[From nobody Thu Oct 9 14:26:45 2008 Return-Path: <globalnet@mindspring.com> Received: from rly-da06.mx.aol.com (rly-da06.mail.aol.com [172.19.129.80]) by air-da03.mail.aol.com (v121_r3.13) with ESMTP id MAILINDA032-a7148ee2e0c3a6; Thu, 09 Oct 2008 12:15:57 -0400 Received: from elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net (elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net [209.86.89.66]) by rly-da06.mx.aol.com (v121_r3.13) with ESMTP id MAILRELAYINDA061-a7148ee2e0c3a6; Thu, 09 Oct 2008 12:15:10 -0400 DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=dk20050327; d=mindspring.com; b=BjfNH3+5x1vtMRlpzno88sI3SarpUoOf7JkKGMA53KbekMcsDHST/a0T4rOPi2OH; h=Received:Message-ID:Reply-To:From:To:Subject:Date:MIME-Version:Content-Type:X-Priority:X-MSMail-Priority:X-Mailer:X-MimeOLE:X-ELNK-Trace:X-Originating-IP; Received: from [68.238.50.58] (helo=deskone) by elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.67) (envelope-from <globalnet@mindspring.com>) id 1Kny6D-0005UH-7p; Thu, 09 Oct 2008 12:10:50 -0400 Message-ID: <07FAA4D741E9459FAAE39AED2F4C3683@deskone> Reply-To: "Global Network" <globalnet@mindspring.com> From: "Global Network" <globalnet@mindspring.com> To: "GN List Serve" <globenet@yahoogroups.com> Subject: Wolfowitz Back and Planning War with China Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2008 12:07:54 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="multipart/alternative"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0015_01C92A07.AA0239A0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.5512 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.5579 X-ELNK-Trace: abf9e2eba570b8e601c17f49696497b440683398e744b8a465ab56b2285aaf5a0d7eaf699f3a279f350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c350badd9bab72f9c X-Originating-IP: 68.238.50.58 X-AOL-IP: 209.86.89.66 X-AOL-SCOLL-AUTHENTICATION: domain : elasmtp-spurfowl.atl.sa.earthlink.net ; SPF_helo = n X-AOL-SCOLL-AUTHENTICATION: domain : mindspring.com ; SPF_822_from = n ------=_NextPart_000_0015_01C92A07.AA0239A0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0016_01C92A07.AA04AAA0" ------=_NextPart_001_0016_01C92A07.AA04AAA0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable State Department Arms Control Board Declares Cold War on China http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/10/isab.php =20 After planning the war against Iraq, former Assistant Secretary of Def= ense Paul Wolfowitz now heads the State Department's International Security=20= Advisory Board that recommends a Cold War against China.=20 By Hans M. Kristensen A report from an advisory board to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has r= ecommended that the United States beefs up its nuclear, conventional, and sp= ace-based posture in the Pacific to counter China. The report, which was first described in the Washington Times, portrays Chin= a's military modernization and intentions in highly dramatic terms that appe= ar go beyond the assessments published so far by the Defense Department and=20= the intelligence community. Although the Secretary of State asked for recommendations to move US-Chinese= relations away from competition and conflict toward greater transparency, m= utual confidence and enhanced cooperation, the board instead has produced a=20= report that appears to recommend policies that would increase and deepen mil= itary competition and in essence constitute a small Cold War with China. China's "Creeping" Nuclear Doctrine Although the report China's Strategic Modernization - written by the Interna= tional Security Advisory Board (ISAB) - deals with China's overall military=20= modernization, its focus is clearly on nuclear forces. What underpins China'= s expansion of its offensive nuclear capabilities, the report says, is an "e= merging creep toward a Chinese assured destruction capability" to create a "= mutual vulnerability relationship" with the United States. The objective is, an interpretation the authors say is supported by "numerou= s Chinese military statements," for Beijing to get enough nuclear capability= "to subject the United States to coercive nuclear threats to limit potentia= l US intervention in a regional conflict" over Taiwan and oilfields in the S= outh China Sea. Yet "assured destruction," to the extent that means confidence in a retaliat= ory capability against the United States and Russia, has been Chinese nuclea= r policy for decades. Increasing US and Russian nuclear capabilities, howeve= r, convinced Chinese planners that their deterrent might not survive. The cu= rrent deployment of three long-range ballistic missile versions of the mobil= e DF-31 is supposed to restore the survivability of their strategic deterren= t. The "mutual vulnerability relationship" the authors say China is trying to c= reate to deter the United States from defending Taiwan or limit US escalatio= n options is a curious argument because it implies that the United States ha= s not been vulnerable to Chinese nuclear threats in the past. In fact, US ba= ses and allies in the Western Pacific have been vulnerable to Chinese attack= s since the 1970s and the Continental United States since the early 1980s. It is tempting to read the authors' use of the terms "assured destruction" a= nd "mutual vulnerability relationship" as borrowed components of "mutual ass= ured destruction," or MAD, the term for the nuclear relationship that existe= d between the United States and the Soviet Union during much of the Cold War= . But in responding to China's nuclear modernization and policy, it is very im= portant not to resort to Cold War-like worst-case analysis. To that end, two= of the best analyzes on Chinese nuclear policy are Iain Johnston's China's=20= New 'Old Thinking:' The Concept of Limited Deterrence, and Michael S. Chase=20= and Evan Medeiros' China's Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and Doct= rinal Debate. The ISAB members should read them. Misperceptions or Just Out of Touch The report contains several claims about Chinese nuclear forces and recommen= dations for counter-steps that appear out of sync with what the US intellige= nce community has stated and steps that the US has already taken. Some of th= e most noteworthy are listed below followed by my remarks: * "By 2015, China is projected to have in excess of 100 nuclear-armed missil= es.that could strike the United States." Actually, the projection the intell= igence community has made in public is for 60 ICBMs by 2010 and "about 75 to= 100 warheads deployed primarily against the United States" by 2015. The ISA= B report talks about targeting of the US "homeland." If that includes Guam,=20= then the force could reach a little above 100 by 2015 (it's about 70 today).= If "homeland" means the Continental United States, which has been the focus= of the intelligence community's projection, then a force carrying 75-100 wa= rheads would likely include 20 DF-5As and 40-55 DF-31A. China so far is thou= ght to have deployed fewer than 10 DF-31As. * Some of the missiles "may be MIRVed" by 2015. What the intelligence commun= ity has said is that China has had the capability to MIRV its silo-based mis= siles for years but has not yet done so. MIRV on the mobile missiles, howeve= r, represents significant technical hurdles and "would be many years off," a= ccording to the CIA, and "would probably require nuclear testing to get some= thing that small." Instead, if Chinese planners determine that the US missil= e defense system would degrade the effectiveness of the Chinese force, they=20= "could use a DF-31 type RV for a multiple-RV payload for the CSS-4 in a few=20= years," the CIA stated in 2002. Even so, a multiple-RV payload is not necess= arily the same as MIRV. * China's "substantial expansion" of its nuclear posture "includes developme= nt and deployment of.tactical nuclear arms, encompassing enhanced radiation=20= weapons, nuclear artillery, and anti-ship missiles." That would certainly be= news if it were true, but the intelligence community hasn't talked much abo= ut Chinese tactical nuclear weapons and what it has said has been contradict= ory, ranging from China might have some to "there is no evidence" that they=20= have any. Several of China's tests reportedly involved enhanced radiation or= tactical warhead designs, but whether China is working on fielding tactical= nuclear weapons has not been confirmed. China did conduct what appeared to=20= be operational tests of tactical bombs in the past, which they might have fi= elded, but ISAB does not mention bombs. * China's modernization includes "a growing capability for Conventional Prec= ision Strike and other anti-access/area-denial capabilities" including "subm= arine-launched ballistic missiles." That China would use nuclear missiles on= its future strategic submarines for "anti-access/area-denial" capabilities=20= is news to me and would, if it were true, represent a dramatic change in Chi= nese nuclear policy. But I haven't seen anything that suggests its true, and= the overwhelming expectation is that China will use its SSBNs as a retaliat= ory strike force, if and when they manage to operationalize it. * The US "should reaffirm its formal security guarantees to allies, includin= g the nuclear umbrella." The US does that regularly when it extends the secu= rity agreement with South Korea and Japan. In addition, in response to the N= orth Korean nuclear test in October 2006, President Bush reaffirmed that "Th= e United States will meet the full range of our deterrent and security commi= tments." One week later, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Toky= o where she emphasized the nuclear component by saying that "the United Stat= es has the will and the capability to meet the full range - and I underscore= full range - of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan." * The US should "pursue new missile defense capabilities, including taking f= ull advantage of space," to counter China's growing nuclear capability. For=20= a State Department advisory committee to recommend using missile defenses to= counter Chinese nuclear missiles is, to say the least, interesting given th= at the State Department has publicly stated and assured the Chinese that the= missile defense system "it is not directed against China." * The US should "publicly reaffirm its commitment to retain a forward-based=20= US military presence in East Asia." The US has actually done that quite expl= icitly over the past seven years by shifting the majority of its aircraft ca= rrier battle groups and nuclear attack submarines to bases in the Pacific, b= y beginning to forward deploy nuclear attack submarines to Guam, by sending=20= strategic B-2 and B-52 bombers on extended deployments to Guam, and by forwa= rd deploying the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN= -75) to Japan. The Pentagon describes the recent Valiant Shield exercises as= "the largest Pacific exercise since the Vietnam War." . * "For almost two decades, the United States has allowed its nuclear posture= - its stockpile, infrastructure, and expertise - to deteriorate and atrophy= across the board." Although the stockpile is much smaller compared with the= Cold War and industrial-scale production of new nuclear warheads has ceased= , ISAB's characterization of the US nuclear posture is way off. Instead, during the nearly two decades the authors describe (assuming that m= eans since 1990), the US has deployed eight new SSBNs, deployed 336 Trident=20= II D-5 SLBM on its entire SSBN fleet, deployed 21 B-2 stealth bombers, deplo= yed the Advanced Cruise Missile, deployed the hard-target kill W88 warhead (= including in the Pacific), deployed three modified nuclear weapons (B61-10,=20= B61-11 and W76-1), completely overhauled the Minuteman III ICBM force, deplo= yed two new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of launchin= g nuclear cruise missiles, deployed a modern nuclear command and control sys= tem with new satellites and command centers, modernized the Strategic War Pl= anning System (now called ISPAN), created a "living SIOP" strategic nuclear=20= war plan with broadened targeting against China and new strike options again= st regional adversaries, and built a multi-billion dollar Science Based Stoc= kpile Stewardship Program to certify the reliability of the nuclear stockpil= e without nuclear testing and provide weapons designers with unprecedented k= nowledge about warhead aging and the skills and tools to refurbish existing=20= warheads or build modified ones. Where Are The Non-Military Policy Recommendations? One of the most striking features of the report is its almost complete focus= on military options and the absence of other policy components. It contains= no analysis of or recommendations for how to engage China on nuclear arms c= ontrol or confidence building measures to limit or influence the nuclear mod= ernization, operations and policy. It is almost as if there must be another=20= unknown chapter to the report. Although the authors believe there are a number of measures the US should ta= ke to reduce the prospect for misunderstanding and the chance of miscalculat= ion, those recommendations are few and limited to continuing existing Track=20= II discussions, military-to-military contacts, and asking the Chinese to be=20= more transparent. The report concludes that China does not desire a conflict with the United S= tates, and describes a disconnect between the political and military leaders= hip, and a "clear paranoia and misperceptions about US intentions.." Without= presenting any analysis, it concludes that the US ability to shape or chang= e Chinese choices related to its strategic modernization may be "very constr= ained" and that there is no point in trying to "educate" the Chinese. On the contrary, the report concludes that the US should "reject" Chinese ar= ms control proposals because they will constrain US military freedom. And US= arms transfer to allied countries in the region "should be an important dim= ension of US non-proliferation policy." Indeed, the "most important" policy=20= recommendation is for the United States to "demonstrate its resolve to remai= n militarily strong.." And in a recommendation blatantly "imported" from the Cold War, the authors=20= say the US should "focus" its research and development on "high technology m= ilitary capabilities" that China doesn't have to "demonstrate to Beijing tha= t trying to get ahead of the United States is futile (much the way SDI did a= gainst the Soviet Union." The report essentially capitulates on non-military policy options toward Chi= na. So What Exactly Was ISAB Asked To Do? The advisory board was asked to come up with ideas that could "move the US-C= hina security relationship toward greater transparency and mutual confidence= , enhance cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or misc= alculation that can contribute to competition or conflict." That's a quote! Instead, the authors appear to have produced a paper that would - if impleme= nted - likely move the US-Chinese security relationship in the opposite dire= ction by deepening military competition and mistrust. Indeed, the review looks more like the kind one would expect from the Pentag= on rather than the State Department, which is supposed to pursue a wider set= of policies and different agenda than the military. It is all the more stri= king given that the charter for ISAB - which used to be called the Arms Cont= rol and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB) - describes that the board i= s supposed to "advise with and make recommendations to the Secretary of Stat= e on United States arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies=20= and activities." The Secretary's hope has been for ISAB to provide "independent insight, advi= ce, and innovation," and serve as "a single advisory board, dealing with sci= entific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of ar= ms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation, would= provide valuable independent insight and advice.." Concluding Remarks The militaristic focus of ISAB's report and its lack of recommendations for=20= arms control and broader public diplomacy to defuse rather than continuing a= nd deepening the competitive and mistrustful relationship between the United= States and China suggest that ISAB has failed to live up to its charter. No matter what one might think of China's military modernization, the ISAB a= ppears instead to have drawn up a very effective plan for a Cold War with Ch= ina. Although the authors correctly state up front that the US-Chinese relationsh= ip "differs fundamentally from the US-Soviet relationship and the strategic=20= rivalry of the Cold War," they nonetheless land on a set of recommendations=20= and observations that strongly resemble a China-version of the Reagan admini= stration's aggressive military posture against the Soviet Union. If implemented or allowed to color US policy toward China, the policy recomm= endations would continue and very likely lead to a deepening of military com= petition and adversarial relationship between the United States and China -=20= exactly the opposite of what the Board was asked to come up with. It is prec= isely reports like this that create the "deep paranoia and misperceptions ab= out US intentions" in the Chinese military. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should denounce the ISAB report to make=20= it clear that the core of US policy toward China is not containment and Cold= War posturing. And one of the first acts of the next Secretary should be to= appoint a new advisory board that can - and will - develop recommendations=20= that can "move the US-China security relationship toward greater transparenc= y and mutual confidence, enhance cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of m= isunderstanding or miscalculation that can contribute to competition or conf= lict." Mission not accomplished! Background Information: ISAB Report: China's Strategic Modernization | Chine= se Nuclear Forces 2008 | US Nuclear Forces 2008 | FAS/NRDC Report: Chinese N= uclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning ----------------------------------------------------------------------------= --------------------------------------------------------- Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space PO Box 652 Brunswick, ME 04011 (207) 443-9502 http://www.space4peace.org globalnet@mindspring.com http://space4peace.blogspot.com (Blog) ------=_NextPart_001_0016_01C92A07.AA04AAA0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> <HTML><HEAD> <META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1"> <META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.6000.16705" name=3DGENERATOR> <STYLE></STYLE> </HEAD> <BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial> <P id=3DBlogTitle><STRONG><FONT size=3D5>State Department Arms Control Board= =20 Declares Cold War on China</FONT></STRONG></P> <P id=3DBlogDate><A href=3D"http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/10/isab.php">= http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/10/isab.php</A></P> <DIV id=3DBlogContent> <P align=3Dleft> <TABLE style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: #ffffff 10px solid; PADDING-RIGHT: 0pt; BORD= ER-TOP: #ffffff 10px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 0pt; FLOAT: left; PADDING-BOTTOM:=20= 0pt; BORDER-LEFT: #ffffff 10px solid; PADDING-TOP: 0pt; BORDER-BOTTOM: #ffff= ff 10px solid" cellSpacing=3D0 cellPadding=3D0 width=3D225 border=3D0> <TBODY> <TR> <TD style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: #999999 1px solid; BORDER-TOP: #999999=20= 1px solid; BORDER-LEFT: #999999 1px solid"><IMG alt=3D"" src=3D"http= ://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/_images/wolfowitz.jpg" width=3D225= border=3D0></TD></TR> <TR> <TD style=3D"BORDER-RIGHT: #999999 1px solid; PADDING-RIGHT: 5px;=20= PADDING-LEFT: 5px; PADDING-BOTTOM: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #999999 1px solid; PADD= ING-TOP: 5px; BORDER-BOTTOM: #999999 1px solid" width=3D450><SPAN =20= style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 8pt; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: Arial">After=20 planning the war against Iraq, former Assistant Secretary of Defense P= aul=20 Wolfowitz now heads the State Department=92s International Security Ad= visory=20 Board that recommends a Cold War against China.</SPAN></TD></TR></TBOD= Y></TABLE> <P>By Hans M. Kristensen</P> <P>A report from an advisory board to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ha= s=20 recommended that the United States beefs up its nuclear, conventional, and=20 space-based posture in the Pacific to counter China.</P> <P>The report, which was first <A href=3D"http://www.washingtontimes.com/n= ews/2008/oct/01/new-us-defenses-sought-to-counter-beijing-buildup/" target= =3D_blank>described</A> in the <EM>Washington Times</EM>, portrays China=92s= =20 military modernization and intentions in highly dramatic terms that appear g= o=20 beyond the assessments published so far by the Defense Department and the=20 intelligence community.</P> <P>Although the Secretary of State asked for recommendations to move US-Chin= ese=20 relations away from competition and conflict toward greater transparency, mu= tual=20 confidence and enhanced cooperation, the board instead has produced a report= =20 that appears to recommend policies that would increase and deepen military=20 competition and in essence constitute a small Cold War with=20 China.<!--more--></P> <P><STRONG>China=92s =93Creeping=94 Nuclear Doctrine</STRONG></P> <P>Although the report <A href=3D"http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ISAB= 2008.pdf" target=3D_blank>China=92s=20 Strategic Modernization</A> - written by the International Security Advisory= =20 Board (ISAB) - deals with China=92s overall military modernization, its focu= s is=20 clearly on nuclear forces. What underpins China=92s expansion of its offensi= ve=20 nuclear capabilities, the report says, is an =93emerging creep toward a Chin= ese=20 assured destruction capability=94 to create a =93mutual vulnerability relati= onship=94=20 with the United States.</P> <P>The objective is, an interpretation the authors say is supported by =93nu= merous=20 Chinese military statements,=94 for Beijing to get enough nuclear capability= =93to=20 subject the United States to coercive nuclear threats to limit potential US=20 intervention in a regional conflict=94 over Taiwan and oilfields in the Sout= h=20 China Sea.</P> <P>Yet =93assured destruction,=94 to the extent that means confidence in a=20 retaliatory capability against the United States and Russia, has been Chines= e=20 nuclear policy for decades. Increasing US and Russian nuclear capabilities,=20 however, convinced Chinese planners that their deterrent might not survive.=20= The=20 current deployment of three long-range ballistic missile versions of the mob= ile=20 DF-31 is supposed to restore the survivability of their strategic deterrent.= </P> <P>The =93mutual vulnerability relationship=94 the authors say China is tryi= ng to=20 create to deter the United States from defending Taiwan or limit US escalati= on=20 options is a curious argument because it implies that the United States has=20= not=20 been vulnerable to Chinese nuclear threats in the past. In fact, US bases an= d=20 allies in the Western Pacific have been vulnerable to Chinese attacks since=20= the=20 1970s and the Continental United States since the early 1980s.</P> <P>It is tempting to read the authors=92 use of the terms =93assured destruc= tion=94=20 and =93mutual vulnerability relationship=94 as borrowed components of =93mut= ual=20 assured destruction,=94 or MAD, the term for the nuclear relationship that e= xisted=20 between the United States and the Soviet Union during much of the Cold War.<= /P> <P>But in responding to China=92s nuclear modernization and policy, it is ve= ry=20 important not to resort to Cold War-like worst-case analysis. To that end, t= wo=20 of the best analyzes on Chinese nuclear policy are Iain Johnston=92s <EM>Chi= na=92s=20 New =91Old Thinking:=92 The Concept of Limited Deterrence</EM>, and Michael=20= S. Chase=20 and Evan Medeiros=92 <EM>China=92s Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization=20= and=20 Doctrinal Debate</EM>. The ISAB members should read them.</P> <P><STRONG>Misperceptions or Just Out of Touch</STRONG></P> <P>The report contains several claims about Chinese nuclear forces and=20 recommendations for counter-steps that appear out of sync with what the US=20 intelligence community has stated and steps that the US has already taken. S= ome=20 of the most noteworthy are listed below followed by my remarks:</P> <P><STRONG>* =93By 2015, China is projected to have in excess of 100 nuclear= -armed=20 missiles=85that could strike the United States.=94</STRONG> Actually, the pr= ojection=20 the intelligence community has made in public is for 60 ICBMs by 2010 and=20= =93about=20 75 to 100 warheads deployed primarily against the United States=94 by 2015.=20= The=20 ISAB report talks about targeting of the US =93homeland.=94 If that includes= Guam,=20 then the force could reach a little above 100 by 2015 (it=92s about 70 today= ). If=20 =93homeland=94 means the Continental United States, which has been the focus= of the=20 intelligence community=92s projection, then a force carrying 75-100 warheads= would=20 likely include 20 DF-5As and 40-55 DF-31A. China so far is thought to have=20 deployed fewer than 10 DF-31As.</P> <P><STRONG>* Some of the missiles =93may be MIRVed=94 by 2015.</STRONG> What= the=20 intelligence community has said is that China has had the capability to MIRV= its=20 silo-based missiles for years but has not yet done so. MIRV on the mobile=20 missiles, however, represents significant technical hurdles and =93would be=20= many=20 years off,=94 according to the CIA, and =93would probably require nuclear te= sting to=20 get something that small.=94 Instead, if Chinese planners determine that the= US=20 missile defense system would degrade the effectiveness of the Chinese force,= =20 they =93could use a DF-31 type RV for a multiple-RV payload for the CSS-4 in= a few=20 years,=94 the CIA stated in 2002. Even so, a multiple-RV payload is not=20 necessarily the same as MIRV.</P> <P><STRONG>* China=92s =93substantial expansion=94 of its nuclear posture=20= =93includes=20 development and deployment of=85tactical nuclear arms, encompassing enhanced= =20 radiation weapons, nuclear artillery, and anti-ship missiles.=94</STRONG> Th= at=20 would certainly be news if it were true, but the intelligence community hasn= =92t=20 talked much about Chinese tactical nuclear weapons and what it has said has=20= been=20 contradictory, ranging from China might have some to =93there is no evidence= =94 that=20 they have any. Several of China=92s tests reportedly involved enhanced radia= tion=20 or tactical warhead designs, but whether China is working on fielding tactic= al=20 nuclear weapons has not been confirmed. China did conduct what appeared to b= e=20 operational tests of tactical bombs in the past, which they might have field= ed,=20 but ISAB does not mention bombs.</P> <P><STRONG>* China=92s modernization includes =93a growing capability for=20 Conventional Precision Strike and other anti-access/area-denial capabilities= =94=20 including =93submarine-launched ballistic missiles.=94</STRONG> That China w= ould use=20 nuclear missiles on its future strategic submarines for=20 =93anti-access/area-denial=94 capabilities is news to me and would, if it we= re true,=20 represent a dramatic change in Chinese nuclear policy. But I haven=92t seen=20 anything that suggests its true, and the overwhelming expectation is that Ch= ina=20 will use its SSBNs as a retaliatory strike force, if and when they manage to= =20 operationalize it.</P> <P><STRONG>* The US =93should reaffirm its formal security guarantees to all= ies,=20 including the nuclear umbrella.=94</STRONG> The US does that regularly when=20= it=20 extends the security agreement with South Korea and Japan. In addition, in=20 response to the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, President Bush <A= href=3D"http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/10/reaffirming_the_nuclear_umbre= l.php" target=3D_blank>reaffirmed</A> that =93The United States will meet=20= the full range of=20 our deterrent and security commitments.=94 One week later, Secretary of Stat= e=20 Condoleezza Rice arrived in Tokyo where she emphasized the nuclear component= by=20 saying that =93the United States has the will and the capability to meet the= full=20 range - and I underscore full range - of its deterrent and security commitme= nts=20 to Japan.=94</P> <P><STRONG>* The US should =93pursue new missile defense capabilities, inclu= ding=20 taking full advantage of space,=94 to counter China=92s growing nuclear=20 capability.</STRONG> For a State Department advisory committee to recommend=20 using missile defenses to counter Chinese nuclear missiles is, to say the le= ast,=20 interesting given that the State Department has publicly <A href=3D"http:/= /www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/6879.htm" target=3D_blank>stated and=20 assured</A> the Chinese that the missile defense system =93it is not directe= d=20 against China.=94</P> <P><STRONG>* The US should =93publicly reaffirm its commitment to retain a=20 forward-based US military presence in East Asia.=94</STRONG> The US has actu= ally=20 done that quite explicitly over the past seven years by shifting the majorit= y of=20 its aircraft carrier battle groups and nuclear attack submarines to bases in= the=20 Pacific, by beginning to forward deploy nuclear attack submarines to Guam, b= y=20 sending strategic B-2 and B-52 bombers on extended deployments to Guam, and=20= by=20 forward deploying the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington= =20 (CVN-75) to Japan. The Pentagon describes the recent Valiant Shield exercise= s as=20 =93the largest Pacific exercise since the Vietnam War.=94</P> <P><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: xx-small; COLOR: #ffffff; FONT-FAMILY: Arial"= >.</SPAN><BR><STRONG>*=20 =93For almost two decades, the United States has allowed its nuclear posture= =96 its=20 stockpile, infrastructure, and expertise =96 to deteriorate and atrophy acro= ss the=20 board.=94</STRONG> Although the stockpile is much smaller compared with the=20= Cold=20 War and industrial-scale production of new nuclear warheads has ceased, ISAB= =92s=20 characterization of the US nuclear posture is way off.</P> <P>Instead, during the nearly two decades the authors describe (assuming tha= t=20 means since 1990), the US has deployed eight new SSBNs, deployed 336 Trident= II=20 D-5 SLBM on its entire SSBN fleet, deployed 21 B-2 stealth bombers, deployed= the=20 Advanced Cruise Missile, deployed the hard-target kill W88 warhead (includin= g in=20 the Pacific), deployed three modified nuclear weapons (B61-10, B61-11 and=20 W76-1), completely overhauled the Minuteman III ICBM force, deployed two new= =20 classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of launching nuclear cr= uise=20 missiles, deployed a modern nuclear command and control system with new=20 satellites and command centers, modernized the Strategic War Planning System= =20 (now called ISPAN), created a =93living SIOP=94 strategic nuclear war plan w= ith=20 broadened targeting against China and new strike options against regional=20 adversaries, and built a multi-billion dollar Science Based Stockpile=20 Stewardship Program to certify the reliability of the nuclear stockpile with= out=20 nuclear testing and provide weapons designers with unprecedented knowledge a= bout=20 warhead aging and the skills and tools to refurbish existing warheads or bui= ld=20 modified ones.</P> <P><STRONG>Where Are The Non-Military Policy Recommendations?</STRONG></P> <P>One of the most striking features of the report is its almost complete fo= cus=20 on military options and the absence of other policy components. It contains=20= no=20 analysis of or recommendations for how to engage China on nuclear arms contr= ol=20 or confidence building measures to limit or influence the nuclear modernizat= ion,=20 operations and policy. It is almost as if there must be another unknown chap= ter=20 to the report.</P> <P>Although the authors believe there are a number of measures the US should= =20 take to reduce the prospect for misunderstanding and the chance of=20 miscalculation, those recommendations are few and limited to continuing exis= ting=20 Track II discussions, military-to-military contacts, and asking the Chinese=20= to=20 be more transparent.</P> <P>The report concludes that China does not desire a conflict with the Unite= d=20 States, and describes a disconnect between the political and military=20 leadership, and a =93clear paranoia and misperceptions about US intentions= =85.=94=20 Without presenting any analysis, it concludes that the US ability to shape o= r=20 change Chinese choices related to its strategic modernization may be =93very= =20 constrained=94 and that there is no point in trying to =93educate=94 the Chi= nese.</P> <P>On the contrary, the report concludes that the US should =93reject=94 Chi= nese=20 arms control proposals because they will constrain US military freedom. And=20= US=20 arms transfer to allied countries in the region =93should be an important=20 dimension of US non-proliferation policy.=94 Indeed, the =93most important= =94 policy=20 recommendation is for the United States to =93demonstrate its resolve to rem= ain=20 militarily strong=85.=94</P> <P>And in a recommendation blatantly =93imported=94 from the Cold War, the a= uthors=20 say the US should =93focus=94 its research and development on =93high techno= logy=20 military capabilities=94 that China doesn=92t have to =93demonstrate to Beij= ing that=20 trying to get ahead of the United States is futile (much the way SDI did aga= inst=20 the Soviet Union.=94</P> <P>The report essentially capitulates on non-military policy options toward=20 China.</P> <P><STRONG>So What Exactly Was ISAB Asked To Do?</STRONG></P> <P>The advisory board was asked to come up with ideas that could =93move the= =20 US-China security relationship toward greater transparency and mutual=20 confidence, enhance cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of misunderstandi= ng=20 or miscalculation that can contribute to competition or conflict.=94 That= =92s a=20 quote!</P> <P>Instead, the authors appear to have produced a paper that would - if=20 implemented - likely move the US-Chinese security relationship in the opposi= te=20 direction by deepening military competition and mistrust.</P> <P>Indeed, the review looks more like the kind one would expect from the=20 Pentagon rather than the State Department, which is supposed to pursue a wid= er=20 set of policies and different agenda than the military. It is all the more=20 striking given that the <A href=3D"http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza= tion/76604.pdf" target=3D_blank>charter</A> for ISAB - which used to be ca= lled the Arms Control=20 and Nonproliferation Advisory Board (ACNAB) - describes that the board is=20 supposed to =93advise with and make recommendations to the Secretary of Stat= e on=20 United States arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies and=20 activities.=94</P> <P>The Secretary=92s hope has been for ISAB to provide =93independent insigh= t,=20 advice, and innovation,=94 and serve as =93a single advisory board, dealing=20= with=20 scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of= =20 arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation, wou= ld=20 provide valuable independent insight and advice=85.=94</P> <P><STRONG>Concluding Remarks</STRONG></P> <P>The militaristic focus of ISAB=92s report and its lack of recommendations= for=20 arms control and broader public diplomacy to defuse rather than continuing a= nd=20 deepening the competitive and mistrustful relationship between the United St= ates=20 and China suggest that ISAB has failed to live up to its charter.</P> <P>No matter what one might think of China=92s military modernization, the I= SAB=20 appears instead to have drawn up a very effective plan for a Cold War with=20 China.</P> <P>Although the authors correctly state up front that the US-Chinese=20 relationship =93differs fundamentally from the US-Soviet relationship and th= e=20 strategic rivalry of the Cold War,=94 they nonetheless land on a set of=20 recommendations and observations that strongly resemble a China-version of t= he=20 Reagan administration=92s aggressive military posture against the Soviet=20 Union.</P> <P>If implemented or allowed to color US policy toward China, the policy=20 recommendations would continue and very likely lead to a deepening of milita= ry=20 competition and adversarial relationship between the United States and China= =96=20 exactly the opposite of what the Board was asked to come up with. It is=20 precisely reports like this that create the =93deep paranoia and mispercepti= ons=20 about US intentions=94 in the Chinese military.</P> <P>Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should denounce the ISAB report to ma= ke=20 it clear that the core of US policy toward China is not containment and Cold= War=20 posturing. And one of the first acts of the next Secretary should be to appo= int=20 a new advisory board that can - and will - develop recommendations that can=20 =93move the US-China security relationship toward greater transparency and m= utual=20 confidence, enhance cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of misunderstandi= ng=20 or miscalculation that can contribute to competition or conflict.=94 Mission= not=20 accomplished!</P> <P>Background Information: <A href=3D"http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/= ISAB2008.pdf" target=3D_blank>ISAB=20 Report: China=92s Strategic Modernization</A> | <A href=3D"http://thebulle= tin.metapress.com/content/25094v7235832574/fulltext.pdf" target=3D_blank>C= hinese Nuclear Forces 2008</A> | <A href=3D"http://thebulletin.metapress.c= om/content/pr53n270241156n6/fulltext.pdf" target=3D_blank>US Nuclear Force= s 2008</A> | <A href=3D"http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf"=20= target=3D_blank>FAS/NRDC=20 Report: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War=20 Planning</A></P></DIV></FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial>--------------------------------------------------= ----------------------------------------------------------------------------= -------</FONT></DIV> <DIV><FONT face=3DArial>Global Network Against Weapons &amp; Nuclear Power i= n=20 Space<BR>PO Box 652<BR>Brunswick, ME 04011<BR>(207) 443-9502<BR><A href= =3D"http://www.space4peace.org">http://www.space4peace.org</A><BR><A href= =3D"mailto:globalnet@mindspring.com">globalnet@mindspring.com</A><BR><A hr= ef=3D"http://space4peace.blogspot.com">http://space4peace.blogspot.com</A>=20 (Blog)<BR></DIV></FONT></BODY></HTML> ------=_NextPart_001_0016_01C92A07.AA04AAA0-- ------=_NextPart_000_0015_01C92A07.AA0239A0 Content-Type: image/jpeg; name="wolfowitz.jpg" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/_images/wolfowitz.jpg /9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQEAqACoAAD/2wBDAA0JCQoKCg4LCw4UDQsNFBcRDg4RFxsVFRUVFRsb 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