll be back in Burma,” says Myint emphatically. “We’ll be
home.”

akshai.j at livemint.com

____________________________________
OPINION / OTHER

August 11, Irrawaddy
Can the opposition remain relevant? – Min Zin

The opposition in Burma should be measured both in terms of the public
support it draws and its ability to achieve both its intermediate and
ultimate goals

Since Burma won independence from Britain in 1948, the country has been
fraught with a spectrum of contentious politics ranging from armed
insurgencies to nonviolent movements against the state. The current
political environment, however, marks the first time in Burmese history
that the  opposition is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
And if they are going to remain relevant, the question is how?
There are two basic factors in determining the relevancy of an opposition
group. The first is public support, or legitimacy. The second is the
ability to achieve desired outcomes.

Legitimacy

In Burma’s contentious political environment, repression and the resulting
grievances have inspired public action—and provided legitimacy to the
opposition—whenever state interference with people’s everyday routines has
been compounded by brutal and unjust events.

For example, the demonetization combined with police brutality against
students in 1987, and the 500 percent fuel price hike combined with police
brutality against Buddhist monks in 2007, each sparked political conflict
and nonviolent movements that the public deemed legitimate. The endurance,
commitment, courage and sacrifices of the activists strengthened the
legitimacy of those movements in the public’s eyes, and the opposition was
considered highly relevant despite the fact that activists could not
operate in an open political system and faced a military government with a
propensity for repression.

Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile.
Therefore, because in the past the Burmese regime created a political
environment that compelled the public to support opposition movements, in
examining whether opposition groups will remain relevant following the
2010 elections, it is important to consider whether the repressive nature
of the state will continue.

The new Constitution and the 2010 election will not transform the
incompatible goals of the military elite and the opposition, and therefore
will not change their inherently conflicting relationship. In addition,
the new, post-election government has little prospect of solving the
issues facing the country, including human rights violations, corruption
and economic mismanagement, all of which are associated with the
military’s unchecked power, interests and behavior.

One change that will take place is the transformation of the
one-dimensional military junta into a hybrid form of government—political
and military. The new format, which the regime clearly intends to
manipulate to maintain its grip on power, could ironically be viewed as a
prospect for political realignment and therefore embolden the general
public to rally behind the opposition groups.

But regardless of whether this takes place, the ongoing repressive nature
of state-society relations will again legitimize the opposition groups and
make them relevant by continuing to allow the opposition to rally the
public against the military-backed hybrid regime.

However, as social scientist Doug McAdam says, “Movements may be largely
born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by
their own actions.” In other words, actions lead to outcomes, and in
addition to its ability to achieve its ultimate goals, the opposition’s
actions and its ability to achieve intermediate goals will in large part
determine whether it remains relevant.

Achieving Desired Outcomes

The prevailing general impression is that since 1988 the opposition groups
have failed to accomplish their professed goals. Following its decision
not to re-register the party, the National League for Democracy even
officially apologized to the public for its failed policies in the
struggle for democracy. However, sweeping statements about the
opposition’s relevance based on its inability to achieve its ultimate
desired outcome should not be made without evaluating factors such as
resilience, leverage and endgame strategy.

Resilience

Resilience consists of more than psychological qualities such as
endurance, commitment and courage, all of which the opposition groups
demonstrate admirably. Resilience is also about the strength of a
movement’s repertoire (forms of struggles) and mobilizing structure.

Since 1988, the dominant forms of struggle employed by the opposition
groups have been political parties (mainly the NLD),
underground/clandestine movements, civil society organizations, armed
insurgencies and international advocacy movements.

Due to the cease-fire agreements between the junta and the ethnic
resistance groups since 1989, the armed insurgencies have mostly been
contained. However, international advocacy movements have been strong
thanks to the political-moral strength of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the
increasingly large Burmese diaspora communities around the world.

Student protest in Rangoon during the 1988 mass uprising.(Photo: THE
IRRAWADDY)
One key opposition weakness might be the movement’s unwillingness or
incapacity to diversify its repertoire, or forms of struggle. For
instance, the NLD leadership, instead of allowing (or even encouraging)
those who would like to set up a political party to contest the 2010
election, tended to vilify the moderates within the group. It seems that
the leadership was not strategic enough to be aware of the advantages the
whole movement could gain by sanctioning different forms of struggle. In
this case, their tendency to put all of their eggs in one basket has led
to a strategic blunder that could have long-term consequences for the
opposition.

Another element of Burmese opposition resilience is its mobilizing
structure, which is in many cases hierarchical. However, whenever Suu Kyi
was free, she traveled to provinces where she empowered and inspired local
and grass-roots party members to mobilize. In fact, she sparked
initiatives of civil society by encouraging youth and women leaders to set
up volunteer groups on wide-ranging issues such as assisting HIV/AIDS
patients and providing legal protection for child soldiers and the victims
of forced labor.

In addition, when Min Ko Naing and other 88 generation student leaders
were released from prison in 2004-05, they broadened the opposition’s
civil society practice within its nonviolent repertoire by reaching out to
Buddhist monks, human rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, local NGOs,
intellectuals, writers, the artistic community and others to strengthen
the informal connective tissue of the movement. Before the activists had
sufficient time to organize, however, the 2007 protests broke out. Though
their initiatives contributed to the emergence of the “Saffron Revolution”
in 2007, their lack of leverage allowed the regime to crush the movement
in a violent crackdown.

Leverage

Although leverage is not the ultimate outcome sought by the opposition,
improved leverage is, like resilience, a positive outcome that can be a
stepping stone to achieve the desired endgame of regime change or even a
negotiated outcome.

Since 1988, Burma’s activists have relied to a large degree on marches,
protest demonstrations and public statements making political demands or
requests. As social scientist Kurt Schock notes, these methods may be
effective in mobilizing members of the aggrieved population and the
support of third parties, and thereby obtaining legitimacy, but they are
less effective in directly undermining state power to achieve desired
outcomes unless used in tandem with methods of non-cooperation.

This lack of tactical innovation by the opposition has been compounded by
the fact that the social groups most prominent in the movement—students
and Buddhist monks—while providing maximum symbolic value, provide weaker
leverage than workers or peasants because the state is less dependent on
students and monks to maintain its power and survive. Thus far, no
organization has emerged in Burma that is capable of effectively forging
ties between students, monks, workers and peasants.

The opposition should also take into account the crucial role a third
party can play in improving  opposition leverage. For example, China’s
current diplomatic support and political protection of the junta in the
international arena, as well as its economic and military support, are one
of the most challenging constraints on the opposition movement. However,
China is increasingly aware of the risks of a purely opportunist policy
toward Burma, and if the opposition movement manages to sustain its
resilience and improve its leverage by broadening its active support base,
China might be persuaded to change its unconditional support for the
military regime and actively advocate the goal of national reconciliation
in Burma, thereby exponentially increasing the opposition’s leverage.

Media access also plays a crucial role in strengthening the leverage of
the opposition groups. Although Burma’s domestic media is subject to
severe news blackouts and censorship, the people of Burma listen to
foreign short-wave radio stations, upon which they rely heavily for
information.

In the run-up to the 1988 uprising, the Burmese-language radio services of
the  BBC and VOA played a critical role, virtually coordinating public
protests by disseminating information about the riot police’s brutality
against students and the country’s economic crisis. In the 2007 Saffron
Revolution, the protesters had the advantage of significantly increased
media access and information technology, and thereby managed to broaden
the protests. When the regime cracked down on the Buddhist monk-led
protests, the pictures and video footage of the marching and killing were
sent to the outside world via the Internet, increasing the protesters’
leverage both at the time and for the future.

In contrast, one way in which opposition activists lose leverage is by
focusing too much on their own political demands—such as the transfer of
power to the NLD due to its victory in the 1990 election—or on political
dialogue that is not perceived to be directly related to the people’s
daily struggle for survival. When the opposition becomes self-centered,
leverage is diminished because the public becomes indifferent to politics
and leaves the activists on their own to achieve their personal political
demands.

Endgame Strategy

One of the crucial reasons the 8-8-88 mass uprising failed was that the
opposition did not provide the strategic leadership necessary to achieve
the endgame of regime change. When the street protests reached their peak
in late August through September 18, government mechanisms collapsed.
However, the opposition leaders did not unify and either create or seize
the opportunity for regime change or negotiated transition in the power
vacuum.

Burma’s opposition leadership has always been enthusiastic when it comes
to mobilizing mass movements, but has failed to capitalize and achieve the
intended results when protests have reached their crescendo. In other
words, the opposition always tries hard to achieve the means (instigating
a mass movement) as if that is the end in itself.

While public pressure alone can challenge the status quo, whether a public
movement leads to a genuine political transition depends on whether the
opposition employs an effective endgame strategy. Of course, mass
movements will remain the sine qua non for Burma’s opposition so long as
the intransigent regime refuses to initiate inclusive political reform.

In summary, the question of relevancy for Burmese opposition groups must
be viewed from two perspectives: their legitimacy and the outcome of their
effort. At this time, it appears that while the opposition groups will
remain relevant in terms of public support and legitimacy, they will have
to improve their performance with respect to their ability to maintain
resilience, obtain leverage and formulate effective endgame strategies.

This will require opposition groups to diversify their repertoire, adopt
tactical innovations, persuade influential third parties to support their
cause, broaden their social base and balance between a principle-based and
an interest-based approach. If able to do so, they will not only increase
the likelihood of accomplishing their goals, they will increase their
relevance far beyond their current moral legitimacy.

Hindsight might not be merciful, but it helps break the cycle of repeating
the same thing over and over while expecting different results. Moreover,
it helps in the process of exiting the mindset of nostalgia and entering
the forward-looking strategic realm, which is exactly what the generation
that lead Burma’s 1988 popular movement must do to make themselves
relevant in the country’s current political landscape.

____________________________________

August 11, Irrawaddy
Coup is possible if regime party doesn't win – Aung Zaw

It will be hard to maintain high expectations and optimism about Burma's
election while the international community becomes ever more skeptical
about its credibility and frustration grows over the regime's
intransigence.

Alberto Romulo, foreign secretary of the Philippines, said the Burmese
election would be considered a sham if opposition members were not 
allowed to participate in the process.

“All the parties should be there and not only should be there but they
should be allowed to campaign and their votes should be counted. You know
what democracy is all about,” Romulo said.

Aung Zaw is founder and editor of the Irrawaddy magazine. He can be
reached at aungzaw at irrawaddy.org.
The United States, a vocal critic of the regime, and the European Union,
have also voiced doubts about the credibility of the elections in Burma.
Their doubts are fully justified.

Now United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has expressed his
frustration at the regime's intransigence. “It is a source of
frustration...that Myanmar [Burma] has been unresponsive so far to [the
UN's] efforts. A lack of cooperation at this critical moment represents
nothing less than a lost opportunity for Myanmar [Burma].”

Many may share his frustration, but political activists and opposition
members have no illusions. They don't see the election producing any 
significant landscape change. Optimism is in short supply because of the
regime's pre-election maneuvering.

It's generally believed that the election will only serve to legitimize
military rule and that by hook or by crook the regime will manipulate the
election process to produce a parliament of  military appointed civilians
and former generals.

The regime will not allow any opposition party to win the election.

Phyo Min Thein, who recently resigned his post as chairman of the Union
Democracy Party because he felt the election would not be free and fair,
in a recent interview with The Irrawaddy, cited Deputy Education Minister
Aung Myo Min telling teachers at the University of Foreign Languages that
if the pro-regime Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) failed to
win the election, a coup would be staged.

In early 2010, Col Zaw Min, minister for electric power no.1 reportedly
told his shocked staff: “We are a ready-made government...soon after the
election, we will continue to remain in power and proceed to govern the
country.”

Zaw Min's remark should be instructive for some international analysts and
self-appointed experts who condescendingly say the election will change
the  political landscape in Burma.

So far, more than 40 political parties have registered with the Union
Election Commission. The pro-regime USDP is the largest and naturally
enjoys government support.

The USDP is led by Burma's current prime minister Thein Sein, who
faithfully served under Snr Gen Than Shwe since their War Office
ိေdays in the late 1990s. It can campaign without encountering
any obstacle, even though no election date has yet been set.

In an evident campaign strategy, the USDP recently repaired roads in
Rangoon, donated rice to villagers in central Burma, offered loans and
mobile phones at below-market rates, mainly in central Burma and Arakan
State.

The “ready-made government” is clearly ready to take over power in a new
form. But if it fails with its plan, a military coup could be on the
cards.

____________________________________

August 11, The Hindu
Crafting a richer India-Myanmar partnership – Rajiv Bhatia

New Delhi – In presenting a dispassionate evaluation of the recent visit
to India by Senior General Than Shwe, Myanmar's “strong man,” two useful
tools are rear view and plainspeak. They would indicate that India-Myanmar
relationship has grown in range, depth and vitality in the past decade,
but it is not without vulnerable spots.

In the early 1990s, the government of India showed the capability to take
a long-term view by shifting to a ‘two-track' policy on Myanmar. It chose
to build state-to-state relations while continuing to support the cause of
democracy. As head of a relevant division in the Ministry of External
Affairs, I saw from close quarters how the shift evoked opposition. By
persisting on that path, but also with due sensitivity, India began to
achieve its goals. Gradually, the policy was backed by a wider political
consensus. As ambassador in Yangon a few years later, I had the privilege
of assisting the Ministers from the NDA and UPA governments as they
conducted dialogue with their counterparts in Myanmar. These exchanges
prepared the ground for Gen. Than Shwe's first, ‘historic' visit to India
in October 2004. He conveyed to us how he was impressed with India.
Between then and his second visit last week, both countries worked hard to
strengthen their relations.

Over the years, New Delhi has faced two kinds of criticism on its Myanmar
policy. Realists argued that its pro-democracy stance had driven Myanmar
into “China's lap.” Later, they maintained that the engagement was moving
too slowly. They failed to recognise that it was never in Myanmar's
interest to choose China over India. Now curiously enough, there is talk
of Myanmar playing China against India and India against China. It does
not require rocket science to realise that the best policy for Myanmar is
to befriend both. As for India's motivations and compulsions, they are far
too well known to be delineated here.

The other criticism stemmed from ideologues and supporters of democracy in
Myanmar who freely advised India to sacrifice its interests. It was
difficult to heed their advice or expect them to appreciate the complex
argument of realpolitik. As a democratic country, India would love to see
democracy prevail in the whole world but it is not our mission in life to
spread it globally. Nevertheless, we do sympathise with the victims of the
regime, including refugees, the exiled and prisoners of conscience. Above
all, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's commitment to Gandhian principles, courage and
contribution to Myanmar are appreciated widely in India. In fact, many of
us who had the unique privilege of meeting and interacting with her came
away with a clear impression that she is an outstanding personality of our
age.

Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that the impact of the
pro-democracy camp on India-Myanmar policy seems to have diminished
considerably. This was evident throughout Gen. Than Shwe's visit as well
as in the joint statement issued in New Delhi on July 27. Hidden in a
45-para statement was a small paragraph which reflected India's emphasis
on “comprehensively broad-basing the national reconciliation process and
democratic changes being introduced in Myanmar.” This, together with
informal indications available from the visiting delegation, left one in
little doubt about the political realities. Even after the elections,
expected to be held towards the year-end, there may not be any material
change in the military's role. It is set to continue calling the shots.

Gen. Than Shwe's visit resulted in a commitment by both sides to further
strengthen and broaden the “multidimensional relationship.” A considered
assessment would suggest that three aspects were of special significance.

Among political issues, a shared satisfaction with progress in bilateral
relations was noted. Both Asean-related and sub-regional cooperation are
significant, but what really matters is that India and Myanmar relate to
each other as immediate neighbours, linked by geography, history and
age-old ties of religion, culture and interaction at people's level. There
is still insufficient realisation in India of what a powerful magnet our
Buddhist sites represent for visitors from Myanmar. It was no coincidence
that Gen. Than Shwe included a 24-hour stay in Sarnath and Bodh Gaya on a
full moon night to pray to Lord Buddha, seeking spiritual solace and
enlightenment.

The other important political issue was a common perspective on the reform
of United Nations institutions, especially Myanmar's reiteration of
support to India's candidature for permanent membership of the Security
Council.

Border security and development appear inter-linked issues in dialogue.
Activities of smugglers, insurgents and terrorists constitute a continuing
threat to both countries. Hence it is logical for them to enhance their
cooperation. Hopefully, the treaty on mutual assistance in criminal
matters, signed during Gen. Than Shwe's visit, would spur new measures.
However, India needs to do more to address the internal dimension of
insurgency in Manipur and other border areas. Myanmar too will need to
assist India more effectively, matching its words with determined and
visible action. This may well be a critical test for our friendship with
Myanmar.

Economic cooperation is now viewed as the central theme in bilateral
relations. A target of $1 billion in bilateral trade has been achieved,
albeit after a delay of three years. The balance of trade is unfavourable
to India in a 5:1 ratio, posing a challenge to Indian companies. Are they
going to be content with exports valued at only $200 million to Myanmar
which is hungry for Indian products and services? Specific areas have to
be identified; constraints need to be eliminated; and business promotion
should be stepped up. Consensus on these issues emerged at an excellent
meeting arranged by the FICCI with the business delegation, which included
three Cabinet Ministers.

The most dramatic moment at the meeting came when U Thaung, Minister for
Science and Technology, observed that Indian investments in Myanmar
presently stood at below the quarter million-dollar mark, adding dryly
that Indian business was taking “too long to come, unlike China and Asean
countries.” This seemed a wake-up call to India Inc. to re-energise itself
for its own benefit.

The basket of development projects has been expanding at a rapid pace.
About two-thirds of the joint statement related to them. After years of
discussions, studies and negotiations, the stage is now set for commencing
implementation of the flagship Kaladan multimodal transit transport
project. When ready, it should contribute to the development of our
northeast. The trilateral highway project too has been a subject of
discussions and negotiations for long; it needs priority attention now.
The range of areas covered by Indian projects is impressive — roads,
railways, telecom, power, energy, hydrocarbons, remote sensing,
agriculture, industry, IT and education. Let timely implementation be our
mantra.

South Block may well be advised to leave the debate on weighty issues like
geopolitical trends, rivalry in the Bay of Bengal and India-China ‘power
game' to academics. Instead, it should encourage our Embassy in Yangon to
hone its project management skills and help India Inc. deepen its foray
into Myanmar.

(The author is a former ambassador to Myanmar.)

____________________________________
PRESS RELEASE

August 11, Human Rights Watch
Burma: EU should endorse international war crimes inquiry

Brussels – European Union member states should publicly support the
establishment of an international Commission of Inquiry into war crimes
and crimes against humanity in Burma ahead of the United Nations General
Assembly in September, Human Rights Watch said in a letter to EU foreign
ministers today.

Human Rights Watch urged the EU to include a Commission of Inquiry in the
draft resolution on Burma for the General Assembly. Such a move follows up
on the March 2010 statement by the UN special rapporteur on human rights
in Burma, Tomás Ojea Quintana, calling on the UN to consider the
possibility of establishing a Commission of Inquiry into crimes in
violation of international law committed in Burma.

"Ritually condemning Burma in annual General Assembly resolutions is no
longer enough," said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights
Watch. "The UN needs to raise the price for continuing abuses by starting
to investigate them."

In support of Quintana's call, the European Parliament on May 20 passed a
resolution on Burma calling on the EU High Representative and member
states to publicly support the UN's establishment of a Commission of
Inquiry on Burma and to include this request in the General Assembly's
draft resolution on Burma at the upcoming session.

Some EU member states, as well as the government of Australia, have
already publicly pledged their support for an international commission for
Burma.

The June 2010 Kampala Declaration resulting from the Review Conference of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), reiterated the
commitment of 111 ICC member states "to put an end to impunity for
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern." EU
states, which are all members of the ICC, should demonstrate that
commitment by taking a leading role in pushing for the establishment of an
international commission of inquiry to investigate abuses by all parties
amounting to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity in Burma,
Human Rights Watch said.

For years UN special mechanisms, Human Rights Watch, and others have
documented and publicly reported on serious, widespread, and systemic
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Burma.
There have been 19 resolutions on Burma in the UN General Assembly alone
since 1992.

Human Rights Watch also released today an extensive Q & A that addresses
various issues relating to accountability for crimes in violation of
international law in Burma.

"Continuing business as usual in Burma will only embolden rights abusers"
Roth said. "Establishing an international Commission of Inquiry would be
an important first step towards bringing abusers to justice and ending
impunity in Burma."

____________________________________

August 11, Canadian Friends of Burma and Burma Campaign UK
Canada under increased pressure to support UN inquiry into war rimes

Canadian Friends of Burma and Burma Campaign UK have joined forces to call
on the Canadian government to support a UN Commission of Inquiry into war
crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma.

For many years the United Nations has been documenting horrific human
rights abuses which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.
These include the deliberate targeting of civilians, with more than 3,500
villages in Eastern Burma destroyed in the past 15 years, the systematic
use of rape as a weapon of war, torture and mutilations, arbitrary
executions and slave labour.

In a groundbreaking report in March this year, the Special Rapporteur on
Burma stated that the ‘gross and systematic’ nature of the abuses and the
lack of action to stop them indicated; ‘a state policy that involves
authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels.’ He
also stated; ‘According to consistent reports, the possibility exists that
some of these human rights violations may entail categories of crimes
against humanity or war crimes under the terms of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court.’ ... ‘UN institutions may consider the
possibility to establish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact
finding mandate to address the question of international crimes.’

Canada has traditionally taken the lead in supporting accountability and
respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. It has also
been a strong supporter of promoting human rights and democracy in Burma.
However, five months has passed since the report by the Special
Rapporteur, and Canada has failed to publicly state that it supports a UN
inquiry.

Seventy-three Canadian MPs and Senators (see the list at:
http://www.cfob.org/news/PFOBandCFOBurgeGovToSupportCoIonBurma.html) have
called on the government to support an Inquiry. More than three thousand
people have emailed the Canadian government in the past week alone, also
calling on Canada to support an inquiry.

“The Government of Canada, especially Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence
Cannon, should respond to this important call. For Canada, this is another
practical step to take action against the repressive regime in Burma,”
said Tin Maung Htoo, Executive Director of Canadian Friends of Burma.

“The campaign to persuade Canada to support a UN Commission of Inquiry is
now going global,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK. “It
is very surprising Canada has not publicly stated that it supports the
recommendation of the Special Rapporteur for a Commission of Inquiry. We
need as many countries as possible on the record with their support.
Canada’s silence will encourage the dictatorship that they can continue to
get away with their crimes.”

So far Australia, the UK, Czech Republic and Slovakia have expressed
support for a UN Commission of Inquiry.

For more information contact Tin Maung Htoo on (613) 297-6835, and Mark
Farmaner on 44(0)7941239640